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Securing Haiti's Transition:

Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

By Robert Muggah

An independent study by the Small Arms Survey
Commissioned by DFAE

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ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPSF	Interim Public Safety Force
IRI	International Republic Institute
ITAR	International Traffic in Arms Regulations
LDC	least-developed country
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MICIVIH	International Civilian Mission in Haiti
MIF	Multinational Interim Force
MIIS	Monterey Institute of International Studies
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MIS	management information system
MSF	Doctors without Borders *(Médecins sans Frontières)*
NCDDR	National Commission on DDR
NCHR	National Coalition for Haitian Rights
NISAT	Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers
NSC	National Security Council
OAS	Organization of American States
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OP	popular organization
ORS	Opportunity and Referral Service
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OT	operating theatre
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PAHO	Pan-American Health Organisation
PNUD	Programme de Development des Nations Unies (UNDP)
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SDC	Swiss Development Co-operation
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSR	security sector reform

TPTC	Haitian Ministry of Public Works
UNAIDS	United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHABITAT	United Nations Human's Settlements Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USPGN	Presidential Guard *(L'Unité de Sécurité Présidentielle)*
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Summary

There are tremendous challenges to the restoration of human security and national stability in Haiti. While the scale and frequency of armed violence peaked in 2004, the international community and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) have provided a buffer for containing major risks to human security in the short term. However, confusion persists over the future role of the former military, i.e. the Armed Forces of Haiti (FADH), as with the prospects of convincing popular organizations (OPs), armed gangs, criminal groups, private security companies, and heavily armed civilians to lay down their arms. Initial deadlines set by the Interim Government in mid-2004 to hand back weapons proved to be ineffective. In the meantime, these very same groups are consolidating their influence and networks throughout the country. The state has failed to secure either legitimacy or authority in the eyes of its people.

The country urgently requires a framework for embarking on sustainable and meaningful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Without the permanent demilitarization of armed groups, humanitarian assistance and development will be continuously endangered. Haiti's vicious cycle will thus continue. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS) recently concluded that 'armed groups appear to control security in significant areas of the country and where the State is not providing effective protection to the people living in those regions.' With presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 13 November 2005, the prospects of establishing genuinely democratic institutions may be compromised by escalating and retributive politics if DDR is not effectively designed in a way that speaks to local priorities on the ground.

Despite broad support for an Interim Cooperation Framework (or *Cadre de Cooperation Interimaire* – CCI) to ensure political reform, rehabilitation, and economic reconstruction, the newly installed Interim Government and MINUSTAH share an uneasy relationship. MINUSTAH has been mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to support constitutional and political reform, strengthen governance, and to assist in maintaining safety and public order. It also has a mandate to support the Interim Government and civil society in promoting and respecting human rights,

and to assist in the reform of the police and judiciary. All parties, as well as many representatives from Haitian civil society, recognize that disarmament is a priority, but the Interim Government and the Haitian National Police (HNP) have thus far dragged their feet in moving the process forward.

The international community appears to be cautiously inclined to support the CCI – some USD 1.085 billion were pledged at a donor conference in August 2004[1]. While MINUSTAH peacekeeping and civilian operations have been slow to get off the ground during their first six months, the mission reached nearly full operational strength in early 2005 and its mandate has been renewed until June 2005, as expected. Even so, UN agencies are only gradually coordinating their activities. Pervasive insecurity continues to hamper mobility and investment: most NGOs are operating in highly unpredictable environments and regularly evacuate from affected areas. And while investment in security is a precondition for sustained recovery, it remains the case that the Haitian public service and economy are in ruins.

This report provides a general overview of the human security crisis facing Haiti. Commissioned by the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAE), the findings are illustrative and focus primarily on the consequences of escalating armed violence on civilians, the distribution and dynamics of armed gangs and the arms trade in Haiti, and the comparatively recent experiences of DDR and security sector reform (SSR). This report in no way represents the views or intentions of DFAE. By emphasizing the scale and magnitude of arms availability and misuse in the country and the attendant difficulties of undertaking conventional humanitarian and development assistance, this report calls for a concerted focus on DDR and SSR to secure Haiti's transition.

Findings

There was a considerable escalation of armed violence directed against civilians in 2004, and this is expected to continue in the lead-up to elections in late 2005. A review of media, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and private hospital records indicates that at least 700 individuals died as result of intentional firearm-related violence between September 2003 and December 2004 and three to four times that number were non-fatally injured. According to this same review,

among these groups are fluid, and motivations stem from a complex combination of predatory and protective behaviour – itself firmly tied to local interests. Further, many of these groups have consolidated their power base in the months between February and December 2004.

These armed groups are embedded in communities and are characterized by robust local support. Many community residents, as well as various military and criminal groups fueling insecurity, are well armed. Civilian elite and various segments of poorer communities possess significant quantities of weapons, though often for very different reasons. Local power brokers – often affiliated with armed groups within poorer communities – are demonstrably prepared to use armed violence to defend their interests. The local monopoly of violence is now a benchmark of 'effective' leadership. Strategies to reduce armed violence and permanently remove weapons from society will therefore require an approach tailored to the local political, social, and economic dynamics of specific communities, entailing a process of painstaking negotiation with brokers, religious figures, and politico-military leadership, as well as the provision of differentiated incentives.

Armed non-state groups possess fewer weapons than state and international forces. Though a preliminary estimate, non-state armed groups (including private security groups) are in possession of up to 13,000 small arms and light weapons of various calibres. The majority of these are semi-automatic firearms (i.e. M16s, M14s, PMKs, Uzis) and handguns (i.e. 0.38s, 0.45s and others). Manufactured weapons are held primarily by the leaders of various armed groups, while the rank and file tend to use home-made or 'creole' weapons. The limited disarmament throughout the 1990s and early 2000s has resulted in a situation where a considerable number of weapons remain in the hands of these groups. By way of contrast, state and former state security groups, including MINUSTAH and demobilized FADH, likely hold as many as 27,000 weapons. Despite the comparatively large number of firearms ostensibly under 'state' control, there nevertheless appears to be frequent appeals for still more small arms.

Civilians represent a significant category of weapons owners in Haiti. Weapons ownership has been a constitutional right in Haiti since 1987 and firearms are widely possessed by middle-class and 'bourgeois' homeowners throughout the country, though especially in the capital, Port-au-Prince. Weapons are also widely distributed among the poorer strata of Haitian society. In 2001, the HNP registered 20,379 legal

firearms in the country, though since 2003, these weapons are effectively illegal. Alarmingly, there are a number of reports of new weapons permits being issued in early 2005, despite no formal regulatory system being in place. This study contends that the real numbers of weapons held by civilians is in fact much higher: they are estimated to own some 170,000 small arms, primarily pistols (0.38s, 9 mms) and revolvers (including 'creole' weapons), though weapons of 7.62 calibre are also owned by civilians. The regulatory framework for domestic possession and use is permissive and no tangible registry of permits or legitimate weapons ownership currently exists.

Grey- and black-market weapons transfers and trafficking are common, though trends and patterns are difficult to verify. Due to the US, OAS, and UN arms embargoes on Haiti during the early and mid-1990s, and the inability of the country to manufacture its own weapons, covert and illicit transfers are common. The de facto lifting of the unilateral US arms embargo against Haiti indicates that legal trade to the HNP has potentially resumed in late 2004. Established smuggling routes between Haiti and the US (Florida) are also well known, and automatic and semi-automatic weapons have also been sourced from the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Jamaica, South Africa, Israel, and Central America.

The HNP and correctional services are weak and in need of considerable investment. Recent estimates generated by MINUSTAH and the Interim Government indicate that there are approximately 5,000 HNP officers, down from an estimated 6,300 in 2003. The UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) is calling for an increase to 6,500 – or a ratio of one officer to every 1,200 civilians. Moreover, of the 189 police stations, prisons, and jails, 125 were destroyed following the departure of President Aristide in February 2004, and the remainder needs extensive repairs. Though almost 1,600 prisoners have been reincarcerated, at least as many are still at large, following their release in February 2004. Efforts are currently under way to retrain HNP officers, restore infrastructure, and re-establish a functional correctional and penal system. But the training of a credible and legitimate police force is taking longer than anticipated. Many fear that the HNP are increasingly becoming a source of criminal violence, rather than an effective institution to reduce crime and guarantee public security.

Previous efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate armed groups have achieved limited success. Fewer than 4,265 weapons have been collected since the mid-1990s. Although a sizeable number of weapons were collected by US marines in the mid-1990s, fewer than 2,500 of

these – about 12 per cent – have been destroyed. Concerted efforts began with the US intervention in 1994 and have continued to the present day. These have focused on 'buying back' weapons and the provision of short-term transition credits and have entailed limited follow-up. Most have focused narrowly on weapons collection rather than the broader objectives of reconciliation, violence reduction, or peace-building. Virtually every disarmament effort in Haiti has failed. Few weapons have been collected or destroyed and the majority of left-over arms were ultimately recycled into the population. Though previous Haitian administrations have demonstrated support for various disarmament conventions at the UN and OAS, signed international regulatory instruments have yet to be ratified.

Ensuring the DDR of the FADH is a priority. Despite the demobilization of approximately 4,800 soldiers by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in the mid-1990s, many in the FADH continue to claim de jure constitutional legitimacy. Moreover, its influence appears to have consolidated, particularly in those areas of the country where the state exerts limited authority. Due to the existing relationships between the Interim Government and FADH representatives, there appears to be growing interest in reinstating a security or auxiliary force composed of former soldiers. The implications of a reconstituted army for human and national security are difficult to predict.

Recent disarmament efforts have achieved results far below expectations. Between March and October 2004, the Multinational Intervention Force (MIF) and MINUSTAH collected some 200 weapons. Despite a number of coercive disarmament efforts, checkpoints, and various voluntary programmes, the Interim Government and the UN have not successfully collected small arms in large numbers. What has been collected includes a combination of heavy, automatic, and semi-automatic weapons, as well as handguns and ammunition. The majority of these, some 60 per cent, have been handed over to the HNP, while the remainder have been either returned to their owners or destroyed. A broader strategy is urgently required.

Recommendations

Stakeholders must ensure clear and precise strategies to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate high-risk armed elements. The Interim Government and MINUSTAH have agreed on a platform to guide recovery and reconstruction. The international community has pledged some USD 1.085 billion to the process, though is unable to disburse without clear and concrete proposals and clear evidence of the scale and distribution of needs[2]. DDR and SSR are clear priorities toward ensuring human security. Evidence of the number and distribution of weapons, the profile of users, appropriate reintegration incentives, and absorption capacities is urgently needed. But even basic questions concerning who precisely is to be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated, the specific involvement of the FADH in the process, the process for prosecuting human rights violations and crimes against humanity, and the political willingness of certain groups to participate have not been laid on the table, much less answered. The clear articulation of evidence, priorities, and strategies for intervention is a foundation, perhaps even a precondition, of effective design and implementation.

The Haitian Interim Government must demonstrate unambiguous political commitment to DDR, and a coherent execution plan must be prepared by a National Commission on DDR and implemented with the technical support of MINUSTAH. A National Commission on DDR (NCDDR) was established by presidential decree in early February 2005, and will aim to ensure clear lines of communication among stakeholders, strategic direction, and transparent budgeting of the process. The NCDDR includes senior representation from the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, and the HNP, with observer and consultative status for the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) of MINUSTAH. All DDR activities must be channeled through the NCDDR in order to ensure coherence and maximum accountability in the process. Perhaps most important, the international community must adopt a clear position on the future role and configuration of the FADH. Though the reconstitution of an army is ultimately a sovereign issue, continued ambiguity will undermine political and economic recovery, as well as DDR.

The integrated MINUSTAH/UN Development Programme (UNDP) DDR Section must form the basis of the technical and implementing arm of the NCDDR. The MINUSTAH/UNDP DDR Section, staffed by

other OPs. In order to ensure equity and reduce the prospect of renewed armed violence, an integrated and coordinated framework for DDR – one that addresses all armed groups in a reciprocal manner – must be put in place. No one group can be favoured, nor can DDR be used as a political tool to privilege one actor over another. There is a real and present danger of DDR being hijacked for political gain, with certain armed factions (FADH) benefiting at the expense of others (Lavalas and *chimères*). An uneven DDR process runs the risk of escalating tensions and further undermining prospects of a stable transition and recovery.

In following the political process, DDR must be pursued assertively, opportunistically, in a decentralized fashion and with maximum flexibility. The traditional DDR formula applied in war-torn countries is not appropriate for the current situation in Haiti. DDR cannot be conceived as a straightforward technical process. Nor can it be a substitute for meaningful political reform. Ultimately, the establishment of a political and institutional framework – the NCDDR – is a crucial component of the process. In practical terms, DDR must be broadly targeted and not focused exclusively on individual armed actors. Each region where DDR is to be implemented requires a responsive strategy focusing on spoilers, power brokers, agents for reconciliation and other stakeholders. Awareness of community dynamics and the articulation of innovative responses that prioritise meaningful development opportunities will be essential if DDR is to be successful. Top-down approaches are necessary but insufficient to delivering significant benefits at the grass roots. Rather, the harnessing of local institutions to ensure effective communication and local buy-in will be vital.

DDR needs to be complemented by parallel efforts that seek to strengthen political dialogue, reinforce judicial reform, promote reconciliation and strengthen the security sector. An anti-impunity strategy and a process to strengthen the judiciary should parallel the DDR initiative. Reported violations of human rights and international humanitarian law must be investigated, enforced and brought to trial in a free and fair process. Moreover, future agreements must avoid blanket amnesties for crimes under international law, including human rights violations. The justice sector must be similarly supported: particularly needed is support for the training of personnel with expertise in gathering and preserving documentary, testimonial and forensic evidence; prosecuting cases; establishing accountability mechanisms; and building respect for the rule of law. Similarly, the restructuring of the HNP, with an emphasis on com-

munity-level policing, is a priority for the success of DDR. The OAS and CIVPOL are currently working together with the HNP to register, recruit, train and strengthen the police force. Ensuring an effective screening process, as well as effective mentoring and training in human rights, will be a core feature of this initiative.

Long-term commitment must be ensured by the international community. As noted by the UN Secretary-General, DDR, the re-establishment of the rule of law, and institution building and reform will take years, perhaps decades. The advancement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), including the elimination of poverty and the reduction of child mortality, will require considerable long-term investment. International donors must consider the promotion of security as a priority – particularly through supporting the integrated DDR process, as well as SSR more generally. The provision of traditional and development-intensive activities is unattainable and unsustainable in the present climate. Support for reconciliation activities and meaningful political dialogue, electoral reform, the promotion of judicial and prison reform, the provision of training and support for the HNP, and investment in durable DDR are clear priorities.

