

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JEAN-JUSTE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER, et al.,
Defendants.

Certified to be a true and correct copy of the original.
Carlos Juenke, Clerk
U.S. District Court
Southern District of Florida
By James S. Deputy Clerk
Date 2-24-98

CASE NO. 86-0459-CIV-SCOTT

FILED
JAN 3 1988
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST
JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER AND
MICHELLE BENNETT DUVALIER

This cause was initiated by a Complaint filed by the Rev. Gerard Jean-Juste and Etzer LaLanne, individually and on behalf of the Haitian people against the Defendants, Jean-Claude Duvalier and Michelle Bennett Duvalier. An Amended Complaint was filed on March 14, 1986. The Amended Complaint was served on Defendants at the City of Grasse in accordance with the laws of the Republic of France and this Court is satisfied that based on the papers presented to me that service was conducted in the appropriate manner. This Court is satisfied it does have jurisdiction in this case under the laws of the United States of America.

Despite appropriate service of process, the Defendants failed to answer the Complaint, enter an appearance, or even seek a limited appearance challenging the jurisdiction of this Court. A default pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was subsequently entered appropriately by the Clerk of the Court on September 2, 1986 when the Defendants failed to file any responsive pleading to the Complaint.

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On March 25, 1987 this Court ordered that a hearing be held on the amount of damages to be awarded to the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants. By Court Order the Plaintiffs were required to provide proof sufficient to substantiate their claim of damages. This Order was served upon the Defendants in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as was every subsequent Order to provide them the opportunity to personally appear and challenge the Plaintiffs' claims.

On May 4, 1987 a hearing was held before this Court to determine if damages should be awarded and, if so, the fair amount of those damages. At the hearing both lay and expert witnesses testified and extensive documentation was provided concerning the misappropriation of funds by the Defendants.

At the May 4, 1987 hearing, Mr. Michael Hooper, an attorney and internationally recognized expert on the politics and economics of Haiti was qualified as an expert witness before this Court. Mr. Hooper provided the Court with detailed sworn testimony and extensive notarized official documentation (See Exhibits B & C) that were based on carefully scrutinized cancelled checks and other bank transactions showing that Jean-Claude Duvalier, Michelle Bennett Duvalier and three persons acting as their personal agents misappropriated more than \$504,000,000 from public monies and the Haitian treasury alone. See, e.g., Exhibit B, Affidavit of current Haitian Minister of Justice Francois St. Fleur as presented to the Investigations Commission on Public Finance of the Government of Haiti.

The testimony further indicated that the multiple corruption schemes^{1/} did not include, and were probably not as lucrative as other methods used by the Duvaliers to benefit from their positions of virtually total influence like direct bribes, kick-backs on state contracts and on licensing arrangements, tax breaks, and tax holidays for favored corporations. The testimony and documentation, however, have indicated that at a minimum the Defendants illegally misappropriated, embezzled, and stole from Haiti Five Hundred and Four Million Dollars (\$504,000,000.00).

In addition to the testimony and documentation concerning the Defendants' illegal conduct, the two Plaintiffs, Rev. Gerard Jean-Juste and Etzer LaLanne testified about the violation of their rights which they suffered under the Duvalier regime.

In view of the detailed proof of damages presented, this Court hereby Orders that Final Judgment be entered against Jean-Claude Duvalier and Michelle Bennett Duvalier pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). The amount of the Judgment shall be apportioned as follows:

1. The Plaintiffs, as representatives of the Haitian people, shall be awarded the sum of Five Hundred Four Million Dollars (\$504,000,000.00), less attorneys fees and costs associated with recovery of the Defendants' assets. This award shall be distributed to the Haitian people under this Court's

^{1/} The testimony and documents portrayed a number of techniques utilized by the Duvaliers to siphon off and launder funds rightfully belonging to the Haitian people by virtue of taxes paid for goods and services.


supervisory authority, through the economic development plan which is attached to this Final Judgment and incorporated herein.

2. Plaintiff Gerard Jean-Juste shall be awarded the sum of One Million Dollars (\$1,000,000.00), less attorneys fees and costs associated with recovery of Defendants' assets, resulting from his inability to practice his religion freely and subsequent exile from his homeland.


