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**Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner
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annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1**

Haiti*

The present report is a summary of 23 stakeholders' submissions¹ to the universal periodic review. It follows the structure of the general guidelines adopted by the Human Rights Council. It does not contain any opinions, views or suggestions on the part of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), nor any judgement or determination in relation to specific claims. The information included herein has been systematically referenced in endnotes and, to the extent possible, the original texts have not been altered. Lack of information or focus on specific issues may be due to the absence of submissions by stakeholders regarding these particular issues. The full texts of all submissions received are available on the OHCHR website. The report has been prepared taking into consideration the four-year periodicity of the first cycle of the review.

* The present document was not edited before being sent to United Nations translation services.

I. Background and framework

A. Scope of international obligations

1. Joint Submission 1 (JS1) stated that Haiti had ratified several of the core human rights treaties and the core ILO Conventions but did not ratify the international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention against Torture and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.² La Plateforme des Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits Humains (POHDH) a recommandé à Haïti de ratifier la Convention internationale sur les droits de tous les travailleurs migrants et les membres de leur famille.³

2. Joint Submission 5 (JS5) reported that the Constitution provided that international treaties that had been ratified were self-executing and automatically became part of the law of the country.⁴ POHDH a toutefois recommandé à Haïti d'adopter les lois d'application des conventions ratifiées.⁵

B. Constitutional and legislative framework

3. POHDH a indiqué que la Constitution consacre explicitement certains droits économiques, sociaux et culturels.⁶

4. Amnesty International (AI) recommended that Haiti adopt and implement without delay a Children's Code incorporating the provisions of international human rights treaties⁷, while Joint Submission 3 (JS3) urged Haiti to pass the law on the integration of persons with disabilities.⁸

C. Institutional and human rights infrastructure

5. L'Association des Jeunes Progressistes pour le Développement du Sud d'Haïti (AJPDSH) a encouragé Haïti à décentraliser l'administration étatique.⁹

6. JS1 recommended that Haiti expand the scope and build the capacity of the *Office de la Protection du Citoyen* for implementation of all of its international human rights obligations, consistent with the Paris Principles.¹⁰

7. L'Office de la Protection du Citoyen (OPC) a mentionné les limites de l'Institut du Bien-être Social, direction autonome du Ministère des Affaires sociales et du Travail.¹¹

8. OPC a noté la création, en 2007, d'une Secrétairerie d'État à l'Intégration des Personnes Handicapées (SEIPH) et a recommandé l'adoption de la loi cadre de la SEIPH.¹²

9. OPC a noté la création de l'Unité de lutte contre la corruption ainsi que de l'Unité Centrale de Renseignements Financiers et a recommandé qu'Haïti adopte des mesures efficaces pour que les personnes impliquées dans des actes de corruption puissent être jugées.¹³

10. Joint Submission 3 (JS3) referred to the establishment in 2003 of a specialized unit of the Haitian National Police, the Brigade for the Protection of Minors (BPM).¹⁴ However, it noted that BPM was underfunded, understaffed and, unable to fully respond to child protection problems when they arose.¹⁵

D. Policy measures

11. JS7 reported that decision-making authority on matters related to reconstruction was exercised concurrently by the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission and national lawmaking bodies.¹⁶ Joint Submission 11 (JS11) a déclaré que les décisions de cette institution portaient atteinte à la souveraineté nationale.¹⁷ JS1 stated that stakeholders should be allowed to fully participate in the rebuilding process, and to facilitate this, information about aid must be transparent and the population routinely consulted.¹⁸

12. Human Rights Watch (HRW) indicated that the earthquake had further weakened the capacity of Haitian National Police.¹⁹ AI recommended that Haiti provide security forces with adequate training and supervision in order to implement and ensure strict observance of international human rights standards.²⁰

II. Promotion and protection of human rights on the ground

A. Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

Cooperation with special procedures

13. POHDH a recommandé à Haïti de délivrer une invitation pour le Rapporteur Spécial sur l'indépendance des juges et des avocats.²¹

B. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

1. Equality and non-discrimination

14. OPC a indiqué que le principe de l'égalité entre hommes et femmes était prévu dans la Constitution.²² According to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR), discrimination of women remained a widespread and tolerated phenomenon in Haiti, which had resulted in women having a disadvantaged position in the economic, education, health, justice, labor and decision-making sectors.²³ POHDH a ajouté que le gouvernement préparait une loi d'équité proscrivant expressément la discrimination fondée sur le sexe dans le cadre de l'application de sa politique publique.²⁴ JS1 added that sexual harassment was not included as prohibited discrimination in Haiti's labor code.²⁵

15. POHDH a recommandé qu'Haïti applique le Plan d'Équité à tous les niveaux de l'appareil d'État et prenne des dispositions pour combattre réellement toutes formes de stéréotypes et discriminations à l'égard des femmes.²⁶

16. HRW stated that women's lack of access to economic security increased their vulnerability to other forms of insecurity, as women resort to risky behaviors to survive.²⁷ HRW recommended Haiti to integrate a gender perspective into recovery and reconstruction plans.²⁸

2. Right to life, liberty and security of the person

17. OPC a rapporté que, selon les estimations officielles entre 250,000 et 300,000 personnes auraient péri le 12 janvier 2010 et 300,000 personnes auraient été blessées.²⁹

18. Joint Submission 10 (JS10) reported that Government agents routinely subjected prisoners to torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, despite having laws that prohibit these acts.³⁰ OPC, AI et JS10 ont fait état de la mutinerie survenue

dans la prison civile des Cayes en janvier 2010. Une commission internationale d'enquête a établi la responsabilité des agents de l'administration pénitentiaire.³¹ AI and JS10 mentioned that the police shot dead 12 people in this case.³²

19. Joint submission 2 (JS2) reported that human rights defenders had been targeted for violence, including rape, and extortion for their work defending rape victims.³³

20. HRW reported that Haiti suffered from chronic and severe overcrowding in prisons when the earthquake hit.³⁴ In 2008, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights decided that Haiti shall adopt, within a reasonable time, the necessary legislative, administrative and any other measures to substantially improve the conditions of the Haitian prisons.³⁵ AI was concerned that some prison conditions could amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.³⁶ JS10 stated that the 2010 earthquake destroyed or severely damaged several detention facilities.³⁷ OPC et HRW ont fait état des évactions massives qui ont eu lieu à cette occasion.³⁸

