



Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: **Key Recent Developments**

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About the Author

The Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) is a U.S.-based non-profit organization that works in solidarity with its Haiti-based sister organization, the *Bureau des Avocats Internationaux* (BAI), to drive systemic change in Haiti by helping Haitian activists and grassroots groups enforce their internationally-recognized human rights. BAI and IJDH combine strategies including: (a) litigation in Haiti, the United States and beyond; (b) public advocacy on the streets, in the press, in academia and on social media; (c) capacity building for grassroots groups and activists; (d) training of human rights lawyers; and (e) nurturing advocacy networks and collaborations worldwide. For nearly 30 years, BAI and IJDH have kept activists safe, rallied global allies to the fight for human rights in Haiti, and impelled the justice systems to serve marginalized communities.

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In Memoriam

In memory of Mario Joseph, Managing Attorney of the *Bureau des Avocats Internationaux* (BAI) for 29 years and valued IJDH collaborator. Mario had led the BAI in Port-au-Prince since 1996, winning historic victories for victims of massacres by the Duvaliers and the *de facto* regime, victims of the UN cholera epidemic, sexual assault survivors, and political prisoners, among others. He persevered in this work through frustration, threats of death and arrest, the relentless advance of gang violence and the uncountable obstacles that all Haitians struggle through every day.

Mario's greatest legacy might be the legions of people he inspired and trained to win battles for justice around the world: his BAI colleagues, a whole generation of public interest lawyers in Haiti, the IJDH team, and dozens of us who daily use what Mario taught us to fight for justice in courts, on the streets, in academia, and in government service throughout Haiti, the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa.

We hope that this report continues Mario's legacy by providing accurate documentation of the human rights challenges facing the majority of Haitians who are impoverished, marginalized, and vulnerable, that others will use to advance stability and prosperity for Haiti.



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Table of Acronyms

| | |
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| ANS | Haiti's National Security Agency |
| BAI | <i>Bureau des Avocats Internationaux</i> (Office of International Lawyers) |
| BINUH | United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti |
| BSAP | <i>Brigade de Sécurité des Aires Protégées</i> (Haiti's Brigade for the Security of Protected Areas) |
| CARICOM | Caribbean Community |
| CBP | U.S. Customs and Border Protection |
| CEPR | Center for Economic and Policy Research |
| CHNV | Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans |
| CSPJ | <i>Conseil Supérieur du Pouvoir Judiciaire</i> (Haiti's Superior Council on Judicial Power) |
| DHS | U.S. Department of Homeland Security |
| ECC | <i>Ensemble Contre la Corruption</i> (Together Against Corruption) |
| FAd'H | Haitian Armed Forces |
| HRW | Human Rights Watch |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IJDH | Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| IRC | International Rescue Committee |
| MSF | <i>Médecins Sans Frontières</i> (Doctors Without Borders) |
| MSS | Multinational Security Support [Mission] |
| OCHA | UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OHCHR | Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights |
| PAHO | Pan American Health Organization |
| PHTK | <i>Pati Ayisyen Tèt Kale</i> (Haitian Tèt Kale Party) |
| PNH | <i>Police Nationale d'Haïti</i> (Haitian National Police) |
| RNDDH | <i>Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains</i> (National Network for the Defense of Human Rights) |
| TPC | Haiti's Transitional Presidential Council |
| TPS | Temporary Protected Status |
| UCREF | Haiti's Central Financial Intelligence Unit |
| ULCC | <i>Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption</i> (Haiti's Anti-Corruption Unit) |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| USAID | U.S. Agency for International Development |
| WFP | World Food Programme |



Executive Summary

Since IJDH's last Update on Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti in December 2024, Haiti's governance and insecurity crisis has deteriorated further, with spiraling armed group violence and profound humanitarian breakdown. Ineffectiveness, corruption, and infighting are debilitating the transitional government and prompting stronger calls for its removal. Less than a year remains on its agreed transition timeline, but no meaningful progress has been made towards restoring peace or democracy.

This reporting period saw further increases in violations of the right to life and security of the person that the government has been unable or unwilling to control and in which it is increasingly complicit. Over 4,000 people have been killed and over one million displaced since January. Mutilation, sexual violence, the burning of people and property, kidnapping, and forced recruitment are omnipresent in areas under armed group control. The armed groups have expanded that control into new territories, most notably into the Kenscoff area of Port-au-Prince, the Petite-Rivière commune in the Artibonite, and the Central Department. Haiti's police remain weak and largely ineffective at controlling armed group violence. An increasing number of non-state actors, including civilian "defense" groups and private military contractors hired by the Haitian government, are filling the resulting security vacuum. These non-state actors are responsible for a growing number of civilian deaths and injuries, as well as other human rights abuses, which are largely unchecked and sometimes abetted by police. The proliferation of these unaccountable armed actors, many with private agendas, is further complicating Haiti's security challenges and undermining government authority.

Multiple members of the Transitional Presidential Council are credibly accused of corruption and collusion with the armed groups ravaging Haiti, a perpetuation of historic patterns of government abuse that precipitated Haiti's crisis in the first place. Widespread corruption was also reported across multiple government ministries and agencies. The police and other government actors are engaged in a pattern of extrajudicial killings and widespread civilian harms. Systemic impunity for these and other abuses – including as a result of entrenched corruption and politicization of the judiciary – fuels the cycle of violence. Haiti's justice sector remains virtually non-functional due to systematic dismantling by corrupt governments, chronic neglect, and acute insecurity impacting court operations. Persistent high rates of pretrial detention and inhumane prison conditions amount to distinct human rights violations.

The insecurity and interrelated humanitarian crisis continue to disproportionately impact individuals already at the margins. This reporting period saw another dramatic increase in sexual violence against women and girls, especially at displacement sites. Armed groups continue to systematically recruit and exploit children. Women, children, and other vulnerable individuals face added barriers in accessing resources, services, and protections, and have been disproportionately impacted by humanitarian aid cuts. Persistent marginalization of women and their needs in the transition process – in violation of Haitian laws and accepted best practices – perpetuates inequality and risks undermining the transition.

Haiti's already catastrophic social and economic landscape continues to deteriorate. Approximately 40% of Haitians live in extreme poverty, and over 5.7 million are acutely food insecure: Haiti is one of just five countries worldwide facing immediate risk of starvation. Widespread school and hospital closures continue to impact hundreds of thousands.

These combined challenges are driving increasing numbers of Haitians to flee the country in search of safety. But at the same time that foreign states decry the deteriorating human rights situation in Haiti, several – most notably the Dominican Republic and the United States – have implemented racist, inhumane, and in many cases illegal measures to restrict opportunities for refuge and deport Haitians already within their borders.

Even as Haiti's crisis escalates, the international response has become increasingly muddled. Foreign policies installed and continue to enable political actors responsible for Haiti's current challenges. The illegal flow of weapons and ammunition into Haiti, most notably from the United States, remains unaddressed even as it fuels the present violence. At the same time, the Multinational Security Support Mission, which continues to struggle with adequate funding and deployment, has not been able to stop the armed groups' advance and faces an uncertain future. Desperately needed and already chronically underfunded humanitarian assistance has been precipitously cut, mostly due to U.S. dismantling of its overseas aid.

I. Introduction

This reporting period¹ saw deepening government dysfunction and an increasingly ineffectual international response, which have enabled armed groups and a growing number of additional armed actors to intensify insecurity and deepen Haiti's humanitarian crisis. Armed groups continue to brutalize the population and expand their territorial control, capturing or destroying critical infrastructure in the process. The human toll is devastating: Haiti has among the highest rates of killing, displacement, sexual abuse, and starvation in the world, and rampant child recruitment and exploitation are stealing Haiti's future.

The Haitian state continues to falter in its responsibilities to protect from violence or to provide humanitarian relief and basic services¹ – indeed, many government duties are increasingly performed by others.² Government ineffectiveness is especially glaring with respect to recurring incidents where communities warn of massacres and beg for protection but receive no assistance or even see police officers flee.³

The government has launched a number of measures presented as advances towards restoring democracy, improving its security response, and addressing impunity – including for corruption. These include the launch of specialized judicial units to investigate financial and mass crimes, adoption of a new penal code, and formation of the National Security Agency (ANS).⁴ But some of these measures raise serious questions as to their constitutionality⁵ and potential for abuse.⁶ And all raise questions as to impact and resource diversion given the ineffectiveness, corruption, and dismantling of the existing institutions tasked with the same purpose – and poised to constrain any new measures that fail to address these underlying weaknesses.⁷ The government also continues to direct substantial energy at amending the constitution through a patently unconstitutional referendum. The project, which receives significant international support, has been widely criticized by human rights, legal, and other civil society groups, and is likely to delay any elections.⁸

In fact, the transitional government has not made credible strides towards organizing free and fair elections even though less than a year remains of its mandate.⁹ More generally, the transitional government is hobbled by infighting¹⁰ and mired in significant corruption allegations.¹¹ And it is not meeting its legal and practical imperative to include women in leadership.¹² In combination with its struggles to improve the security situation, the result has been a sharp loss of popular legitimacy and social trust, as reflected in widespread anti-government protests (brutally suppressed)¹³ and material civil society mobilization around proposals to remove the transitional government as a failure.¹⁴

The international response to Haiti's intensifying crisis has at the same time become more overtly unproductive and, in many cases, damaging. As discussed in previous updates, much of Haiti's current crisis was shaped by the international community's engagement with Haiti, including (a) long term policies such as the extortion of the "Independence Debt" by France, predatory financial practices, and the undermining of democratic governance;¹⁵ (b) persistent international support for the *Pati Ayisyen Tèt Kale* (PHTK) and affiliated actors as they dismantled Haiti's democratic structures from 2011-2024;¹⁶ and (c) forcing the expansion of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) in March 2024 to increase representation by PHTK allies and others connected to armed groups.¹⁷ The ongoing failure to stem the illegal flow of weapons and ammunition into Haiti actively fuels the fighting every day. At the same time, security support provided by the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) remains consistently underfunded, under-deployed, and ineffective, and may be withdrawn or further weakened.¹⁸ More generally, international humanitarian assistance has been catastrophically reduced by irresponsible, abrupt U.S. funding cuts even as Haiti's needs soar.

In combination, the atrophy of Haiti's government functions and failures of international engagement are not just exposing Haitians to acute suffering. They are also impeding the restoration of security and long-term stability and prosperity. Two elements of this dynamic are not new but continue to degenerate. First, armed groups have taken advantage of state absence to strengthen their fighting capacity and join transnational criminal networks.¹⁹ They have been able to respond to police and MSS initiatives threatening their activities with increasingly sophisticated weaponry and geographic reach into areas at the heart of Haiti's political and economic power.²⁰ And while previously armed groups did not overtly seek political power,²¹ *Viv Ansanm* in December expressed the intention to form a political party and more recently announced its intent to overthrow the government.²²

¹ Previous Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) Updates are available on the IJDH website at IJDH, *News and Resources Publications: Human Rights Updates*, <https://www.ijdh.org/news-and-resources/publications/> (last visited Jul. 16, 2025).

Second, civilian-led “defense” groups, which emerged to protect communities against armed groups in the absence of effective state security, are increasingly committing widespread human rights violations themselves, often with police involvement. Their activities, sometimes reflecting agendas beyond community protection,²³ have become a distinct threat to civilians and a barrier to services.

An additional emergent element is the government’s decision to employ private military contractors, who are reportedly involved in the unprecedented deployment of armed drones. Concerns about the potential for resulting human rights abuses, reduced accountability, and conflict escalation have already been substantiated.

The resulting increasingly chaotic environment; proliferation of actors with access to lethal force, distinct agendas, and a lack of human rights oversight; and further dismantling of the Haitian state are likely to impede resolutions of Haiti’s crisis by deepening political divisions, complicating security challenges, and inhibiting community reconciliation.

II. Violations of the right to life & security of the person

Haiti’s already-catastrophic violence has grown worse over the past six months.²⁴ Armed groups, some operating jointly under the banner of *Viv Ansanm*,²⁵ continue to expand their territorial control, including through multiple coordinated, large-scale attacks against people and infrastructure.²⁶ Widespread killing and displacement once again increased dramatically. Haiti now has the world’s highest homicide rate.²⁷ The resulting desperate economic and humanitarian situation (see Section VI) fuels recruitment by armed groups,²⁸ furthering the cycle of violence. Haiti’s police remain unable to effectively protect the population from armed groups, even with the partial deployment of the MSS and a reconstituted army. In the resulting security vacuum, an increasing number of non-state actors, including civilian “defense” groups and private military contractors, are using force with tacit or overt government approval. They are responsible for growing civilian casualties and other human rights abuses. More generally, the proliferation of these unaccountable actors with private agendas fuels chaos, complicates the pathways to peacebuilding, and further undermines government authority.

