



Voices from the Shanties

A Post-Earthquake Rapid Assessment
of Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince

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ABOUT INURED

The Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (INURED) is a research and higher education establishment based in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. INURED's mission is to the development top quality research and scientific and training with the aim of improving the socioeconomic and political conditions of Haiti's people.

As a "think and do" tank, the Institute's collaborative research and problem-solving model applies powerful data analysis, multidisciplinary research and evaluation techniques, and a policy-driven perspective to address a wide range of issues facing Haiti.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake shook southwestern Haiti and leveled one-third of the capital city, Port-au-Prince. The immediate consequences of such a disaster were predictable—thousands dead, hundreds of thousands injured and homeless, and the decimation of the city's infrastructure. Eight weeks have passed now, and a plethora of international aid agencies have solidified their operations. There is value at this juncture in examining persistent problems faced by victims in one of the most neglected regions of the city and anticipating new challenges that are beginning to arise.

A representative sample of 962 residents from Cité Soleil was recruited from eight sections of the district to provide a rapid assessment of the living conditions in aftermath of the earthquake. Cité Soleil is a shantytown on western coast of Port-au-Prince with a pre-earthquake population estimated at 300,000-350,000, nearly 12.5% of the city's population. The analysis is grounded in facts gathered from a validated survey instrument, as well as previous surveys of Cité Soleil conducted by INURED in 2008 for comparison. The analysis is also grounded in results from focus groups and mapping conducted in the targeted areas from February 6 to February 26. The analysis of their responses presented in this report distills the most pressing issues facing survivors and provides recommendations for immediate solutions and methods to employ when enacting longer-term rebuilding projects.

The Most Critical Issues:

1) **Current Aid Distribution Methods Have Been Ineffective in Reaching Most People.** Less than 28% of respondents received aid from relief organizations at the time of the survey.

2) **Rape and other forms of violence are increasing because security forces in Cité Soleil are fragmented and ineffectual.** Security presence at nighttime in most areas of Cité Soleil is minimal. In particular, organized violence and criminality in the ad-hoc camps for the displaced have risen considerably since the earthquake began. Approximately 14% of residents witnessed or experienced threats of violence or actual attacks where they are currently living. The leading forms of violence experienced included beating (27%), fighting (24%), rape (20%), and theft (18%). "Sex-for-food" trade is not uncommon in the relief camps where young women often have to negotiate sexually for shelter from rain and food aid. The current loosely coordinated security efforts by the Haitian National Police (PNH) and United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) have therefore proven ineffectual against organized local criminal elements that act with impunity.

3) The lack of adequate shelter is one of the principal causes of survivor vulnerability.

Survivors living in temporary encampments were displaced because their homes suffered structural damage (59%) or were completely destroyed (38%). At present, less than 30% of the homeless survivors have been able to obtain tents for shelter because of their prohibitive cost. These individuals are forced to gather discarded materials for makeshift housing. Earthquake survivors in Cité Soleil encampments have no choice but to live in and around excrement. Therefore, living in these spontaneous encampments constitutes one of the principal causes of survivor vulnerability. Besides the constant threat of violence identified above, the lack of sanitation, potable water and high population density is creating conditions conducive to the spread of disease.

4) There are substantial issues of medical care that remain unaddressed. Decision-makers and organizations providing medical relief and care must take into account the following issues:

1) lack of sanitation (latrines, etc.) and the inevitable health consequences of this, 2) follow-up medical care 3) lack of available medical services for women and girl rape victims, and 4) the lack of substantive and in-depth mental health care (which is currently limited to informal counseling). Residents are surrounded and living in other people's excrement, and this presents that most critical, yet unresolved health risk. Follow-up care for patients in critical condition is almost non-existent according to study participants, as are medical services for the rising number of rape victims. Overall, mental health has received very little attention even though two-thirds of survivors reported feeling hopeless, depressed, and showed signs of trauma.

Our Recommendations:

Aid Distribution. Methods of aid delivery in Cité Soleil and other historically disenfranchised shantytowns must include local distribution sites and partnership with neighborhood associations. Formalization of existing neighborhood networks and new mechanisms to distribute aid and disseminate information through these local trusted channels would improve outreach and eliminate waste and redundancy.