21. AI, PODH and JS10 stated that preventive and long-term pre-trial detention remained the rule.³⁹ OPC a indiqué que la mauvaise administration de la justice, l'insuffisance autant que l'utilisation inefficace des ressources disponibles, les carences des parquets, la lenteur des tribunaux et la corruption expliquaient ce taux élevé de détention préventive prolongée.⁴⁰ POHDH a recommandé qu'Haiti juge dans un délai raisonnable toutes les personnes en détention préventive, réviser la législation en matière de détention et prévoit des alternatives à l'emprisonnement.⁴¹ AI recommended that Haiti address the problem of overcrowding in prisons, take all the necessary measures, as a matter of urgency, to address the backlog of cases in prolonged pre-trial detention and guarantee the right to habeas corpus.⁴²

22. OPC a indiqué, qu'au vu des problèmes de santé et d'hygiène endémiques dans le système carcéral, les autorités de l'administration pénitentiaire avaient pris des dispositions pour améliorer les conditions de détention.⁴³ POHDH a également mentionné les problèmes de l'alimentation en eau potable et de l'accès aux soins, lesquels ont empiré suite au séisme.⁴⁴ HRW recommended that Haiti improve food supply, sanitation, and access to medicine and health services within prisons.⁴⁵ HRW and JS10 mentioned that the cholera 2010 epidemic affected prisons and HRW made recommendations in this regard.⁴⁶ In 2011, IACHR urged third countries to suspend deportations to Haiti of persons of Haitian origin with criminal charges or indictments, who were seriously ill or who had family members in their country.⁴⁷

23. JS10 reported that Haiti had only one prison designated exclusively for women offenders while, elsewhere, women were detained in separate cells in mixed-gender facilities.⁴⁸

24. OPC a indiqué qu'un décret de 2005 avait modifié le régime des agressions sexuelles et avait éliminé en la matière les discriminations contre les femmes dans le Code pénal.⁴⁹ POHDH a indiqué que la loi-cadre sur la violence faite aux femmes n'avait pas été adoptée.⁵⁰ AI referred to the adoption, in 2005, of the 2006-2011 National Plan to Combat Violence Against Women but indicated that little had been achieved in implementing these commitments.⁵¹ POHDH a ajouté que les rapports sociaux de sexes basés sur les préjugés et la violence demeuraient un problème majeur.⁵² JS3 alleged that rape of women and girls had dramatically escalated after the earthquake.⁵³

25. JS2 indicated that medical services providers were overwhelmed and unable to meet healthcare needs stemming from the assaults; women reported a lack of privacy and limited access to female healthcare providers.⁵⁴ JS2 reported that many victims were afraid to report sexual violence to the police because of the lack of police response, threats of retaliation made by the attacker, and embarrassment due to the general social stigma

associated with rape.⁵⁵ JS2 added that the overwhelming majority of rapes in Haiti post-earthquake have gone unpunished.⁵⁶

26. AI recommended that Haiti ensure that legislative measures and programs to prevent sexual violence were fully and effectively implemented at the national and local levels.⁵⁷ OPC a recommandé à Haïti d'intensifier les poursuites contre les auteurs de viol.⁵⁸ POHDH a recommandé qu'Haïti implante plus de structures de prise en charge des femmes victimes de violence et lance une campagne de sensibilisation sur les violences sexuelles.⁵⁹ JS3 recommended that Haiti provide better training for police officers in responding to victims of sexual violence.⁶⁰

27. AI, HRW, JS1, Joint Submission 9 (JS9) and Restavèk Freedom (RF) referred to the issue of child domestic workers (restavèk).⁶¹ Although a 2003 law prohibited the employment of child domestic workers, AI and RF noted that the phenomenon persisted.⁶² RF stated that this law failed to include penalties for violating the law.⁶³ HRW stated that these children were often unpaid, denied education, and physically and sexually abused. Unaccompanied minors and orphans, who increased in number after the earthquake, were vulnerable to this form of forced labour.⁶⁴ RF described the living conditions of these children and noted that the majority were girls.⁶⁵ RF notably recommended that Haiti enforce the law against restavèk and develop a plan of action, in consultation with civil society to address the root causes of the restavèk situation.⁶⁶

28. POHDH a rapporté que la traite d'enfants était un phénomène très important surtout à la frontière avec le pays voisin, lequel phénomène avait été accentué depuis le séisme.⁶⁷ RF noted the complete lack of anti-trafficking legislation.⁶⁸

29. While noting that it was unclear whether or not corporal punishment was lawful in the home, Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children (GIEACPC) hoped that the review will highlight the importance of enacting and implementing prohibition of corporal punishment of children in the home and other settings.⁶⁹

3. Administration of justice, including impunity, and the rule of law

30. AI reported that impunity for past human rights violations prevailed in Haiti.⁷⁰ AI and JS10 stated that the return of Jean-Claude Duvalier to Haiti offered a unique opportunity to address the alleged human rights violations committed throughout his 15 years in power.⁷¹ AI also mentioned other specific cases of impunity.⁷² HRW noted that victims expressed concerns about their safety within the investigation of Duvalier.⁷³ HRW recommended that Haiti exhaust all judicial avenues in the prosecution of Jean-Claude Duvalier and continue to strengthen the rule of law by investigating and prosecuting past crimes.⁷⁴

31. OPC a fait référence à la loi sur le Conseil Supérieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire, la loi sur le Statut des Magistrats, et celle de l'École de la Magistrature et aux articles 173 à 184 de la Constitution qui établissent l'exercice du pouvoir judiciaire.⁷⁵ POHDH a rapporté que ces lois n'étaient pas mises en application pour des raisons politiques. OPC a indiqué que la destruction de l'infrastructure judiciaire de la capitale a causé un ralentissement important des services de justice.⁷⁶ OPC a recommandé à Haïti de prendre des dispositions énergiques pour relancer cette réforme et d'harmoniser les lois avec les instruments internationaux ratifiés ainsi que de doter le système judiciaire des moyens adéquats.⁷⁷ OPC a également recommandé à Haïti d'intégrer la réforme de la justice dans le plan de reconstruction.⁷⁸ While JS10 mentioned the unlawful appointments and removals of judges and Supreme Court justices, AI recommended that Haiti name without delay the President of the Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary.⁷⁹

32. JS10 referred to the unfair trial procedures and the lack of defence counsel.⁸⁰

33. OPC a indiqué qu'il existait un système de juridiction pour les mineurs et un centre de détention pour les garçons qui était en reconstruction et agrandissement suite à son effondrement.⁸¹ OPC a fait état de la formation académique dont les mineurs détenus bénéficient.⁸² JS3 noted that, while the Penal Code prohibited the incarceration of children under 16 years old, younger children were routinely held in prison; minors were not segregated from the adult population; and that pre-trial detention was used to detain juveniles.⁸³ JS3 added that institutions of remedial education, as required under the Penal Code for children below 16 years, were non-existent.⁸⁴