Violence by armed groups and related displacement

- Armed groups operate in every department in Haiti, with the West, Artibonite, and – most recently – Central Departments²⁹ most heavily and directly impacted.³⁰ An estimated 85 to 90% of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area is under the control of armed groups.³¹ Attacks in other regions have also increased.³² Armed groups are systematically targeting areas previously considered safe;³³ attacking critical infrastructure;³⁴ and consolidating their control over key roads, waterways, and airports³⁵ as a means of increasing revenue and establishing strategic bases.³⁶ The Port-au-Prince International Airport, which shut down on November 12, 2024 after armed groups shot multiple airplanes, remains closed to international flights.³⁷ Haiti’s main seaport was forced to close temporarily in January 2025 due to threats by armed groups, and activities at the port remain impacted by the insecurity.³⁸
- According to the UN, 7,342 people were killed due to armed group violence in Haiti in 2024.³⁹ At least 4,026 people were killed between January 1 and May 31, 2025, a 24% increase from the same period in 2024.⁴⁰ Armed groups continue to carry out large-scale attacks against the population, leading to mass deaths and displacement.⁴¹ In early December, the Wharf Jérémie armed group massacred at least 110 people in Cité Soleil,⁴² a commune in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.⁴³ *Gran Grif* has continued to target communities in the Artibonite Department;⁴⁴ its attacks in the Petite Rivière commune, for example, have displaced 92,000 people since December.⁴⁵ The *Viv Ansanm* coalition has continued to launch coordinated attacks in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.⁴⁶ For example, in Kenscoff – a key strategic area that was previously relatively unaffected by the violence⁴⁷ – armed group violence has resulted in the deaths of at least 139 people⁴⁸ and the displacement of at least 3,000.⁴⁹ From March 21 to 31, armed groups attacked several towns in the Central Department.⁵⁰ The attacks on Mirebalais are particularly notable – armed groups looted and set fire to the prison in downtown Mirebalais, forced the evacuation of a major hospital, and displaced over 51,000 people.⁵¹
- Armed groups continue to use calculated brutality and restrictions on freedom of movement as primary tactics for advancing their aims.⁵² Abuses include targeted executions;⁵³ mutilation and possible organ trafficking;⁵⁴ sexual violence;⁵⁵ kidnappings;⁵⁶ often accompanied by additional violence;⁵⁷ forced disappearances;⁵⁸ burning people;⁵⁹ using civilians as human shields;⁶⁰ indiscriminate shooting;⁶¹ and looting and destroying property, especially through arson.⁶² They often disseminate videos of their

assaults online to amplify their impact as tools of terror and control, and as a means of increasing revenue.⁶³ Civilians who oppose criminal activities, are suspected of collaborating with police or self-defense groups or sharing information on armed groups' abuses to the media, or try to escape neighborhoods under siege are frequent targets of violence.⁶⁴ Those living in areas where multiple armed groups vie for control are also particularly vulnerable.⁶⁵ Haitians' ability to move freely – already severely curtailed – has diminished further⁶⁶ as armed groups secure their hold over key transportation routes⁶⁷ and disrupt air and maritime traffic.⁶⁸ Armed groups now control all the main roads in and out of the capital, leaving it virtually cut off from the rest of the country.⁶⁹ Armed groups continue to target travelers for extortion and violence, and kill civilians who attempt to evade checkpoints or fail to pay tolls.⁷⁰ More generally, armed groups dictate many aspects of life in neighborhoods under their control.⁷¹ They sometimes portray themselves as “protectors” of the population,⁷² but in practice, generally use their control to extort money while severely restricting access to essential goods and services, including food, water, healthcare, and education.⁷³

- As of June 2025, nearly 1.3 million people – approximately 11% of Haiti's population – have been internally displaced due to the acute insecurity crisis.⁷⁴ This is the highest number of people ever displaced by violence in Haiti, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM).⁷⁵ Approximately 77% of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are being hosted in the provinces,⁷⁶ generally with host families or in rented accommodation.⁷⁷ This continues to put significant strain on local resources, exacerbating tensions with host communities.⁷⁸ Of those who remain in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, 66% are living in approximately 97 makeshift and fluctuating displacement sites,⁷⁹ including schools, churches, and other public spaces.⁸⁰ Conditions in these sites remain dire,⁸¹ with overcrowding⁸² and a lack of adequate access to food, drinking water, and sanitation and health services,⁸³ which puts IDPs at increased risk of disease.⁸⁴ Climate-related challenges exacerbate these vulnerabilities.⁸⁵ IDPs residing in displacement sites also remain at risk of violence from armed groups and authorities,⁸⁶ and many have been displaced multiple times.⁸⁷ The situation for women and children – who make up 55 and 53% of the displaced population, respectively⁸⁸ – is particularly dire, including due to the increased risk of sexual exploitation and abuse.⁸⁹ Whatever state support or protections for IDPs exist remain inadequate.⁹⁰ Some observers characterize the inadequate government investment in sites as a strategy to encourage IDPs to return to their homes, even as the government persistently fails to restore security or otherwise facilitate their safe return.⁹¹ Efforts by humanitarian organizations to provide assistance to IDPs are insufficient to meet needs and, as in previous reporting periods, are hampered by insecurity, underfunding, and lack of coordination.⁹² There are also reports of people who provide assistance diverting humanitarian aid intended for IDPs to people who are not displaced.⁹³
- Threats and attacks by armed groups against journalists have continued to escalate.⁹⁴ According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Haiti is now one of the deadliest places in the world to be a member of the press.⁹⁵ Armed groups have destroyed and occupied newsrooms⁹⁶ and killed and kidnapped journalists,⁹⁷ in what one expert is calling “the wholesale targeting of the media.”⁹⁸ On December 24, armed groups carried out the worst attack on journalists in Haiti in recent years, killing two journalists who were covering the planned reopening of the State University Hospital⁹⁹ and injuring seven others.¹⁰⁰ The government persistently fails to adequately protect against, investigate, and prosecute such threats and attacks.¹⁰¹ The targeted violence and impunity, alongside generalized insecurity¹⁰² and government repression,¹⁰³ continue to threaten freedom of press and contribute to the increased isolation of the population.¹⁰⁴

Government failure to protect civilians

- The Haitian National Police (PNH) continues to lack sufficient personnel,¹⁰⁵ resources and equipment,¹⁰⁶ and logistical and technical capacity¹⁰⁷ to effectively confront armed groups.¹⁰⁸ The ongoing presence of the MSS,¹⁰⁹ significant foreign assistance aimed at improving police capacity,¹¹⁰ and an expanded “war budget”¹¹¹ have not yielded any tangible improvement. The newly-reconstituted Haitian Armed Forces (FAd'H)¹¹² likewise remain under-trained, under-resourced, and unable to effectively support the PNH.¹¹³ The police force continues to lose officers.¹¹⁴ According to the UN, there are just around 12,000 officers in the country.¹¹⁵ Many PNH officers are also used by TPC members and ministers for their personal security, further reducing the number of police available for public protection.¹¹⁶ The government persistently fails to ensure adequate and timely pay, protection, equipment, and medical care for officers,¹¹⁷ many of whom have been displaced due to armed group attacks and are living in police stations in “unacceptable conditions.”¹¹⁸ Officers who remain in the force are systematically targeted by armed groups.¹¹⁹ Armed groups also continue to attack, occupy, and destroy police

infrastructure and vehicles,¹²⁰ and to steal police weapons and ammunition.¹²¹ As of June 20, 78 of the 413 police facilities in the country were non-operational.¹²²

- Police often do not respond to attacks¹²³ or flee in the face of armed groups' superior numbers and firepower.¹²⁴ They have repeatedly failed to take action to prevent large-scale attacks despite being warned – sometimes multiple days – in advance of the impending violence.¹²⁵ In some areas, there is no police presence at all, leaving residents to fend for themselves.¹²⁶ Even when police do engage armed groups, they are generally unable to project sufficient force, deploy in multiple locations, or hold territory,¹²⁷ despite the implementation of additional security measures in certain areas.¹²⁸ These limited incursions paradoxically risk exacerbating the insecurity, as they provoke cycles of retaliation by armed groups and armed civilians.¹²⁹ The government's controversial – and possibly illegal – use of drones against armed groups likewise risks further destabilizing an already volatile security landscape¹³⁰ and provoking reprisals from armed groups with their own drones,¹³¹ while failing to meaningfully curb armed group violence.¹³²
- The inability of Haiti's main security forces to confront armed groups has led to an increasing number of other actors using force with tacit or express government approval.¹³³ To support existing security forces, the Haitian government has hired U.S. private security contractors,¹³⁴ including, reportedly, the successor of private security firm Blackwater (which has a long record of human rights abuses).¹³⁵ As of writing, reporting consistently indicates that these contractors are part of the government-created task force charged with deploying drones against armed groups.¹³⁶ However, the extent to which private contractors are involved in state security operations remains unclear, and there is no mention of human rights monitoring or accountability mechanisms overseeing their functions. The government has also sought to incorporate into its national security forces the Brigade for the Security of Protected Areas (BSAP)¹³⁷ – a government agency-turned-paramilitary group that, since at least January 2024, has been operating largely outside the law.¹³⁸ The recruitment of these actors raises serious concerns about accountability for human rights abuses,¹³⁹ contributes to the proliferation of illegal arms,¹⁴⁰ and risks exacerbating the insecurity crisis.¹⁴¹
- Civilian-led “defense” groups continue to deploy force and gain strength in the absence of functioning state institutions.¹⁴² They are increasingly responsible for human rights abuses:¹⁴³ armed civilians killed at least 290 people between January and May 2025, including children.¹⁴⁴ All the killings are extrajudicial and many target individuals not engaged with armed groups,¹⁴⁵ including journalists and human rights defenders.¹⁴⁶ In a particularly brutal example, an armed “defense” group executed at least 55 unarmed civilians on May 20 in Préval, a community in the Artibonite Department.¹⁴⁷ Some “defense” groups also engage in criminal activities unrelated to protection, including extortion and protection rackets, looting and destruction of property, and other violence.¹⁴⁸ They also contribute to the circulation of illegal weapons¹⁴⁹ and undermine community safety and services.¹⁵⁰ The line between police and civilian “defense” groups is increasingly blurry,¹⁵¹ with police openly operating in tandem with and in support of armed civilians.¹⁵² This dynamic, alongside the complete impunity for abuses committed by “defense” groups, highlights the continued breakdown of state control over security.¹⁵³ Other “defense” groups reportedly collude with armed groups, heightening concerns that they are turning into the very thing they are meant to defend against.¹⁵⁴ The proliferation of armed actors with distinct agendas is also an impediment to restoring peace and security.

III. Government misconduct, including institutionalized violence & corruption

Pervasive government corruption and a history of using armed groups as tools for political violence directly precipitated Haiti's crisis and the proliferation of armed groups. The transitional government has continued these patterns with impunity, and is consequently losing legitimacy.¹⁵⁵ Corruption and credible allegations of collusion with armed groups are visible at all levels of the government, including at the PNH. The lack of meaningful investigations or accountability for these abuses is further eroding state control and fueling a growing pattern of police and other government actors operating well beyond the law to use illegal, indiscriminate, and extrajudicial force.

- Persistent collusion between state actors and armed groups remains a central barrier to restoring security and good governance in Haiti.¹⁵⁶ Accusations of complicity with armed groups against members of the TPC persist.¹⁵⁷ A senior government source has accused the transitional Prime Minister of deliberately obstructing police operations against armed group leaders and legal actions against individuals suspected of providing support to criminal groups.¹⁵⁸ Current and former political actors continue to finance

criminal activities, use armed groups to consolidate control, and are implicated in weapons and drug trafficking schemes.¹⁵⁹ A series of international sanctions have been leveled against political elites with documented complicity in criminal activities.¹⁶⁰ Collusion between PNH officers and armed groups remains widespread,¹⁶¹ and there is consistent evidence that police officers provide weapons to armed groups.¹⁶²

- Police killed at least 1,448 people between January and May,¹⁶³ at least 18% and as many as 40% of whom were unaffiliated with armed groups.¹⁶⁴ The UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) documented at least 874 instances of alleged human rights violations by police during operations against armed groups between April 15 and June 20, further indicating a pattern of unnecessary or disproportionate use of lethal force.¹⁶⁵ The use of drones – which have reportedly injured at least nine civilians, including children – in the fight against armed groups raises additional concerns around abuses and lack of accountability and transparency.¹⁶⁶ Police have also reportedly shot at civilians, including medical personnel,¹⁶⁷ without cause.¹⁶⁸ Public prosecutors and police have executed at least 165 people outside of the law since 2024.¹⁶⁹ Police officers have also been accused of sexual violence.¹⁷⁰ Police regularly use tear gas, and sometimes live ammunition, to violently repress people exercising their right to protest against state failures, leading to civilian deaths and injuries.¹⁷¹ Efforts to investigate and prosecute these abuses are limited and impunity remains the norm.¹⁷²
- Widespread corruption persists at all levels of government and continues to undermine state function and institutional trust.¹⁷³ Haiti ranks 168th out of 180 countries on Transparency International's 2025 Corruption Index.¹⁷⁴ The TPC has awarded itself massive, unjustified personal “allowances” totaling over US\$8 million per year,¹⁷⁵ some of which was allegedly siphoned from funds intended for state intelligence services.¹⁷⁶ Three TPC members were separately accused of abuse of office, bribery, and corruption in a 2024 report by Haiti's Anti-Corruption Unit (ULCC).¹⁷⁷ In January, a judge dismissed a related case brought against the same three members on the ground that their presidential status makes them immune to summons by a regular court.¹⁷⁸ That decision has been criticized by some as evidence of the lack of political will to investigate corruption.¹⁷⁹ Corruption also goes well beyond the TPC, with at least 25 public officials across multiple ministries and government agencies implicated in various scandals.¹⁸⁰ Reporting by the UN and a Haitian anti-corruption organization, *Ensemble Contre la Corruption* (ECC), also indicates extensive corruption within the PNH.¹⁸¹ Despite efforts by the ULCC, ECC, and Haiti's Central Financial Intelligence Unit (UCREF) to investigate corruption and the creation of a new specialized judicial unit to prosecute financial crimes,¹⁸² impunity for such crimes persists.¹⁸³ The lack of accountability in these cases reflects the patterns of impunity and corruption that precipitated Haiti's current crisis, as exemplified by the embezzlement of over US\$2 billion from the PetroCaribe development fund by high-ranking government officials between 2008 and 2016 and the subsequent use of armed groups to suppress popular demands for accountability.¹⁸⁴

IV. Lack of access to justice & chronic impunity

Haiti's justice sector – already virtually non-functional due to chronic neglect, under-funding, and deliberate dismantling by successive corrupt governments – remains unable to deliver justice for most Haitians. Acute insecurity compounds barriers. Institutionalized corruption and politicization further entrench the resulting impunity, which in turn feeds Haiti's cycles of violence.¹⁸⁵ Continuing high rates of pretrial detention and inhumane conditions in Haiti's prisons, exacerbated by serious problems with prison administration, constitute distinct grave human rights violations. In June, the government adopted a new penal code, although the process has been widely criticized as unconstitutional.¹⁸⁶

Justice sector dysfunction and chronic impunity

- Chronic under-resourcing of the justice sector,¹⁸⁷ exacerbated by the acute insecurity crisis,¹⁸⁸ continues to impede court operations.¹⁸⁹ Three of the country's 18 courts of first instance did not hold any criminal hearings last year.¹⁹⁰ The Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance has not held any criminal or civil hearings for several years due to insecurity and funding-related challenges,¹⁹¹ and remains virtually non-operational after being relocated to a private residence that lacks the space, security, and equipment for effective court function.¹⁹² Severe staffing shortages at all levels of the judiciary across the country further limit judicial function, with several courts at risk of having to close entirely.¹⁹³ Frequent extended strikes by court personnel exacerbate these shortages.¹⁹⁴
- Corruption and politicization of the judiciary likewise continue to erode access to justice.¹⁹⁵ With few exceptions,¹⁹⁶ alleged criminals with links to political actors, access to money, or affiliations with armed

groups are often not arrested¹⁹⁷ or are released without ever facing trial.¹⁹⁸ Threats and attacks against judicial actors persist and weaken judicial function and independence,¹⁹⁹ with some magistrates forced to leave the country out of fear for their lives and those of their families.²⁰⁰ The transitional government's proposed unconstitutional reforms to Haiti's constitution – which would eliminate term limits for certain judges and limit the power of the judiciary's oversight body – threaten to further undermine judicial integrity.²⁰¹

- The challenges described above perpetuate impunity, with grave human rights abuses and other crimes – including sexual violence²⁰² – going unaddressed.²⁰³ There has been virtually no progress even in high-profile cases, including the assassinations of former President Jovenel Moïse,²⁰⁴ former Port-au-Prince Bar Association President Monferrier Dorval,²⁰⁵ political activist Antoinette Duclair and journalist Diego Charles,²⁰⁶ and LGBTQI+ activist Charlot Jeudy.²⁰⁷ Investigations into the PetroCaribe corruption scandal²⁰⁸ and numerous high-profile massacres²⁰⁹ likewise remain stalled. In April, the government created two specialized judicial units to investigate and prosecute financial crimes and mass crimes.²¹⁰ Perceptions of these judicial units and their potential effectiveness are mixed, with some Haitian civil society organizations criticizing the government for failing to implement civil society recommendations or consider the corruption and structural challenges that are at the root of Haiti's judicial dysfunction.²¹¹