Map Haiti


ATLANTIC OCEAN
Matthew Town
Lake Windsor
Great Inagua
(The Bahamas)
Baracoa
Cabo Maisi
Windward Passage
Ile de la Tortue
Port-de-Paix
Cap-Haitien
San Fernando de M. C.
Fort-Liberte
Dajabon
San Felipe Puerto Bla
Santiago de los Caballeros
Gonaives
Golfe de la Gonâve
Hinche
Concepc de la Ve
Elias Piña
Grand-Boucan
Ile de la Gonâve
PORT-AU-PRINCE
Las Lajas
Jumani
Jérémie
Barahona
Jacmel
Les Cayes
Perdernales
Hispaniola
CARIBBEAN SEA
HAITI
0 km 30 60 90 km

I. Background

Haiti is neither experiencing a civil war nor facing a post-conflict situation[5]. But a decade after the last UN-sanctioned military intervention, the country is again facing widespread armed violence and receiving massive overseas assistance[6]. It is a failing state par excellence. In order to stay further collapse and regional instability, two recent UN Security Council resolutions have mandated Chapter VII interventions[7]. The first, UNSC 1529, called for the deployment of a US-, Canadian-, and French-led Multinational International Force between March and June 2004 to secure the country. The second, UNSC 1542, outlined a more expansive UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti[8] to ease the transition from ousted President Aristide to an Interim Government[9]. There are no formal or legitimate peace agreements to guide recovery, though the Interim Cooperation Framework (CCI) has been hastily cobbled together to ensure donor cooperation. Despite some improvements by the end of 2004, the security situation around the country remains precarious. But this is not for lack of international concern.

The international community has mobilized to support Haiti's transition. The recently installed Interim Government faces enormous challenges and there is still considerable effort required to organize free and fair elections by November 2005. The internationally sanctioned CCI aims to support these activities, and to coordinate investment and recovery[10]. Despite repeated calls by Haitian civil society and the international donor community for a far-reaching 'national dialogue' to generate credible participation in the CCI process, the Interim Government seems to have stalled in that respect and its credibility has been damaged. The CCI is nevertheless under strain because most of the USD 1.085 billion committed to securing the peace has not yet been disbursed. Many are growing impatient and the deteriorating situation urgently needs to be reversed.

Haiti is trapped in a state of chronic political instability. For at least the past two decades, it has faced a combination of societal and state collapse from the centre and accruing armed influence at the periphery. According to some analysts, a tradition of localised – as opposed to national – rule was reinforced under President Aristide in the early 1990s and again in the years after his reinstatement. Within distinct communities, local religious, administrative, and even criminal leaders have come to

rely on an increasingly strident monopoly over military, economic and political control. Unlike Haiti's national military and economic elite, who cater to a narrow bandwidth of commercial interests, local leaders often define themselves as acting on behalf of their local constituencies. Their allegiances at the national level are fluid opportunities and contingent on the material benefits arising from partnership with a national party. Many of these local leaders emerged during traumatic armed violence in the 1990s and gained credibility as a result of their rejection of the former military junta of General Cédras.

The current economic situation is precarious. Successive governments have been administered by an unrepresentative elite, and mired in corruption and an excessive reliance on the use of force to advance their personal agendas. Commercial activities in Haiti are strongly monopolistic to the extent that Transparency International rated the country as the most corrupt in a survey of 146 countries in 2004 for the second year in a row. Haiti is the only least-developed country (LDC) in the western hemisphere[11] and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have repeatedly postponed talks to renew funding, due to the insecurity plaguing the country[12]. With virtually the entire national budget supported by outside donors, remittances continue to make up some 40 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP)[13]. Unsurprisingly, public services are either non-existent or treated with suspicion by civil society. The devastating floods affecting Gonaives in September 2004 have exacerbated the economic situation enormously[14]. In addition to widespread collapse of entitlements, the provision of relief assistance and investment in development continues to be obstructed by a climate of persistent insecurity.

This study finds that Haitian society is over-armed and heavily militarized. Armed groups – from the former military (FADH), national police (HNP), and paramilitary groups (FRAPH) to armed gangs, pro-opposition groups, popular militia, and private security companies – are widely distributed throughout the country. On-going recruitment from communities and the consolidation of local leaders of various armed groups throughout the country continue apace. Moreover, civilians have enjoyed a constitutional right to possess firearms of various calibres since the late 1980s. But the majority of weapons in the hands of armed groups appear to have been leaked from 'official' stockpiles and inventories, rather than acquired illegally from abroad.

This report also finds that the country is exceedingly vulnerable to weapons transfers and illicit trade across its borders. There is an urgent

need to suppress and reduce the spread of weapons, while simultaneously moving toward the regulation of state and non-state arms supplies and permanent civilian disarmament. If the country is to host elections by November 2005, initiate a genuine national dialogue, promote fiscal probity, reform its judiciary and police, cultivate a culture of respect for human rights or promote sustainable livelihoods, the provision of security must be treated as an over-riding priority. A central pillar of any intervention will have to involve comprehensive DDR and SSR.

II. Armed groups and their weapons

In Haiti, there is a bewildering array of armed groups that possess and trade a vast assortment of weapons. Whilst the country has a long-standing tradition of egregious human rights abuses and militia-inspired violence, widespread firearms use has increased substantially since the late 1980s. There are several types of armed groups, many of them overlapping and interconnected. Many of these groups were present in the early 1990s following the election of President Aristide. Others consolidated their power bases in the intervening years of the Cédras regime. They include, *inter alia*, the ex-FADH[15]; the *Police Militaire* and their attachés or civilian auxiliaries; the notorious rural police chiefs, or *chefs de sections*[16]; and, from 1993, paramilitary organizations such as FRAPH[17]. The primary motivations and origins of these groups are summarized in Annexe 1. Table 1 ascribes an estimated number of members, a multiplier of weapons per member, and a total estimate of their weapons holdings.

Determining the absolute number of weapons circulating in Haiti, including firearms registered by civilians, is exceedingly challenging[18]. This is largely because there is no up-to-date registry of firearms in the country. The HNP is alleged to have registered some 20,379 'legal' weapons among civilians by 2001[19]. But the registration system collapsed and despite the suspension of new licenses, no records currently exist. It is clear that the absolute number of legal and illegal arms available to civilians and armed groups is much higher than was earlier reported. Though it is virtually impossible to isolate all of the supply networks and distribution chains operating across the country, broad estimates of the likely availability of small arms and light weapons in Haiti can be rendered. By drawing on a combination of data sources and employing predictive weapons multipliers, the current estimate of the total national Haitian stockpile, including non-state, state, civilian, and MINUSTAH supplies, rises as high as 210,000 small arms and light weapons. Table 1 provides a tentative and preliminary estimate of arms distribution, disaggregated by armed group.

The distribution of these firearms can be disaggregated according to non-state armed groups, civilians, and international and state-based groups. For example, the study finds that there are comparatively fewer small arms among non-state armed groups – whether OPs, gangs or revolutionaries – than previously believed: fewer than 13,000[20]. These weapons are probably unevenly distributed among these actors, and their approach to holding and stockpiling weapons differs tremendously. This is because the command and control structures vary from comparatively strict hierarchies and clear chains of command with the ex-FADH to small triads and amorphous collectives such as the *baz armés* in peri-urban areas of Port-au-Prince. The latter armed groups rely disproportionately on civilian recruits – and the line between 'armed actor' and 'civilian' is nebulous.

Table 1. Armed groups and weapons availability, January 2005

	Group	Estimated numbers	Multiplier	Est. weapons
Non-state military	Revolutionary Front of the North	500–1,000	0.5–1	250–1,000
	Ex-USGPN (Presidential Guard)*	700	2	1,400
	Ex-FADH/FRAPH	1,500–2,000	0.5–1	750–2,000
Non-state political	OPs,* including vigilance brigades	2,000 (10–50 members per OP)	0.5	1,000
	Pro-opposition groups	–	0.5	–
	Self-defence bourgeois militia	200–300	1.5	300–450
Non-state criminal	Baz armés (criminal gangs)*	2,000 (10–30 per baz)	0.5	1,000
	Organised criminal gangs (including drug traffickers)	–	0.5	–
	Zenglendos (petty criminals)**	–	0.5	–
	Prison escapees	1,500	0.2	300
Non-state other	Private security company personnel	6,000	1	6,000
Non-state sub-total				**11,000–13,150**
Civilians	Bourgeois, middle class, slum dwellers	8,500,000 (1.7m households)	0.1	170,000***
MINUSTAH	Argentina (1 BTN, 2 COY)a		2	12,400
	Brazil (2 BTN, 5 COY)		2	
	Chile (1 BTN, 2 COY)b		2	
	Guatemala (MP, 1 COY)		2	
	Jordan (1 BTN, 4 COY)		2	
	Nepal (1 BTN, 4 COY)		2	
	Peru (1 COY)		2	
	Spain/Morocco (1 BTN, 2 COY)		2	
	Sri Lanka (1 BTN, 4 COY)		2	
	Uruguay (1 BTN, 3 COY)		2	
	HQ		2	
State	HNP	5,000****	1	5,000
	Demobilized FADH and IPSF	5,482 (1994–96)	1.5	8,220
	Disbanded MIPONUH	285 (2000)	1.5	430
	Navy (coast guard)	30	2	60
	Disbanded air force	– (1995)	–	–
	Dismissed HNP	500–1,000 (2003–04)	1	500–1,000
State sub-total				**26,610–27,110**
Total				**207,610–210,260**

Notes for Table 1

a: 1 AV UNIT (28) and 1 HOS LEV II (57)

b: 1 AV UNIT (93) and 1 ENG COY (150)

Weapons types for state groups include pistols (e.g. 9 mm Beretta 951, 0.45 M19), sub-machine guns (9 mm Uzi, 0.45 Thompson), rifles (5.56 mm Galil, 5.56 mm M16, 7.62 mm G3, 0.3 Garand M1), machine guns (e.g. 7.62 mm M60, 0.30 Browning, M19), as well as close-support weapons (M79), mortars (60 mm M2, 81 mm M1) and anti-tank missiles (57 mm RCL M18 and 106 mm RCL M40).

** Government militia – colloquially known as the 'chimères' – are composed of members of the baz armés, the armed OPs, and the USGPN.*

*** Zenglendos tend to be armed primarily with 'creole' weapons.*

**** The HNP registered some 20,379 weapons held by civilians in 2001.*

***** The HNP reported some 6,130 police officers in November 2004, though most OAS and MINUSTAH officials agree that it is unlikely that the number rises above 5,000.*

The study observes, however, that Haitian civilians and home-owners – particularly upper-middle-class households – own by far the majority of the estimated national stockpile: up to 170,000 weapons. It is generally believed that most elite households own several weapons, many of them procured legally in the US and subsequently imported into Haiti. It is assumed that the majority of these owners are not in fact either *baz* or members of military forces. By way of contrast, the MINUSTAH forces carry as many as 12,400 weapons, following the arrival of the full contingent of troops. Excluding MINUSTAH, fewer than 15,000 weapons are currently believed to be held by state (HNP) or former state forces, though the numbers are likely to grow if unchecked[21].

The presence of armed gangs remains a continuous threat to human security in Port-au-Prince and in other major cities throughout the country's ten provinces. In late 2004, MINUSTAH reported that at least 30 distinct 'armed gangs' were known to be active in the capital, though smaller sub-units have not been identified[22]. But in addition to 'armed gangs', armed elements of pro-Aristide OPs – including the *chimères* – are active, as are FADH insurgents throughout the capital[23]. Alliances within and between these groups are traditionally fluid and dynamic, largely as a result of efforts to consolidate control over local constituencies. Since the departure of President Aristide, previously 'politicized' armed groups have been reverting to more traditional forms of extortion, such as car jacking, kidnapping, and armed robbery. The weapons used and circulated by gangs are diverse, ranging from AK-47s, M16s, M4s, T-65s[24], M50s, and Uzis to various types of handguns (see Annexes 4 and 5). Though no significant weapons caches have been discovered by either MIF or MINUSTAH, it is believed that they may be distributed in the hills outside the capital.

Masked leaders of the Base Cameroon gang, an armed group that claims to be fighting for the return of ex-President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, carry the coffin of gang member during a street funeral in the Bel-Air neighborhood of Port-au-Prince in December 2004. © REUTERS/Daniel Morel

The organization of gangs has been investigated by a number of practitioners (Calpas, 2004; Skzryerbak and Demetriou, 2004). For example, each gang is estimated to consist of between 20 and 40 members armed with a combination of firearms and machetes. The leaders of each gang often preside over small arsenals of military-style and commercial weapons (e.g. Uzis, 0.38 specials, 45 mm revolvers), which are distributed to gang members on a needs basis. If they own a weapon at all, the majority of rank and file possess craft-produced single-shot weapons, which are locally manufactured by metal smiths. Gangs display complex patterns of collective and individual ownership, with leaders often selecting their preferred weapons as a measure of status. In some cases, gang leaders' names are synonymous with specific weapons types – usually of a high calibre.

Overall weapons types vary. According to former gang members, common weapons types among armed groups include pistols (e.g. 0.38s) and revolvers (e.g. 9 mm), as well as sport and assault rifles (e.g. T-65s and M16s) and sub-machine guns (e.g. Uzis and M60s). Though there are few heavy weapons in circulation – such as heavy machine guns or man portable missile systems – grenades and explosives are believed to be relatively

widely distributed (see Figure 1 and Table 2). Two 50 cal. (12.7 mm) machine guns from the presidential armory went missing following President Aristide's ousting, though one has recently been located in Bel Air. As illustrated in the following section, there is a surfeit of weapons from the US, Europe, and South America, with comparatively few Soviet-era armaments being shipped from either Central America or other countries in the Caribbean[25].

III. Arms trade and trafficking

Rumour and anecdote often substitute for fact when it comes to assessing the trade, distribution, and origins of small arms in Haiti. Although reliable and verifiable information on the arms trade is difficult to obtain in even the most transparent countries, it is nevertheless possible to piece together a cursory picture of arms flows in and out of Haiti. Very generally, small arms are sourced through a variety of legal, covert, and illegal networks – themselves operating at the international, regional, and national levels. Both legal and illegal trade are known to exist, for the simple reason that Haiti lacks the capacity to manufacture its own firearms, though craft-produced or 'creole' weapons are common[26]. This trade is poorly regulated and positively correlated with surges in human insecurity. Where large legal and illegal shipments are reported into Haiti, they are soon accompanied by the outbreak of armed violence. As noted by US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) officials: 'we would see, all of a sudden, a rash of large gun purchases ... throughout South Florida. We would find that then, a month or two months later ... a coup takes place in Haiti[27].' These three dimensions of the arms trade – legal, covert, and illegal – are discussed in more detail below.

The legal export of small arms to Haiti is comparatively limited, due to a variety of OAS, UN, and US arms sanctions. For example, the OAS initiated an arms embargo between 1991 and 1993 – the years of President Aristide's first ousting[28]. The UN initiated an embargo in 1993 and closed it in 1994, following Aristide's return (UN, 1996)[29]. The US followed the OAS with a more concrete unilateral arms embargo. This embargo was amended in early 1994, following the imposition of the UN embargo. But after 13 years, it appears that the US embargo has eased[30]. According to informants on the ground, US arms shipments to Haiti have resumed[31]. Recent evidence indicates that a shipment of weapons – including 3,635 M14 rifles, 1,100 Mini Galils, several thousand assorted 0.38 cals, 3,700 MP5s, and approximately one million assorted rounds of ammunition (valued at USD 6.95 million) – were *allegedly* transferred to Haiti for probable sale to the HNP by the US in November 2004[32].