34. JS3 notably recommended that Haiti establish at least 3 children courts in the country and develop alternative methods of holding children accountable for their illegal acts by focusing more on rehabilitation, and less on punitive measures.⁸⁵

35. JS8 referred to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between MINUSTAH and Haiti and further reported on alleged human rights violations committed by MINUSTAH members for whose investigation results remained unknown.⁸⁶ JS8 recommended that Haiti renegotiate the SOFA with the UN to allow for accountability of MINUSTAH members.⁸⁷

4. Right to privacy, marriage and family life

36. OPC a fait référence aux trois volets du droit à l'identité (état-civil, électoral et fiscal) et à la perte des documents d'état civil pour plus de 500,000 personnes après le séisme.⁸⁸ OPC a toutefois noté que l'Office national de l'Identification avait déjà enregistré la moitié de la population.⁸⁹ POHDH a indiqué que l'absence d'identification était un indicateur de l'exclusion dont sont victimes certains groupes sociaux, y compris les Haïtiens migrant vers l'étranger qui n'ont pas eu accès à un acte de naissance.⁹⁰

37. OPC a recommandé à Haïti de poursuivre ses efforts en vue de l'amélioration de l'accès aux bureaux de l'état civil et de l'harmonisation des trois volets du problème et de prendre des mesures pour simplifier les procédures relatives à la perte et au remplacement des documents d'identité et particulièrement les actes de l'état civil.⁹¹ POHDH a recommandé qu'Haïti adopte la loi organique de l'Office National d'Identification.⁹²

38. OPC a rapporté que le cadre normatif régulant le régime familial était générateur d'insécurité et d'injustice sociale pour les enfants issus de la forme d'union prédominante du pays: «le plaçage».⁹³ POHDH a recommandé l'adoption des lois sur le plaçage et la filiation et la paternité et la maternité responsable.⁹⁴

39. OPC a indiqué que la question de l'adoption d'enfants avait regagné d'intérêt après le séisme.⁹⁵ HRW echoed concerns raised about improper processing of inter-country adoption in violation of domestic and international standards.⁹⁶

5. Freedom of religion or belief, expression, association and peaceful assembly and right to participate in public and political life

40. POHDH a indiqué que, depuis 2006, les élections avaient été marquées par de faibles taux de participation, la mainmise de l'internationale, l'appropriation de l'appareil par les partis politiques et/ou par l'exécutif, des luttes intestines, un très grand déficit de crédibilité, par le trucage électoral, par la peur et le désenchantement généralement indexés par les observateurs indépendants nationaux et étrangers.⁹⁷

41. La soumission conjointe 4 (JS4) a indiqué qu'un Conseil électoral permanent (CEP), tel que prévu par la Constitution, n'avait jamais été établi et que les élections en Haïti étaient administrées par un Conseil Electoral Provisoire qui n'était pas légalement constitué.⁹⁸ OPC a notamment recommandé qu'Haïti mandate une structure pour l'élaboration des lois

d'applications relatives au fonctionnement des assemblées départementales après la mise en œuvre du conseil électoral permanent.⁹⁹

42. JS4 a rapporté que le CEP avait exclu sans justification et autorité légale des partis politiques haïtiens, y compris le parti Fanmi Lavalas depuis les scrutins de 2009.¹⁰⁰ JS4 a également fait part de défaillances d'inscriptions d'électeurs dans le registre électoral pour les élections de novembre 2010, notamment en raison de la création de Centres d'Opération et de Vérification pour enregistrer les électeurs des camps de déplacés internes, ce en dehors de la loi électorale.¹⁰¹ JS4 a ajouté que le gouvernement haïtien, en collaboration avec la communauté internationale, n'avaient pas réussi à empêcher les irrégularités et la violence lors du scrutin de 2010.¹⁰² Enfin, JS4 a indiqué que les procédures du dépouillement des votes n'avaient pas été respectées et que la communauté internationale avait imposé un résultat du scrutin, sans tenir compte de nombreuses irrégularités et fraudes.¹⁰³

43. HRW recommended that Haiti include more female representatives, with voting power, on the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission.¹⁰⁴

6. Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work

44. While recalling that rates of un- and underemployment were high and that job creation was among the key priorities of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, JS9 reported on the limited numbers of programs for employment.¹⁰⁵ AJPDSH a encouragé Haïti à encadrer les jeunes universitaires pour les accompagner sur le marché du travail, notamment par des stages rémunérés.¹⁰⁶

45. JS9 recommended that Haiti strengthen administrative infrastructure to monitor and enforce all rights contained in the Labor Code.¹⁰⁷ JS9 reported on human rights abusers in the Cash for Work programs and the textile industry.¹⁰⁸ JS9 added that freedom of association and collective bargaining remained elusive, due to the lack of adequate and just enforcement mechanisms.¹⁰⁹

7. Right to social security and to an adequate standard of living

46. HRW indicated that, for many Haitians, the earthquake increased the daily strain of extreme poverty.¹¹⁰ JS9 reported that 80 per cent of the population lived under the poverty line, and more than half lived in abject poverty.¹¹¹ JS6 reported that as much as 70 per cent of the Haitian population earned a living either directly or indirectly through the agricultural sector.¹¹²

47. JS1, JS5, JS7 and the Lamp for Haiti Foundation (LHF) reported that the Constitution stated that “[t]he State recognizes the right of every citizen to decent housing, education, food and social security”.¹¹³

48. POHDH a rapporté que le Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail était mal perçu par les contribuables, au regard de la politisation de ses services au détriment de la protection des intérêts et fourniture de services.¹¹⁴ Joint Submission 6 (JS6) added that continued and substantial debt service had disabled the government's ability to invest in social services.¹¹⁵

49. POHDH a indiqué que la malnutrition touchait plus de la moitié de la population, notamment les populations rurales, et a mentionné le saccage de l'économie haïtienne suite à l'application des politiques d'ajustement structurel. En conséquence, plus de 50 pour cent de l'alimentation consommée était maintenant importées.¹¹⁶ JS6 furthermore indicated that the the food provided through direct assistance was often inadequate and could be harmful to the sustainability and availability of local food for purchase.¹¹⁷

50. POHDH a recommandé à Haïti d'élaborer et mettre en œuvre une politique agricole capable de recapitaliser les exploitations et de relancer les filières de production végétale et animale tout en privilégiant les productions vivrières.¹¹⁸