3. Plaintiff Etzer LaLanne shall be awarded the sum of Seven Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars (\$750,000.00), less attorneys fees and costs associated from the recovery of the Defendants' assets, resulting from the deprivation of human rights as a result of physical and emotional torture incurred under the Duvalier regime.

4. Attorneys fees shall be awarded to the law firm of Kurzban Kurzban and Weinger, P.A. of Miami, Florida in the amount of Fifteen Percent (15%) of any amounts recovered from the Defendants plus all costs associated with recovery of the funds.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Miami, Florida this 8th day of January, 1988.


THOMAS E. SCOTT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: Edwin Meese, III, Esq.
Leon Kellner, U.S. Attorney
Hon. Antonio Jean-Poix
Mr./Mrs. Jean-Claude Duvalier
Ira J. Kurzban, Esq.



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 86-0459-CIV-SCOTT

JEAN-JUSTE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

ECCNOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PLAN FOR HAITI

JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER, et al.,

Defendants.

Background to Economic Disaster
and Exacerbating Underdevelopment

It is virtually impossible to exaggerate the debts of the worsening poverty of this predominantly rural country that occupies only 28,000 square kilometers of the western end of the Caribbean island of Hispanola. The Republic of Haiti is the only country in the Americas to be classified by the United Nations as a "Least Developed Country." The per capita gross national product is estimated at \$300 US per annum by the Haitian government¹ and at \$320 per annum by the United States Agency for International Development. The inequality of income distribution in Haiti is also dramatic with Ninety Percent (90%) of the population earning less than the absolute poverty level of \$150 in 1985.² Fewer than Twenty Percent (20%) of full-time workers actually receive the official urban minimum wage of \$3 per day;

¹ Republic of Haiti, Interim Development Program for 1986-88, October 1986, p.1.

² World Bank, Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office, Memorandum on the Haitian Economy, May 13, 1985, p.6.

even government employees often earn less. In the countryside, wages average only a little more than one-half the rural daily minimum of \$2.64.³

Haiti's food deficit is extremely high, and in spite of the importation of large amounts of the most basic foodstuffs, only Fifty Percent (50%) of the required caloric needs are met and approximately Eighty Percent (80%) of children under five suffer from malnutrition according to the Haitian government itself.⁴ According to the United States Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D.), in 1985 the average Haitian consumed Twenty Percent (20%) fewer calories than levels recommended by the United Nations and Thirty Percent (30%) less protein. In rural areas - where Seventy-Five Percent (75%) of the population live - these deficiencies climb to Forty Percent (40%) for calories and Fifty Percent (50%) for protein.⁵ The Government of Haiti itself estimates that this shortfall is even greater pegging the average per capita caloric intake at less than 1,500 per day, as opposed to the 3,000 calories required daily by an average female adult according to the World Health Organization and the United Nations Childrens Fund.⁶

³ World Bank, Haiti Policy Proposals for Growth, Report No. 5601-HA, June 1985, p.11.

⁴ Republic of Haiti, Interim Development Program for 1986-88, October 1986, p.3.

⁵ World Bank, Haiti Policy Proposals for Growth, Report No. 5601-HA, June 1985, p.11.

⁶ Republic of Haiti, Interim Development Program for 1986-88, October 1986, p.5.

At least one-third of the children under five suffer chronic malnutrition, which along with gastroenteritis, account for Ninety Percent (90%) of child deaths. Twenty-seven (27%) percent of Haitian children die before the age of five.⁷ The infant mortality rate - 135 per 1,000 births - is the hemisphere's highest, while average life expectancy is just 53 years.⁸ Overall, one Haitian child dies every five minutes from malnutrition, dehydration and diarrhea.⁹

The current Haitian population of approximately 5.5 million is only growing at approximately 1.4%, but this is only because of the hemisphere's highest rate of infant mortality and an emigration rate of 0.5% per year with refugees from Haiti continuing to enter the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic and the United States.¹⁰ Slightly more than Seventy-Five Percent (75%) of Haiti's population is still rural, but the rural exodus to the principal cities and particularly Port-au-Prince (with now over 1 million inhabitants) is so severe that it has created an unemployment and underemployment rate exceeding Fifty Percent (50%) in Haiti's capital.

⁷ World Bank, Report and Recommendations, February 9, 1987, Report No. P-4411-HA.

⁸ World Bank, Report and Recommendations, February 9, 1987, Report No. P-4411-HA, p.4.