Security. There is a critical need for PNH and MINUSTAH forces to increase security at nighttime when most of the organized violence takes place, and this requires that they coordinate their efforts more effectively. Past efforts have shown that organized security forces working formally and transparently with community leaders and neighborhood committees will significantly improve these issues more effectively.

Shelter and Sanitation. The most neglected issues—improved shelter and effective sanitation—require the most immediate responses from decision-makers. In large part, shelter and sanitation account for a majority of security and medical problems. Wherever sanitation systems cannot be implemented relocation is a viable option and has the support of residents of Cité Soleil.

Medical Care. Implementing effective sanitation and drainage systems will help significantly reduce the rise in illnesses over the coming months. Improving the security apparatus will reduce the number of rape victims and other victims of violence, which have increased substantially and at increased risk of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs).

This rapid assessment provides initial indicators for where recovery efforts can make the most effective interventions. It is clear that the current arrangements are not sustainable and that the only way to prevent further devastation is by addressing two key issues: 1) Short and medium-term shelter provision must be properly secured to prevent the risk of increasing violence and disease; and 2) Neighborhood-based associations are capable and active in facilitating aid distribution as well as recovery efforts and fostering safety even in these challenging conditions.

MAP OF CITÉ SOLEIL



I. BACKGROUND OF CITÉ SOLEIL

The community of Cité Soleil lies on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. With an estimated population of 300,000 to 350,000 people, Cité Soleil is the most densely populated area of Port-au-Prince and among the poorest areas in the entire country. In many ways, Cité Soleil emblemizes the plight and hope for Haiti's recovery. Over the last decade, Cité Soleil has been the site for several large-scale interventions requiring international aid.


In October 17-18, 2008, with the support of INURED, with a seed grants from the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI), grassroots organizations held a two-day meeting to begin setting up a provisional structure for a Community Forum in Cité Soleil. The Forum has served as a critical tool that leads community participants to take ownership of their own problems by working with other community members and policy-makers. Community Forum participants engage with issues as varied as housing and sanitation to violence and education. Between October 2008 and May 2009, the elected leadership body has been working block by block and in every neighborhood of Cité Soleil to extend the base of the Forum and thereby reinforce its legitimacy within the community. This effort has established the foundation for a budding civil society in Cité Soleil.

In the wake of the January 12th earthquake, Cité Soleil is on the verge of reverting back to its precarious condition or using the recent gains made in combating violence and developing a community development plan to turn a new page in the history of Haiti's development. This study points to the most critical challenges facing residents of this community and provides recommendations for moving towards a positive direction.

II. Methodology

This report provides an assessment of the earthquake's initial devastation and emerging problems in the Cité Soleil district of Port-au-Prince. Data was gathered using a standardized survey instrument to interview displaced residents of Cité Soleil now living in temporary encampments. A total of 120 trained staff were deployed to administer the surveys of which 70 were members of Cité Soleil's Community Forum previously trained by INURED for survey research projects. The remaining survey team consisted of INURED staff and local elected officials. The initial goal was to interview 1,100 individuals. 962 individuals were recruited. The responses of survey participants were encoded and analyzed at INURED's data analysis center. The report is based on a triangulation of data based on surveys, individual focus groups, mapping, and interviews given from February 6th to the February 26th.

Gender and age characteristics of survey respondents:



III. FINDINGS

A. INEFFICIENT ACCESS AND DISTRIBUTION OF AID

Since aid efforts began, one of the most frustrating obstacles has been the inability to distribute a large quantity of shelter, food aid, water and supplies to the survivors scattered throughout Port-au-Prince. The findings of this study indicate that the lack of coordination between relief groups and neighborhood associations was a key impediment. Furthermore, highly populated areas including Cité Soleil were often neglected completely and did not receive much aid from international aid efforts.