51. HRW indicated that, already weak prior to the earthquake; the health system had struggled under increased pressure.¹¹⁹ OPC a indiqué que les besoins de 60 pour cent de la population en matière de santé primaire n'était pas pourvus.¹²⁰ OPC a rappelé qu'une épidémie de choléra avait frappé le pays depuis octobre 2010.¹²¹ HRW stated that 4000 people died from that epidemic by early February 2011.¹²² JS3 stated that the Government's response to providing preventive services for children was widely inadequate.¹²³ HRW recommended that Haiti rebuild the health sector to ensure access to universal primary health care for all.¹²⁴

52. JS5 indicated that the Constitution stated that any practices that might disturb the ecological balance were strictly forbidden. A 2006 Management of the Environment Decree defined the national policy on environmental management and sustainable development.¹²⁵ JS5 indicated that as much as 95 per cent of forests had been lost. JS5 recommended that reconstruction and environmental protection efforts must promote community woodlands operated and/or owned co-operatively.¹²⁶ JS5 reported that the extractive sector represented a relatively low portion of Haiti's GDP; however, increased mining activities presented grave implications for land use and planning objectives and entailed a number of environmental concerns.¹²⁷ JS5 recommended that environmental analysis must be injected into all aspects of decision-making and that stakeholder engagement must be a central activity of all such assessments.¹²⁸

53. JS3 noted that the earthquake left Haiti coping with a great number of physically disabled people, including children.¹²⁹ JS1 reported that many of these children were abandoned because of the costs associated with caring for them, and because of a history of shunning the disabled.¹³⁰

54. POHDH a noté que la majorité des logements était notamment exigus et délabrés.¹³¹ POHDH and JS7 referred to the increase of rent prices.¹³² LHF indicated that millions were living in slums prior to the earthquake, where living conditions were inhuman. LHF presented the specific case of Cité Soleil, one of the largest slums in Haiti.¹³³ OPC a indiqué qu'il a résulté du séisme une destruction massive d'immeubles résidentiels, scolaires, commerciaux et des bâtiments les plus symboliques de l'Etat notamment le Parlement, le Palais de Justice et le Parlement.¹³⁴

55. JS7 reported that Haiti had failed to protect housing rights or to marshal the resources of existing institutions in this regard.¹³⁵ JS7 recommended that Haiti adopt a national housing strategy and authorise the Division of Social Housing Promotion and Planning to administer it.¹³⁶

56. OPC a recommandé à Haïti d'adopter les dispositions pour que la reconstruction prenne en compte le respect du droit au logement, à l'éducation, la protection des groupes vulnérables.¹³⁷ HRW notably recommended that Haiti draft a clear, comprehensive plan to address the housing problems that have arisen after the earthquake and effectively communicate the plan, with benchmarks and clear expectations, to camp residents and other persons displaced by the earthquake.¹³⁸ JS5 recommended that Haiti implement land titling procedures that provide a variety of options based on the needs and customs of the local populations.¹³⁹

57. JS5 indicated that, as of March 2011, less than 20 per cent of the rubble from the earthquake had been removed, that their removal had consistently been undertaken without adequate safety equipment and that they had frequently been placed in ecologically sensitive areas.¹⁴⁰ JS5 made recommendations in this regard.¹⁴¹

58. JS6 indicated that, in 2009, Haiti established the Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement.¹⁴² JS5 stated that, even prior to the 2010 earthquake, the sanitation and hygiene infrastructure had long been non-functional throughout much of Haiti, especially in rural areas. Since the earthquake, many rural towns had become *de facto* urban areas, due to influx of refugees from Port-au-Prince.¹⁴³ JS6 reported that, combined with unsanitary conditions, the lack of water was a major factor in exacerbating Haiti's health crises.¹⁴⁴

59. HRW recommended that Haiti follow through with implementation of the 2009 water reforms, including the development of a national water and sanitation sector, and the regulation and control of all actors.¹⁴⁵

8. Right to education and to participate in the cultural life of the community

60. Asamble Vwazen Solino (AVS) and JS3 noted that the Constitution provided for free compulsory primary education.¹⁴⁶

61. OPC a indiqué qu'un Plan national d'éducation et de formation et un programme visant au renforcement de la qualité de l'éducation avaient été adoptés.¹⁴⁷ AVS noted that the earthquake destroyed or badly damaged at least half of the nation's 15,000 primary and 1,500 secondary schools and that the entire school system shut down for three months following the earthquake. Efforts to build temporary schools within camps were often blocked by landowners who feared that the camps will turn into permanent settlements.¹⁴⁸ Istituto Internazionale Maria Ausiliatrice (IIMA) a indiqué que ces centres n'étaient pas adéquats.¹⁴⁹ POHDH a indiqué que l'éducation était privatisée à 92 pour cent. Plus de 500 000 enfants en âge d'aller à l'école n'y avaient pas accès, le taux d'analphabétisme était élevé, le personnel était insuffisant et mal repartis, la formation des enseignants diminuait et les ressources didactiques de base étaient quasi-inexistantes.¹⁵⁰ IIMA a rapporté que la discrimination des filles était frappante pour l'accès à l'éducation.¹⁵¹

62. HRW noted that, prior to the earthquake, only about half of primary school-age children in Haiti attended school.¹⁵² AVS indicated that school fees varied widely depending on the school, education level and whether the school was in an urban or rural area. While public schools had lower costs, numerous "hidden" fees—for school maintenance, uniforms, books, and teacher-salary augmentation—put even public education out of the reach of many parents.¹⁵³ AVS added that rural areas had not insufficient and inadequately funded school, what constituted one push factor behind unsustainable population migration to more urban areas.¹⁵⁴

63. HRW recommended that Haiti develop and implement a plan towards the realization of universal primary education.¹⁵⁵ POHDH a notamment recommandé à Haïti de créer des écoles primaires gratuites sur tout le territoire.¹⁵⁶ OPC a recommandé à Haïti de mettre sur pied un plan de carrière pour les enseignants.¹⁵⁷ AVS recommended that Haiti increase the national budgetary allocation for education to at least 25 per cent; implement special efforts, particularly in rural areas, to ensure that young girls are provided the same access to education as boys; provide instruction in Haitian Creole at all educational levels; provide, regulate and monitor training to all teachers in both the public and private schools; and adequately fund and build the capacity of quality control agencies.¹⁵⁸

64. JS3 referred to the difficulties met by parents to take their disabled children to schools and indicated that most schools in Haiti were not built with access for disabled children.¹⁵⁹

65. IIMA a indiqué qu'Haïti devrait construire un enseignement supérieur de qualité sur la base des réalités et de la société locale, qui puisse créer des professionnels disposés à travailler à Haïti.¹⁶⁰