Figure 1. A sample of reported US small arms transfers to Haiti, 1991–2004



Source: US Annual Reports and COMTRADE (various years) provided by NISAT (2004)
1991: military ammunition up to 22 mm (USD 26,225)
1996: ammunition, 'bombs' and grenades (USD 165,944)
1997: ammunition up to 22 mm (USD 39,522)
1998: ammunition up to 22 mm, riot-control ammunition (USD 100,507)
1999: parts and accessories of military weapons and up to 22 mm (USD 4,478)
2001: 'bombs', grenades, and APM (USD 3,900)
2004: includes a shipment allegedly received in November 2004

A number of countries have legally exported weapons to Haiti over the past decade. Despite the existence of the various sanctions discussed above, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) *Criteria on Conventional Arms Exports*[33] and *Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons*[34], the EU *Code of Conduct*[35], and the *Wassenaar Arrangement*[36], legal weapons trade to Haiti persists. For example, between 1999 and 2001, Brazil is known to have exported over USD 392,000 worth of sporting and hunting rifles. The Italians also reportedly exported more than USD 92,000 worth of ammunition in 1991, while the Dutch, Swiss, French and British governments have together shipped over USD 26,000 worth of pistols and revolvers, ammunition, grenades and anti-personnel mines (APM) between 1993 and 1998.

Despite the presence of arms sanctions, the US has been by far the biggest supplier of both 'legal' and covert weapons since the 1980s[37]. According to a combination of UN (*2005*) and *US reports* the country has

exported at least 542 military-style weapons, 2,723 shotguns, 1,667 pistols/revolvers, 1,260,000 rounds of ammunition, and over USD 2 million worth of weapons and ammunition between 1991 and 2002 – in spite of the aforementioned multilateral and unilateral embargoes[38]. Military-style weapons and equipment were alleged to have been provided to the HNP through the back door via the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) until 1998 (Richardson, 1996; Nairn, 1996)[39]. The transfer of these weapons came to an abrupt end following the official termination of ICITAP after allegations emerged that US intelligence agencies were infiltrating and undermining the programme. But legal transfers from the US resumed in 2004, as noted above.

Table 2. A sample of reported small arms transfers to Haiti, 1990–2004

Date	Source	Status	Estimated number
1990	Switzerland	Legal	15–20 SIG-saur 9 mm pistols for HNP
1990–98	US	Legal	Military equipment and training for HNP
1993–94	US	Covert	5,000–10,000 .38 revolvers, 9 mm automatic rifles, M-3 grease-guns, Thompson sub-machine guns, Smith & Wesson .38 revolvers, and fragmentation grenades
1995	US (Florida)	Illegal	260 firearms, 15,000 rounds of ammunition
1996	US (Florida)	Illegal	At least 12 .45 handguns, ammunition
1998	US (Florida)	Illegal	78 M16 assault rifles, 9,000 rounds of ammunition
2000	US	Legal	187 shotguns, 20 pistols, 86,000 rounds of ammunition, USD 2,000 of pistols
2001	Brazil	Legal	USD 36,977 of shotguns
2001	US (Florida)	Illegal	5–10 .38 and .45 handguns
2001–04	US–Dominican Rep	Covert	M16s, ammunition, and equipment
2001	US	Legal	150 shotguns, 20 pistols, 33,000 rounds of ammunition, USD 31,199 of bombs, grenades and ammunition, USD 3,800 of ammunition
2002	US	Legal	155 sport rifles, 1 pistol, 36,000 rounds of ammunition
2004	South Africa	Covert	150 R1 rifles, 5,000 rounds of ammunition, grenades, etc.
2004	US	Legal	3,635 M14 rifles, 1,100 Mini Galils, 500 assorted .38 cals, 3,933 .38 cals, 700 MP5s, 1 million assorted rounds of ammunition for the HNP

Source: Assorted media reports, UN (2005) NISAT (2004)

Part of the covert arms trade is believed to have operated directly from the US, via the Dominican Republic, into Haiti. Prior to the reinstatement of President Aristide in 1994, considerable amounts of weaponry were reportedly transferred by the US to FRAPH forces. For example, 5,000–10,000 pieces of weaponry addressed to officers at the Haitian

national palace were alleged to have been received between 1993 and 1994, in spite of embargoes in force at the time. By November 1993, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) cable observed that the FRAPH paramilitary forces had considerably increased their capabilities, with its enforcers enjoying 'the perception of power derived from being able walk the streets of a town carrying an automatic weapon with total impunity' (Nairn, 1996, p. 14). Weapons were also reportedly provided to pro-opposition groups by the US indirectly between 2000 and 2004 through legal exports to third parties[40].

The US is believed to have channeled support to various anti-Lavalas opposition parties since the re-election of President Aristide in 2001[41]. The approach has combined both financial and covert military assistance. For example, it is widely rumoured that several hundred US Special Forces were involved in the training of a number of former FADH headed by Guy Philippe in the Dominican Republic[42]. Military equipment and supplies were believed to have been transferred via Dominican police and military authorities to members of the former Haitian military stationed in the Dominican Republic[43]. What is more, in mid-2003, a number of US citizens were also charged by the Haitian authorities with illegally shipping in army uniforms, assault weapons, munitions, and grenade launchers – ostensibly under the cover of Protestant NGOs – though their relationship with the US government remains unsubstantiated[44].

Due in part to various arms sanctions and an uneven legal trade in small arms and light weapons, successive Haitian administrations have trolled the black market for firearms. Predictably, the embargoes have led to a reliance on covert and illegal acquisitions. Drawing on a number of known intermediaries, the government has acquired weapons from a variety of countries, including South Africa[45] (see Table 2). Frustrated by its inability to acquire weapons legitimately, the president of the Interim Government has also repeatedly warned that his administration would source weapons from black markets if it is unable to secure arms through legitimate networks[46]. Black-market trading is persistent and an 'ant trade' for weapons – particularly pistols and revolvers – exists between Haiti and her outlying Caribbean neighbours. Source countries for illegal weapons since the early 1990s include Jamaica, Colombia, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic, as well as Central America (Richardson, 1996; Nairn, 1996; Mustafa, 2004)[47].

But the primary source of illegal pistols, revolvers, and automatic weapons remains the US – principally Florida. According to the ATF, at least one in four weapons smuggled from Miami, Pompano Beach, and Fort Lauderdale in the past two years has been destined for Haiti. Many of these weapons have entered through the Guajira Peninsula, Cap Haitien, Miragoane, Jacmel, and Port of Gonaives[48]. Members of the elite regularly smuggle pistols and revolvers from the US back to Haiti[49]. The physical means by which weapons – including 0.45 pistols and MAK-90s[50] – are smuggled into the country are ingenious: arms have been stored in tomato cans (1996), shipped by lobster vessels (1998), wrapped in frozen turkeys (2001), or packed in containers of bulk good such as textiles and used clothing.

As long as instability persists in Haiti, illegal weapons transfers will continue. The strong societal preferences for self-protection and predatory behaviour are obvious motivating factors for continued demand. Also, the fact that the country acts as a trans-shipment area for an estimated ten per cent of Colombian cocaine entering the US also ensures adequate resources for new weapons acquisitions[51]. Illegal transfers and trafficking are facilitated by a combination of porous and poorly monitored borders and the corrupt customs services[52]. For example, some 500 Haitian police and army officers returning from Dominican Republic and Jamaica after the ousting of President Aristide in early 2004 are known to have kept their weapons. Jamaica has opportunistically attributed its own recent escalation in violent crime to Haitian police, as well as the instability plaguing the country (AP, 2004).

The leakage of small arms, light weapons, and ammunition from domestic stockpiles is also common. Small arms are regularly channeled from police armories by 'insiders' and transferred to sympathetic OPs, militia groups, and criminal gangs in urban centres. For example, according to former palace guards, at least 4,000 weapons (a combination of assault rifles, pistols, and revolvers) were provided by former President Aristide to the *chimères* – including arms provided by South Africa – in the days leading up to his ousting in early 2004[53]. The role of the previous Aristide government, HNP officers and magistrates in distributing weapons to sympathetic militia and organized crime is equally well known, if seldom substantiated[54]. A review of weapons collected by MIF and MINUSTAH since March 2004 indicates that many weapons issued to former HNP officers have been collected, though most of these have subsequently been returned to the HNP (see Tables 8 and 9).

IV. Policing, correctional services, and the role of the army

The inability of the Haitian state to ensure the security of its civilians is a long-standing challenge. The HNP is the sole force vested with maintaining public order and security. Immediately following the dissolution of the Haitian army in late 1994, Presidential Decree 103 (28 December) outlined the framework for the revitalized HNP under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice[55]. The HNP was responsible for monitoring and regulating borders and frontiers – both through coast guard and customs, despite the existence of a separate customs code. At its height in 2003, the HNP counted some 6,300 active personnel among its ranks, distributed amongst 189 *commissariats* and *sous-commissariats* around the country[56].

Although it has always been widely admonished for corruption, the recent deterioration of the HNP has nonetheless been dramatic and profound[57]. The number of police personnel stood at fewer than 5,000 in late 2004, following a purge by the director-general in the aftermath of Aristide's departure. Many others abandoned their posts over the same period[58]. Since March 2004, more than 350 additional police officers were dismissed from the HNP but not disarmed, including 150 members of the palace guard (ICG, 2004). But as of January 2005, neither CIVPOL, OAS, nor HNP personnel could confirm the total number of registered officers, despite on-going efforts to review force needs[59].

Police infrastructure is in disarray: some 125 *commissariats* and *sous-commissariats* were destroyed entirely in early 2004 and an additional 75 require repairs. Day-to-day activities – including border and frontier controls – are virtually non-functional, due to the absence of adequate materials and personnel. The CCI contends that some 225 *commissariats* and *sous-commissariats* will be required in all to provide for all metropolitan and rural areas. The UN commissioner for police claimed in late 2004 that approximately 6,500 HNP will ultimately be installed, a ratio of one officer to every 1,300 Haitian civilians[60]. Some observers argue that even with the planned increases in police staffing, the new force will be inadequate to secure the safety of both urban and rural civilians[61].

The HNP is legally responsible for the control and regulation of small arms and light weapons throughout the country. Articles 7 and 8 of the

1994 Presidential Decree emphasize the role of the police in controlling weapons throughout the national territory, as well as the activities of private security actors. On paper, the control and registration of weapons is regulated by the Central Department for Administrative Police (DCPA), though it has not been operational since 2002. Falling under the overall jurisdiction of the *Direction Central de la Police Judiciares, the Bureau de Renseignements Judiciares* (BRJ), and the *Bureau de la Police Scientifique et Technique* (BPST) are also charged with monitoring permits and following up crimes involving small arms, though these departments have been practically inactive since 2002. The Haitian government suspended the issuance of new firearm licences and renewal of existing weapons permits in 2003, though there appear to be new permits among some ex-FADH. As a result, most formerly legal weapons in Haiti are now technically illegal.

Despite a long-established juridical tradition spanning over two hundred years, the country's legal and administrative systems are disproportionately reliant on the executive and riddled with incompetence. Though efforts have been directed at overcoming corruption and restoring public confidence in the legal process – such as the introduction by the French government of a Magistrate's School[62] and support for the training of judicial officials – the judicial sector continues to be hampered by chronic underfunding, poor human resources, and the absence of basic equipment. The outbreak of armed violence in 2004 exacerbated the situation: at least eight court houses were destroyed[63] and few judges report for work. There is no information on the activities or whereabouts of the 600 judges who comprised the Haitian judicial system.

Another source of persistent human insecurity is the country's prisons. A significant proportion of the membership of armed gangs, so-called resistance fronts and OPs include former inmates who have escaped over the years. The state of the prisons and correctional system is worrisome – particularly given their legacy in providing recruits for armed violence. Correctional facilities have in particular earned a reputation for their ineffectiveness over the years[64]. In late 2003, there were some 21 correctional facilities in the country, including two prisons. The OAS estimates that these were staffed by 600 correctional officers, 52 of them women. More than 3,800 prisoners were reportedly incarcerated in late 2003, of which more than 80 per cent were considered 'pre-trial' detainees.

Despite UN and OAS training and education of correctional officials and the rehabilitation of prison facilities since the mid-1990s, conditions were described as 'over-crowded' in various ICRC, OAS and Amnesty International reports. The ICRC was authorized to access political prisoners in January (2004) – estimated at some five per cent of the total. But immediately following the ousting of President Aristide, all prisons and jails were emptied of convicts[65]. Together with MINUSTAH, the HNP has managed to reimprison approximately 50 per cent of those who escaped[66].

A lingering threat continues to be the current and future role of former army members: the ex-FADH. Though the Haitian national army was officially dissolved in 1994 and its soldiers 'demobilized' between 1994 and 1996, it nevertheless is perceived by its membership to have constitutional legitimacy. Moreover, the FADH appears to have actually grown in the intervening years, as new recruits joined its forces. Despite the fact that an army presents an inordinate expense, appears to have little strategic utility in the Haitian context and has been deeply implicated in widespread and systematic violations of human rights, it seems that many in the current Interim Government and amongst the economic elite would prefer to see it reinstated[67]. It is clear that the 1,500–2,000 mobilized FADH (and post-1995 recruits) represent a very real threat to national and human security.

A former member of Haiti's disbanded Armed Forces aims his weapon in December 2004, after hearing shots and rumours that UN peacekeepers are planning to dislodge the band of ex-soldiers from their makeshift headquarters in Petit Goave. © REUTERS/Daniel Morel

A secretary for national security was appointed in late 2004, presumably to begin addressing the specific interests of the FADH. The Interim Government also simultaneously established three separate commissions to review the grievances of the former military. A three-person Demobilized Soldiers Management Bureau was established in late-October 2004, under the auspices of the *Conseil Supérieur de la Police Nationale*, ostensibly to reintegrate demobilized soldiers into civilian life. The bureau has announced its intention to provide 'indemnity payments' and 'pensions' for some 5,000 legitimate members of the FADH throughout 2005, though there appears to be no clear determination of how the anticipated USD 29 million budget will be covered[68]. Confusingly, the minister of justice also recently called for the establishment of a 'private security entity' made up of former soldiers, during meetings with donors and key officials in late 2004[69]. What is more, CIVPOL privately advanced the concept of an 'auxiliary force', under the supervision of MINUSTAH, to supplement the HNP. The debate over the future shape and role of the FADH is very much alive and must be clarified as a matter of urgency.

V. The effects of armed violence and insecurity

Haitian civilians face a wide variety of threats to their well being and livelihoods. Indicators of their human insecurity range from fatal and non-fatal injuries to widespread perceptions of fear, reduced mobility, kidnapping and intimidation, targeted electoral violence, and suppressed macro- and micro-economic activity. But many of these go unrecorded. Rumours and speculation predominate. The country's human rights and humanitarian communities do not practise a culture of evidence-based advocacy or awareness building.

This study undertook a rapid assessment of a number of available indicators of human insecurity in Haiti. The gathering of longitudinal and comparative data could potentially be used to monitor the quantitative and qualitative impacts of discrete violence-reduction initiatives such as DDR, community policing, and SSR. Without this data, any discussions on strengthening human security will continue to be anecdotal and piecemeal. It should be emphasised that the following analysis is far from exhaustive, and that more robust baseline analysis of both arms availability and socio-economic profiles of affected communities is required if interventions are to be effectively evaluated over time.