Survivors rely mostly on themselves and their neighborhood networks


Most survivors have relied almost exclusively on their own limited resources and those of their neighbors. At the time of the survey, less than 28% of study participants reported being visited by a relief organization and receiving aid. Focus group interviews with study participants revealed that neighborhood associations are met with more trust than do local government officials. At the same time, it was found that many relief institutions have little to no local knowledge and poor coordination with the communities. Because of this, certain communities and segments of the population receive disproportionate attention and aid while others are entirely neglected.

The most common form of aid distributed was food (rice or pasta) and water. However, very often, food, water and hygiene kits were obtained via purchase or through the generosity of their neighbors. As for survivors' shelter needs, tents are scarcely available to residents because of severe shortages throughout the city. Less than 27% of respondents were able to purchase tents for their shelter needs. More than half the residents (55%) scrape together their own makeshift shelter using sheets and other scrap materials because they do not have the money to purchase better alternatives. One month following the earthquake, the most pressing issues facing residents are: lack of food, poor shelter, and lack of potable water.



Photograph depicts makeshift shelters in Fierté, Cité Soleil, 2010

Figure 1. Ranking of most pressing concerns for Cité Soleil earthquake survivors



Opportunists have taken advantage of the current relief system

In-depth interviews reveal that the current distribution method and network have had detrimental consequences for survivors. Common distribution schemes (e.g. WFP food-for-ticket) that are carried out on a first-come, first-serve basis often favor those survivors that are the healthiest and most violent rather than the most vulnerable. Observations from the camp indicate that opportunists taking advantage of the current situation have been seen in possession of 50+ WFP tickets selling them to families, often at prices that are well above affordability between 150 gds to 250 gds (or \$4 - \$10).

Opportunistic Activities were witnessed in neighborhoods of Cité Soleil that are difficult to access like Wharf, Norway, Ti Kanada, and areas of Ti Ayiti, which have also witnessed increased violence. Relief agencies have tended to label these places extremely violent and avoided them even though these areas are the most populous and harbor most of the individuals profiting off people's misery and the scarcity of aid.

Survivors feel abandoned, but are eager to help improve the recovery effort

Many survivors in Cité Soleil complain that relief groups are avoiding their neighborhoods because their shantytown was not as severely affected by the earthquake as larger homes in more prosperous areas of Port-au-Prince. One interviewee expressed his frustrations like this: "Before the earthquake, they ignored us, and we didn't know where to go. After the earthquake they still continue to ignore us and say that we are better off than other places where people have been more affected. How much worse can things be for us?" This opinion was shared amongst many of the participants interviewed from all the blocks in Cité Soleil. The findings indicate that although some parts of Cité Soleil fared well as compared to other parts of the capital, the overall precariousness of these neighborhoods to begin with has made them even

more vulnerable to problems of disease, violence, and depression.

Respondents are extremely critical of government response to the earthquake, but are optimistic about working with relief groups to improve their conditions. Participants expressed sentiments such as "We don't have a government," "We have been alone all along," and "There is no leadership in Haiti to properly govern the country the way citizens expect." These were echoed by many of the residents interviewed in Cité Soleil. However, some participants say that "If international institutions and the Haitian government work with us directly we can improve the relief process." For many participants, however, they have been disappointed by the current whole relief effort. In particular, they doubt that despite the large-scale relief work, there will be a significant improvement in their lives because big non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the government rarely listen to them or partner with them to carry out relief work.

Recommendations

- **Relief Agencies must increase availability of aid to Cité Soleil residents (particularly food and shelter)**
- **Neighborhood-based associations are capable of facilitating relief aid and information and have legitimacy with local residents**
- **Organizations in communities have the capacity to facilitate more even distribution of aid**
- **These organizations will provide the foundation for lasting networks capable of longer term development planning and coordination**

B. LIMITED SECURITY PRESENCE AND ORGANIZED VIOLENCE

Violence has been a defining character of Cité Soleil for more than a decade. However, over the last few years, PNH and MINUSTAH forces working in close partnership with the civil institutions and neighborhood-based organizations in Cité Soleil have been able to substantially reduce insecurity and actual incidents of violence. In the aftermath of the earthquake, neighborhoods have been dismantled and many of the community mechanisms and safeguards ensuring security have been broken down. However, increasing police presence and reengaging neighborhood groups and networks to prevent violence is a strategy that has currency among residents of Cité Soleil.


