Anthropology and NGO Leadership and Development, Northern Illinois University Faculté d’Ethnologie, l’Université d’Etat d’Haïti
November 16, 2012
Striking Haiti on its way to the United States’ eastern seaboard in late October, Hurricane Sandy exposed the precariousness of the estimated 370,000 people still living under tents almost three years after the devastating earthquake.
Yet the population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) peaked at 1.5 million. As a report from the US State Department pointed out, the current IDP population is estimated at 25% of this total. Much has been said about the efforts of the international community to rehouse this vulnerable population, particularly President Michel Martelly’s “16/6” program and the NGO programs that have followed.
With all the international aid going into Haiti, what are the results? How are Haitian people benefiting? What worked and what did not? Has relocation out of camps in Haiti been a success? Are people living better after leaving the camps? How do we know?
There is little information publicly available to evaluate people’s current living situation after leaving the IDP camps. This report offers a snapshot, showing that the results differ across a range of several indicators.
It was recently reported that work on neighborhood revitalization within 16/6 is about to finally begin. This report clearly shows that this is both welcome and long overdue, since more progress needs to be made in neighborhood revitalization.
Results indicate that where there have been significant public-private partnerships, such as the provision of water and sanitation services, people (all of whom by design are in permanent housing) report better living conditions now than where they were living before January 12, 2010. However other indicators such as economic prospects and security are worse, with some surprising results indicating that people lived better off within the camps than they do now. Families were also split up as a result of many factors including food aid and relocation assistance policies. Almost half of residents report that this may be a permanent change. Some notable findings of the research include:
- 32 % of people now live in a different neighborhood
- 47% live with different people than before the earthquake
- 56% left the camps because of bad conditions; 17% were forced out
- 62% report worse economic activity; the same percent also report making less money now than when living in the camps
- 53% report access to health services was worse now than when living in the camps
- 47% report their access to water is better, 36% worse, than before the earthquake
- 71% report their conditions is better, 21% worse , than before the earthquake
Results show that more progress should be made in neighborhood revitalization. By themselves, rental assistance programs – in which subsidies will be ending beginning in a couple of months – do not address the underlying structural conditions that produced Haiti’s heightened vulnerability to natural events like the 2010 earthquake and the ever-increasing destructiveness of hurricanes, as Sandy dramatically shows.
The January 12, 2010 earthquake triggered a complex humanitarian crisis. At its peak, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in over 1200 camps across the country. A USAID-funded survey of housing evaluated 382,256 Port-au-Prince homes, marking 205,539 green, or habitable (54%), 99,043 yellow, or in need of repair (26%), and 77,674 red, requiring demolition (20%) (BARR 2011).
As of April 2012, the last publicly available data, the Shelter Cluster has reported the construction of 4,843 housing units and repairs to 13,198 nationwide. This amounts to just above 10 percent of the housing surveyed in Port-au-Prince alone.
The 16/6 program was announced by president Michel Martelly in the summer of 2011, an effort to move people out of six priority camps sitting on public plazas (Place Boyer, Place St. Pierre, Aéroport, Maïs Gaté, Canapé Vert, and Stade Sylvio Cator) and revitalize the 16 neighborhoods where presumably these IDPs came from. Relocation from this program began in late 2011, with funding from the World Bank and managed by the International Organization for Migration (Stade Sylvio Cator residents were forced out before the program began and not offered relocation assistance). Given that the vast majority of IDPs at the time had been renters before the earthquake (80.5 percent of the author’s 2011 study and 95 percent of a follow up research in January 2012), the most common housing solution was a rental subsidy of 20,000 Haitian gourdes, or about $500, given to a willing landlord of a structurally sound dwelling.
Since the last of the six camps was relocated, this model was generalized among private NGO actors securing other funding. Each NGO has signature components of their individual program but in general they follow the model established by the IOM.
As of the time of this writing, an estimated 369,000 IDPs are still living in 541 camps of varying size, quality, land tenure, and location. Another study recently released by French NGO Fédération International des ligues des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), collaborating with their Haitian partners, shares many of the same conclusions and recommendations as this present study about the crises in human security (2012).
The author has conducted several research projects in Haiti since the 2010 earthquake, publishing two reports (“Unstable Foundations,” in October 2010 and “Mèt Ko Veye Ko“ in January 2011) based on a random sample of 108 IDP camps in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. The first report focused on a range of additional indicators, including condition of the tents, and levels of communication, but the second report focused solely on water and sanitation (WASH) indicators because of the cholera epidemic. For example in July/August 2010 30.3 percent of camps were without a toilet and 40.5 percent were without water. Several independent variables were tested including presence of an NGO camp management agency, municipality, and land tenure, some of which proved statistically significant.