Public-health costs

Security is widely believed to be a core priority for Haitians. But despite past and on-going UN interventions, insecurity has and will continue to be the norm for the foreseeable future. A clear indicator of insecurity is death – measured as a direct consequence of homicide and intentional violence or indirectly as excess mortality associated with raised levels of acute morbidity. Though records are inconsistent, the ICRC estimates that at least 500 people were fatally injured as a result of gunshot wounds in the period of acute violence between September 2003 and May 2004. At least 200 more individuals were shot and killed between June and December 2004 – and dozens of police officers fatally wounded in the month of October alone.

Drawing on records from the General Hospital of Port-au-Prince, the US-based National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR) claims that some 170 civilians were fatally injured and 241 non-fatally injured between September and October (NCHR, 2004). Though difficult to independently verify, at the peak of the recent tensions in January 2004 just before the forced departure of President Aristide, the injury-to-killed ratio in northern areas such as Gonaives rose to 6:1, while in Port-au-Prince it was as high as 15:1[70].

Other violations of human rights and humanitarian law are common. There have been frequent allegations of children using weapons (primarily pistols and revolvers) in contravention of international norms on child soldiers and the rights of children (Amnesty International, 2004a; 2004b). Moreover, reports emerged of the unprofessional and excessive use of force by the HNP, including the misuse of M16s against the civilian population and the lethal use of teargas and riot-control weapons at close quarters[77]. Though verified and continuous national surveillance data on mortality is unavailable, descriptive information on external injuries affected by armed violence can be determined (see Table 3).

Table 3. Profile of firearm injuries in Port-au-Prince, Sep. 2003–April 2004

	Trauma	Violent Trauma	Blade injuries	Firearm limb	Firearm body	Firearm head	Firearm death	Other in-patients	Total in-patients
Sep. 03	0	20	6	1	9	2	2	88	119
Oct. 03	2	10	6	2	2	0	1	86	109
Nov. 03	0	18	14	2	1	0	1	105	141
Dec. 03	1	18	37	15	4	1	0	8	84
Jan. 04	0	2	36	45	13	7	8	17	128
Feb. 04	1	12	24	22	23	20	1	3	106
Mar. 04	4	19	35	34	21	11	3	47	174
Apr. 04	7	10	21	15	6	1	0	67	127
Total	15	109	179	136	79	42	16	421	988

Source: Collated records from Canapé Vert Hospital (2004)

Trauma: Psychological symptoms / Violent trauma: Physical injuries and asphyxiation / Blade injury: Multiple flesh wounds (cranial, body, or other) / Firearm limb: Arm or leg injuries / Firearm body: Abdomen, thorax, or buttocks injuries / Firearm head: Cranial, neck injuries / Firearm death: Injuries leading to death / Other in-patients: Cardiac, disease, pregnancy, illness, etc.

There are many reasons why it is difficult to develop a robust profile of deaths, injuries, and other incidents associated with armed violence in Haiti. For one, national and municipal public-health and crime-surveillance

capacities are limited, uneven, and under-funded[72]. The public and non-governmental sectors do not have a strong tradition of collecting and systematizing longitudinal data[73]. The destruction of HNP information systems, such as they were, in early 2004 means that even (under-) reported criminal trends may never be known. Even qualitative research is lacking, due to the limited access to many areas of the north and east between 2003 and 2004.

More worrisome, health and policing services have been increasingly politicized and the site of considerable armed violence. Extra-judicial killings and gun battles within hospitals were common in the months leading up to and following Aristide's departure. Patients – particularly wounded police officers and members of various armed groups – were regularly targeted, as were medical personnel themselves. In both the Port-au-Prince General and Gonaives Hospitals, for example, atrocities such as the extra-judicial execution of injured police officers and civilians were common. Others have been fatally and non-fatally injured in the ensuing crossfire or during hostage takings within hospital walls. For these and other reasons, national and regional data is poorly stored and managed, and doctors are wary of servicing armed elements and injured patients unwilling even to register during times of acute need[74]. Because of the limited faith in public-sector services, as well as the climate of fear associated with hospitals, selection biases are tremendous.

Despite the best efforts of the ICRC and others, the national public-health and international-humanitarian sectors were unprepared for the scale and distribution the armed violence affecting Haiti over the past two years. While the Ministry of Health and the *Ecole de Médicine* held a seminar in June 2004 to prepare surgeons to deal with poly-trauma and injuries, available surgical and clinical facilities were ill-equipped to deal with the logistics of a massive influx of war wounded. In fact, between November 2003 and May 2004, surgical capacities in Port-au-Prince were almost entirely shut down. The capital's two public hospitals (800 beds) and the dozen or so remaining private clinics were closed down. Only the erstwhile Military Hospital, reopened by Cuban doctors on contract to support the Ministry of Health, provided nominal services at the height of the crisis.

Accounting for the costs of firearm injury

Determining the financial burden of firearm injury is exceedingly difficult and controversial. Though direct expenditures and productivity losses associated with wounds can be estimated, calculating the intangible costs—the emotional and psychological consequences of injury for individuals and families—is controversial, if not impossible. Discussions with surgeons and financial managers at various private clinics in Port-au-Prince revealed a preliminary snapshot of the immediate financial burden of firearm injury. Estimations of 'victim assistance' were not rendered, but can safely be assumed to inflate the overall costs.

Even during so-called 'peaceful' times, a considerable number of Haitians turn to private services, due to the decrepit state of the public-health infrastructure. Because publicly administered health services are often unreliable or inaccessible, the rural poor themselves often turn to traditional medicine, though even this is often out of reach. For most, the public-health costs are prohibitive. Assuming an annual income of USD 350 a year, few people have regular and consistent access to health services, let alone emergency treatment, care, and long-term disability assistance. The economic costs of firearm injuries are extremely high. Even before someone is injured, they are liable for up to USD 60 per month for insurance premiums, and a deductible levy of approximately USD 1,800. With the exception of the most traumatized patients, all in-coming victims are required to pay a deposit of USD 200 before they can be administered a single treatment.

The costs of treatment can vary according to the severity of the wound. Operating theatre (OT) costs are approximately USD 100 per day. Costs of medication, including anesthetics (USD 700–1,000), antibiotics (USD 50–200), laboratory work (USD 100–150), and radiographs (USD 20–30), are borne by the patient. Surgeons are hired privately on a needs basis, and costs vary according to their specialty. According to some hospital administrators, the costs for firearms-related surgery on the abdomen, limbs and skull range from USD 2,000 to USD 5,000. If the patient needs to be evacuated to the US, the costs can rise to USD 11,000. With rooms costing USD 40–150 a night, injured patients can stay in the hospital for between three and seven days.

The costs of treatment and care following their release are also prohibitive, if hidden. In the case of Canapé Vert, *Médicins sans Frontières* and *Médicins du Monde* provided some additional post-operation stabilization services, including the continued provision of beds, traction, and some medication. But most of the injured did not receive this care. Productivity losses, including disability-adjusted life years or life expectancy (DALYs, DALEs) are unknown. Assuming the cost structure outlined above, a firearm injury costs the equivalent of roughly USD 5,170 for a patient with an extremity injury, assuming a five-day stay in hospital and no further complications. The costs rise above USD 8,680 for more acute injuries to the abdomen or head. The overall financial burden swells to USD 20,000 if the patient requires medi-evacuation, though this does not include madical-related costs incurred in the US. Given the injury profile experienced at Canapé Vert Hospital for the period September 2003 to April 2004, total costs of firearm injuries rose above USD 2,703,400[75].

The ICRC has invested in supporting the treatment of victims of intentional armed violence. The privately operated Canapé Vert Hospital, temporarily subsidized by the ICRC to provide services to all victims of war, remained open in Port-au-Prince during the tensions. The ICRC determined that an influx of war wounded could be managed and absorbed provided additional materials, OT capacity and blood banks were made available. The buildings were fortified with barbed wire, walls, and French troops to protect the hospital during the height of the armed violence[76]. In the north, two private US-run hospitals, the Pignon Hospital and the Albert Schweitzer Hospital, also functioned during the crisis. Their catchment areas extended to Gonaives and Cap Haitien.

Figure 2. Typology of firearm injuries by vocation, Sep. 2003-April 2004



Source: Adapted from out-patient records at Canapé Vert Hospital (October 2004)

A comprehensive review of available out-patient records at the only functioning hospital in Port-au-Prince during September 2003 and April 2004 (Canapé Vert) reveals a number of important patterns. For example, of a total of 988 records over the eight-month period, more than 58 per cent were victims of intentional armed violence. Over a quarter of all victims (27 per cent) were treated for gunshot wounds. Of these, one in four included limb injuries, one in ten suffered firearm injuries to their chest, abdomen, or buttocks, and seven per cent sustained head wounds. Over one per cent of all reported in-patients to OT died of their firearm-related injuries. Moreover, the majority of all victims of small arms injuries were students (some 48 per cent), followed by representatives of the commercial sectors (25 per cent) and the police (16 per cent) (see Figure 2)[77].

Perceptions of insecurity

Though objective surveillance-based indicators of mortality and morbidity provide a useful gauge of human insecurity, it is the subjective experience of individuals and households that is often more important. In fact, how violence and insecurity are subjectively experienced has immediate and tangible implications for supposedly objective decision making, including

everything from night-time mobility, schooling, and employment to membership of militia groups and armed gangs. As is well known in Port-au-Prince, even a single gunshot can lead to school closures; massive road congestion as people seek refuge outside of central areas of the city; formal and informal market closures; and reduced attendance at factories, ports, and other essential services.

Perception surveys recently undertaken in Haiti indicate a number of common trends. A national household survey of over 1,000 individuals sponsored by the UN in 2004, for example, notes that some 60 per cent of urban Haitians were frightened in their own homes, as compared to 15–20 per cent of rural residents. Almost half (45 per cent) of urban respondents indicated that they were 'fearful' of driving to the nearest town or going to markets, while roughly half the number of rural households felt the same. The implications of reduced mobility for school attendance and literacy – particularly in violence-prone areas – are well known (UNDP, 2004c).

A separate small-scale victimization survey undertaken in Carrefour-Feuille in late 2003, a comparatively non-violent slum area in Port-au-Prince, also revealed a number of differentiated patterns of victimization. Drawing on a sample of some 800 households in four sectors of the community, the survey appraised the various manifestations and distributions of violence (Calpas, 2004). Though rates were spatially varied, it found that gun-related victimization was astoundingly high. Specifically, some 40 per cent of respondents experienced street fights in which guns were used, while death threats at gun-point (33 per cent), armed robbery (26 per cent), protests, domestic violence (24 per cent), and rape also ranked high. According to the same survey, one quarter of all respondents claimed to have had a family member recently victimized by armed violence. Almost half claimed to know of someone killed or injured by gunfire[78].

Militarized politics

There is a long-standing and pervasive tradition of weapons ownership and misuse in the Haitian political arena. The firearm holds a fierce symbolic resonance for Haitians. At independence in 1791, popular myth indicates that 30,000 flintlock weapons were distributed to freed slaves and their ownership was subsequently tied inextricably to popular

conceptions of 'freedom'. The use of firearms to advance ostensibly populist objectives became quickly engrained on the political landscape. In the first few decades of independence, politics was to become heavily militarized and militia groups (e.g. the 'cacos') were formed to consolidate power in the hands of an aristocratic elite (Blumenthal, 2004).

The application of coercive force as a means of shoring up political advantage continued into the twentieth century. Following the US occupation in 1915, a disarmament programme was introduced to address militia groups. A National Army and gendarmerie were formed and trained shortly thereafter. Following the US withdrawal in 1934, politicians and elite resumed their militarization of militia groups. The use of violence in advancing personal and political gain reached its apogee under the Duvalier dynasty, with the formation of the notorious *Ton Ton Macoute* – a voluntary militia believed to have grown to more than 300,000 members by 1986[79]. Elected with a populist mandate in 1990, President Aristide's Lavalas Party created the 'zenglendos' or 'attachés', which were a group of armed gangs that acted as the president's personal army. These would later go through several transformations, with some eventually adopting oppositional stances. Despite the introduction of a Truth and Reconciliation process, the climate of impunity persisted[80]. Though temporarily deposed, on Aristide's return following the US-led Operation Uphold Democracy[81], he promptly disbanded the army and concentrated authority in the HNP and his own armed gangs. These gangs were to later adopt the mantle of '*chimères*' in 2002.

External actors have played a role in militarizing Haitian politics. The US-based International Republic Institute (IRI), for example, contributed substantially to the growth of opposition parties during the 2000 legislative and presidential elections. The *Espace de Concertation* and the Democratic Convergence were two disparate parties created to challenge pro-Aristide Lavalas. Despite the fact that over 60 per cent of registered voters turned up to vote in favour of Lavalas, with few reports of violence during the legislative elections, the OAS and US government have consistently described the election as flawed and fraudulent[82]. The opposition capitalized on the alleged election 'flaws' as a pretext to boycott the November 2000 presidential elections[83]. President Aristide was nevertheless elected with a controversial majority.

The Group of 184 emerged in 2002 to generate a consolidated front against Lavalas. The so-called 'constitutionalist wing' of the Group of 184 subsequently mounted anti-Aristide street protests between 2002

and 2003, while 'hard-liners' devised plans for forcing Aristide from office. The latter are alleged to have enlisted Guy Philippe to assume leadership of a 'resistance' force consisting of exiled members of FRAPH death squads and FADH[84]. Following their assault on Port-au-Prince, President Aristide was forced to leave the country on 29 February 2004. Despite the installation of the Interim Government[85] and the arrival of successive international military intervention forces, the FADH, former paramilitary leaders, armed gangs, and prison evacuees now effectively control most of the Haitian countryside. Disarmament of high-risk groups must be regarded as a vital precondition of free and fair elections[86].

VI. Practical disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

There have been a number of small-scale disarmament efforts launched by a combination of international and national actors since the mid-1980s. Many such efforts have adopted coercive strategies, while others have entailed a combination of buy-back and voluntary approaches. Efforts in the late 1990s to institutionalize the process through small-scale public awareness campaigns and the formation of a national focal point on small arms have been unsuccessful[87]. Combining all of the various collection initiatives, fewer than 4,265 weapons have been collected since the mid-1990s. Including the US operation in 1994–95, the number rises to 19,501. From the available documentation, it would appear that only 2,435 of these – about 12 per cent – have been destroyed. Given the number and distribution of small arms throughout Haiti, new, flexible, and innovative approaches to disarmament are sorely needed.