Inhumane prison conditions

- Haiti's prisons remain catastrophically overcrowded,²¹² an ongoing challenge exacerbated by prison closures due to armed group attacks.²¹³ According to the UN, prisons are at 296% capacity, with just 0.34 square meters of cell space per person.²¹⁴ Authorities also continue to incarcerate people in makeshift cells in police stations, in similarly overcrowded and inhumane conditions.²¹⁵ With limited government initiatives to reduce the number of people held in pretrial detention,²¹⁶ rates remain high at approximately 82%.²¹⁷
- Deepening insecurity, corrupt prison authorities, chronic under-resourcing, and growing attrition among prison staff continue to impact prison security and administration,²¹⁸ as reflected in the high number of prison breaks since the beginning of 2024.²¹⁹ In a notable example, on May 31, armed groups attacked the Mirebalais prison, facilitating the escape of at least 500 people detained there.²²⁰ Armed groups also looted the building before setting it on fire.²²¹
- The state remains unable to provide incarcerated persons with access to adequate food, clean water, sanitation, and healthcare.²²² It largely relies on civil society, humanitarian organizations, and private citizens to provide basic needs to incarcerated individuals,²²³ even as new restrictions on visitation due to the increasing number of prison escapes impede their ability to do so.²²⁴ The conditions in prisons have dire health consequences, with reports of malnutrition, starvation, and infectious and parasitic diseases that go untreated.²²⁵ From January to March, 25 incarcerated individuals died, primarily due to the unsanitary conditions and lack of access to adequate food and clean water.²²⁶
- Women and children continue to be held in the same facilities as men, putting them at heightened risk of violence, especially sexual violence.²²⁷ The state has not taken adequate steps to mitigate the risk posed to women and children incarcerated alongside men or to hold perpetrators of sexual violence accountable.²²⁸ The relocation of adults to the children's prison has also impacted rehabilitation and education programs, with classrooms turned into cells to accommodate the adult detainees.²²⁹

V. Lack of equal rights & protections

Haiti's worsening violence, humanitarian crisis, and accompanying collapse of services continue to disproportionately impact individuals with marginalized identities. Gender-based violence (GBV)^{II} is omnipresent in the lives of Haiti's women and girls,²³⁰ and remains a deliberate instrument of conflict for armed groups. Collective rape has become pervasive. There is a desperate and largely unmet need for support and services, including medical and psychosocial. Women's leadership and distinct needs are marginalized in violation of Haiti's domestic and legal obligations and to the detriment of resolving its

^{II} According to the UN, GBV is "an umbrella term for any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person's will and that is based on socially ascribed (i.e. gender) differences between males and females. It includes acts that inflict physical, sexual or mental harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion, and other deprivations of liberty. These acts can occur in public or in private." UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Gender-based Violence*, https://www.unhcr.org/gbv-toolkit/_test/ (last visited Jul. 12, 2025).

crisis.²³¹ The lack of a woman with a vote on the TPC and widespread government failure to respect the constitutional 30% quota for women in public roles,²³² along with the government's effective absence from providing critical support to GBV survivors,²³³ are examples of the discrimination and exclusion that are replicated all the way down to displacement camp management²³⁴ – with violent and damaging consequences for women and girls.²³⁵ Haiti has become “one of the worst places on the planet to be a child” according to UNICEF Executive Director,²³⁶ with children ravaged and trapped by brutal violence, widespread armed group recruitment, and denial of food, education, and other basic rights. Irresponsible foreign aid cuts drastically reducing already-limited access to healthcare and other essential services have had disparate and grave impacts on vulnerable groups.²³⁷

- Reported incidents of sexual violence continue to surge, with some providers reporting an increase in cases as high as 1,600% relative to this time last year.²³⁸ BINUH reported a 254% increase of sexual violence between the last quarter of 2024 and the first quarter of this year.²³⁹ These statistics fundamentally fail to capture the ubiquity of sexual violence, however, as fear of retaliation, re-victimization, and social exclusion – alongside limited services for victims and lack of trust in the justice system – contribute to chronic underreporting.²⁴⁰
- Armed groups continue to use GBV as a deliberate weapon to spread terror, hold territory, and punish people living under the control of rival armed groups.²⁴¹ Sexual violence against women and girls is generally characterized by brutality and the use of weapons, and often accompanies other harms like kidnapping.²⁴² Rape by multiple perpetrators has become endemic.²⁴³ Armed groups continue to forcibly recruit women and girls or otherwise force them into exploitative relationships and even commercial sex.²⁴⁴ While sometimes the label of “girlfriend” is used, the dynamic is one of coerced or forced labor (most frequently cooking, cleaning, and other household tasks) and coerced or forced sex (which constitutes rape) – sometimes in return for “protection” or desperately needed food.²⁴⁵ Cases of sexual slavery, trafficking for sexual exploitation, and prolonged sexual abuse in captivity following kidnapping are growing.²⁴⁶ Attacks occur everywhere: in public spaces, in transit, and in homes;²⁴⁷ and spare no one, including very young girls and older women.²⁴⁸ Omnipresent GBV impedes the ability of women and girls to safely transit through public spaces, which in turn reduces their access to necessities and services²⁴⁹ and economic activity.²⁵⁰ The resulting loss of independence further increases vulnerability to abuse, exploitation, and survival sex.²⁵¹
- Women and girls make up the majority of those displaced²⁵² and are subject to additional vulnerabilities at displacement sites due to the lack of security and privacy, the desperate humanitarian situation, and abusive management.²⁵³ Displaced women and girls report being sexually extorted for access to basic assistance, such as food, shelter, and use of toilets;²⁵⁴ or in some cases driven to survival sex by desperate need.²⁵⁵ The government's abdication of responsibility for protection and care,²⁵⁶ combined with the persistent failure to center women's leadership and needs,²⁵⁷ underlies and enables these harms. International support has likewise been inadequate.²⁵⁸
- The general collapse of services and government functions²⁵⁹ continues to have gendered impacts, especially given the acute needs of mostly female victims of GBV.²⁶⁰ The limited existing support is provided at grave personal risk by civil society with international support,²⁶¹ and the impacts of irresponsible aid cuts have been particularly severe.²⁶² Maternal mortality rates – already the highest in the region²⁶³ – have increased further as insecurity and funding-related challenges reduce access to care.²⁶⁴ The risks and scarcity are so intense that Haitian mothers are seeking care in the Dominican Republic in spite of deportation and harassment risks.²⁶⁵ There are no legal and safe abortion services, and women and girls who become pregnant from rape face significant additional physical, psychological, and economic harms.²⁶⁶ More generally, victims of GBV continue to face immense barriers to accessing medical care, psychosocial services, shelter, and other forms of critical support, including timely prophylaxis for sexually transmitted infections.²⁶⁷ Similarly, notwithstanding some formal measures to address inadequate government protections – including most notably the creation of a specialized tribunal with jurisdiction over mass crimes, including sexual violence crimes²⁶⁸ – impunity is the norm and as a practical matter, victims of GBV are rarely able to access police or judicial recourse.²⁶⁹
- Haiti has the fifth highest verified incidence of grave violations against children and the third sharpest increase in such violations in the world according to the UN Secretary-General's report on Children in Armed Conflict.²⁷⁰ The UN Secretary-General found a 490% increase in the number of grave violations against children in 2024.²⁷¹ Reported numbers are likely an undercount given that much of the violence occurred in areas under armed group control and sustained reporting that sexual violence against children

increased by 1,000% in the last year.²⁷² Approximately 1.2 million children are exposed to deadly violence and privations;²⁷³ one in four live in areas where access to vital aid is limited;²⁷⁴ approximately 700,000 are displaced;²⁷⁵ hundreds of thousands – more than 90% in some parts of the country – are unable to go to school;²⁷⁶ and almost three million children are facing consistently high levels of food insecurity.²⁷⁷ Children remain over half of those displaced²⁷⁸ and experience the abuse and privations of displacement more acutely.²⁷⁹ Armed groups traffic, exploit, and recruit children as young as seven as combatants, with up to half of all members of armed groups estimated to be children.²⁸⁰ This abuse is enabled by hunger, poverty, insecurity, and lack of alternative livelihoods, as well as fear of violent reprisals for refusing to join or seeking to leave.²⁸¹ Children forced to join armed groups or those suspected of doing so based on their place of residence also experience arbitrary arrest, detention, beatings, and killing – along with social stigmatization – from police and community “defense” groups.²⁸² Beyond rising extrajudicial killings by police, Haiti’s juvenile justice system remains fundamentally unable to provide children with humane due process or justice.²⁸³ There have been some measures taken to develop appropriate policies and capacity to enable effective demobilization and reintegration of children, but they fall woefully short of what is needed given the scale of child recruitment and the special needs of victimized children.²⁸⁴

- Other marginalized groups continue to face severe discrimination, exclusion, and violence, though the prolonged acute crisis has made disaggregated data scarce. LGBTQI+ persons²⁸⁵ and persons with disabilities lack adequate legal protections and continue to experience discrimination, and persons with disabilities face added challenges with respect to escaping violence, securing jobs and food, education, and accessibility in situations of displacement.²⁸⁶ Haiti’s rural farmers, “*peyizan*,” continue to face significant disruptions and attacks by armed groups²⁸⁷ and land grabs by powerful actors operating under the cover of public and private institutions.²⁸⁸ This reporting period also saw elderly persons and Vodou leaders targeted and killed by an armed group over its leader’s perception that they were capable of causing supernatural harm.²⁸⁹

VI. Collapse of economic & social rights

Haiti’s social and economic landscape continues to deteriorate, with Haiti now one of the ten countries most at risk of new or worsened humanitarian emergencies.²⁹⁰ Over half the population is facing acute food insecurity. Widespread closures of medical facilities and schools are fueling the collapse of the health and education sectors. Increasing poverty and climate impacts²⁹¹ – exacerbated by chronic under-funding of prevention and response plans²⁹² – contribute to vulnerability. These challenges are the result of long-term under-development and institutional dysfunction rooted in persistent foreign interference and extraction, as well as corruption and mismanagement by Haitian officials. Meaningful solutions to Haiti’s intersecting crises require addressing these structural drivers. This includes reparations for past foreign harms, in particular restitution for the debt extorted by France in exchange for Haiti’s independence, which has played a significant role in undermining Haiti’s development for 200 years.²⁹³

Economy in decline

- Haiti is in its seventh consecutive year of economic decline,²⁹⁴ with nearly 40% of Haitians living in extreme poverty.²⁹⁵ As of May, inflation remains high at 27.2%.²⁹⁶ The consequent increase in the prices of essential goods,²⁹⁷ together with high unemployment rates and declining household incomes,²⁹⁸ leaves many families unable to afford bare necessities.²⁹⁹ As a result, Haitians are increasingly forced to take on debt or resort to harmful coping strategies.³⁰⁰ Safe housing has also become unaffordable for many due to a combination of inflation, unemployment, and rising displacement.³⁰¹ Several recent U.S. policies³⁰² are expected to have a chilling effect on money sent to Haitians from family and friends abroad – which account for approximately 20% of Haiti’s gross domestic product³⁰³ – further depriving already desperate families.
- Deepening insecurity³⁰⁴ exacerbates the long-term structural drivers of Haiti’s economic decline.³⁰⁵ Armed groups continue to extract money and goods from Haitians through increasingly professionalized extortion and protection schemes³⁰⁶ and an ever-expanding network of checkpoints, where victims are forced to pay huge sums of money.³⁰⁷ Rampant looting and kidnapping for ransom further exacerbate already crushing poverty.³⁰⁸ The insecurity also continues to disrupt trade flows, increase transportation costs, and impact commercial activity, resulting in reduced access to goods and increased prices.³⁰⁹ Continued extortion by armed groups of fuel transporters – exacerbated by the recent shutdown of Haiti’s main hydroelectric plant by civilians protesting the government’s failure to restore security³¹⁰ –

compounds these challenges.³¹¹ Attacks by armed groups have forced some businesses and key informal economic centers to close entirely, while others remain under the control of armed groups, further destabilizing Haiti's economy.³¹² The persistent lack of socio-economic opportunities, alongside the deepening hunger crisis, is a principal factor driving recruitment by armed groups, with children particularly at risk.³¹³

Access to water, sanitation, and hygiene

- Access to drinking water, basic hygiene and sanitation remains limited,³¹⁴ aggravating the spread of cholera and other water-borne diseases.³¹⁵ The situation is particularly dire in rural and poor areas³¹⁶ and in displacement sites,³¹⁷ with some families forced to drink unpotable water or risk dying of dehydration.³¹⁸ Water shortages also impact agricultural production, contributing to Haiti's hunger crisis and economic decline.³¹⁹ The UN's 2016 promise to improve Haiti's water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure as part of its plan to eliminate UN-introduced cholera remains unfulfilled,³²⁰ compounding structural challenges.³²¹ Chronic state failures to manage waste and sanitation in the north of the country are posing a public health risk and contributing to the spread of infectious diseases.³²²
- Haiti's longstanding problems with water access are rooted in government failures to build, maintain, and invest in infrastructure,³²³ further compounded by environmental challenges³²⁴ and insecurity. Armed groups control access to certain water sources managed by the National Directorate of Drinking Water and Sanitation.³²⁵ Some water distribution points, even if not directly under the control of armed groups, are located in areas with armed group activity, preventing water distributors from reaching them and making the journey to collect water a matter of life or death.³²⁶

Access to food

- Haiti's acute food crisis, at unprecedented levels as of IJDH's previous Updates,³²⁷ continues to escalate.³²⁸ According to the World Food Programme (WFP), Haiti is one of five countries facing immediate risk of starvation.³²⁹ Over 5.7 million people are acutely food insecure, the highest number recorded in recent years.³³⁰ Of those, approximately 2.1 million are experiencing emergency-level^{III} food insecurity.³³¹ The number of people experiencing famine^{IV} – all of whom are living in makeshift internal displacement camps – rose to 8,400, an increase of 40% from September 2024.³³² Women and children are particularly acutely impacted,³³³ with UNICEF estimating that 129,000 children will suffer from severe acute malnutrition in 2025.³³⁴ Many households are unable to meet their nutritional needs, with people forced to skip meals, reduce portions, and go entire days without eating.³³⁵
- Insecurity and inflated food prices are the direct drivers of Haiti's acute food crisis.³³⁶ Armed groups' increasing control over key transportation routes, alongside the general insecurity, continues to limit food distribution and lead to supply shortages.³³⁷ Violence and extortion against *Madan Sara* – the women traders who form the backbone of Haiti's food distribution network – have increased.³³⁸ Attacks, extortion, and other violence by armed groups against *peyizan*, particularly in the Artibonite Department (Haiti's main agricultural region),³³⁹ likewise continue to impede food production and distribution.³⁴⁰ Even when food is available for purchase, millions of Haitians cannot afford it.³⁴¹
- Long-term foreign interference with Haiti's food insecurity³⁴² – exacerbated by agricultural policy failures and neglect³⁴³ and environmental challenges impacting food production³⁴⁴ – is a longer-term driver of Haiti's protracted food crisis. Humanitarian food assistance remains inadequate to meet the need.³⁴⁵

Access to healthcare

- Targeted attacks by armed groups against hospitals and healthcare workers have continued to increase,³⁴⁶ forcing hospitals to close and severely limiting access to healthcare.³⁴⁷ According to the UN, only 13% of the 254 healthcare facilities in Haiti with in-patient capacity are fully functional;³⁴⁸ in Port-au-Prince,

^{III} Emergency-level food insecurity refers to households either living with very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality or only able to meet their food needs by resorting to emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), *IPC Overview and Classification System*, <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/ipc-overview-and-classification-system/en/> (last visited Jul. 12, 2025).