Lack of effective police coordination and visibility has increased security risks

Limited police presence during the day and the lack of it after sundown is the most common complaint amongst Cité Soleil residents. Overall, more than half (54%) of all residents do not feel safe where they sleep right now. For the 38% that do feel safe, it is attributed to the presence of PNH or MINUSTAH in the area. However, where police presence is reported, 40% of respondents complain that police forces are not very effective in protecting people from violence or criminal elements. Security forces are not effective largely because of their lack of coordination and failure to engage in partnerships with neighborhood associations and community. Other reasons for the general lack of safety include lack of trust between residents and security forces (23%), fear of the police (19%), and the dominant presence of gangs, especially at night.

Rape and other forms of violence determine access to aid and shelter

Limited police presence and the breakdown of partnerships between neighborhood associations and security forces have resulted in increases in rape and other violent attacks in the encampment areas. The specific acts of violence are spread relatively evenly between theft, beating, rape, and fighting. In half the cases, the attacker was someone familiar still living in the area. Many women in focus group discussions reported being beaten by men out of anger and frustration. Eleven percent (11%) of all respondents said that rape was common where they were living, and in a third of the instances the person raped was someone they knew. Most respondents chose not to share whether they knew the perpetrator of the rape (67%). In all, 14% of respondents personally witnessed or experienced threats of violence or actual attacks where they are currently living.

Figure 2. Forms of violence in relief camps and individual or groups to whom they attributed



In some areas of Cité Soleil, violent gangs manage access to aid and shelter. In particular, young girls have to negotiate sexually in order to get shelter from the rains and access to food aid. According to respondents, “sex for food” trade is not uncommon in the relief camps at night when participants report that there is no police presence and when a majority of sexual assault and violence take place. The women participating in the focus groups said that many of the women who are been raped are ashamed to talk about it because others might blame it on them and also because they themselves feel somewhat guilty. Also, nudity and a lack of privacy have become serious problems in the relief camps and have contributed to sexual assaults, rapes and other acts of violence. Other implications of this include the risk of sexually transmitted disease (STD) transmission, exacerbated by the current lack of adequate medical services.


Organized Violence is the most pressing security concern

After the earthquake, MINUSTAH reported that 5,100 prisoners escaped Haiti’s main prison in Port-au-Prince. Convicted gang leaders from Cité Soleil neighborhoods have reportedly returned and regrouped, taking advantage of the breakdown of security and limited police presence. Residents report significant vulnerability to violence and intimidation, particularly in parts of lower Cité Soleil, where gangs have taken control of the area to act as gatekeepers for who can and cannot access aid often frisking people on the streets and robbing them. Overall, gang presence has been documented in Boston, Brooklyn, Sou Ray, Dezyem Site, and Wharf as well as areas just outside of Cité Soleil in La Saline, Boulevard des Americans/Route # 9. Once night falls, there are reportedly no security forces and gangs take control of the area. As the gangs have reclaimed their territories, it has generated violent rivalries between older gang members

that escaped prison and gangs that were present prior to the earthquake, increasing gun violence incidence throughout Cité Soleil.

More than 60% of the respondents felt that women and children are less safe where they live now versus prior to the earthquake. Residents perceived various agencies as having some modicum of control over security in their encampments. However, approximately 40% felt a complete lack of security in the camps. Most families have between 2-5 children in their household mostly under the age of 10, making safety a critical concern. 24% of households have a pregnant woman living with them. Male respondents overwhelmingly designate concerns over the pervasiveness of gangs and gang violence as the most pressing (in the forms of robbery, shootings, attack, and rape), and hold the government responsible for the breakdown of order.

Figure 3: Agencies with control over security in camp areas



Accounts from study participants report that security concerns are the main obstacle preventing individuals from accessing distant or unprotected aid distribution sites. Respondents favored situating aid distribution within neighborhoods, perhaps because formally partnering with neighborhood committees for aid distribution and coordination would create an environment of trust. Security concerns have become an increasingly obstructive force to the aid effort and threaten to derail years of progress in violence reduction in Cité Soleil. In spite of this, residents feel strongly that substantially increasing police presence, especially in the nighttime, and

formally coordinating their efforts with MINUSTAH and other forces and the neighborhood committees will help turn the tide.