Returning to the same camps in January 2011, the second study showed that the progress in WASH services was minimal overall: 25.8 instead of 30.3 percent of camps were still without a toilet, and 37.6 percent instead of 40.5 percent still lacked water. The progress was concentrated in Cité Soleil; the government WASH agency, DINEPA, had made full coverage in Cité Soleil IDP camps a priority, and they worked with NGOs to meet this goal. On their own, aid agencies only increased WASH services to an additional one percent of camps.
In June 2011 the author began an NSF-funded research project of eight of these IDP camps, employing a purposive sample of four camps with an NGO camp management agency and four without (gender, expressed in a majority of camp committee membership being women, was also attempted as an independent variable but there were too few to choose from). In addition to 791 household interviews and 86 recorded semi-structured interviews with IDPs, research assistants conducted five weeks of participant observation and the author conducted a total of 84 interviews with agency representatives.
Among the findings from this study is that NGO aid altered preexisting kinship and social ties. For example, the mean household size decreased from 5.37 to 3.36. Qualitative interviews with both IDPs and aid agency representatives indicate that a primary motivation for this decrease in Haiti’s multigenerational, matrifocal (mother-centered) kinship structure is the chance for increased aid.
The author has had a formal affiliation with the Faculté d’Ethnologie, l’Université d’Etat d’Haïti since 2003, teaching courses since 2004 and supervising research since 2008. A team of eight research assistants, each of whom had finished their classwork at the Faculté d’Ethnologie, was selected from a group who had completed a research methods seminar conducted by the author in January 2012. Some assistants had experience participating in six field research teams, and half at least two.
This team conducted a week of field research beginning on July 23, in four neighborhoods. Two were popular / low income (Carrefour Feuilles and Fort-National) and two were mixed (Canapé-Vert and Maïs Gaté). Other low-income neighborhoods were initially chosen (e.g., Martissant and Cité Eternelle) but there were too many recent acts of violence, jeopardizing researchers’ and residents’ safety.
On top of questions of safety there are other challenges to conducting research. Haiti, and certainly the earthquake-impacted areas, is one of the most researched in the world and many people are expressing research fatigue. Several aid agencies have conducted monthly censuses of IDP camps, and some individuals expressed an expectation of material aid as a result of participation in a survey.
Research assistants began at a fixed point and fanned outward, interviewing one in every ten domiciles. Researchers filled out a 43-question survey following their oral interview with residents (see appendix). A team leader who had the most field experience accompanied the research assistants for the first interviews and wrote a detailed description of the physical area and infrastructure.
Researchers entered the answers into an Excel spreadsheet, which the author compiled and spot-checked for accuracy. The statistical inferences were conducted by the author based on the completed spreadsheet.
Most people living in the four neighborhoods were currently renting. Of the sample, 122 were homeowners (33.6%). This number is slightly higher than the statistic of people who lived in the camps as of summer 2011 (19.5%), suggesting that homeowners were less likely to leave their home for a camp. Current research data confirms this: landowners were less likely to have left for a camp (62%, compared to 71%). This suggests that renters did not have the access to return to housing units, and had no incentive to repair the units, because these units were not theirs to repair. It is also possible that renters were more vulnerable because of poverty. It is also possible that some used the opportunity to not pay rent. This last hypothesis was more widely promulgated, but it is important to remember the context of the dire living conditions within the camps, certainly the conditions of the shelters (tents and tarps) themselves.
Perhaps not surprisingly, residents of mixed income neighborhoods were more likely to be landowners than the lower income neighborhoods. An average of 41% of residents in Canapé-Vert and 36% in Maïs Gaté were homeowners, compared with 31% in Carrefour-Feuilles and 28% in Post-Marchande.
There are other land tenure arrangements in Haiti such as that the land is rented and the occupant is required to build on this patch of land and consequently make repairs. The survey allowed for comparison between this and renting. Most people in the neighborhoods were either traditional owner occupants or renters, which might be very different in areas like Cité Eternel, Cité Soleil, and the new outgrowth in Kanaran.