^{IV} Famine- or catastrophic-level food insecurity refers to a situation where at least 20% of households have an extreme lack of food and other basic needs and at least 30% are acutely malnourished, leading to higher mortality rates and the complete collapse of people's livelihood assets and strategies. IPC, *IPC Overview and Classification System* (last visited Jul. 12, 2025).

just 5% are fully operational.³⁴⁹ The Bernard Mevs Hospital, Haiti's only neurological trauma center, has been closed since armed groups set the hospital on fire and destroyed equipment worth millions of dollars in December 2024.³⁵⁰ Just one week later, armed groups attacked the planned reopening of the State University Hospital, which had closed in March 2024 due to repeated attacks and looting.³⁵¹ The hospital was attacked again in February 2025 and remains closed.³⁵² The University Hospital of Mirebalais, which provided the highest level of care in Haiti, closed in April after an armed group attack that forced patients and staff to evacuate.³⁵³ Violence by police and civilian "defense" groups against healthcare providers suspected of treating armed groups further impacts the health sector.³⁵⁴ For example, police reportedly deliberately targeted *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) vehicles evacuating staff from its Turgeau facility – which had been forced to close due to armed group violence in the area – to its Carrefour facility.³⁵⁵ As a result, MSF decided to suspend its operations in both Turgeau and Carrefour for a minimum of three months.³⁵⁶ As insecurity forces hospital closures, it also increases demand, leaving remaining healthcare facilities overwhelmed and patients at risk.³⁵⁷

- Even where hospitals are operational, insecurity continues to impede physical access for patients and healthcare workers³⁵⁸ and generate acute shortages of medicine, blood, oxygen, and other critical supplies.³⁵⁹ The majority of hospitals still functioning are private, making access to care for Haitians impacted by the economic crisis virtually impossible.³⁶⁰ Chronic under-resourcing of and dysfunction within the healthcare sector,³⁶¹ exacerbated by global cuts to foreign assistance,³⁶² is a longer-term driver of Haiti's health crisis. These challenges, together with the government's failure to ensure adequate working conditions and timely pay for medical professionals,³⁶³ contribute to staffing shortages.³⁶⁴
- The constant exposure to violence and the desperate humanitarian situation have created a mental health crisis in Haiti.³⁶⁵ Children³⁶⁶ and victims of sexual violence³⁶⁷ are particularly impacted. The barriers to accessing healthcare described above, exacerbated by chronic government failures to prioritize mental health,³⁶⁸ impede access to psychological care.³⁶⁹ The lack of adequate psychiatric care more generally in Haiti leaves people with psychiatric needs at risk of violence and neglect.³⁷⁰ Providers and front-line workers themselves also continue to be affected psychologically and struggle to access mental health support.³⁷¹
- Cholera, introduced to Haiti by UN peacekeepers' reckless disposal of human waste in 2010, reemerged in October 2022³⁷² and remains a significant threat. The number of cases has surged in 2025, with 1,298 suspected cases, 9 confirmed cases, and 19 deaths reported between January and March.³⁷³ The spread of infection is driven by longstanding failures in water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure,³⁷⁴ and exacerbated by the dramatic increase in displacement³⁷⁵ and the onset of the rainy season.³⁷⁶ The high rate of malnutrition also contributes to increased mortality rates,³⁷⁷ while insecurity and under-resourcing – exacerbated by recent U.S. cuts to foreign aid³⁷⁸ – impede prevention and treatment.³⁷⁹

Access to education

- Targeted attacks by armed groups against schools and the increasing use of schools as informal displacement sites³⁸⁰ continue to restrict access to education. Armed groups have destroyed over 300 schools since the beginning of 2024.³⁸¹ Nearly 1,600 schools across the country³⁸² and at least 69 public and private university faculties are closed due to insecurity,³⁸³ impacting at least 1.2 million students and teachers.³⁸⁴ Others have been forced to relocate and are operating with minimal resources.³⁸⁵
- Even where schools remain operational, attending is not necessarily safe.³⁸⁶ Armed group violence prevents physical access to some schools;³⁸⁷ in other cases, parents prefer to keep their children at home rather than risk the dangerous journey to school.³⁸⁸ School closures are putting immense strain on the already fragile education system, and the resulting overcrowding continues to impact teachers' ability to provide quality education.³⁸⁹
- The government response to these acute challenges remains inadequate³⁹⁰ and is rooted in chronic under-resourcing of and general dysfunction within the school system.³⁹¹ Poor children have always faced disproportionate barriers to accessing education due to the dearth of public institutions,³⁹² but increased economic hardship and insecurity-related difficulties are preventing more and more families from being able to pay to send their children to school.³⁹³ Many teachers have been on strike since January 2025 to protest the government's failure to improve working conditions and pay timely salaries,³⁹⁴ while others have fled the country.³⁹⁵ The resulting disruptions to education³⁹⁶ contribute to lower exam pass rates and increase the risk of recruitment by armed groups.³⁹⁷

VII. Emigration pressures

Haitians fleeing across national borders to protect their lives are being met with increasingly harsh policies aimed at restricting asylum and otherwise preventing migration. These policies are grounded in anti-Black, as well as specifically anti-Haitian, racism and xenophobia.³⁹⁸ Foreign states that are publicly decrying the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Haiti have nevertheless increased removals of Haitian nationals from their territories, in violation of their obligations under international law. The Dominican Republic, in particular, is responsible for extreme human rights abuses in its targeting of Haitians for removal.³⁹⁹ The Trump administration has sought to terminate vital humanitarian programs for Haitian migrants and effectively blocked all immigration from Haiti to the United States.

- The number of Haitians seeking to escape the escalating insecurity and humanitarian crises in Haiti continues to increase.⁴⁰⁰ According to the UN, over 400,000 Haitians fled Haiti in 2024.⁴⁰¹ Haiti's physical isolation as an island nation⁴⁰² and neighboring states' restrictive immigration policies⁴⁰³ force many Haitians to take extremely dangerous and often expensive routes in search of safety.⁴⁰⁴
- Foreign states continue to remove Haitians,⁴⁰⁵ despite criticism from human rights organizations⁴⁰⁶ and UN officials⁴⁰⁷ who have described the removals as hypocritical, inhumane, and, in many cases, illegal. The Dominican Republic – responsible for over 98% of all removals⁴⁰⁸ – expelled over 119,000 Haitians between January and April 2025.⁴⁰⁹ Dominican authorities continue to target individuals for removal to Haiti solely on the basis of their skin color,⁴¹⁰ and often deny Haitians the opportunity to prove their lawful status or accuse them of possessing fraudulent documents.⁴¹¹ As previously reported, the Dominican Republic's deportation operations have led to a myriad of human rights abuses, including as a result of inhumane detention and deportation conditions;⁴¹² extortion and physical violence, including rape, by Dominican authorities;⁴¹³ and family separation.⁴¹⁴ New measures targeting Haitians seeking healthcare for deportation are particularly impacting pregnant women and newborn babies, with severe consequences for perinatal health.⁴¹⁵ The U.S. government likewise continues to remove Haitians in violation of their rights,⁴¹⁶ even as it urges its own citizens to leave Haiti.⁴¹⁷ The Trump administration has resumed the practice of detaining Haitians at the migrant detention facility at Guantánamo Bay prior to deportation,⁴¹⁸ exposing them to inhumane conditions and additional rights violations.⁴¹⁹ It also recently designated certain armed groups in Haiti as terrorist organizations – itself an acknowledgment of the level of violence in the country⁴²⁰ – which advocates and experts are concerned will be used as justification for further deportations.⁴²¹
- The U.S. government has cut off virtually all legal pathways to protection in the United States for Haitians.⁴²² On March 25, the Trump administration terminated the humanitarian parole program for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans (CHNV),⁴²³ putting over 200,000 Haitians at risk of removal.⁴²⁴ Attempts to place further illegal limitations on access to asylum⁴²⁵ that disproportionately impact Haitians;⁴²⁶ the indefinite suspension of all refugee resettlement to the United States;⁴²⁷ and the imposition of a full visa ban on Haitian nationals to the United States⁴²⁸ compound the resulting lack of protection. As of writing, the current designation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians – which offers protection for Haitians already in the United States prior to June 3, 2024⁴²⁹ – remains in effect until February 6, 2026, despite efforts by the Trump administration to terminate it.⁴³⁰
- Haitian migrants who are returned to Haiti (“**returnees**”) – many of whom arrive with pre-existing humanitarian needs⁴³¹ – are extremely vulnerable to Haiti's intersecting crises. Those deported due to a prior criminal conviction, in particular, face discrimination and threats from civilian “defense” groups, arbitrary detention and extortion by authorities, along with increased risks of violence and recruitment by armed groups.⁴³² Children, many of whom are unaccompanied, are especially vulnerable to armed group recruitment.⁴³³ The manner of the deportations compounds returnee challenges: U.S. and Dominican governments almost exclusively⁴³⁴ return Haitians to Cap-Haïtien (a city in the North Department) and towns along the Haitian-Dominican border, respectively, regardless of their cities of origin, forcing many to travel long distances along dangerous routes controlled by armed groups if they want to be reunited with their families.⁴³⁵ Assistance to returnees remains limited and insufficient to meet needs.⁴³⁶ The situation for returnees is so desperate that many attempt to flee again,⁴³⁷ particularly to the Dominican Republic, where they are often extorted by Dominican army officers who act as both smugglers and deporters.⁴³⁸

VIII. Failures of the international community to respect the rights of Haitians

The international community is playing an increasingly chaotic role in Haiti's present crisis, which is itself rooted in persistent foreign interference and extraction.⁴³⁹ Although foreign actors repeatedly emphasize the need to restore security and good governance in Haiti,⁴⁴⁰ they implement mutually inconsistent policies that ultimately disrupt Haiti's long-term stability, democracy, and human rights.⁴⁴¹ International support is still enabling the same set of PHTK-affiliated actors even as they perpetuate the same patterns of corruption and abuse that directly precipitated Haiti's crisis.⁴⁴² The foreign-backed MSS has failed to meaningfully improve the security situation, and its future is uncertain as persistent funding and personnel challenges come to a head.⁴⁴³ Foreign private military contractors appear poised to step into the breach, raising serious concerns about potential abuses and accountability.⁴⁴⁴ Any apparent efforts to restore security are further undercut by the international community's persistent failure to stem the flow of foreign – mostly U.S. – weapons into Haiti. Against this backdrop, the United States' precipitous withdrawal of critical humanitarian assistance, on top of an already severely underfunded humanitarian response plan, is inhumane and irresponsible. It is accompanied by increasingly harsh policies to prevent migration to from Haiti through increasingly inhumane and illegal means.⁴⁴⁵ Aggressive new U.S. terrorism designations against armed groups are expected to chill humanitarian responses and drive Haiti into deeper economic decline, even as they are unlikely to impact armed group operations.

- Nearly two years after the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorized the MSS mission to Haiti,⁴⁴⁶ less than half of the personnel promised – just over 1,000 – have been deployed.⁴⁴⁷ Its partial deployment has not materially improved the security situation, which has continued to deteriorate despite claims from UN, U.S., and MSS officials that the mission has had success in combatting armed groups.⁴⁴⁸ As reported in previous IJDH Updates,⁴⁴⁹ persistent funding,⁴⁵⁰ equipment,⁴⁵¹ and personnel shortages⁴⁵² – alongside logistical challenges,⁴⁵³ a lack of intelligence capacity,⁴⁵⁴ and fundamental flaws in the mission's strategy and conception⁴⁵⁵ – underlie these failures. Notably, several contracts essential for the continued operation of the MSS are set to expire in September unless renewed;⁴⁵⁶ Kenyan President William Ruto has said that Kenya, which is leading the mission, will be forced to “review its engagement” if urgent action is not taken to address this problem.⁴⁵⁷ Tensions and lack of coordination between the MSS and the PNH, including because of huge disparities in pay and treatment, as well as the fact that most MSS personnel do not speak French or Haitian Creole, further complicate the situation.⁴⁵⁸ The United States has continued efforts to transform the MSS into a UN peacekeeping operation.⁴⁵⁹ The UN Secretary-General has assessed that such a transformation is not feasible and instead proposed a plan that would increase the UN's role in providing logistical and operational support to the MSS.⁴⁶⁰ The Secretary-General's plan, which would rely on increased – but still voluntary – financial and personnel contributions from Member States and chronically under-resourced UN peacekeeping funds,⁴⁶¹ does not seem likely to alleviate the MSS's funding challenges.⁴⁶² Efforts to ensure prevention and accountability for any human rights abuses committed by MSS personnel remain inadequate.⁴⁶³ In January, after over a year of pressure from Haitian and allied civil society and advocacy groups,⁴⁶⁴ the MSS launched a Complaints and Reporting Mechanism,⁴⁶⁵ intended to investigate and address any abuses committed by MSS personnel against the Haitian population.⁴⁶⁶ A steering committee for the Mechanism was established in May.⁴⁶⁷ Although the committee reportedly includes representatives from civil society organizations, neither the specific composition of the committee nor the process by which selections were made has been made public.⁴⁶⁸
- Despite an ongoing arms embargo,⁴⁶⁹ arms trafficking into Haiti continues to increase and remains a significant driver of the insecurity.⁴⁷⁰ Most weapons are coming from the United States.⁴⁷¹ U.S. government efforts to address arms trafficking to Haiti remain⁴⁷² limited and inadequate.⁴⁷³ Insecurity, capacity constraints, and widespread corruption⁴⁷⁴ continue to impede efforts by Haitian authorities to intercept arms shipments and prosecute perpetrators.⁴⁷⁵
- Foreign states have continued to sanction Haitian individuals accused of corruption or collusion with armed groups.⁴⁷⁶ However, the impact on armed groups remains negligible,⁴⁷⁷ including because of persistent failures by Haitian and foreign governments to effectively and timely implement them.⁴⁷⁸ For example, in June, the Port-au-Prince public prosecutor announced that bank accounts belonging to individuals sanctioned under the UNSC sanctions regime⁴⁷⁹ had been frozen and requested that the ULCC and UCREF open corresponding investigations.⁴⁸⁰ But these measures apply only to the seven individuals sanctioned under the UNSC regime,⁴⁸¹ leaving sanctions against an additional 62 people⁴⁸² – including many of the key political actors ultimately responsible for the current crisis⁴⁸³ – unenforced. An example of foreign deficiencies includes the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince awarding nearly