9. Internally displaced persons

66. POHDH a rappelé le Plan du Relèvement et de la Reconstruction d’Haïti qui ne visait que les propriétaires et non les locataires.¹⁶¹ AI reported that displaced people occupying private land had been forcibly evicted by landowners, on most occasions with the assistance of the police or armed men. In April 2010, the government announced a six-week freeze on forced evictions of displaced people, but lacked the capacity to enforce the measure.¹⁶² In November 2010, IAHRC asked Haiti to adopt a moratorium on the expulsions from the camps until a new government can take office.¹⁶³ JS3 indicated that most evictions were currently carried out extra-judicially.¹⁶⁴ JS3 stated that forced evictions disproportionately affected children and other vulnerable groups.¹⁶⁵

67. JS7 indicated that, in March 2010, the Government authorized the seizure of more than 17,000 parcels of vacant land but reportedly designated only five plots of land for transitional shelter in downtown Port-au-Prince.¹⁶⁶

68. JS7 reported that the 2010 draft *Neighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction Framework*, created by the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission in consultation with the Government and the UN’s Shelter Cluster did not adequately reflect international guidelines on durable solutions for IDPs.¹⁶⁷

69. HRW added that the lack of security was a concern expressed by residents, notably women.¹⁶⁸ JS3 stated that lack of access to adequate housing continued to affect the security, physical and mental health of children.¹⁶⁹

70. OPC a rapporté que le séisme avait contribué à une recrudescence importante des actes de violence contre les femmes dans les camps de déplacés.¹⁷⁰ While the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ) provided figures in four camps¹⁷¹, HRW stated that it was difficult to get accurate quantitative data in this regard.¹⁷²

71. In 2010, the IACHR granted precautionary measures for all the displaced women and children living in 22 camps notably relating to medical and mental support and protection of victims and to the security in camps.¹⁷³ A number of submissions, including IACHR, underlined the need for the participation of women in planning and implementing policies on violence in camps.¹⁷⁴ JS2 stated that it was critical for Haiti to implement the IACHR’s recommendations and accountability mechanisms for human rights violations.¹⁷⁵

72. HRW recommended that Haiti continue to provide, and increase where necessary, security in camps to protect camp residents, especially women and children.¹⁷⁶ JS8 noted failure in protecting women and children in camps.¹⁷⁷

73. AI reported that displaced people living in camps and host communities had had to rely largely on international agencies and NGOs whose efforts had been hampered by the authorities’ failure to produce an effective and comprehensive plan for managing disaster efforts.¹⁷⁸ HRW indicated that, over a year after the earthquake, the emergency shelters could not stand up to the elements.¹⁷⁹ JS6 referred to the squalid living conditions in camps and limited access to latrines, which created a sanitation crisis in the IDP camps and were a major public health threat.¹⁸⁰ JS7 stated that Haiti had failed to provide alternative housing options outside of the IDP camps.¹⁸¹

74. HRW indicated that there were plans to charge residents for water usage, which will make potable water economically inaccessible to them.¹⁸²

III. Achievements, best practices, challenges and constraints

75. IACHR stated that, as a consequence of the 2010 earthquake, the existing challenges were compounded by new problems of a unique nature.¹⁸³ JS1 urged Haiti to use this

opportunity to review its pervasive shortcomings in both its policies and practices, and to commit to not rebuild Haiti as it existed prior to the earthquake, but to build it into a country that respects and promotes human rights in a sustainable and autonomous fashion.¹⁸⁴

IV. Key national priorities, initiatives and commitments

N/A

V. Capacity-building and technical assistance

76. JS6 stated that, on 30 March 2010, donors pledged a total of \$5.3 billion toward long-term reconstruction, and directed the funds toward specific priority sectors identified by the Government in the Action Plan for Reconstruction and Development to achieve the reconstruction goals.¹⁸⁵ JS2 mentioned that much of the funding pledged had still not been released. Of the money released, a large portion had not yet been spent and much of it had gone to international aid agencies, not to Haitian organizations or the government.¹⁸⁶

77. JS6 stated that the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was established after the 2010 donors conference to improve coordination.¹⁸⁷ JS6 stated that Haiti must work to strengthen its ability to lead and coordinate the activities of donor countries, inter-governmental organizations and NGOs to ensure that they take an approach that brings human rights to the forefront of all assistance efforts.¹⁸⁸ JS6 recommended that Haiti and international actors ensure transparency throughout all stages of aid planning and distribution and that Haiti should work to build the capacity of the OPC or create a national office to receive, investigate, and respond to complaints about violations of human rights relating to international assistance.¹⁸⁹

Notes

¹ The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org. (One asterisk denotes a non-governmental organization in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council.)

Civil society

AI	Amnesty International, London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*;
AJPDSH	Association des Jeunes Progressistes pour le Développement du Sud d’Haiti; Cayes, Haiti;
AVS	Asamble Vwazen Solino, <u>submission endorsed by</u> : Bureau des Avocats Internationaux; Center for Constitutional Rights; Conférence des universitaires pour la défense des droits et de la liberté; Fanm Viktim Leve Kanpe (FAVILEK); Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti; LAMP for Haiti Foundation; Link Haiti, Inc.; Paloma Institute; UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic; and Unity Ayiti; Port-au-Prince, Haiti;
CHRGJ	Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York, NY, United States of America;
GIEACPC	Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
HRW	Human Rights Watch, New York, United States*;
IIMA	Istituto Internazionale Maria Ausiliatrice, Veyrier, Switzerland*;
JS1	Joint Submission 1 submitted by: Lawyers’ Earthquake Response Network; Bureau des Avocats Internationaux; Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti;