⁹ UNICEF Report cited in Miami Herald, April 25, 1987.

¹⁰ Republic of Haiti, Interim Development Program for 1986-88, October 1986, p.1.

Haiti is not just underdeveloped, it is underdeveloping continuously, as is reflected in the traditionally miniscule state expenditures on public education, health and agricultural extension services, the lowest in the hemisphere. Almost Eighty Percent (80%) of the population is illiterate, and most of 18,000 children ready to enter school each year cannot be accommodated for lack of facilities, teachers and support funds.¹¹ Fully Seventy-Seven Percent (77%) of the overall population is illiterate and this staggering figure exceeds Ninety Percent (90%) in rural areas.¹² More than one-half of Haiti's students leave school after one year and this school-leaving rate is even higher in rural areas where only 3 in 100 finish primary school. The educational system has been virtually privatized through neglect, and now consists mainly of church-run schools. Sixty Percent (60%) of all teachers work in urban areas, the vast majority in Port-au-Prince, while student-teacher ratios in the countryside reach 60 to 1 or worse. Haiti's future is further buffeted by an enormous brain drain of professionals either fleeing political repression or searching for some *medicum* of security.

Haiti continues to import almost twice as much as it exports, with the deficit exceeding \$160 million in 1985.¹³

11 U.S.A.I.D., Haiti Action Plan - 1985, p.3; World Bank, Haiti Policy Proposals for Growth, Report No. 5601-HA, June 1985, p.5.

12 Republic of Haiti, Interim Development Program for 1986-88, October 1986, p.5.

13 World Bank, Haiti Policy Proposals for Growth, Report No. 5601-HA, June 1985, p.8.

Disaster has been averted only because of the substantial amounts of money sent home by Haitians living abroad, conservatively estimated at \$125 million annually.¹⁴

Haiti has the capacity to meet its own needs for rice, vegetables and many cereals, yet the food situation is reaching crisis proportions. A rapidly expanding population has increased demand, while agricultural productivity has seriously declined.¹⁵ Food imports have risen dramatically over the years, to \$89 million today (up from \$62 million in 1984) and now constitutes some Twenty Percent (20%) of total imports.¹⁶ Much of this imported food is linked to U.S.A.I.D. programs like "Food for Work" and "Food for Peace," which bring wheat in at concessionary prices, but which also make it virtually impossible to maintain production of locally grown cereals that are substitutes for these subsidized imports. Wheat imports increased Eleven Percent (11%) per year from 1970 to 1983, and by 1984 constituted Thirty-Two Percent (32%) of grain consumption.¹⁷ These percentages are believed to have increased considerably since 1984.

Haiti's inequitable distribution of wealth is dramatically illustrated by its virtually feudal patterns of land ownership, exacerbated by the existence of large tracts of underutilized

14 International Monetary Fund, Haiti, Recent Economic Developments, p.45; Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris), August 1987.

15 U.S.A.I.D., Haiti Action Plan - 1987-88, p.46.

16 Ibid. p.47.

17 Ibid, Annex 1, p.3.

land. Haiti's total arable area is approximately 875,000 hectares, of which Sixty Percent (60%) are small holdings under one hectare; large farms (1-300 hectares) number about 1,000.¹⁸ Many major landowners live in the capital, doing little to encourage increased output. Sharecroppers lack the means to invest in the land, and are typically limited to technology such as the machete and the hoe. Few have horses or oxen to haul a cart. Many peasants are relegated to poor plots on steep hillsides where primitive techniques yield little and greatly increase soil erosion. About Forty-Five Percent (45%) of the agricultural labor force are independent farmers and peasants; the remaining Fifty-Five Percent (55%) are wage laborers or sharecroppers. Farmworkers earn an average of \$1.45 per day, far below the government-mandated minimum.

Today agriculture (including stock raising, fishing and forestry production) contributes only one-third of the gross domestic product, as opposed to Fifty Percent (50%) in 1970.¹⁹ Yet it is undeniable that agriculture remains the pivot point of the economy, and as such remains the foundation of any real national development strategy.

Haitian rural areas continue to be undermined by the structure and functioning of a national economic system that stymies most self-help efforts of the peasants. Increasingly

¹⁸ World Bank, Haiti Policy Proposals for Growth, Report No. 5601-HA, June 1985, p.12.