US\$400,000 worth of contracts to a company owned by Haitian businessman Antoine Salim Succar, despite Canadian sanctions against him for significant corruption.⁴⁸⁴ The U.S. government has also neglected to enforce its own sanctions⁴⁸⁵ against former President, PHTK founder, and Miami resident Michel Martelly.⁴⁸⁶ At the same time, the U.S. government officially designated the *Viv Ansanm* coalition and *Gran Grif* as terrorist organizations in May.⁴⁸⁷ Unlike individualized sanctions regimes, these designations impose harsh penalties on anyone providing “material support” to these groups that, because of the breadth of the definitions involved, are likely to impede foreign assistance and further hamper economic activity in Haiti while doing little to stop armed group violence.⁴⁸⁸

- This reporting period has seen a precipitous decline in already-inadequate humanitarian assistance to Haiti,⁴⁸⁹ even as needs continue to surge.⁴⁹⁰ As of writing, the 2025 humanitarian aid basket for Haiti was just 8.2% funded,⁴⁹¹ shockingly meagre even relative to historically shabby funding for Haiti.⁴⁹² This is largely due to the U.S. government’s shutdown of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)⁴⁹³ and massive cuts to U.S. foreign aid,⁴⁹⁴ which funded around 60% of Haiti’s humanitarian basket in 2024.⁴⁹⁵ The cuts – on top of chronic under-funding⁴⁹⁶ – have already disrupted aid operations in Haiti⁴⁹⁷ with devastating consequences, especially for those with intersecting vulnerabilities.⁴⁹⁸ The rising insecurity continues to complicate aid delivery, endanger staff, and force aid organizations to close.⁴⁹⁹ Moreover, the scale of armed groups’ territorial control makes it virtually impossible for humanitarian organizations to operate without interacting with criminal groups.⁵⁰⁰ This dynamic legitimizes armed groups while putting humanitarian actors at risk of attack from police and civilian “defense” groups, who sometimes perceive them as working with armed groups.⁵⁰¹ These acute challenges are happening in the broader context of long-standing harmful aid practices that continue to impede Haiti’s development, even as they purport to help.⁵⁰²
- BINUH’s mandate was renewed on July 14, 2025,⁵⁰³ even as insecurity and funding-related challenges continue to impact BINUH’s operational capacity and ability to fulfil its mandate.⁵⁰⁴ In response to these challenges, and in light of the significant role envisioned for BINUH as part of the UN Secretary-General’s new plan for the MSS,⁵⁰⁵ the UN Secretary-General has proposed revising BINUH’s mission concept to a scaled-down, more focused mission that he claims will enable BINUH to better fulfill its mandate.⁵⁰⁶

Notes

¹ Assessments of the transitional government's performance have become increasingly harsh. *See, e.g.*, Robenson Geffrard, *Port-au-Prince Bar Council Urges Authorities to Face the Consequences of Their Inaction*, Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 27, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254666/port-au-prince-bar-council-urges-authorities-to-face-the-consequences-of-their-inaction> (Port-au-Prince Bar Association: "After 11 months in power, the Transitional Presidential Council shows no sign that it can steer the country back on course. On the contrary, under the leadership of the CPT's nine members, the situation in the country continues to deteriorate."); Robenson Geffrard, *Haiti's Electoral Council Unable to Announce Election and Referendum Dates*, Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 17, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254274/haitis-electoral-council-unable-to-announce-election-and-referendum-dates> ("More than ten months after taking office, the CPT members still have not been able to govern the country effectively. Their power is largely limited to appointing officials within the public administration. In ten months, no territory controlled by armed groups has been reclaimed."); National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH), *Fall of Two Communes in the Centre Department into the Hands of Armed Gangs: Transitional Authorities Worsen the Country's Security Crisis*, ¶ 26 (Apr. 10, 2025), <https://web.rnddh.org/fall-of-two-communes-in-the-centre-department-into-the-hands-of-armed-gangs-transitional-authorities-worsen-the-countrys-security-crisis/?lang=en> ("By ignoring the Western Department's collapse, the transitional authorities show they have no real plan to restore citizens' rights and public safety.").

² For example, the government has increasingly ceded what is the traditional monopoly by sovereign states over the legitimate use of force to civil "defense" groups and foreign military contractors (with dire human rights consequences for civilians). Basic services are likewise provided primarily by civil society organizations with international support and at grave personal risk. *See, e.g.*, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), *Living Together: The Gangs of Haiti – Part 2: Fighting Back*, at 35:28 (Apr. 30, 2025), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CdKP5zWx9Tc> ("Bwa Kale [civilian "defense" movement] is the latest example of the privatization of the state's functions. Basically in Haiti today, almost everything from electricity to public safety to health to education, most things are privatized. Because the state is dysfunctional and incapable to provide those services, the Haitian population has to take matters into its own hands and give themselves security.").

³ Notable examples of attacks for which the transitional government received advance warnings and community pleas for support, and which it nevertheless failed to repel (with police officers in some cases abandoning their posts) include massacres in Kenscoff, Mirebalais, and Delmas 30. *See* note 125.

⁴ The ANS was announced by a communique of the Prime Minister's office on April 30, 2025, which also established a national state of emergency. *Alterpresse, Création d'une Agence nationale de sécurité et prolongation de l'état d'urgence pour trois mois supplémentaires en Haïti* (May 2, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31659>. The ANS replaces the National Intelligence Agency (ANI), which had been criticized by civil society for its extra-constitutional origins and lack of adequate human rights protections. RNDDH, *Reflections of the RNDDH on the decrees creating the ANI and organizing the strengthening of public security in Haiti* (Dec. 16, 2020), <https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/12-Rap-RNDDH-Reflections-decrees-ANI-and-Public-security-in-Haiti-16Dec20-ENG.pdf>. It is not clear to what extent the ANI was ever operationalized, raising further questions about the expected functionality of the ANS and related allocation, or potential misallocation, of resources.

⁵ Legislative power rests with Haiti's non-functional Parliament. Constitution Art. 88 (vesting legislative power in Parliament); *see also* Arts 128 ("Only the Legislature Power has the authority to interpret laws..."), 59-60-2 (establishing the separation and non-delegation of government powers), 150 ("The President of the republic shall have no powers other than those accorded to him by the Constitution."). While the transitional government has been empowered to exercise limited authority directed towards restoring security and a democratically elected government, such profound changes to Haiti's laws and institutions go well beyond its limited powers.

⁶ For example, the decree creating the ANS contains numerous provisions that authorize broad powers without meaningful oversight and human rights protections and thus poses the same human rights concerns as its predecessor. The creation of the specialized judicial units has also been criticized for failing to implement civil society recommendations or consider the corruption and structural challenges at the root of Haiti's judicial dysfunction. *See* notes 210-211.

⁷ As documented below and in previous IJDH Updates, Haiti's justice sector, including its anti-corruption units, lacks independence and is largely unable to function. The government's national security mechanisms are likewise rife with corruption and have a strong history of civilian abuses. These core unaddressed limitations (notably emphasized by Haiti's civil society proposals for transition but marginalized in the foreign-supported process that produced the April 3, 2024 Political Accord for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition (**April 2024 Transition Accord**)) present significant barriers to the implementation and functionality of any new rules and mechanisms that do not deliberately address them, however well-intentioned. *See* Section IV. Lack of access to justice & chronic impunity; *see e.g.*, IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024*, pp. 5-6 (Dec. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/December-2024-Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments.pdf>; Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI) et al., *Justice Sector Challenges in Haiti* (2021), https://ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Updated-Justice-Sector-Challenges-in-Haiti-UPR-Submission_EN-1.pdf.

⁸ Haiti's Constitution explicitly prohibits constitutional changes by referendum. Constitution Arts. 284-1 (requiring changes to be approved by a two-thirds parliamentary majority before ratification by the National Assembly), 284-3 (forbidding general elections to amend the Constitution by referendum). In addition, the amendment process to date has lacked transparency and inclusiveness, and detracts policy attention and budget from other critical priorities. Because the envisioned constitutional reforms would shape the structure of elections, at least some material electoral preparations would be delayed pending a referendum vote and implementation of the proposed constitution. Notably such a referendum vote would face all the same security, funding, and procedural challenges as the eventual election. As a consequence, the process has generated significant civil society critique and opposition. *See, e.g.*, RHI News, *Des organisations de la société civile rejettent l'avant-projet de Constitution du Conseil présidentiel de transition, dénonçant une manœuvre illégitime et antidémocratique...* (Jun. 11, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/politique/des-organisations-de-la-societe-civile-rejettent-lavant-projet-de-constitution-du-conseil-presidentiel-de-transition-denoncant-une-manoeuvre-illegitime-et-antidemocratique/> (human rights organizations including the Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organizations (POHDH), the National Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace (CE-

JILAP), RNDDH, and Together Against Corruption (ECC) “categorically reject the preliminary draft reform of the 1987 constitution that the Steering Committee presented to the CPT, in this context of widespread insecurity and resulting from an illegal process, in violation of the fundamental principles of transparency, participation and sovereignty of the people”) (internal quotations omitted); *Alterpresse, Haïti - Constitution : Le Gafé rejette l'avant-projet et appelle à une vigilance citoyenne accrue* (Jun. 23, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31861> (reporting criticism by the Francophone Action Group for the Environment, which says “the conditions are not in place for legitimate constitutional reform, since constitutional rules are not applicable and the security and political context remains deeply unstable”) (internal quotations omitted); Kay Fanm #KwapeVyolans, X (May 31, 2025), <https://x.com/KayFanmAyiti/status/1928845632229257296/photo/1> (feminist organizations *Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA)*, *Kay Fanm*, *Fanm Deside*, and *Fondation TOYA*, and feminist Sabine Manigat denounce the constitutional reform as illegitimate, lacking transparency, and constituting a grab threat to Haitian rights); John Smith Justin, *Civil Society Organizations Oppose the Holding of the Referendum*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Mar. 24, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254517/civil-society-organizations-oppose-the-holding-of-the-referendum> (“[R]epresentatives from the *Fondation Je Klere [FJKL]*, *SKL [L'Organisation de Défense des Droits Humains Sant Karl Levèque]*, the Protestant sector, peasants, Madan Sara, among others, unanimously rejected the idea of the [constitutional] referendum, which they consider illegal under the constitution.”) (internal quotations omitted); Juhakenson Blaise, *Haitians reject draft constitution over concerns of fragmentation and weakened democracy*, *Haitian Times* (Jun. 9, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/06/09/new-constitution-draft-rejection/> (“[P]olitical actors, civil society leaders, economists and legal scholars. . . contend that the document not only proposes broad changes that would restructure the Haitian state but also risks exacerbating the country’s governance crisis and igniting new territorial and political divisions.”); Juhakenson Blaise et al., *Haiti’s upcoming constitutional referendum: A controversial process amid political and security crisis*, *Haitian Times* (Apr. 1, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/04/01/haiti-faces-referendum-controversial-process/>.

⁹ Under the April 2024 Transition Accord, elections are to be held in November of this year, with the installation of an elected government in February 2026. The transitional government (Jean Junior Celestin, *Elections: Are PM Fils-Aimé and President Voltaire on the Same Page?*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Feb. 13, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/253285/elections-are-pm-fils-aimé-and-president-voltaire-on-the-same-page>) along with its international partners (UN Web TV, *Haiti - Security Council, 9953rd meeting* (Jul. 2, 2025), <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1k/k1k2frxbw>) continue to refer to this timeline. A complete Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) was installed in December, four months past deadline and accompanied by significant controversy over procedural challenges and lack of transparency. IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024* (Dec. 2024), note 16 and associated text. However, the pervasive insecurity - and especially the government’s inability to effectively control significant population centers - along with inadequate resources (International Crisis Group (ICG), *Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti*, pp. 7, 8-9, 28 (Feb. 19, 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/107-violence-haiti.pdf>), make holding elections that are free, fair, and credible within this timeline effectively impossible. The government has signaled it recognizes this limitation and is willing to accept something lesser: the government has contemplated holding national elections in which only the “eight departments that are free of gangs” would vote, which could exclude up to 60% of eligible voters. GI-TOC, *Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Issue 3*, pp. 5-6 (Apr. 2025), <https://riskbulletins.globalinitiative.net/download/ht-obs-003-screen-pdf.pdf>; Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti leader says elections can be held this year even as gangs continue their rampage*, *Miami Herald* (Jan. 30, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article299406989.html>.

¹⁰ See ICG, *Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti* (Feb. 19, 2025), p. 4 (“[M]any Haitians despair at the political bickering that has consumed the transitional government’s attention and accounts in large part for its half-hearted efforts to remedy the country’s dire security problems. . . . Political deadlock has meant that a crucial post at the helm of the security apparatus was left vacant for almost nine months, while the institution in charge of coordinating security cooperation with donors remains dormant, as its members have not yet been appointed. . . . Personalised politics, infighting and alleged corruption have done much to undermine the workings of the transitional administration.”); David C. Adams & Frances Robles, *Massacre Upon Massacre: Haiti’s Bleak Spiral Into a Failed State*, *NY Times* (Jan. 6, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/06/world/americas/haiti-gang-massacres-murders-instability.html> (“[M]any experts believe Haiti is a failing state, with various factions of the interim government embroiled in political bickering with no apparent strategy for tackling the worsening violence and providing a path to elections, which were supposed to be held this year.”). A salient example is the government’s failure to successfully reactivate the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantling, and Reintegration (CNDDR). The Council of Ministers reactivated the CNDDR in March, in recognition of its importance for restoring peace and security, naming seven members to the Commission. *Haiti Libre, Haiti - Security : Installation of members of the National Disarmament Commission...* (Mar. 11, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44452-haiti-security-installation-of-members-of-the-national-disarmament-commission.html>; Dimitry Charles, *Haitian government installs new members of the CNDDR*, *Canada-Haiti Information Project* (Mar. 10, 2025), <https://canada-haiti.ca/content/haitian-government-installs-new-members-cnDDR>. However, it was dissolved just two months later by the TPC, which cited a lack of confidence in the members appointed by the Council of Ministers, through a process that may have violated the separation of government authorities. *Le Quotidien 509, Why did the TPC disbands [sic] the CNDDR?*, *Canada-Haiti Information Project* (May 3, 2025), <https://canada-haiti.ca/content/why-did-tpc-disbands-cnDDR>; Lakay Info 509, *Haïti : dissolution de la CNDDR don’t certains membres sont discrédités* (May 3, 2025), <https://lakayinfo509.com/haiti-dissolution-de-la-cnDDR-dont-certains-membres-sont-discredites/>. For example, an attempt by three TPC members - representing the December 21 Agreement, the Collective of Political Parties of January 30 and the EDE/RED party, all affiliated with the PHTK - to change the structure and composition of the TPC led to significant upheavals. In January, the three members sent a letter to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) “arguing for a reconfiguration of the ruling panel” and presenting a scenario in which the TPC would be reduced to three members led by a member of the *Cour de Cassation* (Haiti’s Supreme Court). The three members highlighted the support of *Viv Ansanm* for this proposal, which was widely understood - including by other TPC members - as legitimizing the armed group coalition. Jacqueline Charles, *Can Haiti’s gangs help solve the political crisis? Some politicians seem to think so*, *Miami Herald* (Jan. 14, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article298345513.html>.