- JS2 Joint Submission 2 submitted by: MADRE, New York, United States*; Komisyon Fanm Viktim Pou Viktim (KOFAVIV); Fanm Viktim Leve Kanpe (FAVILEK); Kodinasyon Nasyonal Viktim Direk (KONAMAVID); Women's Link Worldwide; The International Women's Human Rights (IWHR) Clinic at the City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law; Best Practices Policy Project (BPPP); Human Rights Clinic (University of Miami School of Law); International Human Rights Law Clinic (University of Virginia School of Law) and; endorsed by: The Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti (IJDH); The Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI); Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR);
- JS3 Joint Submission 3 submitted by: Fondasyon Kolezepòl pou Sove Timoun; Moun Viktim (MOVI); Action des Unités Motivées pour une Haïti de Droit (AUMOHD) and; endorsed by: Bureau des Avocats Internationaux; Center for Constitutional Rights; Conférence des universitaires pour la défense des droits et de la liberté; Fanm Viktim Leve Kanpe (FAVILEK); Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti; LAMP for Haiti Foundation; Link Haiti, Inc.; Paloma Institute; UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic; and Unity Ayiti;
- JS4 Joint Submission 4 submitted by: Bureau des Avocats Internationaux; Canada Haiti Action Network; TransAfrica Forum; Louisiana Justice Institute and; endorsed by: Bri Kouri Nouvel Gaye; Center for Constitutional Rights; Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti; Klèdev; LAMP for Haiti Foundation; Let Haiti Live; Link Haiti, Inc.; Paloma Institute; UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic; UnityAyiti;
- JS5 Joint Submission 5 submitted by: Association Haitienne de Droit de l'Environnement (AHDEN); Environmental Justice Initiative for Haiti; National Lawyers Guild-Environmental Justice Committee and; endorsed by: Bureau des Avocats Internationaux; Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti; LAMP for Haiti Foundation; Link Haiti, Inc.; Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) Haiti; Other Worlds are Possible; Paloma Institute; UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic; UnityAyiti;
- JS6 Joint submission 6 submitted by: Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (NYU School of Law); Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti; LinkHaiti, Inc.; Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington D.C., USA* and; endorsed by: Bureau des Avocats Internationaux; Center for Constitutional Rights; Conférence des universitaires pour la défense des droits et de la liberté; LAMP for Haiti Foundation; Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) Haiti; Paloma Institute; Sustainable Organic Integrated Livelihoods (SOIL); UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic; UnityAyiti; You.Me.We;
- JS7 Joint Submission 7 submitted by: Camp Benediction; Camp CAPVVA; Camp Cavil; Camp CCTT; Camp COSSBAMI; Camp CR-5; Camp Faitree Michiko; Camp Imaculée Deplacée; Camp Michiko I; Camp Mosaique; Camp Refugee; Camp SOHOMO; Camp Toussaint Louverture; Groupe d'Action pour la Défense des Droits Humains en Haïti; International Action Ties; MOSFV; You.Me.We and endorsed by: Bureau des Avocats Internationaux; Center for Constitutional Rights; Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti; LAMP for Haiti Foundation; Link Haiti, Inc.; Moun Viktim; Paloma Institute; UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic; Unity Ayiti;
- JS8 Joint Submission 8 submitted by: Bri Kouri Nouvel Gaye; Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) Haiti; Let Haiti Live; Unity Ayiti and endorsed by: Bureau des Avocats Internationaux; Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti; International Action Ties; LAMP for Haiti Foundation; Link Haiti, Inc.; Paloma Institute; TransAfrica Forum ; UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic;
- JS9 Joint Submission 9 submitted by: Antèn Ouvriye; Transnational Legal Clinic, University of Pennsylvania Law School; and endorsed by: Bureau des Avocats Internationaux; Center for Constitutional Rights; Conférence des universitaires pour la défense des droits et de la liberté; Institute for Justice & Democracy in

- Haiti; LAMP for Haiti Foundation; Link Haiti, Inc.; Paloma Institute; UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic; UnityAyiti;
- JS10 Joint Submission 10 submitted by: Alternative Chance; Center for Constitutional Rights; Conférence des universitaires pour la défense des droits et de la liberté; LAMP for Haiti Foundation and endorsed by: Bureau des Avocats Internationaux; Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti; Link Haiti, Inc.; Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) Haiti; Paloma Institute; UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic; University of Miami School of Law, Human Rights Clinic; Unity Ayiti;
- JS11 Joint submission 11 submitted by L'Organisation des Etudiants de l'Université de l'Etat d'Haïti (OEUEH); La Commission Rédaction, La Faculté de Science Humaine (FASH); La Faculté d'Agronomie et de Médecine Vétérinaire (FAMV); Port-au-Prince; Haiti;
- LHF The Lamp for Haiti Foundation; Philadelphia, United States of America; Bois Neuf, Haiti;
- POHDH Centre de Recherches Sociales et de Formation pour le Développement (CRESFED), Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH), Commission Episcopale Nationale Justice et Paix (JILAP), l'Institut Culturel Karl Levêque (ICKL), Programme pour une Alternative de Justice (PAJ), Centre Karl Levêque (SKL), Groupe d'Assistance Juridique (GAJ) et Commission de Réflexion et d'Assistance Légale – de la Conférence Haïtienne des Religieux (CORAL-CHR); conjointement avec Solidarité Femmes Haïtiennes (SOFA), Antèn Ouvriye, Fondation Ecuménique pour la paix et la justice (FOPJ), Coalition Contre la Traite et le Trafic des Femmes et Filles en Amérique Latine et dans la Caraïbes (CATW-LAC), Organisation des Femmes Thomonde (OFAT), Groupe d'Intervention en Droits Humains (GIDH), Sant Edikasyon Popilè Jacques Stephen Alexis (SEPJA) et la Fondation «Zanmi Timoun»; Port-au-Prince, Haïti;
- RF Restavèk Freedom endorsed by: Bureau des Avocats Internationaux; Center for Constitutional Rights; Conférence des universitaires pour la défense des droits et de la liberté; Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti; LAMP for Haiti Foundation; Link Haiti, Inc.; Paloma Institute; UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic; Unity Ayiti; Cincinnati; United States of America;
- National human rights institution*
- OPC Office de la Protection du Citoyen et de la Citoyenneté, Port-au-Prince, Haïti.
- Regional intergovernmental organization*
- OAS Organisation of American States; Washington, D.C., United States of America
- Submission of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review; 18 March 2011;
 - Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on human Rights 2010; OEA/Ser.L/V/II - Doc. 5, rev. 1 – 7 March 2011;
 - Press release N° 6/11: IACHR urges United States to suspend deportations to Haiti, 4 February 2011;
 - Press release N° 3/11: IACHR reminds Haiti of its on-going duty to investigate and prosecute human rights violations; 19 January 2011;
 - IAHRC, PM 340/10 – Women and girls residing in 22 Camps for internally displaced persons in Port-au-Prince, Haiti; 22 December 2010;
 - Press Release N° 114/10: IACHR expresses concern over situation in camps for displaced persons in Haiti; 18 November 2010;
 - IACHR, PM 367/10 – Forced Evictions from Five Camps for Displaced Persons; 15 November 2010 IACHR, *The Rights of Women in Haiti to be free from Violence and Discrimination*, OEA/Ser.L/V/II Doc. 64, 10 March 2009;