Table 4. Reported weapons-collection activities, 1995–2004

Operation	Date	Type	Area	Weapons collected	Weapons destroyed
US military	1994–95	Coercive	National	15,236*	2,088
US military	1994–95	Buy-back	National	3,684**	N/A
HNP sweeps	1995	Coercive	National	N/A	N/A
HNP	2002	Coercive	Port-au-Prince	51	–
HNP Operation Hurricane	2002	Coercive	National	5	–
HNP operations	2002	Coercive	Port-au-Prince	37	–
HNP and OAS	2003	Coercive	National	233	233
UNDP: Carrefour District, Port-au-Prince	2003	Voluntary	Port-au-Prince	55	55 UN-held
MIF	2004	Coercive	National	135	39
MINUSTAH	2004	Coercive	National	65	20 UN-held
Total				*19,501*	*2,435*

** Some 15,236 weapons were alleged to have been seized, of which 2,961 were assault rifles, 1,446 were sub-machine guns, 7,450 rifles, 604 shotguns, 2,413 handguns, 5 M5 tank artillery, 1 M3A1 tank grease-gun, as well as an assortment of V150, anti-tank, mortar, howitzer, AAA, RR, B399, and automatic ammunition.*

*** Some 10,196 'items' were collected, of which 3,389 were classified as small arms and light weapons (US Army 1996)*

Encouragingly, the CCI calls for a multi-pronged approach to national disarmament[88]. The UN supports this strategy and is undertaking an integrated approach to DDR organized through the NCDDR. The integrated MINUSTAH/UNDP DDR Section, together with CIVPOL and the Haitian Ministries of Justice and the Interior, intends to implement a combination of involuntary arms seizures with a voluntary weapons-collection initiative linked to socio-economic reintegration, community development, and reconciliation activities (UNDP 2005; 2004b). Together with the UNDP, the DDR section would also invest in strengthening the current legal and administrative capacity to regulate and contain arms possession and trade through the drafting of new legislation for parliament[89].

But it is also important to recall past DDR efforts in Haiti. Perhaps the largest followed the US-led Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994. This included a large-scale disarmament initiative between September 1994 and March 1995. The goals of the programme were to (i) reduce the number of weapons; (ii) promote stability; and (iii) provide monetary incentives to Haitian citizens who supported the programme. One element of the programme was coercive, involving the seizing of caches and door-to-door searches. Some 15, 236 weapons were seized (see Table 4)[90].

Table 5. US weapons buy-back, 1994-95

	Number returned	Value per weapon (USD)*	Approximate value (USD)
Handguns	1,516	200	283,200
Assault rifles	504	800	403,200
Sub-machine guns	401	800	320,800
Shotguns	152	400	60,800
Rifles	1,097	400	438,800
Rifles GL	21	800	16,800
Machine gun	1	1,200	1,200
Flare guns	2	100	200
Total small arms and light weapons	3,684		1,525,000
Explosives and chemical devices	6,512		399,950
Total including explosives	10,196		1,924,950

** The exchange value for weapons changed during the course of the intervention. According to O'Connor (1996) and Richardson (1996), the amount offered for returned weapons was reduced by 50 per cent at the end of 1995. See also US Army (1996).*

Handguns include 0.38, PT 92, 0.32 and 0.45. Rifles include M1, Monesverg, flintlock and percussion. Automatics include U21, Gaul, M16, AR18, FNFAL, FNFAP and M14. Heavy weapons include 30 cal. MG and M240 COAX.

Originally launched as a 'buy-back', the operation of the US 10th Mountain Division collected over 10,196 items, of which 3,684 were small arms and light weapons. The management of the buy-back has been brought into question (Mendiburu and Meek, 1996). According to the US spokesman at the time, Col. Barry Willey, US troops were 'handing them on to the Haitian police, who in turn have been letting most of them go' (Preston, 1995). Other weapons were reportedly stored in military vehicles and subsequently shipped back to the US for destruction (at Letterkenny, Pennsylvania), or safeguarded as museum pieces[91]. Key informants in Cité de Soleil have claimed that a number of these were seized by gangs in 1994, but that the US representatives turned a blind eye.

The US-administered buy-back initiative was widely regarded as unsuccessful. Its focus was on military caches and 'crew-served' weapons. The approach it adopted was extremely selective (Nairn, 1996, p. 12)[92]. By their own admission, US Army commanders have stated that the programme was a 'dismal failure' in reducing the number of weapons and achieving a secure and stable environment (USA, 2000; Harding, 1994)[93]. The UN and US repeatedly clashed over the extent and effectiveness of the operation (Preston, 1995)[94]. But criticisms of the intervention came hard and fast. For example, weapons were believed to be of an extremely low quality, with some better quality weapons being passed on to the US Department of Justice-funded ICITAP police training programme. The US was criticised for inadequately investing in local intelligence (to determine the location of large arms caches). Political will to undertake national disarmament was never established. Soldiers claimed at the time that the buy-back had created a 'market' for weapons, with new ones being smuggled in from the Dominican Republic or from Haitian ports (O'Connor, 1996).

The entire buy-back exercise is alleged to have cost some USD 1,924,950 – or USD 522 per returned firearm[95]. But far from promoting a culture of disarmament, the intervention is rumoured to have made a small minority of FADH, FRAPH, and organized criminals (e.g. 'middle-men') extremely wealthy[96]. According to some informants, guns were often returned from the backs of expensive Toyota Land Cruisers by well-dressed individuals (O'Connor, 1996). Moreover, it is also believed that the buy-back initiative suffered from leaks and recycling of weapons. According to various media reports, 'rockets, cannon rounds, grenades, and rifles also vanished during or after military operations in Haiti', although absolute numbers are unknown[97].

Table 6. Demobilizing FADH, 1994-96

Status	Number	Percentage
Estimated number of FADH*	6,250	100 per cent of potential target group
Registered with IOM	5,482	88 per cent of target group
Accepted training	5,204	95 per cent of those registered with IOM
Dropped out	337	6 per cent of those accepting training
Graduated	4,867	94 per cent of those accepting training
Received tool kits**	4,734	97 per cent of those graduating
Participated in ORS***	4,572	94 per cent of those graduating
Employed (via ORS)	304	6 per cent of those graduating

** There are no reliable figures on the number of FADH prior to the US-lead intervention in 1994. Statistics here are based on US and UN estimates, which do not rise above 7,000.*

*** Tool kits included basic tools for the chosen vocation of graduating FADH and were valued at USD 120 each.*

**** ORS = Opportunity and Referral Service*

At the same time as the weapons buy-back, efforts to demobilize and reintegrate the Haitian military were also undertaken. Demobilization and reintegration of the FADH was launched simultaneously by the USAID's Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI) and IOM. The intervention was designed with 'political' (as opposed to socio-economic) objectives in mind: to neutralize spoilers and to lay the foundations for the reintegration of former FADH into Haitian society[98]. Some 5,482 ex-FADH registered for the Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DRP) between September 1994 and November 1996 (see Table 6). Approximately 200 were integrated directly into the HNP, which then numbered as many as 5,300. All demobilized soldiers were eligible to participate in the programme, registering first with IOM. Vocational training and other skills development were supplemented with six-month stipends and support through the ORS. The total cost of the programme amounted to some USD 8.6 million (Dworken et al., 1997, p. 21).

The DRP followed a conventional format. Its primary focus was on providing a variety of training and vocational opportunities to ex-FADH. According to an independent evaluation, training choices by former soldiers included auto mechanics (37 per cent), electrical repairs (14 per cent), computers and IT (12 per cent), plumbing (11 per cent), welding (7 per cent), masonry (7 per cent), carpentry, general mechanics, and refrigeration. Demobilized soldiers were also provided with a USD 100 per month stipend to cover their 'transition' for a maximum of six months, equal to the salaries entitled to soldiers during their period in the military[99].

Table 7. FADH demobilization sites, 1994-96				
	Region	**FADH demobilization**	**IPSF demobilization**	**Total**
Port-au-Prince	Croix de Bouquets	222	24	246
	Casernes Dessalines	958	–	958
	District de Carrefour	736	–	736
	Corps des Pompiers	–	497	497
	Casernes de la Police	445	1,622	2,067
Province	Northwest	38	–	38
	North	27	–	27
	Plateau Central	101	113	214
	Artibonite	131	82	213
	Northeast	128	90	218
	Grandanse	50	–	50
	South	116	–	116
	Southeast	192	–	102
Total		3,054	2,428	5,482
Source: Dworken et al (1997)				

It should be recalled that the DRP did not focus on collecting or destroying weapons. Of the 5,482 FADH slated for demobilization, there are no records of their arms being surrendered and it can be assumed that most were left with military-style weapons. The weapons buy-back, running concurrently, was designed to retrieve these weapons, though no independent evaluation has been conducted to measure its success (Hayes and Weatley, 1996; O'Connor, 1996). Even so, according to an independent evaluation, the DRP did help to 'protect the US military force, and contributed to the maintenance of a secure and stable environment' (Dworken et al., 1997).

More recently, the OAS has played a strong role in calling for disarmament. Mandated through various resolutions (806; 822), efforts have focused on generating public awareness, voluntarily collecting weapons, and separating legitimate firearms from illegal weapons in circulation (e.g. those not covered under the Constitution). But national disarmament efforts – even when supported by multilateral agencies – are always channeled through the Haitian government and the HNP. OAS initiatives have been frustrated by the Haitian government's reluctance to disarm its own constituencies and militia supporters. OAS informants have argued that buy-backs, the preferred approach of previous Haitian governments, have generally been ill-conceived and unsuccessful. For example, despite President Aristide's unilateral offer to pay twice the

asking price for weapons during various initiatives in 2002, virtually no weapons were ultimately returned (OAS, 2002; 2004a).

Under the auspices of OAS Resolution 822, the HNP launched a series of coercive collection initiatives following the re-election of President Aristide in 2001. For example, in various operations conducted in July 2002, some 51 weapons were reportedly seized in Port-au-Prince (6 conventional, 2 'creole'), Delmas (14 conventional, 11 'creole'), Cité de Soleil (10 conventional, 6 'creole'), Carrefour (1 conventional), and Petion-Ville (1 conventional). Ammunition was also reported to have been collected in August, including 720 rounds of T-65 (5.56), 980 Galil rounds (5.56), 432 Uzi cartridges, 68 rifle cartridges, and 300 9 mm bullets. Operation Hurricane II, launched later in the year, managed to collect five small arms, despite interrogations of over 1,480 individuals and hundreds of boat and vehicle inspections, house searches, and drug seizures. Searches in high-risk areas in October led to the confiscation of 37 weapons of various types in Cité de Soleil and elsewhere (OAS, 2002).

Table 8. MIF and MINUSTAH weapons collection, March-Oct. 2004

	Region	MIF	March–June	MINUSTAH	June–Oct.
Capital	Port-au-Prince	Canada, US, Chile	91	Canada, US, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Nepal	53
Provinces	Artibonite	France	31	Argentina/Uruguay	3
	Northwest	France		–	–
	North	France		Chile	9
	Northeast	–	–	Spain	–
	Plateau Central	Chile	13	Nepal	–
	Grandanse	–	–	–	–
	South	–	–	Peru	–
	Southeast	–	–	Jordan	–
Total			135		65

Source: Based on interviews with MIF and MINUSTAH representatives (2004)

The UNDP has also recently launched a pilot project to appraise the merits of community-based approaches to violence reduction and disarmament (UNSC, 2004d; 2004e; UNDP 2004b). Beginning in April 2003, the project aimed to strengthen community capacities to improve local security through specialised development projects that addressed root causes or effects of violence. It also sought to promote non-violent conflict resolution and local reconciliation and provide alternatives to violence-based livelihoods through socio-economic reintegration assistance

to high-risk youth and gang members in exchange for the voluntary surrender of weapons and the disbanding of gang structures (Skzryerbak and Demetriou, 2004; Calpas, 2004). Some 200 armed gang members were originally anticipated, though limited funding for the reinsertion of 50 was ultimately made available. To support their reintegration, UNDP financed several small businesses (valued at USD 1,800 each) to be managed by beneficiaries (UNDP, 2004a; 2004b). Approximately 55 weapons were collected and returned to MINUSTAH – more than half of them 'creole' – over the course of the initiative.

Both MIF and MINUSTAH have embarked on weapons collection, together with the HNP, since March 2004. Over a period of three months, MIF collected some 200 weapons, as well as additional material and ammunition (see Tables 8 and 9). A profile of the weapons collected reveals a range of features of the disarmament exercises. For example, the majority of weapons collected were in urban areas of Port-au-Prince – over 70 per cent of the total. This reflects both the density of the Haitian population and armed violence, as well as the relative deployment strengths of MIF and MINUSTAH. What is more, no weapons have been collected from the southern areas, such as Grandanse and the South and Southeast Provinces, despite the widespread presence of arms use in the region.

Table 9. Profile of arms collected by MIF/MINUSTAH, March–Oct. 2004

Type	Quality		Destination			
	High quality	Low quality	Returned to owners	Returned to HNP	Stored by MINUSTAH	Destroyed or inoperable
Heavy	2	1	–	2	–	1
Automatic	23	15	–	19	10	9
Rifles	36	14	–	34	2	14
Handguns	89	15	15	69	9	11
Creole	–	1	–	–	1	–
Ammunition	4	–	–	–	–	4
Other	5	–	–	2	-	3
	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sub-total	154	46	15	123	20	39
Total	200		200			

Source: MIF and MINUSTAH files (confidential) 2004-2005

***Heavy**: M60, 40 mm grenade launcher / **Automatic**: M16, M14 Winchester, M1 Garand, M50 SMG Madsen, Atuo Lar50.42 Herstal, Uzi 9 mm, MP5 Heckler & Koch, M4 T-65, SKS, Ayti, Mini 14 Uzi 0.223 / **Rifles**: Mauser, Winchester, Mossberg, Mod 870 and Mod 88, Maverick Mossberg, Mod 88 Remington, Boito, Mod 151,*

Notes for Table 9 (continued)

*Mod 100 Remington, Crossman BB gun. 870 Mag Remington / **Handguns:** PT-92 Para 0.38 Taurus, 0.38 Smith and Weston, Mod 30 Glock, Mod 870 Remington, Mod 916A Enstfield, Mod PPK/S Walther, Auto P226 SIG Sauer 9 mm, 92FS Beretta 9 mm, P95DC Ruger 0.45, P89 Ruger 9 mm, SP101 Ruger 9 mm, PJK Browning 9 mm, Auto M1911A Colt, Dentonics 9 mm / **Creole:** 12.7 mm shotgun, others / **Ammunition:** 7.62, 5.56, 0.38 / **Other:** Magazines, parts, radios, gas masks, 12 inch daggers, machetes*

By assessing the types, quality, and destination of weapons collected, other trends emerge. For example, some 18 per cent of all weapons collected by MIF and MINUSTAH were automatic weapons such as M16s, Uzis, M50s, and T-65s. By far the majority seized were pistols and revolvers – some 52 per cent of the total. Though some 20 per cent of the (poorer quality) weapons were ultimately destroyed by the international forces, over 60 per cent of all weapons collected were returned to the HNP. Also, almost one in ten of all collected weapons were returned to registered civilian owners.

Normative disarmament

There are a number of international and domestic legal and customary prescriptions for arms ownership, trade, and use in Haiti. All signed and ratified international conventions and treaties carry domestic jurisprudence. There have also been a range of international and bilateral efforts to reduce the legal and illegal flow of weapons into Haiti, notably, the US, UN, and OAS embargoes initiated at various points between 1991 and 1994 (and beyond). But the country's capacity to monitor and enforce international and national legislation pertaining to weapons is hampered by an extremely weak legislative and judicial system. According to French Embassy officials, at the level of implementation, efforts fall short due to widespread lack of training, corruption and patronage, poor salaries, retributive politics, and procrastination: 'cumulatively, it is a system riddled with incompetence and mediocrity.'