Of the 371 people for whom verified information was possible, 262, or 70.6%, had lived in a camp at one point. This statistic may be surprising to some who have consistently argued that people were not really living in camps, only there for aid. It could mean that numerical estimates of people leaving their homes and becoming IDPs might have actually been low, if this is a consistent trend across the many neighborhoods throughout Port-au-Prince. The methodology of the present study could be generalized to see if this statistic holds true across a broader spectrum of neighborhoods.
There is some variation among neighborhoods, between lower-income areas like Post-Marchande (79%) and Carrefour-Feuilles (72%) to more mixed areas such as Maïs Gaté (68%) and Canapé-Vert (65%). This could be because lower-income areas, certainly Post-Marchande, were harder hit, with greater damage to the housing stock. It could also be that IDPs disproportionately went to low-income neighborhoods, either because of stigma attached to being an IDP and fewer landlords elsewhere would rent to them, or because of lower rents with a fixed rental subsidy ($500, and often lower – some NGOs were paying landlords $300).
Potentially offering some information to verify this latter interpretation is whether people moved back into the neighborhoods in which they lived before January 12. Most people from these neighborhoods did return to the same area. Of the 321 people for whom verified information was obtained, 102 live in a different neighborhood than before the earthquake, or 32%. So there is a small but significant population of newcomers to these areas since the earthquake.
There is some variation based on neighborhood, with lower income neighborhoods being more likely recipients of new people, including IDPs. For example 43% of people currently living in Carrefour-Feuilles lived somewhere else, suggesting this is a location where IDPs are relocated. By contrast, only 26% of people living in Maïs Gaté or Canapé-Vert had lived somewhere else. Several aid agency staff had said anecdotally that other areas, including those which we could not sample because of violence (noted above) were recipients of IDPs because of their low rents. Methodology tracking IDPs where they were relocated would be more useful to answer this question.
For people who live somewhere else, they used to live in a wide range of neighborhoods from across the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Responses to this open-ended question indicate that this moving experience was quite disruptive in people’s lives. Many people moved from more stable, comparatively higher income areas, which could be an indication that people, especially former IDPs, had few alternatives.
Why did people leave the IDP camps?
Most people reported leaving the camp because of bad conditions, 147 of 262, or 56%. Some of these conditions identified by the residents included proper sanitation, a lack of security, and conditions of the shelters, among others.
The next most common answer is that people were forcibly evicted by the landlord, often but not always accompanied by the police or local government. A total of 45 of 260, or 17%, left because they were forced, just over a sixth.
It is difficult to claim success or progress given these statistics. While each reason was treated as an independent yes/no question during data entry and analysis, and thus there is a possibility of some overlap, taken together almost three-fourths of people felt compelled to leave, either because of bad conditions or threats by an individual or a group. While in the first scenario people may have decided on their own, it could be argued that leaving because of bad conditions is a violation of IDPs’ rights to life-saving services as recognized by the UN Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement and Article 25 of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
One in seven (37 overall, or 14%) left the camp because they had received money, varying from $125 to $500 based on their own testimony. The source of funds were the IOM or an NGO, according to residents.
Several other reasons were identified (as “Other” in the survey). Among them were both “push” factors like insecurity (3 people), health, sanitation, cholera, too much sun, persecution, ripped tents, and a “pull” factor, namely that the house was tagged green (7).
Of the former IDPs, 149 lived in a camp on public land, or 57 percent. A total of 94 people lived in a camp designated for the original 16/6 program or Champs-de-Mars. The author recreated the spreadsheet with just these camps, conducting a similar set of statistical inferences.
People who lived in 16/6 camps were as likely to have left because of the bad conditions (55 instead of 56 percent), somewhat more likely to have received funding (18 compared to 14 percent) and less likely to have left because of threats (12 compared to 17 percent).
ARE PEOPLE BETTER OFF?
The short answer is: it depends. Some people are better off in some indicators. Unfortunately the data do not point to a clear answer that after one of the largest and best funded humanitarian efforts in recent history, people are better off now than before the earthquake. Some actors are quick to point out the disastrous state of affairs before the earthquake. Some may find comfort that things are not worse than they are.
The survey asked questions about economic activity, whether people made more or less money, their level of security/insecurity, and their access to water, toilets, and health care. As noted, the results vary based on which variable was being measured.
When asked simply to evaluate their level of economic activity, their access to livelihood opportunities, the statistical average of responses was 3.01 (1=have many opportunities, 2=has some opportunity, 3=a little bit of opportunities; 4=none). While obviously this is self-reported data with no consistent standard, this is at least some assessment as to how the population views its current state of economic opportunity.