Recommendations

- **Nighttime police presence is the one of the most effective responses to the increase in organized violence in the relief camps**
- **PNH and MINUSTAH must coordinate their involvement in Cité Soleil in a way that maximizes visibility and provides protection to vulnerable residents.**
- **Security forces should resume working in collaboration with neighborhood-based associations in order to take advantage of local knowledge and generate trust in the community.**

C. SHELTER AND SANITATION

Observations from the field indicate that shelter is by far the largest problem facing Cité Soleil's residents. Relief agencies have experienced challenges providing temporary housing (waterproof tents and tarps) to areas hardest hit by the earthquake because of shortages and lack of information. Therefore, very few residents have access to these supplies and have resorted to using scrap materials for their shelter needs. At the same time, the encampments are set up in places that do not have adequate sanitation and drainage systems. Both of these challenges combine to present significant immediate and longer-term problems both in terms of security and disease risks.

Poor shelter is the primary source of vulnerability

More than half of the surveyed population reports that they live in makeshift camps that are not secured with waterproof materials. A resident of Cité Soleil draws attention to the connection between temporary housing and health when he explains, "The most essential thing is tents or tarps, because when the rain falls people say they can't sleep and what's more, their children are dying of respiratory illnesses because of the rain." In addition to concerns over the expected rainy season, respondents are constantly worried about safety and privacy in the current camps.

However, despite the clear need for shelter aid, several participants claim that relief agencies believe Cité Soleil's residents were not hit as hard as other areas of Port-au-Prince, and thus do not deserve, or at least are not prioritized for receiving, aid. One Cité Soleil resident says, "The state and the NGOs say that in Cité Soleil there are no victims. They aren't giving us potable water or medical care. Everyone is in the street."

Cité Soleil has long been represented as a community of undeserving criminals, even though most of the violence is perpetrated by a small contingent of organized groups rather than the general population. The aftermath of the earthquake merely throws this notion of deservingness into sharper relief. In fact, shantytowns like Cité Soleil faced dire conditions even before the earthquake, and the earthquake has made a difficult situation wholly unbearable. Cité Soleil's residents are doubly victimized – especially women and children, who suffer particularly from the effects of structural inequality.

To complicate matters, people less seriously affected by the earthquake have manipulated the situation in order to get access to aid. In many cases, families have distributed members to various camps in order to get the greatest amount of aid. These actions, while perhaps understandable in a moment of scarcity, have led to conflict between those seriously affected

and those less affected by the earthquake. In this context, injured, disabled, and vulnerable individuals forced to compete with comparatively able-bodied individuals for resources and aid.

People are living in and around excrement

Even before the earthquake, Cité Soleil never had an adequate sanitation or drainage system. INURED's previous study (2008) indicated that only 40% of Cité Soleil residents have access to latrines, with certain blocks of Cité Soleil where only 25% of residents have access. In the current study, Cité Soleil residents explain that the sanitation situation is so dire that conflicts occur over it. As one person put it, "One of the biggest conflicts between neighbors and blocks has been shit...because there are not enough latrines for everybody, people defecate in bags and throw them." This scenario was found to be common and many respondents worried that there was no effort to ameliorate these terrible conditions.

The earthquake has made this already difficult situation much worse. Because of the lack of facilities and clean water, and overcrowded conditions, in the burgeoning "tent cities," sanitation is of paramount concern for obvious medical concerns. Already Cité Soleil residents report an increase in diarrheal illnesses and other conditions associated with lack of sanitation. There remains limited access of potable water via aid agencies, and many residents reported the inability to afford paying for it.