¹⁹ Republic of Haiti, Interim Development Program for 1986-88, October 1986, p.1.

backward agricultural techniques, the increasing division of arable land into extremely small plots, the insufficiency of irrigation systems and the deteriorated condition of those systems that do exist have forced a precipitous decline in peasant productivity in the last 15 years to a point where the peasantry today is really involved in an antiquated system of subsistence farming.²⁰ This desperate situation is aggravated by the virtual absence of vocational training and agricultural outreach for the peasantry, and a virtually non-existent agricultural credit system.

Only Twenty-One Percent (21%) of the land in Haiti is situated below 200 meters of altitude, and deforestation and intensive and chaotic land clearing has further reduced the amount of available arable land. Because of the increasingly dramatic shortage of land, and because of the complete lack of agricultural technique training, the peasants increasingly cultivate higher land, with excessive slopes, without following contour lines and without knowledge of terracing techniques or appropriate land clearing methods. The increasing reliance on charcoal which provides over Seventy Percent (70%) of primary energy needs, has aggravated deforestation and soil erosion.

The total area of irrigated land has fallen from 125,000 hectares at the end of the 1950's to less than 70,000 at the present time.²¹ This massive deterioration is principally the

²⁰ Republic of Haiti, Interim Development Program for 1986-88, October 1986, p.1.

²¹ Republic of Haiti, Interim Development Program for 1986-88,

result of silting of the water courses and unrepaired flood damage to the irrigation system, exacerbated by heavy erosion in the high plateaus.

One of the most dramatic issues in the countryside today continues to center on the devastating effects of a U.S.A.I.D. program to eradicate and replenish the entire pig population following the detection of African Swine Fever in 1981. Questions persist as to whether the program, which destroyed almost all of Haiti's one million native pigs, was primarily intended to protect the U.S. pork industry, or was actually necessary for Haiti. The loss of pigs was a harsh blow to the already fragile peasant economy.

While the eradication program was completed in 1983, the great majority of peasants who lost their pigs never received any of the partial compensation provided to the Haitian government by international agencies and U.S. taxpayers, and have no reason to expect they will ever receive replacements. Those peasants who did receive these pigs have found them expensive to maintain, as even fifth and sixth generation pigs continue to remain dependent on grain feeds, a luxury that makes them unaffordable to most peasants in Haiti.

The reluctance of both Haitian and U.S. authorities to comply with peasants' demands for the importation of "black pigs" from Jamaica and Martibique, most suitable to the environment and to scavenging for food, has become a powerful focus of anti-

October 1986, p.3.

government feeling. On the sensitive eve of the first anniversary of Duvalier's fall, thousands of peasants threatened to slaughter the Iowa pigs if "black pigs" were not brought in quickly. While the government officially gave in to the demand, little substantive action has followed.

Pushed off the land by hunger, Haitians have migrated to the cities en masse. Port-au-Prince grew from 150,000 in 1950 to 720,000 in 1982.²² It is safe to estimate that the capital now houses one million people, with the outlying slums of Cite Soleil (formerly Cite Simone after Papa Doc's wife), La Saline, Carrefour, Martissant and Bizoton absorbing the biggest influx. The country's second largest city, Cap-Haitien, has 80,000 residents, and Les Cayes, 50,000.

This vast internal migration has also been accomplished by an equally vast migration overseas. Overall, the number of Haitians residing abroad is estimated to be one million, with more than half of this diaspora now residing in the United States.

Those displaced farmers who do remain in Haiti are key actors in the U.S.A.I.D./World Bank development models, as a cheap labor force for the assembly industry.²³ But even the World Bank admits that the "assembly industry is largely outside

22 World Bank, Haiti Policy Proposals for Growth, Report No. 5601-HA, June 1985, p.5.

23 Josh Dewind and David Kinley, Aiding Migration: The Impact of International Development Assistance on Haiti, (New York: Immigration Research Program, Center for Social Sciences, Columbia University, 1986) p.79.

the Haitian economy; it provides employment but purchases few Haitian inputs and makes almost no fiscal contribution."²⁴ Most assembly firms are "shelter operations" in which a Haitian investor or speculator provides workers, plant and equipment (often leased from the United States) and the foreign buyer provides all raw materials and purchases all output. In the women's underwear industry, for example, all inputs are flown in from the United States, most managers are foreigners and none of the products are even available in Haiti.