¹¹ Notably, three members of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) are embroiled in a corruption scandal involving the *Banque National de Credit*, as corroborated in a report by Haiti's Anti-Corruption Unit (ULCC). For additional examples, see notes 175-179.

¹² See notes 231-235.

¹³ Haitian Times, *Protesters in Haiti demand new government and more security as anger over gangs spreads* (May 7, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/05/07/protesters-in-haiti-demand-new-government-and-more-security-as-anger-over-gangs-spreads/> (“Dozens of protesters marched up the hills of Haiti’s capital on Sunday demanding an end to persistent gang violence as they called on the country’s prime minister and transitional presidential council to resign. It’s the latest protest to reflect growing anger and frustration over a surge in violence as gangs try to seize full control of Port-au-Prince.”); Diego Da Rin, *UN Paralyzed on Haiti despite Gang Threat to Government*, ICG (Apr. 25, 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/caribbean/haiti/un-paralysed-haiti-despite-gang-threat-government> (“[L]arge protests against gang violence have shaken Port-au-Prince for a month, flustering a transitional government that is itself consumed by internal political disputes.”); Alterpresse, *Situation toujours tendue à Port-au-Prince dans un contexte de mobilisation contre la criminalité en Haïti* (Apr. 16, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31609> (reporting on protests launched by the Canapé Vert “defense” movement “to force the authorities to take firm and effective measures to put an end to acts of terror and other violence by armed gangs in Haiti”); Dimitry Charles, *Manifestation massive des habitants de Canapé-Vert contre l’insécurité et la violence des gangs*, Juno7 (Mar. 19, 2025), <https://www.juno7.ht/manifestation-canape-vert-insecurite-gangs/> (“Despite promises from the authorities and the use of explosive drones in police operations, the security crisis continues to worsen. Protesters are demanding concrete action and denouncing the leaders’ failure to protect citizens. In the absence of effective solutions, popular anger shows no signs of abating.”); see also note 171.

¹⁴ UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), *Report of the Secretary-General*, ¶ 6, UN Doc. S/2025/418 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/418> (“Various stakeholders, including new emerging coalitions of political, civil society and diaspora groups, have voiced the need for alternative governance arrangements. On 14 May, Engagés pour le Développement requested the Caribbean Community’s Eminent Persons Group to reorient the political transition. The Groupe de Contact International pour Haïti adopted a resolution on 18 May calling for the swift restoration of constitutional order through the appointment of a judge from the Court of Cassation to steer the transition, the establishment of a downsized ministerial cabinet headed by a Prime Minister and the creation of an oversight commission. On 20 May, a coalition of political and civil society groups proposed another governance blueprint comprising a judge from the Court of Cassation as transitional president and a Prime Minister selected through broad national consultations.”); RHI News, *Haïti : le RDNP exige le départ immédiat du Conseil présidentiel de transition...* (Apr. 6, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/politique/haïti-le-rdnp-exige-le-depart-immediat-du-conseil-presidentiel-de-transition/> (reporting on calls from the Rally of Progressive National Democrats for the TPC and Prime Minister to resign); RHI News, *Le RDNP propose une sortie de crise par la Cour de cassation et appelle à un nouveau politique...* (Jul. 5, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/politique/le-rdnp-propose-une-sortie-de-crise-par-la-cour-de-cassation-et-appelle-a-un-renouveau-politique/>; see also Da Rin, *UN Paralyzed on Haiti despite Gang Threat to Government* (Apr. 25, 2025) (“Some political leaders have intensified calls on the council and prime minister to resign.”); Alterpresse, *Haïti-Criminalité : Un autre policier national tombé sous les balles assassines des bandits à Mirebalais* (Apr. 9, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31583> (“[T]he Union of the National Police of Haiti (Spnh-17) . . . calls on the authorities to resign if they are unable to restore order, eradicate gangs, prevent the daily assassination of national police officers and the loss of territory.”).

¹⁵ See note 439.

¹⁶ See IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024*, notes 9, 10 and associated text (Jun. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments-December-2023-through-May-2024.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2023*, notes 21, 22 and associated text (Dec. 2023), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/IJDH-HRU-Dec.-2023-12.11-FINAL.pdf>.

¹⁷ After attacks by the *Viv Ansanm* armed group coalition forced Haiti’s de facto government to resign in March 2024, credible Haitian civil society groups proposed a five-member Transitional Presidential Council with one representative from the PHTK party. The United States and CARICOM modified that proposal to include seven voting members, three of whom were from the PHTK or allied groups, and required all members to agree to support the MSS. Having the additional members, especially several allied with the anti-democratic PHTK, has already resulted in attempts to coopt the transitional process, prevented the TPC from reaching consensus on key issues, and led to a complicated and paralyzing competition to install loyalists in government service. Robenson Geffrard, *Threats and Intimidation... the CPT Undermined by Internal Crises*, Le Nouvelliste (Jul. 5, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/257828/threats-and-intimidation-the-cpt-undermined-by-internal-crises>; IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024* (Jun. 2024), p. 2; see also note 10. Two of the three TPC members accused of a major bribery scandal last year are from PHTK-allied groups, and the third is from a party added to the Council by CARICOM. This foreign intrusion into the process - including the requirement that TPC members accept the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) - has undermined the transitional government’s credibility from the start and continues to enable the kind of corruption and state capture that precipitated Haiti’s crisis. Brian Concannon, *Can the Transitional Council Lead Haiti Effectively?*, Latin America Advisor, pp. 3-4 (May 8, 2024), <https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/LAA240508.pdf>.

¹⁸ See Section VIII. Failures of the international community to respect the Rights of Haitians.

¹⁹ See Kirk Randolph, Nicolás Devia-Valbuena & Louiceus Ozias, *How to Break Gangs’ Grip in Haiti*, U.S. Institute of Peace (Mar. 13, 2025), <https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/03/how-break-gangs-grip-haiti> (“The unchecked rise of criminal networks in Haiti is not an isolated crisis — it poses a growing threat to the broader region. Indeed, these gangs are evolving from localized criminal groups to transnational criminal organizations.”); GI-TOC, *Living Together: The Gangs of Haiti – Part 1: The Death of a President*, at 18:30 (Apr. 22, 2025), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UaBaj-XpDQ>; GI-TOC, *Last Chance? Breaking Haiti’s Political and Criminal Impasse*, p. 1 (Jan. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Last->

[chance-Breaking-Haitis-political-and-criminal-impasse-GI-TOC-January-2025.pdf](#) (“In 2024, institutional weaknesses and internal political wars opened up opportunities for the gangs to exploit. Criminal groups acted quickly and strategically, adapting to the context and putting pressure on the authorities. Institutional fragility thus feeds gang power, which, in turn, continues to weaken transition efforts, in a vicious circle from which no one seems to escape”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, ¶ 74, UN Doc. S/2025/226 (Apr. 14, 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on_haiti_april_2025en.pdf (“Gangs are exploiting the ongoing political uncertainty, eroding State authority and benefiting from the illicit trafficking of weapons”); RNDDH, *Fall of Two Communes in the Centre Department into the Hands of Armed Gangs: Transitional Authorities Worsen the Country’s Security Crisis* (Apr. 10, 2025), ¶ 27 (“The absence of state response has turned the police into firefighters—constantly reacting without strategic direction—while towns fall one after another. Unlike state authorities, the Viv Ansanm terrorist groups follow a deliberate plan, gradually conquering provincial towns with minimal resistance, usually from civilian self-defense brigades rather than state forces.”).

²⁰ See Daniel Dickinson, *Haiti ‘awash’ with guns leaving population ‘absolutely terrified’*, UN News (Apr. 17, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/interview/2025/04/1162396> (in discussing arms trafficking: “William O’Neill: . . . The gangs have powerful automatic weapons that fire many rounds per minute as well as sniper rifles which some gang members have been trained on.”); GI-TOC (May 14, 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/haiti-kenya-mission-paralyzed/> (“gangs are functioning more and more like armed militias”); Jacqueline Charles, *U.S., Caribbean community condemn plans by gangs, allies to overthrow Haiti government*, Miami Herald (Apr. 14, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article304160441.html> (Apr. 14, 2025) (“Since coming together under the coalitions, gangs have proven themselves to be more mobile and more coordinated, carrying out military-style ambushes far away from their strongholds.”); Daniela Mohor, Dumas Maçon & Nyaboga Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering*, New Humanitarian (Jan. 13, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigations/2025/01/13/haiti-depth-why-kenya-led-security-mission-floundering> (“The armed groups have also been acting in a more coordinated and unified manner, often attacking simultaneously on several fronts, displacing thousands of people, sometimes in a matter of days.”); see also note 36.

²¹ GI-TOC, *Living Together: The Gangs of Haiti – Part I: The Death of a President* (Apr. 22, 2025), at 27:30.

²² Da Rin, *UN Paralysed on Haiti despite Gang Threat to Government* (Apr. 25, 2025) (“The country’s year-old transitional government is facing overt threats of a coup. Gangs have encroached further on some of the few neighbourhoods in Port-au-Prince that had remained beyond their reach. The spokesperson of the gang coalition *Viv Ansanm* has acknowledged that the gangs’ goal is to reach the offices of the Transitional Presidential Council and the prime minister and overthrow the government, with no plan for what would follow.”); Charles, *U.S., Caribbean community condemn plans by gangs, allies to overthrow Haiti government* (Apr. 14, 2025). There are also ongoing debates about whether armed groups should be given a seat at the political negotiating table. See Charles, *Can Haiti’s gangs help solve the political crisis? Some politicians seem to think so* (Jan. 14, 2025) (“Last year, as Caribbean leaders worked with Haitians to set up the political transition, several CARICOM leaders suggested the gangs should be included. Both the United States and France objected. But the idea that gangs and other political spoilers should be included has been raised by policymakers. The idea of including non-gang figures regarded as ‘spoilers’ into talks has long guided some foreign embassies’ approach in Port-au-Prince. Some political observers have been quietly wondering if the government is seeking ways to negotiate with armed gangs based on certain appointments that were recently made for local mayors offices. Neither the government nor the ruling council has said they are interested in negotiating with gangs, although others close to the leadership have been accused of having close ties to gang leaders.”); GI-TOC, *Are Haitian gangs on the road to political recognition?* (Apr. 3, 2025), <https://riskbulletins.globalinitiative.net/ht-obs-003/04-haitian-gangs-road-to-political-recognition.html> (“Some TPC members have reportedly considered recognizing *Viv Ansanm* as a political entity; as of February 2025, discussions regarding the recognition of the coalition as such have been marked by differing viewpoints. . . . The differing viewpoints within the TPC underscore the sensitivities associated with recognizing gangs as legitimate actors in Haiti’s transitional governance. On the one hand, political integration could provide an incentive for criminal groups to disarm and transition into governance. On the other hand, integration could formalize violent existing gang-controlled power structures, preventing the emergence of a legitimate government system and potentially harm efforts to address the grievances of marginalized communities.”); see also note 10.

²³ See note 148.

²⁴ Haiti Libre, *Haiti - UN : The security situation in Haiti has deteriorated considerably* (Jun. 22, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45179-haiti-un-the-security-situation-in-haiti-has-deteriorated-considerably.html>; Da Rin, *UN Paralysed on Haiti despite Gang Threat to Government* (Apr. 25, 2025) (then-BINUH head María Isabel Salvador said Haiti is “approaching a point of no return”) (internal quotations omitted); UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), *Restoring dignity: A global call to end the violence in Haiti* (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/04/restoring-dignity-global-call-end-violence-haiti> (according to UN Expert on Human Rights in Haiti William O’Neill, “[h]uman rights violations and abuses have reached a scale and intensity . . . never seen before in Haiti”) (internal quotations omitted); Michelson Césaire, « Nous sommes en guerre », *le président Fritz Alphonse Jean fait appel aux fils du pays désireux de se battre*, Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 31, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/254748/nous-sommes-en-guerre-le-president-fritz-alphonse-jean-fait-appel-aux-fils-du-pays-desireux-de-se-battre> (Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) President Fritz Alphonse Jean acknowledged “that the country is in a ‘war situation’”); Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti’s volatile capital is in a free fall. Here’s what its collapse could look like*, Miami Herald (Mar. 24, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article302396134.html> (reporting that this is the closest Port-au-Prince has ever been to capitulating to the *Viv Ansanm* armed group alliance); Jacqueline Charles, *We are all by ourselves: Haitians warn that fall of Port-au-Prince is imminent*, Miami Herald (Mar. 20, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article302275119.html> (according to one security expert, “[t]he collapse of Port-au-Prince is imminent”) (internal quotations omitted); William O’Neill, *Violence, Abuses and Hunger in Haiti*, ReVista (Jan. 30, 2025) <https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/violence-abuses-and-hunger-in-haiti/>; Adams & Robles, *Massacre Upon Massacre: Haiti’s Bleak Spiral Into a Failed State* (Jan. 6, 2025); see also RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques*,

¶ 6 (Feb. 28, 2025), <https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2-Rap-Wharf-Jeremie-Kenscoff-Chateaublond-28Fev2025.pdf> (finding that an average of 30 people were victims of rights violations every day in Haiti in 2024).