In the current context, many participants suggest that there are areas in Cité Soleil that should have not have allowed for construction. In these areas, people must be relocated elsewhere. Studies in 2008 of the same neighborhoods (such as Ti Kanada) documented that these areas are below sea level so latrines/drainage cannot be built. When there are rains, these areas are flooded immediately. In these locations, residents agree for the need to relocate to other inhabitable areas. Participants in focus groups also mentioned the possibility of migrating to the provinces if there were opportunities to work and access to basic services. For now, many report that family members who left for the provinces have faced significant challenges.

Recommendations

- ***Haitian planners and policy makers must make a decision about depopulating certain areas of Cité Soleil. residents agree for the need to relocate to other inhabitable areas.***


D. CASUALTIES AND MEDICAL CARE

The earthquake caused significant death and injury to thousands of families in Cité Soleil. Many of the survivors suffered from loss of family and community social networks as well as homes and property. This has understandably led to a high incidence of mental health problems in the population.

Widespread casualties and mental health problems have been ignored in Cité Soleil

Overall, 32% of respondents lost family members and close to 50% have family members that were injured and required medical care. The average age of fatalities was 22 years for women and 24 years for men, which underscores the loss of young, able-bodied people in this community. A total of 15% of respondents reported missing family members since the earthquake.


Figure 4. Types of Earthquake Damage to Property



Respondents interviewed live in encampments within Cité Soleil or on its border. 95% of all surveyed residents reported damage to their property. Of those, 38% reported complete destruction of their homes while 59% reported damage that involved significant cracks in the masonry structures. In general, most structures are single-story and made of unreinforced cinderblock construction. Very few respondents (27%) felt that their current homes were secure.

Approximately 70% of survivors surveyed reported feeling one or more psychological problem since the earthquake. Anxiety was the most common (37%) and was followed by panic attacks (22%) and depression (16%). As a Cité Soleil resident puts it, “Now more mental illness is developing in the country because of the stress; many children are forgetting everything they learned in school because they are so badly traumatized.”

Figure 5. Mental Health Problems faced by Earthquake Survivors



Critical gaps in medical response

At present, humanitarian and medical organizations in Cité Soleil (such as MSF and CHAPI) have been providing care to victims in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. However, these responses are designed for urgent crisis situations, not for long-term sustainable intervention in post-disaster settings. As such, decision-makers in Haiti must organize plan alongside institutional partners to address the following: 1) follow-up care, 2) lack of sanitation (latrines, etc.) and the inevitable health consequences of this, 3) lack of available medical services for women and girl rape victims, and 4) the lack of substantive and in-depth mental health care (which is currently limited to informal counseling).

A long-term and ongoing medical response to this catastrophe is needed. By far, the problem of sanitation is the most challenging medical issues facing residents. Medical care for many patients who require follow-up care or surveillance are not able to access that care as is the case for victims of rape. Lastly, people's mental health continues to deteriorate as the devastation of the earthquake gives way to unbearable living conditions for residents of Cité Soleil.

Recommendations

- ***Addressing issues of shelter and sanitation will in large part help prevent a dramatic rise in disease. It will require that public health and planning professionals work together to develop solutions***
- ***Medical relief groups must coordinate their efforts in order to ensure that they address critical gaps and needs, especially with regards to follow-up care***
- ***The increasing problem of rape in relief camps, with its personal and public health implications (STDs) requires a dedicated initiative focusing on this issue***
- ***Mental health continues to be a neglected dimension of the relief effort. However, coordinating mental health professionals with neighborhood associations in relief camps can be a starting point for engaging this challenge***

IV. CONCLUSION

In comparison with other areas of Port-au-Prince, Cité Soleil is unique in that the present conditions are not a complete rupture from pre-earthquake life. Although the earthquake caused significant damage and misery, many individuals have long suffered from the constant calamity of living in conditions without sewers or water infrastructure, persistent violence, hunger, and in abysmal housing. Respondents' experiences lie on a continuum if looked at over the arc of the past decade.

In a larger perspective, the international community has been engaged in efforts to "save" Cité Soleil through relief programs, aid, and military interventions for decades before the earthquake. But these efforts have largely failed because of the fundamental lack of people's voices, resiliency, and solidarity into development plans. If this is not addressed, planners and decision-makers will not be able to rebuild a better future for Haitian society. In this way, the problem of Haiti is a common problem of urban citizenships—recognizing the long-term significance of putting people at the center of the urban development.