As previously mentioned, the OAS adopted and implemented an arms embargo against Haiti in the aftermath of the 30 September 1991 coup. The US government initiated sanctions on Haiti four days later (USA, 1991)[100]. On the same day, the OAS adopted a resolution calling for the suspension of all 'military, police or security assistance of any kind and to prevent the delivery of arms, munitions or equipment to the country in any manner, public or private'. The embargo was extended by the US

government in 1994, following the introduction of an Amendment to ITAR (126), which called for the denial of all applications for licenses and other approvals to export or otherwise transfer defence articles and services to Haiti, including those for use by the police[101]. The details of the UN arms embargoes have been discussed in previous sections of this report.

Haiti has signed a number of international regulatory instruments to control the illegal flow of weapons. For example, on 14 November 1997, it signed the *Inter-American Convention Against the Manufacture and Trafficking of Illegal Small Arms, Munitions and Explosives*. Moreover, the country signed up to the *UN Convention Against Organized Trans-border Crime*, as well as its *Firearms Protocol* on 15 of December 2000. Finally, Haiti is a signatory to the UN *Programme of Action* of 2001.The *Inter-American Convention* provides the normative framework for the Haitian government to focus on regional arms flows. The convention cannot be ratified, however, due to the status of the Interim Government. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Justice claims to be working toward implementing key aspects of the convention and making it relevant for 'terrorist' threats. It is possible that appropriate legislation will be issued as presidential decrees, given the absence of parliamentary authority.

Haitians have a constitutional right to bear arms. This is a typically American civil right that co-exists within a French (Napoleonic) legal system – and as such generates certain contradictions. Articles 268.1 and 268.3 of the 1987 Constitution state that: 'every citizen has the right to armed self-defense within the confines of their home.' Though this right is expressed constitutionally, the Haitian penal code actually makes few mentions of weapons. Indeed, the calibre and type of weapons permitted to civilians were never specified in the 1987 Constitution. As a result, definitions of what actually constitute small arms or light weapons remain ambiguous and confusion over terminology persists. An effort to clarify the types of weapons permitted to civilians and private security companies was initiated in 1988 and 1989. Presidential Decree 41-A (1 June 1989) modifies Presidential Decree 4 (14 January 1988) with respect to the calibre permitted to civilians under the Constitution. Accordingly, 0.38, 9 mm, and 7.62 mm weapons were permitted, while heavier weapons and explosives were excluded. Moreover, the right to domestic possession was supported, though specialized permits were required for carrying guns out of the home. Presidential Decree 39 (22 May 1989) also permitted the state to delegate certain private organiza-

tions, named by the 'Security Agencies of the State', to carry out security-related activities[102].

The international community has repeatedly emphasised the importance of the disarmament of armed groups in Haiti and the strengthening of domestic arms-control regulation (UNSC, 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; 2004d; 2004e;OAS, 2002). Disarmament has been a key tenet of OAS efforts in Haiti, as outlined in Resolutions 806 and 822. The 'Prior Action Plan' adopted by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) also identifies core tenets of a potential disarmament process, including the development of a national disarmament programme and the implementation of pilot projects[103]. The OAS, together with UNDP, has also recently supported the drafting of new arms legislation to be presented to the Haitian Chamber of Representatives. Although the draft was written with the involvement of Haitian legal representatives, it was never put to a vote, due to the outbreak of violence in mid-2003. The integrated MINUSTAH/ UNDP DDR Section is currently supporting the updating of this draft legislation and its possible resubmission to the Interim Government.

VII. Conclusions

The achievement of human security is an over-riding priority for Haitians. Political, legal, and economic reform and recovery are inconceivable without real and perceived safety. Today, the provision of humanitarian relief and development investments is severely compromised by the prevalence of armed gangs and a climate of impunity. The international community and the Interim Government cannot postpone action. The security vacuum is expanding, and a clear and legitimate state presence is urgently required. As things currently stand, armed groups are filling the void, and there is a risk that the search for security be answered by ex-FADH and armed criminal gangs, to devastating effect.

The expectations of civil society, armed groups, the Interim Government and the international community must be managed effectively. There is widespread awareness of the political and economic implications of the CCI and its anticipated resources. International agencies, the Interim Government and stakeholders have assumed a range of expectations of how the process ought to proceed. But donors and others are wary: they have faced similar situations in the past. But it should be stressed that there are no quick-exit strategies for Haiti, and commitment must be long-term and sustained.

Ultimately, the Interim Government, Haitian civil society and the international community must together lead the DDR process. Past efforts to disarm armed groups and civilians have failed due to limited buy-in from Haitians themselves. Thus, strong and unambiguous political support for DDR must be demonstrated at the highest level. Basic agreement on standard concepts and strategies must be clearly articulated and agreed to. MINUSTAH's efforts to effectively communicate and advocate coordinated strategies must be redoubled. It is imperative that donors and multilateral actors such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), multilateral UN agencies and NGOs, and bilateral donors advance a coherent approach to pressuring the Interim Government. Internal coherence is prerequisite to ensuring that pledges are ultimately adopted. But an approach that builds on local realities, norms, and opportunities is similarly essential.

The DDR of FADH is an urgent priority. Due in part to mandate constraints, the USAID/IOM-led 1994–96 demobilization was incomplete and failed to effectively disarm and demobilize former FADH soldiers. Though the MINUSTAH DDR Section cannot be expected to resolve the political problems generated during the mid-1990s, the remaining 'mobilized' FADH should nevertheless be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated through the NCDDR, with technical support provided by the integrated MINUSTAH/UNDP DDR Section. DDR cannot be conceived as a reward for ex-FADH, but rather an approach to neutralizing spoilers. It should proceed in concert with DDR of other armed groups. In order to ensure that rights violations do not go unpunished, a human rights entity could also be established in parallel to ensure the transparent and legitimate screening of potential candidates. For the purposes of building confidence across civil society, weapons should be publicly destroyed.

On-going, credible, and compelling security guarantees are a precondition for creating adequate 'space' for effective DDR. The active engagement of MINUSTAH peacekeepers in creating the initial conditions for community engagement in DDR is essential. Rapid and convincing disarmament is required to reduce the presence of weapons and armed groups in affected areas. This must begin at the earliest possible moment, be backed up with sustained military resources and seek to capture the hearts and minds of violence-prone communities. A robust and sustained community policing effort is also vital in order to generate confidence in the DDR process. CIVPOL, together with a reconstituted HNP, will lead this process. Active patrolling, community outreach, neighbourhood watch groups, recreational groups, and even innovative artistic programmes could contribute to deterring weapons possession. This approach must be adequately supported and backed up with training by CIVPOL. Training schemes, mentoring programmes, and the generation of clear curriculums for participants are essential.

The DDR of armed gangs, *chimères*, prison escapees, and other factions is also vitally important. Several thousand armed members of popular OPs and the *baz* remain potentially armed, and exert considerable influence among local constituencies. DDR interventions in seven regions should begin in tandem with military and police interventions[104]. The integrated MINUSTAH/UNDP DDR Section has prepared a comprehensive and bottom-up approach to DDR. Drawing on a team of between 50 and 60 DDR experts, UN volunteers, and national employees, it will estab-

lish regional offices to begin promoting dialogue, public awareness, and small-scale programmes to disarm mobilized groups and promote reconciliation in 'communities of return'. Voluntary disarmament will be pursued in concert with efforts to generate alternatives to violence. Vocational training, quick-impact projects and other interventions to promote community reintegration and stigmatize arms use should be promoted. Equally important, the harnessing of local institutions such as radio[105], television, arts and music[106], and other festivals will be vital.

DDR requires a sophisticated understanding of community dynamics. This must be backed up with a deep knowledge of gang structures, their socio-economic profiles, the predominant values and norms, and preferences for weapons ownership in communities. It also requires a concerted attempt to identify factors and agents for peace, as much as those predisposed toward violence. On-going support to local leadership and honest brokers is vital. Urban and grassroots leaders are a vital component of successful DDR. As those involved in peace-building know all too well, reinforcing community capacities for peace is a crucial, if challenging, objective. Clear benchmarks and indicators of success for DDR must also be established. This is an essential element for generating accountability and transparency in the process. Identification of benchmarks should be participatory and locally generated in order to promote ownership and monitoring, and evaluation of implementation should harness community capacities.

Finally, the reform of the judicial sector and penal system is a pivot upon which the sustainability of DDR efforts depends[107]. A robust framework for the regulation of civilian and private security possession of weapons is an essential component of this legislative reform. But there is also an urgent need to clarify the current legal norms associated with civilian ownership. Existing regulations should be backed with enforcement. Because civilian- and state-owned weapons are regularly stolen or leaked to armed elements, the development of an effective registration system backed up with regular checks is an essential feature of any violence-reduction strategy.

Ultimately, DDR must follow the political process. DDR cannot on its own lead political and economic transformation in Haiti. But the danger exists that DDR could become politicized. In order to mitigate this risk, the NCDDR requires firm backing from within and without. It must clarify an approach to DDR that is equitable and transparent. At the very - minimum, DDR cannot be effectively designed, implemented, or monitored in an environment dominated by confusion and mistrust. If it is, there is a danger of history repeating itself in Haiti yet again.

Annexe 1. Typology of armed elements in Haiti

Category	Primary motivations	Description
Popular organizations (OPs)	Political, socio-economic, and predatory: linked to material gain and subsistence	OPs are community-based organizations that ordinarily enjoy tight relations with political leaders, redistribute resources, gather votes, and orchestrate vigilance brigades. The most well-known 'brigade' is the '*chimères*', which has ties to Fanmi Lavalas – Aristide's party.
Baz armés (youth gangs)	Socio-economic and predatory, though used by political groups such as OPs	Usually composed of unemployed and unskilled youth; often contracted directly by OP leadership to undertake acts of violence and intimidation. Many of these gangs join the 'brigades' mentioned above, while others operate autonomously.
Organized criminal gangs	Extractive and illegal rents, both international and national	These groups are generally involved in narcotics and weapons trafficking and organize youth gangs for defensive and commercial purposes. 'Dread Mackenzie' was the leader of such a group in Cité de Soleil.
Resistance fronts (ex-military and civilian)	Political opposition groups, seeking a combination of state control and illegal rents	These include former soldiers, ex-police, and former leaders, as well as educated elite, deportees, and OP members in the case of the 'Revolutionary Front of the North' and the erstwhile 'Cannibal Army' (1990s) and 'Artibonite Resistance Front' (2002)
Pro-opposition groups	Politically affiliated with opposition groups and in pursuit of illegal rents	These groups are anti-Lavalas and are often affiliated with and supported by ex-FADH, FRAPH, or political opposition groups such as Democratic Convergence or the Group of 184. An example is RAMICOS in St Marc.

Ex-USGPN (Presidential Guard)	Hand-selected armed actors appointed to protect Aristide	Individuals with limited police training who specialize in site protection. The majority are partisan to Aristide, recruited on the basis of political loyalty to Fanmi Lavalas in the 1990s and early 2000.
Ex-FADH	Political opposition groups, linked to reclamation of entitlements acquired in the period 1994–2004, as well as self-defence in various areas	Consists primarily of former combatants demobilized between 1994 and 1996 or members of the paramilitary group FRAPH.
Paramilitary death squads: FRAPH	Politically aligned militia or paramilitary groups operating in urban and rural areas	Haiti has over a century of history with paramilitarism: from FRAPH, established in 1993, to the *Ton Ton Macoute* under Duvalier in the 1970s and 1980s.
Zenglendos (petty criminals)	Predatory and illegal rents in urban and rural areas	These are primarily uneducated youth from impoverished districts. Included in this category are 'professional' criminals and 'amateurs'. They are often contracted by the *baz*.
Prison escapees	Predatory and illegal rents in urban and rural areas	This group is heterogeneous, with members of all ages and varying levels of charges. Many were former members of the *baz*.
Armed children	Victims of forced recruitment, though also active participants in some cases	Many of the abovementioned groups include small numbers of children often working in a 'supportive' capacity and not necessarily in possession of firearms.
'Zero Tolerance' groups	Predatory activities linked to political groups	These are not members of the police force, nor officially trained at the police academy; rather, they act as special units made up of armed civilian thugs and operate in police stations in large urban areas. They also often provide special security functions for key political figures.

Self-defence militias	Self-defence in wealthy urban environments	These are common in well-off neighbourhoods and commercial areas where residents and retailers have organized themselves in self-defence.
Private security companies (PSCs)	Socio-economic, though also associated with the trafficking of weapons	PSCs are not practically registered and the permissive regulatory firearms environment has allowed many to be heavily armed. PSCs were legalized in 1987 and 1988 by presidential decree.
HNP associated with criminal groups	Predatory and illegal rents, as well as linkages with political factions	The HNP was formally reconstituted by presidential decree in 1994, following the demobilization of the FADH. It is notoriously corrupt and regularly accused of human rights violations and politicization.