- I/A Court H.R., Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 180;
 - *Observations of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights upon conclusion of its April 2007 visit to Haiti*, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.131 doc. 36, 2 March 2008.
- ² JS1, paras. 1–3; see also HRW, p. 5; IIMA, para. 30; JS6, p. 10.
- ³ POHDH, para. 28.
- ⁴ JS5, para. 5; see also JS3, para. 4.
- ⁵ POHDH, paras. 4, 10 and 22; see also OPC, paras. 7 and 11 and p. 6.
- ⁶ POHDH, para. 9.
- ⁷ AI, p. 5.
- ⁸ JS3, para. 32.
- ⁹ AJPDSH, p. 4.
- ¹⁰ JS1, para. 43; see also OPC, para. 37; POHDH, para. 10.
- ¹¹ OPC, para. 6.
- ¹² OPC, paras. 31–32; see also JS3, para. 30.
- ¹³ OPC, paras. 33–34.
- ¹⁴ JS3, para. 21.
- ¹⁵ JS3, para. 22.
- ¹⁶ JS7, para. 14.
- ¹⁷ JS11, para. 21.
- ¹⁸ JS1, para. 20; see also JS7, para. 16.
- ¹⁹ HRW, p. 1.
- ²⁰ AI, p. 4.
- ²¹ POHDH, para. 6.
- ²² OPC, para. 10.
- ²³ IACHR, *The Rights of Women in Haiti to be free from Violence and Discrimination*, OEA/Ser.L/V/II Doc. 64, 10 March 2009, para. 7. Available at: <http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Haitimujer2009eng/HaitiWomen09.toc.htm> (accessed on 23 June 2011); IACHR, *Observations of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights upon conclusion of its April 2007 visit to Haiti*, para. 40; available at: <http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/April%202007%20Haiti%20Observations%20ENG.pdf> (accessed on 23 June 2011); see also JS1, para. 22; JS9, paras. 20–23.
- ²⁴ POHDH, para. 17; see also JS1, para. 7.
- ²⁵ JS1, para. 8.
- ²⁶ POHDH, para. 20.
- ²⁷ HRW, p. 2.
- ²⁸ HRW, p. 4.
- ²⁹ OPC, para. 15; see also HRW, p. 1; IIMA, para. 3; JS7, para. 5.
- ³⁰ JS10, paras. 12–15.
- ³¹ OPC, para. 25; AI, p. 1; JS10, para. 23.
- ³² AI, p. 1; JS10, para. 23.
- ³³ JS2, para. 4.
- ³⁴ HRW, p. 1; see also JS10, para. 18.
- ³⁵ I/A Court H.R., Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 180, p. 54; available at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_180_ing.pdf (accessed on 23 June 2011).
- ³⁶ AI, p. 4.
- ³⁷ JS10, para. 10.
- ³⁸ OPC, para. 18; HRW, p. 1.
- ³⁹ AI, p. 4; POHDH, para. 5; JS10, paras. 24–27; see also HRW, pp. 1–2; JS1, para. 12; IACHR, *Observations of the inter-American Commission on Human Rights upon conclusion of its April 2007 visit to Haiti*, paras. 36–37; Available at: <http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/April%202007%20Haiti%20Observations%20ENG.pdf> (accessed on 23 June 2011).

- ⁴⁰ OPC, para. 23; see also AI, p. 4; JS1, para. 15 and I/A Court H.R., Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 180, para. 51; available at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_180_ing.pdf (accessed on 23 June 2011).
- ⁴¹ POHDH, para. 6; see also AI, p. 5.
- ⁴² AI, p. 5; see also JS10, pp. 9–10.
- ⁴³ OPC, para. 21.
- ⁴⁴ POHDH, para. 5; see also JS10, paras. 19–20.
- ⁴⁵ HRW, p. 5.
- ⁴⁶ HRW, pp. 2 and 5; JS10, para. 21.
- ⁴⁷ IACHR press release No. 6/11, 4 February 2011; available at: <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Comunicados/English/2011/6-11eng.htm> (accessed on 23 June 2011); see also JS10, paras. 32–34; JS1, para. 13.
- ⁴⁸ JS10, para. 29.
- ⁴⁹ OPC, para. 10.
- ⁵⁰ POHDH, para. 17; see also AI, p. 2.
- ⁵¹ AI, p. 2; see also JS3, para. 25.
- ⁵² POHDH, para. 19.
- ⁵³ JS3, para. 24; see also JS1, para. 9.
- ⁵⁴ JS2, paras. 6–7.
- ⁵⁵ JS2, para. 8; see also JS3, para. 26.
- ⁵⁶ JS2, para. 9; see also JS1, para. 11; JS3, para. 27.
- ⁵⁷ AI, p. 5.
- ⁵⁸ OPC, para. 11.
- ⁵⁹ POHDH, para. 20; see also AI, p. 5.
- ⁶⁰ JS3, paras. 27 and 36 (e)(ii).
- ⁶¹ HRW, p. 3; AI, p. 2; JS1, para. 42; JS9, para. 24; RF, paras. 1–32.
- ⁶² AI, p. 2.
- ⁶³ RF, para. 23; JS1, para. 42.
- ⁶⁴ HRW, p. 3; see also RF, para. 26.
- ⁶⁵ RF, paras. 9–15.
- ⁶⁶ RF, paras. 28 and 31; see also AI, p. 5.
- ⁶⁷ POHDH, para. 23; see also AI, pp. 1–2; JS1, para. 39; JS3, para. 20; OPC, para. 6.
- ⁶⁸ RF, para. 27.
- ⁶⁹ GIEACPC, pp. 1–2; see also IIMA, para. 30(g).
- ⁷⁰ AI, p. 3; see also JS1, para. 17.
- ⁷¹ AI, p. 3; JS10, para. 28; see also IACHR press release No. 3/11, available at: <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Comunicados/English/2011/3-11eng.htm> (accessed on 23 June 2011).
- ⁷² AI, p. 4; see also HRW, p. 3.
- ⁷³ HRW, p. 3.
- ⁷⁴ HRW, p. 5; see also JS1, para. 17; JS10, p. 10.
- ⁷⁵ OPC, paras. 4 and 20; see also JS10, para. 10; POHDH, para. 3.
- ⁷⁶ OPC, para. 18; see also JS10, para. 10.
- ⁷⁷ OPC, para. 5.
- ⁷⁸ OPC, para. 17.
- ⁷⁹ JS10, para. 38; AI, p. 4.
- ⁸⁰ JS10, paras. 35–37.
- ⁸¹ OPC, para. 6.
- ⁸² OPC, para. 21.
- ⁸³ JS3, para. 34; see also JS1, para. 16; JS10, para. 30.
- ⁸⁴ JS3, para. 35.
- ⁸⁵ JS3, para. 36(d); see also POHDH, para. 22.
- ⁸⁶ JS8, paras. 7–22; 33–37; see also JS11, para. 19; POHDH, para. 19.
- ⁸⁷ JS8, p. 10; see also JS1, para. 18.
- ⁸⁸ OPC, para. 8.
- ⁸⁹ OPC, para. 29; see also POHDH, para. 25.
- ⁹⁰ POHDH, para. 27.