²⁵ The *Viv Ansanm* coalition was first formed in September 2023, then rebranded in February 2024 to launch coordinated attacks against the government and other targets, which precipitated the resignation of de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry. The coalition is made up of armed groups that continue to operate separately but come together at points for coordinated attacks. Sandra Pellegrini, *Viv Ansanm: Living together, fighting united – the alliance reshaping Haiti’s gangland*, ACLED (Oct. 16, 2024), <https://acleddata.com/2024/10/16/viv-ansanm-living-together-fighting-united-the-alliance-reshaping-haitis-gangland/>; OHCHR, *Restoring dignity: A global call to end the violence in Haiti* (Apr. 7, 2025) (describing “a coordinated assault on Haitian society” by the *Viv Ansanm* coalition”); see, e.g., Juhakenson Blaise, *Haiti’s La Chapelle falls under gang control as police station torched and town sealed off*, Haitian Times (Jun. 24, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/06/24/la-chapelle-falls-under-gangs-control/> (an attack in the Artibonite Department in June was carried out by an “affiliate of Viv Ansanm”); Evens Sanon & Dánica Coto, *Haitians fleeing gang violence swim across the country’s longest river*, AP News (Apr. 30, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gang-violence-petite-riviere-c0eaf5bd06995b534893fbfdcf021d80> (reporting that *Viv Ansanm* was providing reinforcements to *Gran Grif* during its attack on Petite Rivière in April); Jacqueline Charles, *American Airlines no longer returning to Haiti in early February. Restart date unknown*, Miami Herald (Dec. 8, 2024), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article296763559.html> (reporting that the Wharf Jérémie massacre was perpetrated by armed group leader Micanor Altès, who is part of the *Viv Ansanm* coalition).

²⁶ UN Security Council (UNSC), *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2752 (2024)*, ¶ 20, UN Doc. S/2025/356 (Jun. 10, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/S/2025/356> (hereinafter *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti*).

²⁷ Robert Muggah & Katherine Aguirre, *Latin America’s Deadliest Threat is Made in the U.S.*, Americas Quarterly Apr. 21, 2025), <https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/latin-americas-deadliest-threat-is-made-in-the-u-s/>.

²⁸ See notes 280-282.

²⁹ See BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 17 (discussing attacks on Mirebalais and Saut d’Eau, “where key road sections link the capital to northern regions of the country and the Dominican Republic”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 15 (“[A]ttacks were reported in . . . in Mirebalais and Saut d’Eau (Centre Department). These incidents highlight the efforts of gangs to expand their control beyond the capital.”); Charles, *U.S., Caribbean community condemn plans by gangs, allies to overthrow Haiti government* (Apr. 14, 2025) (“[Armed groups’] latest takeover of the city of Mirebalais in central Haiti has raised panic and underscored that no area of the country is immune.”). According to information shared by Pascale Solages, the cofounder of Haitian feminist organization *Nègès Mawon*, her organization has been receiving an increasing number of complaints of sexual violence in cities in the Central Plateau, including Mirebalais, Lascahobas, and Saut d’Eau. See also note 51; Thomas Lalime, *Why Lascahobas’s Takeover by Armed Gangs Could Be a Significant Step Toward the Country’s Surrender*, Le Nouvelliste (Jul. 7, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/257856/why-lascahobas-takeover-by-armed-gangs-could-be-a-significant-step-toward-the-countrys-surrender> (reporting on armed groups attacks in the Central Department in recent months, which, if not stopped, could have dramatic economic and geopolitical consequences given the department’s proximity to the Dominican Republic). From the last quarter of 2024 to the first quarter of 2025, the percentage of victims of violence located in the Central Department increased from just 1 to 3%. Compare BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025*, note 1 (Apr. 30, 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_jan_-_march_2025.pdf with BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, October – December 2024*, note 1 (Dec. 2024), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/human_rights_quarterly_report_-_october-december_2024_-_en.pdf.

³⁰ See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), note 1 (“The Port-au-Prince metropolitan area continues to account for the highest number of victims (85 percent), followed by the Artibonite (10 percent), the Central department (3 percent), and the Southern department (1 percent).”); Jacqueline Charles, *Gang violence in Haiti has displaced nearly 1.3 million people. It’s a new record*, Miami Herald (Jun. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article308379145.html>; IPC, *Haiti: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot* (Apr. 14, 2025), https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar_Jun2025_Snapshot_Englis_h.pdf; RNDDH, Press Release, *Multiplication des attaques armées contre la presse haïtienne : Le RNDDH rappelle aux autorités de la transition, leur promesse de sécurité*, ¶ 3 (Mar. 17, 2025), <https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/3-CP-RNDDH-Attaques-contre-des-medias-17Mars2025.FR.pdf>; Daniela Mohor, *Aid in the crosshairs: Why access is growing harder in Haiti*, New Humanitarian (Jan. 28, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/interview/2025/01/28/aid-crosshairs-why-access-growing-harder-haiti>; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Haiti: Armed attacks and displacements in the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince – Situation Report #9 (14 to 27 December)* (Jan. 24, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-armed-attacks-and-displacements-metropolitan-area-port-au-prince-situation-report-9-14-27-december>; see also, e.g., Onés Joseph, *Gangs strike twice in one week in Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite, sending residents fleeing across the river* (May 20, 2025) <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/05/02/petite-riviere-artibonite-gang-violence-april2025/> (reporting on a series of attacks in the town of Petite-Rivière in the Artibonite Department in April); Louis Chadrac, *Father Mackenzy Célestin Raises Alarm Over Montrouis Crisis*, Le Nouvelliste (Jan. 16, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/252569/father-mackenzy-celestin-raises-alarm-over-montrouis-crisis> (according to a resident of Montrouis, a town in the south of the Artibonite Department, “[i]t is very rare . . . to go a week without two to four murders”). But see BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 10 (“In Artibonite department, the first three months of the year were marked by relative calm, continuing the trend observed since mid-December 2024, even though gang attacks continued to be recorded.”).

³¹ RHI News, *Le nombre de déplacés de force dans le monde atteint un niveau record de 122 millions, l’ONU alerte sur l’explosion silencieuse des crises oubliées, notamment en Haïti...* (Jun. 12, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/le-nombre-de-deplaces-de-force-dans-le-monde-atteint-un-niveau-record-de-122-millions-lonu-alerte-sur-lexplosion-silencieuse-des-crisis-oubliees->

[notamment-en-haiti/](#) (85%, according to BINUH); Dickinson, [Haiti 'awash' with guns leaving population 'absolutely terrified'](#) (Apr. 17, 2025) (“[I]t is widely believed that gangs control up to 90 per cent of the capital.”); Jacqueline Charles, [Haiti media under siege as armed gangs target news outlets in Port-au-Prince](#), Miami Herald (Mar. 17, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article302184329.html> (90%); UNICEF, [Haiti's Children Under Siege: The staggering rise of child abuse and recruitment by armed groups](#) (Feb. 7, 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/press-releases/haitis-children-under-siege-staggering-rise-child-recruitment-armed-groups> (85%); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, [Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering](#) (Jan. 13, 2025) (85%); see also Jean Junior Celestin, [Port-au-Prince Mayor Admits Losing Control \[O\]ver a Large Part of the Capital](#), Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 6, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/253919/port-au-prince-mayor-admits-losing-control-ver-a-large-part-of-the-capital> (“The mayor of Port-au-Prince, Youri Chevre, has painted a bleak picture of the security situation in the Haitian capital. . . . [H]e admitted that the municipal authorities control only 12 out of the city’s 38 square kilometers.”).

³² Blaise, [Haiti's La Chapelle falls under gang control as police station torched and town sealed off](#) (Jun. 24, 2025) (reporting that “more than 28 zones [are] under gang control across Haiti in 2025”). Cap-Haïtien, a city in the North Department that had until recently been relatively untouched by armed group violence, has seen an increase in incidents. See Gérard Maxineau, [Cinq morts et un blessé au cours d'une opération policière au Cap-Haïtien](#), Le Nouvelliste (May 5, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/255827/cinq-morts-et-un-blesse-au-cours-dune-operation-policier-au-cap-haitien>; Onz Chéry, [Cap-Haïtien anti-gang raid kills five gang members, injures police officer](#), Haitian Times (May 6, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/05/06/five-koulou-gang-members-killed-haiti/>; see also Kervenson Martial, [Fear and outrage sweep Haiti's northwest after police accused of killing Haitian American businessman](#), Haitian Times (Apr. 29, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/04/29/fear-and-outrage-sweep-haitis-northwest-after-police-accused-of-killing-haitian-american-businessman/> (reporting on “fears of gang infiltration of Port-de-Paix” in the Northwest Department). A network of healthcare organizations working in Haiti also reported armed group activity in the South Department and Grand’Anse.

³³ Haitian Times, [Protesters in Haiti demand new government and more security as anger over gangs spreads](#) (May 7, 2025) (“Gunmen in recent months have targeted once peaceful neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince that would give them easy access to Pétion-Ville, a residential area where banks, embassies and other institutions are located.”); Mishra, [Haiti faces 'point of no return' as gang violence fuels chaos](#) (Apr. 21, 2025); Charles, [Haiti's volatile capital is in a free fall. Here's what its collapse could look like](#) (Mar. 24, 2025) (“Today, areas once considered safe two months ago are now empty or blocked by barricades.”); UN News, [Violence triggers record displacements in Haiti's capital](#) (Mar. 19, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/03/1161266>; Charles, [Manifestation massive des habitants de Canapé-Vert contre l'insécurité et la violence des gangs](#) (Mar. 19, 2025); Jacqueline Charles, [As part of Trump aid freeze, police contractors are laid off in Haiti amid gang attacks](#), Miami Herald (Jan. 28, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article299281064.html>.

³⁴ Jacqueline Charles, [Haiti's capital is close to falling to armed gangs. Here's what you need to know](#), Miami Herald (Mar. 25, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article302671734.html> (reporting that armed groups are targeting “[e]verything,” including “strategic infrastructure such as electrical plants, fiber optic and fuel facilities”); Charles, [Haiti's volatile capital is in a free fall. Here's what its collapse could look like](#) (Mar. 24, 2025) (“More than 50 official buildings, including ministries, courts, port facilities, schools, and other strategic institutions, have been vacated, signaling a significant decline in state authority over the capital.”) (internal quotations omitted); GI-TOC, [Last Chance? Breaking Haiti's Political and Criminal Impasse](#) (Jan. 2025), p. 10; see also notes 310-311.

³⁵ RNDDH, *Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country*, ¶ 117 (Apr. 25, 2025), <https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/4-Rap-Bilan-CPT-1-an-25-Avril-2025.ENG.pdf> (“The movement of goods, services and people within the country is controlled and punctuated by armed bandits, who set more toll booths every day.”); Charles, [Haiti's capital is close to falling to armed gangs. Here's what you need to know](#) (Mar. 25, 2025) (“The last road out of the capital to access the country’s four regions in the south is now in the hands of gangs. . . . Several other roads that Haitians were able to use to get to the airport before gangs opened fire on three U.S. jetliners in November are now in gang territory.”); DW, [Haiti – The Iron Grip of the Gangs](#) (Feb. 5, 2025), <https://www.dw.com/en/haiti-the-iron-grip-of-the-gangs/a-71300252> (“[T]he gangs wield considerable economic and military leverage. They control most of Port-au-Prince’s seafront, and thus the zones surrounding the country’s strategically vital ports.”); GI-TOC, [Last Chance? Breaking Haiti's Political and Criminal Impasse](#) (Jan. 2025), p. 10 (“Today, the gangs control or interfere with virtually all the country’s critical infrastructure, both public and private, ranging from the port terminals in the bay of Port-au-Prince, to the main roads linking the capital to the rest of Haiti. . . . The gangs also influence the operation of the international airport . . . and maintain a land blockade against the south of the country.”); Jonasson Odigène, [Transportation Sector Struggles amid Rising Insecurity](#), Le Nouvelliste (Jan. 9, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/252403/transportation-sector-struggles-amid-rising-insecurity> (discussing attacks on boats in response to an increase in the use of maritime transport due to armed groups’ control over roads, and noting that “[m]aritime transport authorities do not always document or disclose these incidents”).

³⁶ See BINUH, *Haiti Flash Report*, pp. 13-14 (Apr. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/flash_report_20250222_kenscoff-en.pdf; Charles, [Haiti's capital is close to falling to armed gangs. Here's what you need to know](#) (Mar. 25, 2025) (“[Several Port-au-Prince neighborhoods’] strategic location on the upper south-east end of the capital with easy and direct access to the main arteries in and out of the capital would give gangs full control of Port-au-Prince and the ability to block the Canapé-Vert leading to Pétion-Ville and use it to launch attacks on the economic center of the metropolitan area.”); Charles, [Haiti's volatile capital is in a free fall. Here's what its collapse could look like](#) (Mar. 24, 2025) (“The gangs’ recent expansion into the mountains and in areas such as Nazon and Delmas 30, which puts them within striking distance of the headquarters of one of the country’s biggest banks, along with Delmas 19, located less than a mile from the government-owned Radio Television Nationale d’Haiti, has rich and poor alike afraid. Any further expansion into Delmas, for example, could lead to a closure of the airspace because air traffic controllers and airport employees would no longer be able to safely commute to work.”); Fondasyon Je Klere (FJKL), *Massacre de Kenscoff: La Fondasyon Je Klere (FJKL) Denonce la Desinvolture et le Cynisme du Conseil Présidentiel de Transition (CPT)* (Feb. 4, 2025),

<https://www.fjkl.org/ht/images/doc/1FJKL1MassacredeKenscoffRapport.pdf>; GI-TOC, *Last Chance? Breaking Haiti's Political and Criminal Impasse* (Jan. 2025), p. 10.

³⁷ Juhakenson Blaise, *Haiti's domestic flights resume, sparking hope, skepticism and criticism*, Haitian Times (Jun. 6, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/06/06/haiti-domestic-flight-resumption-port-au-prince/> (domestic flights between Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Jacmel, Les Cayes, and Jérémie are set to resume on June 12, but the airport remains under a U.S. commercial flight ban until at least September); Jean Junior Celestin, *Security and Infrastructure: The Uncertain Future of Haitian Airports*, Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 28, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254687/security-and-infrastructure-the-uncertain-future-of-haitian-airports>; David Shepardson, *FAA extends bar on US flights to Port-au-Prince through September 8*, Reuters (Mar. 11, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/faa-extends-bar-us-flights-port-au-prince-through-september-8-2025-03-11/>; see also Roberson Alphonse, *U.S. Backs Airport Security Plan, yet American Airlines Won't Return Anytime Soon*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 9, 2024), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/251867/us-backs-airport-security-plan-yet-american-airlines-wont-return-anytime-soon> (discussing the lack of “visible mobilization to secure the approaches or sanitize the airport’s perimeter,” which is surrounded by neighborhoods under armed group control). Haiti’s only other international airport, in Cap-Haïtien, “does not have the capacity to meet the demand.” Celestin, *Security and Infrastructure: The Uncertain Future of Haitian Airports* (Mar. 28, 2025).

³⁸ *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 83, 86; UNSC, *Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*, p. 4, UN Doc. S/2025/122 (Feb. 27, 2025), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4078340?ln=en&v=pdf> (noting a “recent surge in attacks on maritime assets by gangs in the bay of Port-au-Prince”).

³⁹ *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 34. This is a 53% increase from 2023. See BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, ¶ 11, UN Doc. S/2024/62 (Jan. 15, 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/report_of_the_un_secretary_general_on_haiti_binuh_-_15_january_2024.pdf (reporting 4,789 deaths in all of 2023). Note that not all of these killings are directly perpetrated by armed groups – many are perpetrated by police and civilian “defense” groups. See notes 143-144, 163-164.