The government has offered "tax holidays" to prospective assembly industry investors, for periods generally no less than 10 years, through an elaborate system of loopholes and kickbacks which continue even after the "holiday" is over.²⁵ Very liberal or nonexistent customs duties have also temporarily aided this sector. In addition, the government provides the basic infrastructure necessary for efficient operations: roads, low-cost energy and telecommunication services and even buildings. Haitian security forces have always been available to place severe restrictions on labor organizing and to guarantee low wages.

"Haitians need jobs and the assembly industry provides them." says Finance Minister Delatour.²⁶ Yet assembly plants

²⁴ World Bank, Haiti Policy Proposals for Growth, Report No. 5601-HA, June 1985, p.74.

²⁵ See John Cavanagh and Joy Hackel, "Multinational Subcontracting in the Caribbean Basin," Report on the Americas, May/June 1984, Vol. 18, no. 3.

²⁶ Michael S. Hooper Interview, February 1987.

have absorbed a minimal portion of the workforce, employing 40,000 workers, while some 39,000 new workers enter the labor market every year.²⁷ Moreover, assembly industry operations require a political stable environment and a docile labor force. Wages have been set at \$3 per day since 1985. Some assembly workers earn \$5-7 per day, but due to the rising cost of living, between 1981 and 1986 real earnings have decreased Twenty Percent (20%) in this sector.²⁸

There is no doubt that the prosperity of the subcontracting sector depends heavily on the extremely low cost of labor in Haiti. Even in the industrial sector, the monthly average industrial wage is only \$95 in Haiti, while it exceeds \$150 in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, and is over \$600 in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.²⁹

The key figure in CNG economic policy-making is current Finance Minister Leslie Delatour. Labeled Haiti's own "Chicago Boy" in referenced to his cold-bath approach, Delatour has rapidly become as unpopular with the anti-Duvalierist forces - for slashing State expenditures and dismantling some state-owned industries - as with the Duvalierist Right - for eliminating opportunities for graft.

27 World Bank, Haiti Policy Proposals for Growth, Report No. 5601-HA, June 1985, pp. ii and 5.

28 Ibid., p.12.

29 Republic of Haiti, Interim Development Program for 1986-88, October 1986, p.3.

The Ministry has nonetheless made many changes in 10 months in office. It has slashed spending in several departments and closed the edible oils processing plant (ENAO) and one of the country's largest sugar refineries, Darbonne. While few doubt that these state enterprises were inefficient and provided golden opportunities for graft, public opposition to their closing has been vociferous, as it has caused both a direct and derivative loss of employment while increasing dependence on imports. Haitian cane growers, mostly peasants, have been particularly hurt, as they have nowhere to sell their crop.

The finance minister has slashed producer taxes on coffee and basic commodities, begun to reform the income tax system and has reduced many of the tariffs that favored national consumer goods industries. As these tariffs had made many consumer staples produced in Haiti far more expensive the current policy has resulted in a notable reduction in the cost of some basic goods. The problem with this approach, however, is that it ignores the long-term effects on local peasant economies, urban migration and overall dependency.³⁰

Nevertheless, the short term benefits from these policies have combined with a virtual doubling of U.S. economic assistance this past year to produce a little breathing room for an economy that otherwise would have collapsed. And, on the basis of

³⁰ Michael Hooper Interview, February 1987.

increased international aid and reductions in other departments, the Finance Minister has actually increased the education budget by Eleven Percent (11%) over last year's.³¹

As yet, little headway has been made in ending the systematic fraud fostered by the Duvaliers' example. The World Bank reported that in April, 1986 some 57,000 salary checks were issued by the government when there were only 32,500 public employees, the difference being phantom employees who receive what are known as "zombie checks." The report also confirms that influential employees are not expected to perform on the job; some never show up.³² The World Bank team was unable to trace almost one-fifth of the budgeted government spending, while Twenty-Two Percent (22%) of the money spent was not budgeted. Due largely to nepotism, the telecommunications company has five times the number of necessary staff, and the Port-au-Prince water works more than twice as many employees per 1,000 connections as the average for Latin America and the Caribbean.

According to the Washington Post, the Finance Minister discovered early this year that some employees of his ministry were erasing funds from checks and redepositing them, netting over \$400,000 per month.³³ This was particularly embarrassing in light of the finance minister's highly publicized campaign against corruption.