From the first days after the earthquake, local solidarity formed around food, shelter, water, despite the threat of violence and fragmented nature of security. And if anything has been the source of survival for families living on the streets of post-earthquake Port-au-Prince, it is this very solidarity. It is paramount that international institutions and the Haitian government invest in this solidarity by fostering its formalization into neighborhood committees, block groups, and community forums. Failure to connect with and capitalize on people's solidarity and ability to organize will result in the failure to connect the nation to the larger rebuilding process; a process not simply of rebuilding infrastructure but of rebuilding Haitian society.

V. APPENDIX

APPENDIX I: DESCRIPTION OF 3 ENCAMPMENTS IN CITÉ SOLEIL

1. The Place Fierté Camp

Location: Boulevard des Américains/Route Neuve and the Avenue Soleil, across from the police precinct.

Organization, Leadership, and Management: Camp is divided into three self-managed parts. The first part is led by religious leader, Mambo Lucienne, who claims to represent an Organization of the Victims of the Coup d'État (OVKD); the second part, which is subdivided into two parts is managed by the leader of an organization called The Committee for the Relief of the Victims of the Earthquake (COSUVISCS); the last part, which is also subdivided into parts A and B, is managed by an ASEC member (an elected official belonging to a council that runs one of the sections of the Commune of Cité Soleil).

Shelter and Living Conditions: Improvised shelters, or manufactured tents provided by relief agencies. Improvised shelters are of two types: the first type is made of makeshift materials. It is the most common form of shelter, and is the most precarious, because it does not provide adequate protection against the elements. The second type is semi-improvised and made of tarps hung on poles. There are about a hundred of those in the camp that were supplied by AVSI-USA, an NGO that is part of a network created in Italy and called Association of Volunteers in International Service. This type of shelter provides a slightly better protection against the elements. Finally, approx. forty tents, also supplied by AVSI-USA, given preferentially to women who are pregnant, breastfeeding, or raising young children.

Sources and Scope of Aid: Due to high visibility, and a large number of displaced people, the camp does not escape notice of international NGOs. The ground is paved and access to the camp is easy, since it is not fenced in. AVSI supplies tarps and tents only to the inhabitants of blocks A and B; MSF provides medicine only to the inhabitants of blocks C and D; an organization known as CONNOX provides water only to blocks C and D. The part of the same camp that is run by Mambo Lucienne doesn't receive help from any organization. Food is distributed by the NGO World Vision, outside the boundaries of the camp, in the neighborhoods, apparently on the basis of people's pre-earthquake residence. Food coupons are given to municipal officials or to the leaders of community organizations for redistribution to the families that need it. Coupons can be exchanged for half a sac of rice weighting 25 kg. However, food coupons do not always reach the families that are their intended beneficiaries. Networks for the illegal sale of food coupons have been set up by some of the representatives of the municipalities or community organizations. Each of the NGO operating in the camp has its own contact person, which creates a certain rivalry among these persons.

Security: Security is not an issue in this camp, located as it is, across from a police precinct, and benefitting from regular patrols from the NPH.

Other Pertinent Information: *The settlement of the camp is not done according to the neighborhoods from which the residents originated.* In blocks C and D, for instance, are found living side by side, in apparent harmony, people from the Brooklyn neighborhood of Cité Soleil as well as people from the neighborhoods of Boston, Soleil 4 and Ti Ayiti, who were previously often in conflict.

2. Don Bosco Vocational-Technical Center

Location: Enclosed courtyard of the Don Bosco Vo-Tech School

Organization, Leadership, and Management: School is run by a Catholic priest belonging to the Salesian order based in Italy

Shelter and Living Conditions: Most shelters in this camp are precarious and improvised. Thanks to an appeal made to his own order by the headmaster of the school, some 50 tents were shipped from Italy and are currently being installed in a field adjacent to the school and belonging to the school.