When asked to compare their current access to economic opportunities with before the earthquake, exactly the same number of respondents said it was better and worse. Given that two people said about the same and two answered that they did not know, this same number is 49% of people who said that their economic opportunities were better before the earthquake, and 49% said that the current situation is worse.
When asked more directly if people made more or less money, the statistic changes. Twenty-five people reported that they made the same amount of money, and two people said they didn’t know. But the differences are stark: 117 people report making more money, or 31%, whereas 196 people report making less money, or 53%.
Clearly more needs to be done to reinforce people’s economic access. In the author’s sample of 791 households in eight IDP camps, almost half of timachann – people engaged in micro-commerce, lost their livelihood, from 56.9 to 29.6 percent.
Interestingly, people report a different reality when compared with when they lived in the camps. Whereas in general equal numbers of people reported that economic opportunity was better and worse currently compared to before the earthquake, those who lived in the camps said that economic activity was better when they were IDPs. Ninety-eight people report better activity currently compared with when they lived in the camps (36%), while 168 people report that their current economic opportunities are worse than when they lived in the camps (62%). Again, the statistic is clearer when the question was posed about more or less money made: 70 people report making more money (25%), 171 people report making less money (62%), while 6 said the same, and 28 do not know.
This statistic may be somewhat surprising, that almost twice as many people had better economic opportunities when they were living in the camps, and two-and-a-half times as many people made more money. Possible explanations include the existence of temporary Cash-for-Work jobs, having closer and more guaranteed marketing opportunities, being able to re-purpose donated items as merchandise, and generally more resources being directed in the emergency humanitarian phase. Interpreted one way, aid agencies were offering at least some economic assistance that improved IDPs’ livelihood chances while in the camps. However, this could present a paradox about how best to end dependency on emergency aid. Cutting off food and non-food item aid, and infrastructure projects such as Cash-for-Work is being felt by the population, who are by and large still in an economically precarious situation.
Infrastructure projects directed at improving people’s access to basic services in an attempt to help them rebuild and stay away from IDP camps would be very welcome by residents, and they would clearly indicate progress, but this is beyond the purview of a emergency humanitarian mandate, and thus many relief agencies may not see these as opportunities or part of their mandate. These activities would be on the “development” side of the continuum. So the cycle of dependency, unfortunately, continues.
For a clear example of this tendency, despite the “16” of the 16/6 plan, IOM and Haitian government officials admitted to the author that no funds have been spent on neighborhood reconstruction and revitalization.
Residents of the 16/6 camps report having greater opportunities but about the same percentages report making more or less money. Of the 16/6 camp residents, 19 report better current economic opportunities than when living in the camp (20%), 69 report worse economic opportunities than when in the camp (75%), three said the same, and one did not know. Twenty-two people make more money currently than when in the camp (23%), 58 make less money currently than when in camp (62%), 4 said the same, and 10 did not know.
Water and Sanitation (WASH)
The results of these findings are moderately encouraging for water and definitely encouraging for sanitation. Questions asked about walking distance to water sources, cost per five-gallon bucket of water, and comparing the conditions before and after the earthquake. Compared to conditions before the earthquake, 168 people report access to water was better (47%), 129 report access to water was worse (36%), 57 said the same, and 2 do not know.
The survey asked about regular access to toilets, number of people who share a single toilet, and asking residents to compare the overall condition of toilets from before the earthquake and in the IDP camps. Compared to conditions before the earthquake, 249 people report that the condition of the toilets was better (71%), 74 people report that the condition of the toilets was worse (21%), 25 said the same, and 3 said they do not know.
This was only slightly better than the comparison between residents’ current situation and the IDP camps. Comparing the present situation to the IDP camps, 164 people report that the condition of the toilets was better (65%), 82 people report that the condition of the toilets was worse (32%), and 8 said the same.
Explaining this general trend toward improvement could be the cholera epidemic forcing agencies to prioritize the provision of WASH services in the neighborhoods. Another explanation could be that this was a domain in which the Haitian government were active and played an important co-ordination role
The Haitian government, through what used to be called CAMEP (Centrale Autonome Métropolitaine d’Eau Potable, the local agency in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area) worked with NGOs like French GRET to provide water taps in popular neighborhoods. In 2009, this agency expanded its mandate to include sanitation, now known as DINEPA (Direction Nationale de l’Eau Potable et de l’Assainissement National, the National Directorate of Drinkable Water and Sanitation). The principle for these community water taps is community ownership, responsibility, and self-sufficiency. DINEPA creates local water management committees responsible for collecting the kotizasyon – financial contribution – and upkeep.