- ⁹¹ OPC, para. 9; see also POHDH, para. 26.
⁹² POHDH, para. 28.
⁹³ OPC, para. 7; see also POHDH, para. 21.
⁹⁴ POHDH, paras. 18 and 22; see also OPC, para. 7.
⁹⁵ OPC, para. 6.
⁹⁶ HRW, p. 3.
⁹⁷ POHDH, para. 7.
⁹⁸ JS4, paras. 3–4; see also OPC, para. 2.
⁹⁹ OPC, para.3; see also JS4, para. 8; POHDH, para. 8.
¹⁰⁰ JS4, paras. 5–8; see also JS1, para. 19; JS11, para. 7.
¹⁰¹ JS4, paras. 10–12; see also JS11, para. 3.
¹⁰² JS4, paras. 13–15; see also JS11, para. 22.
¹⁰³ JS4, paras. 16–20; see also JS1, para. 19; JS11, paras. 3 and 9–15.
¹⁰⁴ HRW, p. 4.
¹⁰⁵ JS9, paras. 1 and 4–8; see also JS1, para. 25.
¹⁰⁶ AJPDSH, pp. 1–3.
¹⁰⁷ JS9, p. 6 and paras. 9–11; see also JS1, para. 21.
¹⁰⁸ JS9, paras. 12–18; see also JS1, para. 24.
¹⁰⁹ JS9, para. 19; see also JS1, para. 23.
¹¹⁰ HRW, p. 3.
¹¹¹ JS9, para. 1; see also LHF, para. 3.
¹¹² JS6, para. 17.
¹¹³ JS1, para. 26; JS5, para. 5; JS7, para. 11; LHF, para. 8.
¹¹⁴ POHDH, para. 9.
¹¹⁵ JS6, para. 23.
¹¹⁶ POHDH, para. 13; see also JS3, para. 10; JS6, paras. 18-19; JS11, para. 16.
¹¹⁷ JS6, paras. 20–21; see also JS11, para. 16.
¹¹⁸ POHDH, para. 14.
¹¹⁹ HRW, p. 4.
¹²⁰ OPC, para. 13.
¹²¹ OPC, para. 13; see also JS3, para. 11.
¹²² HRW, p. 4; see also JS3, para. 10.
¹²³ JS3, para. 11.
¹²⁴ HRW, p. 5; see also OPC, para. 14.
¹²⁵ JS5, paras. 8–9.
¹²⁶ JS5, paras. 45–50; see also JS1, para. 33.
¹²⁷ JS5, paras. 65–66.
¹²⁸ JS5, paras. 76–77; see also JS1, para. 35.
¹²⁹ JS3, para. 29.
¹³⁰ JS1, para. 40.
¹³¹ POHDH, para. 15.
¹³² POHDH, para. 15; JS7 para. 5.
¹³³ LHF, paras. 3–6 and 12–15; see also JS1, para. 28.
¹³⁴ OPC, para. 15; see also HRW, p. 1.
¹³⁵ JS7, para. 17; see also JS1, para. 27.
¹³⁶ JS7, p. 7.
¹³⁷ OPC, para. 17.
¹³⁸ HRW, p. 5.
¹³⁹ JS5, para. 60; see also JS7, p. 9; LHF, para. 19.
¹⁴⁰ JS5, paras. 10–13; see also JS1, para. 36.
¹⁴¹ JS5, paras. 14–16.
¹⁴² JS6, para. 8.
¹⁴³ JS5, para. 19.
¹⁴⁴ JS6, para. 24.
¹⁴⁵ HRW, p. 5; see also JS3, para. 12; JS5, paras. 20–23.
¹⁴⁶ AVS, paras. 2 and 3; JS3, para. 16; see also POHDH, para. 11.

- 147 OPC, para. 12.
- 148 AVS, paras. 12–13; see also IIMA, para. 3; OPC, para. 12.
- 149 IIMA, para. 17.
- 150 POHDH, para. 11; see also AVS, paras. 7; 11 and 14–17; IIMA; paras. 5–6; 9; 18; JS1, para. 41; JS3, para. 16.
- 151 IIMA, para. 11; see also POHDH, para. 11.
- 152 HRW, p. 2; see also AVS, para. 9.
- 153 AVS, paras. 8.
- 154 AVS, para. 10.
- 155 HRW, p. 5; see also AVS, p. 4; OPC, para. 14.
- 156 POHDH, para. 12.
- 157 OPC, para. 14.
- 158 AVS, pp. 4–5.
- 159 JS3, paras. 31–32.
- 160 IIMA, para. 25.
- 161 POHDH, para. 15.
- 162 AI, p. 2; see also HRW, p. 3; JS1, para. 31; JS7, paras. 6; 21 and 27–31.
- 163 IACHR, PM 367/10 - Forced Evictions from Five Camps for Displaced Persons; available at: <http://www.cidh.oas.org/medidas/2010.eng.htm> (Last accessed on 23 June 2011).
- 164 JS3, para. 15; see also JS1, para. 31.
- 165 JS3, paras. 13–14.
- 166 JS7, para. 13.
- 167 JS7, para. 15; see also JS1, para. 32.
- 168 HRW, p. 4; see also JS1, para. 30.
- 169 JS3, para. 13.
- 170 OPC, para. 10; see also AI, p. 2; HRW, p. 2; JS2, para. 3; JS3, para. 26.
- 171 CHRGI, paras. 8–13.
- 172 HRW, p. 2; see also JS2, para. 3.
- 173 IAHRRC, PM 340/10 – Women and girls residing in 22 Camps for internally displaced persons in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, available at: <http://www.cidh.oas.org/medidas/2010.eng.htm> (Last accessed on 23 June 2011); see also JS1, para. 9; JS2, paras. 14–15.
- 174 AI, p. 3; HRW, p. 4; JS1, para. 9; JS2, para. 15.
- 175 JS2, para. 25; see also JS7, pp. 8–9.
- 176 HRW, p. 4.
- 177 JS8, paras. 38–47.
- 178 AI, p. 2.
- 179 HRW, p. 4.
- 180 JS6, para. 29; see also JS7, paras. 22–25.
- 181 JS7, para. 26.
- 182 HRW, p. 4.
- 183 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on human Rights 2010, p. 587; see also HRW, p. 1.
- 184 JS1, p. 1.
- 185 JS6, para. 11.
- 186 JS2, para. 26.
- 187 JS6, para. 32.
- 188 JS6, paras. 14 and 33; see also Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on human Rights 2010, p. 605; JS1, para. 34.
- 189 JS6, para. 34 and p. 10.