Sources and Scope of Aid: Lacks visibility of the Place Fierté camp; falls under radar of international NGOs. Displaced people living in this camp tend to move on to other camps that receive more attention from NGOs. The manager of the camp claims that no agency has visited the camp, and relief hasn't found its way there. Residents survive thanks to community solidarity. The able-bodied leave the camp every morning to visit food distribution centers located elsewhere and return to the camp in the evening with food, which they share. It is mostly the elderly, children and the wounded who remain.

Security: Police do not carry out patrols in this camp. All security there has been organized by the manager of the camp.

3. Terren Bobi

Location: Vacant unenclosed lot

Organization, Leadership, and Management: The camp is organized into four blocks identified as A, B, C, and D.

Shelter and Living Conditions: All the shelters in this camp are precarious and improvised. Most don't have any occupants.

Security: Camp benefits from its proximity to the military camp set up by the Marines who carry out regular patrols of the area. The Marines supposedly once gave chase to would-be speculators trying to capitalize on illegal sales of food coupons in the camp.

Other Pertinent Information: Little information has been collected on this camp so far. It came spontaneously into being shortly after U.S. Marines set up camp in adjacent lot. Rumor has it that when it became known that American soldiers had set up camp, people erected shelters nearby to avail themselves of relief that might come that way.

APPENDIX II. MINUTES FROM COMMUNITY FORUM MEETING ON CITÉ SOLEIL

INURED and Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI) facilitated a meeting between key decision-making institutions and members of the Cité Soleil Community Forum on February 9, 2010 at the "Citronelle" facility in the SHODECOSA Industrial Park

A. Participants:

Louis Herns Marcelin, Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (INURED)
58 members of the Directorate of the Cité Soleil (CS) Community Forum (CF), representing 8 neighborhood blocks
Mr. Charles Clermont, representative of the Government of Haiti (GoH)
Mr. Bill O'Neil, adviser of the SRSO Edmund Mulet (MINUSTAH),
LTC Patrick Hynes and CPT Andrew Salmo, observers from US military
Mr. David Alari, Deputy Stabilization Coordinator, Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI)
U.S. Embassy/USAID

B. Discussion:

1. What are the major challenges faced by local communities in CS since the disaster hit?
2. What are the major obstacles faced by the GoH, the US Military, MINUSTAH and other public entities in their effort to respond to these challenges?
3. How can the CF help facilitate the aid process in CS and mitigate obstacles?

Major challenges faced by CS inhabitants since earthquake: Shelter; difficulty accessing food and resources (physically or because of fear of violence); reemergence of gangs and violence, especially in areas controlled by prison escapees; lack of information from and communication between outside institutions (e.g. GoH or MINUSTAH) and locals.

Shelter: Mr. Clermont briefed CF members on GoH action thus far and prospective future solutions. Spirited discussion of why response entails a combination of short, medium and long term approach. Some CF members argue that the relocation of population is the only sustainable action in the medium and long term. From CF's perspective, specific neighborhoods, if not the whole of CS, must be relocated. Mr. Clermont called upon CF to help GoH and institutions reach difficult neighborhoods and facilitate communication and exchanges with local elected officials.

Access: Mr. O'Neil suggests that the CF connect with Civil Affairs of MINUSTAH. Mr. Alari agreed and said he can link the two bodies. Interaction with MINUSTAH Civil Affairs will strengthen CF and create opportunities for underrepresented or difficult-to-access areas of CS.

Responses to the reemergence of gangs: Most gang leaders have been identified. CF members call upon security institutions to act now to prevent another security crisis. Mr. O'Neil reiterated that MINUSTAH will be made aware of the situation.

Lack of information/communication: Mr. Clermont said that the Reconstruction Commission is working on an information system that will allow for ground-level information-gathering (via telephone call). Communication with locals, however, requires a concrete mechanism for communities to interact with larger institutions and mitigate discontent.

C. What's Next?

The meeting lasted 1 hour and 30 minutes. The parties did not decide on a date and place to meet again. All parties agree for timely and regular meeting between CF, local elected officials and institutions that participated in the discussion (GoH, US Military, MINUSTAH, HIS, INURED). Private sector should be present and active at next meeting, and subsequent meetings should involve key decision-makers from all clusters (i.e., not just shelter)

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