The present results are consistent with previous lessons learned about the role of the government. The author reported that DINEPA’s hands-on approach working with municipalities and NGOs, meeting in city halls instead of the UN Logistics Base, achieved results in obtaining greater WASH services in Cité Soleil. Without a government mandate, aid agencies only added an additional one percent of WASH services in the camps, the study found.
Access to health services
Despite the valiant effort of the emergency response, and particularly the campaign to respond to cholera, the long-term access to health care is not improving for residents in the neighborhoods. Compared to before the earthquake, 145 people report access to health services was better (41%), 165 people report access to health services was worse (46%), 43 said the same, and 4 reported they do not know.
Similarly to the economic indicators, residents report a slightly better situation within the IDP camps than even before the earthquake. This is thanks to the efforts of the emergency response within the IDP camps. Of the former IDPs, 84 people report access to health services was currently better than in the IDP camps (36%), 123 people report access to health services was currently worse than in the IDP camps (53%), and 25 said the same.
Also similarly to the economic indicators, there are multiple ways to interpret this data, comparing the short term humanitarian with the long term development timelines. In the short term it can be said that overall the aid agencies had a positive short-term impact within the IDP camps, however slight in this case. But this short term aid did not translate to long term development. In the case of health care, some life-saving humanitarian aid came at the price of existing health care. Several media reports cited that after the opening of a Médecins Sans Frontières hospital offering free services and paying doctors much higher than state hospital salaries, several local hospitals closed (Trouillot 2012). There might be a feedback loop within the media and advocacy efforts adding pressure to humanitarian agencies to spend their funds collected, which results in high-visibility, short-term projects.
In addition to the case of foreign NGOs inadvertently starving local hospitals, this same logic of the “photo op” might be behind the production of temporary, or “T-shelters” long after the shelter cluster and Haitian disapproved of their use, preferring instead to invest slightly more per unit in permanent housing. Several NGO and donor agency staff discussed these pressures with the author.
CHANGES TO RELATIONSHIPS
As the final segment of a multi-year National Science Foundation grant, this research is tracking a couple of phenomena first noted in the household survey within the eight camps conducted in June-July 2011. These are relationships: the first being family/households, the second being support network.
In addition to the statistic noted above that half of the timachann lost their business following the earthquake and living in the IDP camps, the 56-question survey found that the average household size decreased, from 5.37 to 3.36.
When we inquired about the reasons for this, the most common answer from across a range of stakeholders, from IDPs to NGOs and donor agencies, was that aid policies of food distribution encouraged families to split up to increase their allocation. Based on World Food Program guidelines women were to be prioritized as mothers, more likely to prioritize sharing with their children. Repeatedly we were told that the amount of food distributed did not vary according to household size. So the multigenerational family structure that allowed the poor majority to survive on the margins for decades was immediately disrupted by foreign assistance from countries that have at least the official promotion of nuclear family units.
A bag of beans, rice, wheat, and cooking oil for two weeks is small compared to the prospect of receiving several hundred dollar cash subsidies (albeit for a landlord). This relocation has the potential to have these negative long-term consequences of splitting up families.
To assess whether this phenomenon is limited to the emergency phase, this survey asked whether people were living with the same people before the earthquake and today. To ensure detail and accuracy the survey detailed which members of the family one lived with before and after the earthquake.
The results showed that 133 of 281 people (47.3%) did not move back in with the same people before the earthquake. This could suggest that the ruptures to the urban Haitian household triggered by the emergency aid could be permanent for almost half of the population. It could also be a temporary phenomenon, as long as rental subsidies are in existence.
One of the persistent challenges of studying this is how, and indeed whether, to measure this using a short-answer closed-response survey in a setting where researchers and respondents do not know one another. How the question is phrased can influence the response.
During the 791-person household survey in the IDP camps this was attempted. Some indicators of diminishing independent civic activity appeared, that 18 to 9 percent of people were involved in a local organization or association.
Based on discussion with field researchers it was decided that the phrase was, “kiyès ki konn ede w” either before the earthquake, during the camps, or today. In this context, “konn” usually connotes that someone regularly does something, so “who typically helps you” was the phrase for the three time periods. In addition to “other” people were given the option to select family, neighbor, friend, church, or organization. They were told to select as many as possible (or no one, in that case).