Culture and communications	France	Culture	France, Brazil, US, CIDA, UNFPA, WFP, FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, World Bank
Humanitarian aid	UNDP, OCHA	Interior	France, US, CIDA, EU, UNDP, OCHA, WHO, FAO, WFP, UNICEF
Potable water, sanitation, and waste management	IADB, WHO	TPTC	France, Spain, CIDA, EU, IADB, World Bank, UNESCO, WHO, UNHABITAT

Source: CCI (2004)

** Acronyms used here are given in the list of acronyms at the beginning of the paper.*

Annexe 3. Reported US arms transfers to Haiti, 1991-2004

	Military-style weapons	Shotguns	Pistols/ revolvers	Ammunition ('000)	Value (USD '000)
1991	0	0	0	0	26
1992	0	0	0	0	0
1993	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0	0	0
1995	0	512	940	529	457
1996	530	448	0	0	369
1997	10	306	357	172	248
1998	0	703	99	73	650
1999	2	272	227	331	198
2000	0	187	23	86	67
2001	0	140	20	33	75
2002	0	155	1	36	37
2003	0	0	0	0	0
2004	5,435	0	4,433	1,000	6,950

Source: Assorted US and NGO-related reports

Annexe 4. MIF weapons collection and destruction, March–June 2004

Calibre	Condition	Surrendered*	Source	Final disposition*
7.62 & 5.56	Fair	04-04-29	Conf. – Chileans	Destroyed 04-05-16
unknown	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
12 ga	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	
7.62	Unserviceable	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
12 ga	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	
12 ga	Unserviceable	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
12 ga	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	
12 ga	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	
12 ga	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	
12 ga	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	
12 ga	Poor	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
16 ga	Poor	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
.38	Good	04-04-30	Programme – French	
.38	Unserviceable	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
.223	Unserviceable	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
.30	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	
.30	Unserviceable	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
.308	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	
.308	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	
7.62	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
.30	Unserviceable	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
7.62	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	
7.62	Unserviceable	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
40 mm	Good	04-04-30	Programme – French	
7.62	Unserviceable	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
Pellet	Unserviceable	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
N/A	N/A	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16

7.62 & .223	Fair	04-04-30	Programme – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
.45	Good	04-03-25	Conf. – Coast Guard	Owners had expired permit (2002)
12 ga	Poor	04-03-31	Conf. – Coast Guard	Destroyed 04-05-16
9 mm	Excellent	04-03-30	Conf. – Coast Guard	Returned to authorized owner 04-05-17
12 ga	Fair	04-04-03	Conf. – Chileans	HNP
Unknown	Fair	04-04-04	Conf. – Coast Guard	
9 mm	Fair	04-04-15	Conf. – Chileans	Returned to authorized owner 04-05-26
N/A	N/A	04-04-03	Conf. – Chileans	Destroyed 04-05-16
9 mm	Good	04-03-18	Conf. – USMC	Returned to authorized owner 04-05-03
9 mm	Good	04-04-03	Conf. – Canadians	
.38	Good	04-04-21	Conf. – USMC	
9 mm	Good	04-04-13	Conf. – USMC	
9 mm	Unserviceable	04-04-07	Conf. – USMC	Destroyed 04-05-16
.38	Good	04-03-29	Conf. – Canadians	Turned over to MIF and returned to authorized owner
.38	Fair	04-04-08	Conf. – USMC	
.380	Fair	04-04-09	Conf. – USMC	
.40	Good	04-03-18	Conf. – USMC	Returned to authorized owner 04-05-28
.38	Good	04-03-29	Conf. – Canadians	Returned to authorized owner 04-05-14
.38	Fair	04-03-29	Conf. – Canadians	
.38	Poor	04-04-21	Conf. – Canadians	
9 mm	Poor	04-03-29	Conf. – Canadians	Destroyed 04-05-16
9 mm	Fair	04-04-13	Conf. – USMC	
.357	Excellent	04-04-13	Conf. – USMC	Returned to authorized owner 04-05-15
.357	Excellent	04-04-07	Conf. – USMC	
.38	Fair	04-04-19	Conf. – USMC	
.40	Fair	04-03-02	Conf. – USMC	
.45	Good	04-04-26	Conf. – USMC	
9 mm	Good	04-04-02	Conf. – USMC	
9 mm	Fair	04-03-21	Conf. – USMC	
.38	Fair	04-03-29	Conf. – Canadians	

.38	Fair	04-03-29	Conf. – Canadians	
9 mm	Unserviceable	04-04-26	Conf. – USMC	Destroyed 04-05-16
.45	Fair	04-03-29	Conf. – Canadians	
12 ga	Fair	04-04-08	Conf. – USMC	Not servicable
12 ga	Unserviceable	04-03-15	Conf. – USMC	Destroyed 04-05-16
12 ga	Unserviceable	04-03-29	Conf. – USMC	Destroyed 04-05-16
12 ga	Fair	04-04-03	Conf. – USMC	
12 ga	Fair	04-04-07	Conf. – USMC	
12 ga	Poor	04-03-15	Conf. – USMC	
12 ga	Fair	04-04-07	Conf. – USMC	
12 ga	Poor	04-04-07	Conf. – USMC	
12 ga	Fair	04-04-07	Conf. – USMC	
12 ga	Unserviceable	04-04-22	Conf. – USMC	Destroyed 04-05-16
12 ga	Fair	04-04-10	Conf. – USMC	Destroyed
12 ga	Fair	04-03-19	Conf. – USMC	HNP owner
12 ga	Fair	04-04-22	Conf. – USMC	HNP owner
12 ga	Fair	04-03-17	Conf. – USMC	
12 ga	Good	04-03-29	Conf. – USMC	HNP owner
40 mm	Good	04-04-27	Conf. – USMC	
9 mm	Unserviceable	04-03-24	Conf. – USMC	Destroyed 04-05-16
9 mm	Unserviceable	04-04-27	Conf. – USMC	Destroyed 04-05-16
.30	Fair	04-04-07	Conf. – USMC	
5.56	Excellent	04-04-26	Conf. – USMC	
7.62	Good	04-04-27	Conf. – USMC	
.38	Unserviceable	04-05-03	Conf. – USMC	Destroyed 04-05-16
9 mm	Poor	04-05-04	Conf. – Canadians	Destroyed 04-05-16
.38	Poor	04-05-04	Conf. – Canadians	Destroyed 04-05-16
.38	Poor	04-05-04	Conf. – Canadians	Destroyed 04-05-16
9 mm & .38	Poor	04-05-04	Conf. – Canadians	Destroyed 04-05-16
12 ga	Fair	04-05-07	Conf. – Canadians	

.22	Unserviceable	04-05-07	Conf. – Canadians	Destroyed 04-05-16
9 mm	Fair	04-05-07	Conf. – Canadians	
.38	Unserviceable	04-05-07	Conf. – Canadians	Destroyed 04-05-16
410 ga	Unserviceable	04-05-07	Conf. – Canadians	Destroyed 04-05-16
Pellet	Fair	04-05-07	Conf. – Canadians	Destroyed 04-05-16
12 ga	Fair	04-05-10	Conf. – Chileans	
9 mm	Good	04-05-10	Conf. – Chileans	Holding permit expired and retained by MINUSTAH
.38	Fair	04-05-10	Conf. – Chileans	
9 mm	Excellent	04-05-11	Conf. – French	
.45	Unserviceable	04-05-11	Conf. – French	Destroyed 04-05-16
12 ga	Fair	04-05-12	Conf. – USMC	Retained by MNUSTAH
12 ga	Fair	04-05-12	Conf. – USMC	Retained by MINUSTAH
12 ga	Fair	04-05-12	Conf. – USMC	Retained by MINUSTAH
.38	Fair	04-05-15	Conf. – French	
9 mm	Fair	04-05-20	Conf. - Chileans	
.38	Good	04-05-20	Conf. – Canadians	Retained by MINUSTAH
.38	Poor	04-05-20	Conf. – Canadians	Retained by MINUSTAH
.38	Excellent	04-05-20	Conf. – Canadians	
12 ga	Good	04-05-21	Conf. – USMC	Returned to owner
.22 long	Good	04-05-21	Conf. – USMC	Returned to owner
12 ga	Good	04-05-21	Conf. – USMC	Returnend to owner
9 mm	Good	04-05-21	Conf. – USMC	Retained by MINUSTAH
.380	Fair	04-05-26	Conf. – Chileans	Retained by MINUSTAH
9 mm	Fair	04-05-27	Conf. – USMC	Retained by MINUSTAH
9 mm	Fair	04-05-27	Conf. – USMC	Returned to authorized owner
9 mm	Good	04-05-29	Conf. – USMC	
9 mm	Fair	04-05-27	Conf. – USMC	
9 mm	Poor	04-05-27	Conf. – USMC	Retained by MINUSTAH
9 mm	Excellent	04-05-31	Conf. – USMC	Retained by MINUSTAH
.38	Unserviceable	04-05-27	Conf. – USMC	Retained by MINSUTAH

.38	Good	04-05-31	Conf. – USMC	
12 ga	Fair	04-05-29	Conf. – USMC	Retained by MINUSTAH
5.56	Fair	04-05-27	Conf. – USMC	Retained by MINUSTAH
9 mm	Good	04-05-27	Conf. – USMC	Retained by MINUSTAH
.38	Good	04-06-01	Conf. – USMC	Returned to HNP
12 ga	Poor	04-06-01	Conf. – USMC	
12 ga	Poor	04-05-23	Conf. – Canadians	
9 mm	Fair	04-05-23	Conf. – Canadians	
.357	Good	04-05-25	Conf. – Canadians	Retained by MINUSTAH
9 mm	Good	04-05-25	Conf. – Canadians	Retained by MINUSTAH
.38	Excellent	04-06-05	Conf. – Canadians	Returned to HNP
9 mm	Good	04-06-05	Conf. – Canadians	Returned to HNP
9 mm	Good	04-06-05	Conf. – Canadians	
9 mm	Fair	04-06-05	Conf. – Canadians	
.223	Excellent	04-06-05	Conf. – Canadians	
12 ga	Excellent	04-06-05	Conf. – Canadians	Retained by MINUSTAH
7.62	Fair	04-06-07	Conf. – USMC	Retained by MINUSTAH
9 mm	Fair	04-06-07	Conf. – French	

Source: MINUSTAH Information Gathering Unit, 2004-2005

** The dates in this column read year-month-day, i.e. 04-04-29 = 29 April 2004.*

Annexe 5. MINUSTAH weapons collection and destruction, June-Oct. 2004

Type of weapon	Serial no.	Date of confisc.	Returned to HNP	Dest./ Inop.	Returned to owner	Condition	Country	Remarks	Rounds
M14		13-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	13
Revolver Special .38		13-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	13
UZIEWITH 9 mm		13-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	5
Remington Spec. 870		13-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Smith & Wesson		13-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Rugger		13-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Taurus 9 mm		13-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Taurus 9 mm		13-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	6
Smith & Wesson		13-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Revolver Special .38		15-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	5
Pistol Colt .45		15-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Pistol Colt .45		16-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	12
Revolver Special .38		16-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	5
Taurus 9 mm		16-Jun-04			17-Jun-04		Canada	MINUSTAH	
Magnum .357		16-Jun-04			17-Jun-04		Canada	MINUSTAH	30
Revolver Special .38		16-Jun-04			17-Jun-04		Canada	MINUSTAH	1
G Block 9 mm		16-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Taurus 9 mm		16-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
M14		16-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
T-65		16-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	60
Revolver Special .38		16-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	4
Revolver Special .38		16-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	6
Revolver Special .38		16-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	6
Revolver Special .38		16-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	6
Jenning Nine 9 mm		16-Jun-04	18-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	12

Pistol 9 mm		17-Jun-04	23-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Smith & Wesson		24-Jun-04	24-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	12
Smith & Wesson .38		28-Jun-04	28-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
M16		28-Jun-04	28-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Smith & Wesson .38		28-Jun-04	28-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Smith & Wesson .38		28-Jun-04	28-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Smith & Wesson 9 mm		28-Jun-04	30-Jun-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Gage shotgun Cl 12		2-Jul-04		2-Jul-04			Canada	MINUSTAH	
Gage shotgun Cl 12		2-Jul-04	29-Jul-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Handgun Cl 22		8-Jul-04	29-Jul-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Smith & Wesson .38		9-Jul-04	9-Jul-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Glock/Mag 9 mm		10-Jul-04	29-Jul-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	17
Dagger 12 inch		11-Jul-04		29-Jul-04			Canada	MINUSTAH/ammo	
Security BADG		11-Jul-04		29-Jul-04			Canada	MINUSTAH/ammo	
Machete		11-Jul-04	29-Jul-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Smith & Wesson .38	3-658-482-4	14-Jul-04		14-Jul-04			Chile	MINUSTAH; holes in barrel	
Shotgun shells		15-Jul-04		19-Jul-04			Canada	MINUSTAH/ammo	25
Star Mag 9 mm		15-Jul-04	29-Jul-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	8
Dentonics .45		15-Jul-04			16-Jul-04		Canada	MINUSTAH	
Pistol 9 mm		15-Jul-04			19-Jul-04		Canada	MINUSTAH	633
Gage shotgun Cl 12		18-Jul-04	22-Jul-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	
Rugger P89 DC 9 mm		21-Jul-04	26-Jul-04				Canada	MINUSTAH	5
Sub-machine Uzi 9 mm	67695	2-Aug-04		3-Aug-04		Unusable	Chile	MINUSTAH	53
M1		7-Aug-04				Good	Chile	MINUSTAH/stored depot	7
Pistol Colt .45		7-Aug-04				Good	Chile	MINUSTAH/stored depot	
Pistol 9 mm		14-Aug-04					Argentina	MINUSTAH/stored depot	
Revolver Special .38		2-Sep-04					Argentina	MINUSTAH/stored depot	
Shotgun 12.7 mm	Home-made	7-Sep-04				Bad	Argentina	MINUSTAH/stored depot	
Sub-machine Uzi 9 mm	67586	15-Sep-04				Good	Chile	MINUSTAH/stored depot	53

M16A2	324942	16-Sep-04				Regular	Chile	MINUSTAH/stored depot	
M1	S/N	16-Sep-04				Bad	Chile	MINUSTAH/stored depot	
M1	36222296	16-Sep-04				Bad	Chile	MINUSTAH/stored depot	
Mossberg shotgun	K827849	16-Sep-04				Regular	Chile	MINUSTAH/stored depot	
Sub-machine Uzi 9 mm	67038	16-Sep-04				Regular	Chile	MINUSTAH/stored depot	1 cartridge
Pistol semi-automat.	S/N	16-Sep-04				Bad	Chile	MINUSTAH/stored depot	
Rifle Glenfield .22	23739326	16-Sep-04				Regular	Chile	MINUSTAH/stored depot	
Rifle 7.62	S/N	16-Sep-04				Bad	Chile	MINUSTAH/stored depot	
Pistol 9 mm G Bl.	BGV 656	26-Sep-04				Good	Brazil	MINUSTAH/stored depot	9
Pistol 9 mm G Bl.	DH 725	26-Sep-04				Good	Brazil	MINUSTAH/stored depot	7
T-65; 5.56 mm	108335	2-Oct-04				Good, new	Brazil	MINUSTAH/stored depot	1,069
Pistol G Block .40	FPP100	5-Oct-04				Good	Brazil	MINUSTAH/stored depot	6

Source: MINUSTAH Information Gathering Unit, 2004-2005

Endnotes

[1] According to UN Security Council Resolution 698 (August 2004), the interim cooperation framework amounted to USD 1.370 billion, of which USD 446 million had been committed by donors. At a follow-up Donors Conference on Haiti in Washington, DC, the international community pledged only USD 1.085 billion.

[2] Although a 'national dialogue' is widely perceived to be a priority by the Interim Government, Haitian civil society, and the international community, its likely shape and process are unclear. See, for example, UNSC (2004a).

[3] Such a baseline survey could review the numbers and types of weapons in circulation, the types of weapons held by specific groups, the dynamics of local markets for weaponry, price shifts, incidence of armed violence, incidence of displacement, and the effects of small arms on rural livelihoods and supply routes. What is more, efforts should be devoted to appraising the local and differentiated 'histories' of conflict; the nature of localized trauma; the organization (command and control) of armed groups and how they operate; women's attitudes toward men carrying weapons; the familial, socio-economic and education profile of members of armed groups (and their dependents); the presence of deportees and ex-prisoners; the presence of children; and possible incentives for disarmament.

[4] As part of the abovementioned assessment, an effort should be made to map out local NGOs and comunity-based organizations (CBOs) that could support DDR, religious leaders, trusted authority figures, and impartial journalists.

[5] The World Bank accords 'post-conflict' status according to a standardized assessment of various indicators, e.g. number of violent deaths (aggregate), numbers displaced, and levels of economic destruction. Due to its persistent arrears to the World Bank, conventional loan and grant mechanisms were unavailable to Haiti. The Post-Conflict Unit was regarded as a possible vehicle for transferring resources in early 2004, though no resources were ultimately made available. For World Bank guidelines, see for example World Bank (1998).

[6] On 31 September 1991, newly elected President Aristide was overthrown in a coup headed by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras. On 11 October 1991, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/7, which condemned the illegal replacement of President Aristide. Following considerable engagement by the OAS, an International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) was approved in Resolution 47/20B on 20 April 1993, with deployment taking place in March.