31 Ibid.

32 World Bank, Public Expenditures Review, p.11.

33 Washington Post, February 4, 1987.

Finally, large quantities of U.S. food donations continue to be sold for profit on the open market. And illegally imported goods such as cigarettes, sugar, flour and rice are blatantly hawked in streets and markets. Over Sixty Percent (60%) of the medical supplies of the country's main hospital are sold off by corrupt administrators while patients go without penicillin, sterile syringes and even sterile gauze.

The end of the Duvalier dynasty has provided an opportunity for trying new development approaches in the poorest country of the Western Hemisphere, especially those based on mass participation in self-help schemes. Widespread nationalist sentiments - a product of the anti-Duvalier movement's success - would seem to make such an attempt feasible.

But international lending agencies have fixed their gaze on developing Haiti's export potential, channelling resources into agribusiness and assembly plants to compete for the U.S. market. Even in the unlikely event that this top-down approach could convert Haiti into the "Taiwan of the Caribbean," the pressures to maintain the country's comparative advantage - a poorly paid and malleable force - would keep the benefits of such growth from trickling down to the poor.

Fund for a Democratic Haiti: A Economic Development Plan for the Redistribution of Public Assets Misappropriated by Former President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier and Michelle Bennett Duvalier.

Administration of the Fund

This fund will be administered by a Commission for a New Haiti that will have fiduciary responsibility for the monies and will consist of seven members, all of Haitian nationality: three development economists or experienced project administrators to be chosen by non-governmental organizations with a demonstrated track record in successful development projects in Haiti; two representatives from and chosen by human rights organizations of recognized reputation; and two from the private sector with one each being chosen by the business community and by one of the three national trade union confederations. These "Commissioners" may request advice from Haitian or international specialists, all their proceedings must be a matter of public record and all proposals and reports must be made public within a thirty-day comment period to allow for public scrutiny and comment. The Commissioners are urged to coordinate their programs with the then-existing government of Haiti, but in all cases they shall endeavor to concentrate on emergency programs for the very poorest of Haitians and every effort shall be made not to duplicate existing international donor or government of Haiti programs.

The Commissioners are urged to pro-rate the distribution of available monies over a reasonable period not to exceed five years so as to ensure that those desperately needed funds can be effectively absorbed. As it is likely that only a small proportion of these monies will be initially identified, attached or recovered, the Commissioners are to begin to distribute these sums in the spirit of effecting demonstration projects that are critically needed to restore Haitians' confidence in the future.

Parameters of the Development Plan for a New Haiti

The central goal of this program will be to deliver direct assistance to the great majority of poorest Haitians through non-governmental agencies and through community councils directly responsible to the local (CASEC) officials. This program will concentrate on high-impact assistance programs in the areas of health including the provision of potable drinking water, and in education including, basic, technical and agricultural extension education.

The strategy and objectives of the DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR A NEW HAITI are complementary. A massive campaign against childhood diseases and malnutrition generally will be combined with a national goal of safe drinking water for everyone after the fifth year of the program and a general expansion of preventive health programs. A similar high priority will be placed on a national crusade against illiteracy particularly amongst the rural population. A priority will be placed on public health and agricultural extension education. In all these

activities of the DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR A NEW .TI no duplication of existing development efforts will be encouraged nor will there be any attempt by the fund to substitute i programs in areas where significant development efforts are th ongoing.


This attempt to complement existin programs and to stimulate cooperation demands that no indivi ual, government or organization will be given complete contr of any one major development sector or effort. The concentra on of effort in the sectors of public health, and basic, techn al and agricultural education and extension information should t be interpreted to reflect adversely on other development iorities such as reforming public administration, reforming olic works measures to decrease unemployment and underemployme or rebuilding and cleaning the the Country's irrigation sys ms. It is simply assumed that international donors will b making substantial contributions in these areas.

Agricultural extension education by trained peasants for the peasant majority of Haiti is absolutely essential because all solutions to the generalized crisis in agriculture demand a virtual revolution in already available techniques and methods. Extension training will include assistance in the cooperative buying and marketing methods, the provision and extension of agricultural credit, as well as the more traditional agricultural techniques training. Agricultural extension teachers will also work cooperatively with the local judicial authorities where they exist to propose methods to rationalize the existing land tenure

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

To all to whom these presents shall come. Greeting:

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