Family members were typically the ones who helped out individuals the most. This is not surprising given general patterns of family relations being first responders in crises. However, people report a decline in this support from family since before the earthquake, from 221 (60%) to 187 (50%).
Following this, people reported that friends typically help them out. There was a slight decline, from 46 (12%) to 43 (11%). Before the earthquake, as many people were helped out by members of a church or members of an organization, 23 (6%). However, after the earthquake fewer people count on other members of an organization, 16 (4%). Churches play a greater role following the earthquake aid, up to 31 (8%). It is the only institution that more people say help them out since before the earthquake. The smallest support group, neighbors, also diminished the most: from 11 people to 6.
These trends become clearer when only the former IDPs and especially those who live in new neighborhoods are considered in the sample, suggesting that relocation reduces people’s social ties. While nearly impossible to quantify and measure, social ties are an important part of people’s survival, livelihood, and quality of life. As such these should be a consideration in any relocation effort. Failure to take this important part of people’s lives results in relocation projects that maybe technically better but still undesirable, such as Corail-Cesselesse or Morne à Cabrit, areas where IDPs were relocated or housing constructed.
1. Prioritize building new social housing
There is still an acute and in Paul Farmer’s (2011) words, acute-on-chronic housing crisis. Almost 370,000 people are still in tents as Hurricane Sandy continued to batter the tents and even the t-shelters. This research shows that more investments must be made in long term social housing solutions. Individual solutions aimed at individual landlords cannot take care of the persistent, and in some cases, growing social problems and lack of access.
2. Link housing with basic social services
The data are far from conclusive but they do point to some persistent problems in quality of life and basic social services. They suggest that more attention be placed on long-term development strategies as opposed to short-term humanitarian solutions (Anderson 1994; Harmer and Macrae 2004). For example, the data shows need for more sustainable job creation, health care access and permanent housing. These are not isolated but can be part of an integrated strategy: jobs can be created if more investments are made in basic human services like housing and health care.
3. Link housing with job creation
To date most of the job creation activity funded by donors and supported by the Haitian government centers around the Caracol industrial park. The construction and rehabilitation of quality, earthquake resistant housing and neighborhood revitalization that would bring access to services such as health care and education can also be powerful job opportunities to explore, and these jobs will have additional benefits.
4. Need long-term follow up
To even begin addressing long-term issues requires that agencies assess the long-term impacts of their projects, and especially relocation. This information gathering needs to be a priority. ALL representatives from NGOs involved in relocation told the author that they are not planning a follow-up past the one-year rental assistance period. Some are planning follow-ups after a shorter period. But what will happen to the former IDPs after their subsidy ends, and thus are required to pay for their own housing? Will they undergo a second displacement? Will landlords still continue to rent to them? Will their rents return to pre-subsidy levels?
5. Reconstruction needs to strengthen communities
Data also show the importance of maintaining social ties, which is why neighborhood reconstruction and revitalization should be tied to housing development, and vice-versa. The author has heard several IDPs explain why they do not want to be moved to far-flung areas like Morne à Cabrit. These areas are not only lacking in basic social service infrastructure but also civic infrastructure.
6. Active participation of affected population
All of these solutions require an active engagement with residents in discussion and planning for their future. Genuine participation includes establishing priorities, setting agendas, and making meaningful decisions.
Anderson, Mary B. 1994. “Understanding the Disaster-Development Continuum: Gender Analysis Is the Essential Tool.” Focus on Gender no. 2 (1):7-10.
Farmer, Paul. 2011. Haiti after the Earthquake. New York: Polity Press.
FIDH, RNDDH, and COED. 2012. Haiti: Human Security in Danger. Paris: Federation Intérnational des Droits Humaines.
Harmer, Adele, and Joanna Macrae. 2004. Beyond the Continuum: the Changing Role of Aid Policy in Protracted Crises. London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute.
Schwartz, Timothy, and with Yves-François Pierre and Eric Calpas. 2011. BARR Survey Report: Building Assessments and Rubble Removal in Quake-Affected Neighborhoods in Haiti. Washington: United States Agency for International Development.
Trouillot, Evelyne. 2012. “Abse sou Klou: Reconstructing Exclusion.” In Tectonic Shifts: Haiti since the Earthquake, edited by Mark Schuller and Pablo Morales, 103-107. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press.