[13] Private transfers (remittances) are estimated to have increased from USD 256 million in 1997 to USD 931 million in 2001 and are estimated over the past decade at culmulatively USD 4 billion (ICG, 2004).

[14] Between 2,000 and 3,000 people are estimated to have died as a result of massive flooding in northern Haiti following rains unleashed by hurricanes in September 2004. Since the flooding, the WFP has distributed more than 1,700 tons of food, mainly in the Gonaives region, where 200,000 people were left homeless. Stocks held by other aid agencies such as Care International were relatively low. WFP was feeding more than 500,000 Haitians prior to the disaster, and supplied rations to over 100,000 for five months.

[15] FADH was led by General Raoul Cédras as commander-in-chief before its disbandment in the mid-1990s (Amnesty International, 2004a; 2004b).

[16] The *chefs de sections* were disarmed and placed under civilian authority by Aristide in 1994, but reinstated after the coup.

[17] FRAPH has been described as a paramilitary group organized to coerce civilians: '... its weapons are small and dispersed, essentially one per killer ...' (Nairn, 1996). Its source of revenue is hotly debated: 'Emmanuel Constant, leader of FRAPH, is widely alleged, and himself claims, to have been in the pay of the CIA during the early 1990s. Emmanuel Constant currently resides in the USA' (Amnesty International, 2004b; 2004c). Shipments of arms between the CIA, US Special Forces, and FRAPH have been documented since the mid-1990s. See, for example, Kidder (1995).

[18] See, for example, Mlade (2004) for a recent overview of the disarmament issue in Haiti.

[19] Interview with Frank Skzryerbak, November 2004.

[20] This finding echoes an earlier study undertaken by Neil O'Connor in 1996, who found during interviews with the former deputy director of the Investigative Group and the former police commissioner of the Multinational Police Observer Group in Haiti that there 'are not as many weapons in Haiti as many would believe and that the crime rate is actually quite low.'

[21] Indeed, recent reports suggesting a de facto lifting of the US embargo and the likely transfer of weapons to HNP officers indicate that the number of weapons may have risen (see Table 2). The US State Department, however, has repeatedly denied the lifting of the embargo.

[22] Previous efforts to reduce the number of armed gangs and criminal groups in the capital have achieved limited success. In the Cité de Soleil slum, for example, there were more than 30 'organized criminal gangs' operating in 2000.

Following the launch of Operation Zero Tolerance by the HNP in 2001, these were alleged to have been reduced by more than half.

[23] Many of these armed groups are based in Cité de Soleil and Bel Air, but also in wealthy areas such as Pietonville.

[24] T-65s are Taiwanese-manufactured assault rifles, similar to AR15 or M16 rifles.

[25] The CCI observes, however, that '*Depuis la crise de fevrier 2004 ... les insurges ont apparemment obtenu des armes a feu par des cargaisons en provenance de l'Amerique Centrale et du Sud (notamment des armes du bloc de l'est, y compris des kalachnikovs et des mitrailleuses PKM). Les groupes pro-Lavalas, quant a eux, auraient recu plus de 4,000 armes a feu directement des depots du government (notamment des pistolets, des revolvers, des fusils M-1 et des fusils d'assaut)*' (CCI, 2004).

[26] Haiti has a strong tradition of metal working, and locally manufactured weapons made of scrap metal, cannabilised arms, and other materials are easily produced.

[27] See, for example, Berman and Reynolds (2002).

[28] For a description of successive OAS resolutions on Haiti, go to <http://www.oas.org/legal/english/dukerev.doc>.

[29] UNSC Resolution 841 (16 June 1993) introduced a sanctions committee but lifted the embargo shortly after UNSC 861 of 1993. The arms embargo was restored again through UNSC 873 (1993) and finally lifted by UNSC 944 (1994), following the return of President Aristide (UN, 1996).

[30] The Haitian minister for justice, Bernard Gousse, requested it be lifted to facilitate the HNP's efforts to contain gang violence. The Haitian government has also approached a number of other governments in CARICOM as well as Canada, though with the exception of the alleged US transfer, there is no confirmation that deals have been made. See, for example, <http://www.haiti-info.com>.

[31] The web site <http://www.haiti-info.com> has substantiated this claim through multiple international news reports.

[32] These weapons were provided by the US, according to key informants in Port-au-Prince. The commissioner of police had claimed needs of only 5,000 0.38 cals, 1,000 9 mms, and 300 M14s, indicating a surplus.

[33] See, for example, <http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/1993/11/460_en.pdf>.

[34] See, for example, <http://www.osce.org/documents/sg/2000/11/673_en.pdf>.

[35] Consult the Small Arms Survey (2001–04) and <http://www.nisat.org> for a complete review of the EU Code of Conduct.

Dominican Republic. The Group of 184 is itself believed to be divided into at least two camps: (i) the majority 'constitutional wing', which emphasised diplomacy and protest as the path to ousting Aristide; and (ii) a 'hard-line' faction determined to use any means necessary to ensure his removal.

[42] Guy Philippe is a former army officer and one-time HNP commissioner. He was detained, together with known FRAPH soldiers, in the Dominican Republic in May 2003 on the allegation that they were plotting subversive acts. They were released after several days, with Dominican officials claiming that they found no evidence to support the claims. See, for example, <http://www.democracynow.org/static/haiti.html>, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3495944.stm> and <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/haiti04.htm>.

[43] Some former army combatants were allegedly provided with Dominican Republic uniforms so as to merge into the population.

[44] See, for example, *Miami Herald* (2003). A former press officer for Aristide has also confirmed that a 'load of heavy weapons', incuding machine guns, was shipped to a 'protestant organization' in Haiti. Apparently this had been authorized by the US State Department and was seized on route to Haiti, though this has not been verified.

[45] A recent alleged transfer involved the provision of military and policing equipment by the South African Defence Force in early 2004. A South African enquiry has revealed that a Boeing 707 was approved by President Mbeki to transfer 150 R-1 rifles, 5,000 rounds of ammunition, 200 smoke grenades, and 200 bullet-proof vests in late February 2004—possibly on the day of President Aristide's departure—though it is unknown whether these weapons were ultimately distributed.

[46] As reported on the radio in late October 2004. See <http://www.haiti-info.com>.

[47] Jamaica was also a transit country for FRAPH weapons, as were the Caicos Islands and Santo Domingo.

[48] According to one informant, the Port of Gonaives is a site of considerable shipments of arms and drugs. Prior to March 2004, it was completely under the control of the Metayer brothers. In Janaury 2003, Butteur Matayer was Lavalas port director, while Amio/Cubain Metayer was in charge of 'security'. Both have admitted to being in control of goods destined for and leaving the port and to taxing all in-coming cargo. Butteur was also an occasional resident of Florida and is alleged to have sent weapons to Haiti from Miami. Following Cubain's death, Butteur and the Gonaives Resistance Front (FRG) remained in charge of the port and there were substantial rumours of weapon shipments.

[49] For example, in 1995, some 260 firearms and 15,000 rounds of ammunition were seized. Another seizure is alleged to have led to the capture of 78 assault rifles and 9,000 rounds of ammunition in 1998 (see Table 2).

[50] The MAK-90 uses a 7.62 mm round, the same as an AK-47. It can be converted to a fully automatic weapon with rudimentary mechanical skills, with web sites on the Internet offering instructions.

[51] Haiti in fact has a long tradition of serving as a trans-shipment point for cocaine and marijuana into the US and the Caribbean. See, for example, USA Senate (1988), Derienzo (1994), and Weaver (2004).

[52] According to CIVPOL, the borders are monitored by only a 'handful' of Haitian officials. The Haitian coast guard consists of two vessels, despite thousands of kilometers of coastline.

[53] According to various key informants, there was nevertheless no considerable qualitative change in the type of weaponry used between September 2003 and September 2004. Though MIF and the Haitian government have repeatedly claimed that the armed groups use 'old' or 'creole' weapons, there is evidence that some new weapons were available.

[54] This is widely confirmed by a broad selection of anonymous key informants associated with the HNP, the Ministry of Justice, and long-standing citizens living in Pietonville, Port-au-Prince.

[55] Administratively, the HNP was to include a *Directeur General, an Inspection Generale*, various *Directions Centrales* and *Territoriales*, and a number of specialized units.

[56] In 2001, the HNP had come under considerable strain due to a combination of politicization and corruption. Though a considerable number of the 5,482 demobilized FADH, some 200, were integrated into the HNP in 1994, the police force was nevertheless riddled with competing interests.

[57] The UNSC (2004e) has noted that the 'arbitrary promotions of Fanmi Lavalas loyalists, the incorporation of chiméres, police abuse, rape, and drug trafficking had further contributed to the demoralization and erosion of the professional standards within the police service and a loss of credibility in the eyes of the Haitian population.'

[58] An additional 700 USPGN were also relieved of their posts (but not their arms) immediately after the departure of President Aristide. Interview with Spyros Demetriou, November 2004.

[67] Though few in the administration are prepared to provide a general amnesty, the National Security Council (NSC), itself constituted by the HNP and Ministries of the Interior and Justice, has repeatedly emphasized this option on local radio.

[68] MINUSTAH has requested that the bureau tie its three indemnity and pension payments to the surrender of small arms and light weapons. Though the prime minister has agreed to tie payments to disarmament, it remains to be seen whether the payments will be provided at all, or how weapons collection and destruction will proceed.

[69] This security entity would be made up of former FADH in order to maintain security.

[70] As the *Small Arms Survey* (2002, p. 161) makes clear, the 'injury-to-killed' ratio can potentially reveal important insights into the circumstances of particular incidents. Where the number killed is greater than the number wounded, such as in situations where firearms are used against people that are immobilized or unable to run away or defend themselves, the injury-to-killed ratio may shrink to zero. It can be tentatively assumed that fighting was at close range, may have involved execution-style killings and potentially involved violations of international humanitarian law. Usually, in standard conflicts, however, the number of people injured is two to three times the number killed, though can increase well above ten.

[71] This was confirmed through evidence gathered at both public (General) and private (Canapé Vert) hospitals.

[72] There has been no national census since 1981 and the population of Port-au-Prince is unknown, but estimated at between two and three million residents.

[73] For example, while the OAS reported in 2002 that rates of violent crime averaged some 480 to 580 per month, there was no disaggregated information on the types of incidents, frequencies, or distribution.

[74] As a result, data on excess mortality and morbidity attributed to armed violence is limited. The media, NGOs, official data, hospitals, and morgues are traditionally sourced, though are of limited credibility in the Haitian context. Most information for this study was collected directly from hospitals, UN and NGO reports, and key informant interviews. The ICRC itself was able to verify some information on the ground due to its on-going contact with armed gangs and other groups since July 2003.

[75] This suggests that USD 703,120 were spent on limb-related injuries, USD 1,050,280 on acute injuries to the body and head, and some USD 320,000 on evacuations.

amongst the urban poor, but also by more than 83 per cent of respondents with some university education.

[84] This group stationed itself in Pernal, a border town in the Dominican Republic, using it as a staging point for acts of sabotage against the Aristide government—including an attack on the Haitian police academy in July 2001 that killed five and wounded 14. Other attacks followed, such as the December 2001 assault by armed gunmen on the National Palace, resulting in 10 deaths, and the various raids that followed in subsequent years (*Miami Herald*, 2003). By February 2004, Philippe, together with an estimated 150–200 insurgents armed with M16 assault rifles and other small arms, captured Cap Haitien and began their advance on Port-au-Prince.

[85] The 15-nation CARICOM still refuses to recognize Latortue's government and in June the OAS opened an investigation into President Aristide's ousting.

[86] Without freedom to campaign and the removal of weapons from various oppositional factions and armed groups, few will join the process. The CCI has called for the establishment of a Provisional Electoral Council, and the UN/OAS are working toward signing a Memorandum of Understanding outlining electoral responsibilities.

[87] For example, UNSC Resolution S/RES/940 (July 1994), as well as various national institutions.

[88] The national strategy calls for: (i) the creation of a strategic plan for disarmament; (ii) the strengthening of regulatory controls; (iii) reintegration programmes for those involved in armed activities; and (iv) the reduction of the culture of violence.

[89] Various draft texts were prepared by the UN in 1994/95 to this effect, but were never tabled by parliament.

[90] Richardson (1996) claims that as many as 30,000 weapons, many of which were heavy artillery not used against the general population and arms of questionable operability, were collected, though no sources are provided.

[91] Indeed, a number of World War 1 Springfield M1 Garand (circa 1921), Harvester M1 Garand (circa 1946), and others were collected by the US.

[92] For example, Nairn (1996, p. 12) reports that 'in late September 1994, right after the U.S. troops arrived, Special Forces teams systematically sat down with local FRAPH heads and told them ... that as long as they kept their guns out of view they would "get no trouble" from the Green Berets.'

[93] The weapons turned in were old and unusable and not the type that could be used against US and other multinational forces. US Army commanders have identified several reasons for the shortfalls in the programme.

[94] US officials argued at the time that while broad disarmament was vital, it was more important for President Aristide to take measures to encourage political reconciliation. According to Preston (1995, p. A31) '... it will not matter if there are some illicit weapons and unregenerate gunmen about if most Haitians – even those who oppose and fear Aristide – feel they are safe.'

[95] The US-led buy-back offered USD 1,200 for 'heavy weapons', USD 1,200 for 'large caliber weapons', USD 800 for 'automatic weapons', USD 400 for 'semi-automatic weapons', USD 400 for 'explosives', USD 200 for 'handguns', and USD 100 for 'tear-gas weapons'. See, for example, *Arms Trade News* (1995).

[96] For example, Johanna Mendelson (formerly World Bank) and others with the US Army claim that the buy-back programme favoured Haitian middle-men. According to Ed Laurance, ' ... they would approach those they knew who possessed, say, auto-rifles [sic], for which the reward was USD$ 600. They'd say, "if you turn it in, the USG will hassle you, watch you, etc. Why not give it to me for USD$ 300 and they will never know who you are".' Interview with Ed Laurance, November 2004.

[97] See, for example, Freeberg and Humburg (2003).

[98] It should be mentioned that the original US-led intervention force changed its plan from an invasion to a 'permissive' intervention at short notice. This intervention turned the FADH into a subordinate military command (for policing) and from enemies to partners in their own dissolution by ensuring that only the most professional soldiers became police officers. The original idea of introducing 'public works'-type programmes was abandoned because the FADH found it humiliating and the Haitian government wanted to reduce expenditures, so it was changed to 'vocational training'.

[99] Where payments were not made, the IOM provided soldiers with meals and transportation.

[100] The US embargo explicitly restricted purchases of both lethal and non-lethal weapons and equipment. As with the economic embargo, the US also applied considerable pressure on other countries to stop them from selling weapons and equipment to Haiti.

[101] The US government (ITAR 1994)]notes that 'US manufacturers and any other affected parties are hereby notified that the Department of State has suspended all previously issues [sic] licenses and approvals authorizing the export of or other transfers of defense articles or services as well as those for use by the police to Haiti.' Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds to Haiti were also suspended until further notice. The US government did, however, note that 'in accordance with established

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