⁴⁰ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 16; see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 5 (reporting 1,617 killed between January and March); RNDDH, *Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country* (Apr. 25, 2025), ¶ 49 (reporting 4,405 people murdered from April 2024 to March 2025, including at least 805 from January to March 2025); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 13 (reporting 2,660 people murdered from December 2024 to February 2025, an increase of 41.3% from the previous three-month period); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti*, ¶ 14, UN Doc. A/HRC/58/76 (Mar. 28, 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/report_of_unhchr_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_24_february_-_04_april_2025_0.pdf (reporting at least 4,239 people killed between July 1, 2024 and February 28, 2025, with approximately 92% of deaths due to firearm use). Not all of these deaths are directly attributable to armed groups; according to the UN, armed groups were directly responsible for 35% of deaths, while police operations against armed groups (and extrajudicial executions carried out by police – see note 169) and violent actions by civilian-led “defense” groups account for 56% and 9%, respectively. BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 5.

⁴¹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Haiti: Displacement Hits Record as Security Efforts Fall Short* (Jun. 25, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/25/haiti-displacement-hits-record-as-security-efforts-fall-short> (attacks since early 2025 have “forced more than 245,000 people to flee their homes”); UN News, *Haiti : la violence des gangs déplace 6.000 personnes en un mois* (Feb. 25, 2025), <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2025/02/1153396> (describing “a wave of ‘extreme brutality’” that displaced over 6,000 people over the course of a month); UN News, *Violence triggers record displacements in Haiti's capital* (Mar. 19, 2025) (“In just one month, intensifying violence has forced over 60,000 people to flee their homes in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince. . . . [T]he UN migration agency’s (IOM) chief in Haiti [says,] ‘[w]e have never observed such a large number of people moving in this short time.’”); RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶ 8 (reporting at least 11 massacres between February and December 2024); see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 6 (“The attacks in the commune of Delmas clearly highlighted the gangs’ tactic of using forced displacement and displacement sites as tools of destabilization.”).

⁴² The attack allegedly targeted elderly practitioners of Vodou. RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), Sum. 2, ¶¶ 23-27; see also note 289.

⁴³ Assessments of the death toll vary, from 110 to 207. Evens Sanon & Dánica Coto, *A gang leader in Haiti is accused of massacring older people to avenge his son's death*, AP News (Dec. 9, 2024), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-massacre-gangs-vodou-97c1206c79648b61b43fd6be6ee1079a>; see, e.g., *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 39 (reporting the death toll at 207); RNDDH, *Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country* (Apr. 25, 2025), ¶ 43 (reporting the death toll at 110); BINUH, *United Nations Investigation Report Brings to 207 the Number of People Executed by the Wharf Jérémie* (Dec. 23, 2024), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/united-nations-investigation-report-brings-207-number-people-executed-wharf-j%C3%A9r%C3%A9mie-gang> (reporting the death toll at 207); Amnesty International, *Press Release, Haiti: Justice and Protection Must Follow Reports of Mass Killing in Cité Soleil* (Dec. 12, 2024), <https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/haiti-justice-and-protection-must-follow-reports-of-mass-killing-in-cite-soleil/> (reporting the death toll at 180); Frances Robles, *Massacre in Haiti's Capital Leaves Nearly 200 Dead, U.N. Says*, NY Times (Dec. 8, 2024), <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/08/world/americas/haiti-gang-massacre.html> (reporting over 184 killed).

⁴⁴ Haiti Libre, *Haiti - News : Zapping...* (Jun. 22, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45181-haiti-news-zapping.html>; AlterPresse, *Haïti – Artibonite : Plus de 5,100 nouvelles personnes déplacées à Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite, sur fond d'attaques armées persistantes* (Jun. 19, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31848>; OCHA, *Haiti: Flash Update No. 1 Armed*

Attacks and Displacement in Artibonite Department, As of 11 May 2024 (May 11, 2025), <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-flash-update-no-1-armed-attacks-and-displacement-artibonite-department-11-may-2025>; see also Jacqueline Charles, *Haitian, Kenyan police took control of a rural town – then the victory led to carnage*, Miami Herald (Dec. 13, 2024), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article297058989.html> (a series of attacks in December resulted in the deaths of at least 150 people, most of which were perpetrated by civilian-led “defense” groups against suspected members of armed groups and sympathizers).

⁴⁵ Charles, *Gang violence in Haiti has displaced nearly 1.3 million people. It's a new record* (Jun. 11, 2025); see also Europe External Programme with Africa, *Gran Grif attack kills 50 in Petite-Rivière; CPT disarmament plan stalls amid controversy; MSS mission underfunded as Kenyan officer remains missing* (May 14, 2025), <https://www.eepa.be/gran-grif-attack-kills-50-in-petite-riviere-cpt-disarmament-plan-stalls-amid-controversy-mss-mission-underfunded-as-kenyan-officer-remains-missing/>; OCHA, *Haiti: Flash Update No. 1 Armed Attacks and Displacement in Artibonite Department, As of 11 May 2024* (May 11, 2025); Sanon & Coto, *Haitians fleeing gang violence swim across the country's longest river* (Apr. 30, 2025); International Organization for Migration (IOM), *Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 63 — Displacement following armed attacks in the municipality of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite* (28 — 30 April 2025) (Apr. 30, 2025), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-63-displacement-following-armed-attacks-municipality-petite>.

⁴⁶ Attacks in Kenscoff, Delmas, Croix-des-Bouquets, and Tabarre killed 347 people, according to the UN. BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 5-9 (“Between January and March 2025 . . . gangs intensified their efforts to expand their territorial control in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and its surroundings. They particularly targeted neighbourhoods such as Delmas 30 and Carrefour Feuilles, whose capture would facilitate their passage into the commune of Pétiön-Ville, a residential area housing banks, institutions, supermarkets, and embassies, and one of the last areas not yet affected by gang control.”); see also BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 19; Charles, *‘We are all by ourselves’: Haitians warn that fall of Port-au-Prince is imminent* (Mar. 20, 2025) (“For weeks now, Haiti’s volatile capital has been caught between cries and gunfire, armed gangs and mass exodus, and anxiety and silence. Neighborhood after neighborhood is being emptied out as criminal gangs, brandishing high-powered automatic weapons, march on Port-au-Prince, crawling through ravines and filing through concrete corridors to seize new territory while young arsonists set fires to homes and businesses. No one has been spared in the frantic chaos that has left a trail of broken furniture, burned out buildings and a stream of misery. Not government ministries, not the pillaged enterprises or the charred homes.”); *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 22-23, 41-42; Jean Daniel Sénat, *Assassinations and Kidnappings in Port-au-Prince, Armed Attack in Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite*, Le Nouvelliste (Apr. 28, 2025), https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/255681/assassinations-and-kidnappings-in-port-au-prince-armed-attack-in-petite-riviere-de-lartibonite#google_vignette (reporting on attacks in the neighborhoods of Babiole, Pacot, and Turgeau); Juhakenson Blaise, *Kenyan police officer injured by gang gunfire amid wave of violence in Haiti*, Haitian Times (Mar. 19, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/03/19/kenyan-officer-injured-in-gang-attack/> (reporting on clashes in Carrefour-Feuilles, Delmas, Christ-Roi, and Kenscoff); RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶¶ 123-27 (an attack on the Chateaublond and Petit Troupeau areas of Pétiön-Ville resulted in the deaths at least 20 people); Juhakenson Blaise, *Two Haitian soldiers, dozen residents killed as gangs seize Delmas 30*, Haitian Times (Feb. 26, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/02/26/haitian-soldiers-dead/> (reporting on an attack in Delmas 30).

⁴⁷ Kenscoff is important strategically because it allows access to previously unoccupied areas of Port-au-Prince – especially Pétiön-Ville, the capital’s “financial and political hub” – and gives the armed groups an effective monopoly on land routes out of Port-au-Prince. It is also an important agricultural area. *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 24-25; GI-TOC, *Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Issue 3* (Apr. 2025), pp. 1, 10; BINUH, *Haiti Flash Report* (April 2025) (also noting “the possibility that these attacks are intended to destabilize the authorities by highlighting their inability to protect one of the most residential areas of the capital”); see also Jonasson Odigène, *No Police Operations for Over 15 Days in Kenscoff*, Says Mayor Massillon Jean, Le Nouvelliste (Apr. 15, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/255298/no-police-operations-for-over-15-days-in-kenscoff-says-mayor-massillon-jean>; RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶¶ 59-66; Jacqueline Charles, *As gangs prepare to attack Haiti’s capital, U.S. freezes critical aid for security mission*, Miami Herald (May 29, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article299705044.html>; FJKL, *Massacre de Kenscoff : La Fondasyon Je Klere (FJKL) Denonce la Desinvolture et le Cynisme du Conseil Présidentiel de Transition (CPT)* (Feb. 4, 2025); Evens Sanon, *Gangs attack a neighborhood in Haiti that’s home to the country’s elite*, AP News (Feb. 4, 2025), https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gang-violence-kenscoff-capital-97e5fd96b963670a4faf8675d1ea7310?utm_source=copy&utm_medium=share; Jean Daniel Sénat, *Human Rights Groups Report Dozens of Deaths in Kenscoff*, Le Nouvelliste (Feb. 3, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/252947/human-rights-groups-report-dozens-of-deaths-in-kenscoff>.

⁴⁸ Assessments of the death toll vary. See, e.g., *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 40 (“While it is difficult to obtain an exhaustive account of the massacre, figures for the number of people killed ranged between 90 and 150 at the time of drafting.”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 14 (“From 27 January to 27 March, BINUH documented . . . at least 262 people killed . . . and 66 others injured [in Kenscoff]”); RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶ 66 (reporting at least 139 people killed or missing as a result of violence from January 27 to 29); FJKL, *Massacre de Kenscoff : La Fondasyon Je Klere (FJKL) Denonce la Desinvolture et le Cynisme du Conseil Présidentiel de Transition (CPT)* (Feb. 4, 2025), ¶ 27 (reporting between 40 and 150 people killed during a massacre on January 27).

⁴⁹ BINUH, *Haiti Flash Report* (April 2025), p. 11; *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 40 (reporting 3,139 displaced). Some estimates are much higher. See Jérôme Wendy Norestyl & Lucnise Duquereste, *In Kenscoff, gangs are expanding their control over farmland.*, Ayibopost (May 6, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/in-kenscoff-gangs-are-expanding-their-control-over-farmland/> (the civil protection coordinator for Kenscoff reported over 15,000 people displaced); RNDDH, *Massacres*

[à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques](#) (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶ 117 (“According to a non-exhaustive report by the Direction de la Protection Civile, at least eighteen thousand (18,000) people have had to flee their homes to take refuge with relatives or friends living in areas not attacked by armed bandits, or in host sites.”); IOM, *Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool* 55.2 — *Updates on displacement following armed attacks in the municipality of Kenscoff* (28 January - 17 February 2025) (Feb. 18, 2025), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-552-updates-displacement-following-armed-attacks-municipality> (the IOM reported 4,169 people displaced in Kenscoff between January 28 and February 17).

⁵⁰ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 10-11.

⁵¹ UNICEF, *Flash Update #1 – IDP Response Following Armed Group Take-Over of Mirebalais and Saut d’eau*, p. 1 (Apr. 20, 2025), <https://www.unicefusa.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/UNICEF-Haiti-Flash-Update-20-April-2025.pdf>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 10-11; RNDDH, *Fall of Two Communes in the Centre Department into the Hands of Armed Gangs: Transitional Authorities Worsen the Country’s Security Crisis* (Apr. 10, 2025); notes 220-221, 353; see also RHI News, *Haiti – Des terroristes de Viv Ansanm prennent le contrôle d’une radio à Mirebalais et la rebaptisent « Taliban FM » ; un journaliste libéré après paiement d’une rançon partielle...* (Apr. 24, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/haiti-des-terroristes-de-viv-ansanm-prennent-le-contrôle-dune-radio-a-mirebalais-et-la-rebaptisent-taliban-fm-un-journaliste-libere-apres-paiement-d/> (“The HCNH journalist reports that the decomposing bodies of dozens, if not hundreds, of victims still litter some streets of Mirebalais.”).

⁵² See generally GI-TOC, *Living Together: The Gangs of Haiti – Part 1: The Death of a President* (Apr. 22, 2025); see also BINUH, *Haiti Flash Report* (April 2025), p. 1 (“Gang members displayed extreme brutality, aiming to instill fear within the population. They executed men, women, and children inside their homes and shot others on roads and paths as they tried to flee the violence, including an infant.”).

⁵³ See, e.g., Chadrac, *Father Mackenzy Célestin Raises Alarm Over Montrouis Crisis* (Jan. 16, 2025) (a resident of Montrouis, a town in the Artibonite Department that has come under attack, “[c]it[ed] multiple instances of individuals abducted from their homes and summarily executed ‘because of their place of origin or family lineage’”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 7 (“On 24 February [in Tabarre]... [g]ang members entered more than ten homes, forcing more than 22 residents out and shot them dead in the street.”); Amnesty International, *Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti*, p. 44 (Feb. 12, 2025), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr36/8875/2025/en/> (“A common tactic used by gangs to punish residents of neighbourhoods under the control of rival groups is to target the population with long-range gunfire, which the UN describes as sniper attacks, especially in contested areas or along turf borders.”).

⁵⁴ Wethzer Piercin, *Unexplained disappearances raise questions in Haiti*, Ayibopost (Apr. 26, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/unexplained-disappearances-raise-questions-in-haiti/>; AP News, *Gangs in Haiti kill 4 soldiers and 4 civilians in bid to seize full control of the capital* (Apr. 24, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gangs-canape-vert-police-8ae266fadb1656fdb80a44430e83d83>; Robles, *Massacre in Haiti’s Capital Leaves Nearly 200 Dead, U.N. Says* (Dec. 8, 2024); see also Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, Ana Paula Oliveira & Matt Herbert, *Haiti’s Gang Crisis and International Responses*, GI-TOC, p. 20 (Feb. 2024), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Romain-Le-Cour-Grandmaison-Ana-Paula-Oliveira-and-Matt-Herbert-A-critical-moment-Haitis-gang-crisis-and-international-responses-GI-TOC-February-2024.pdf>.

⁵⁵ See notes 238-251.

⁵⁶ Armed groups continue to use kidnapping as a key source of income and civilian terror, with the most recent UN reporting indicating 2,017 people kidnapped for ransom in 2024 (*Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 34) and 731 between December 2024 and May 2025 (BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 16). GI-TOC, *Living Together: The Gangs of Haiti – Part 1: The Death of a President* (Apr. 22, 2025), at 24:04 (referring to Haiti as “the kidnapping capital of the world,” and estimating that kidnapping, which is a “whole economy,” brings in about US\$25 million every year); Robert Muggah, *Flows of Guns and Money Are Dooming Haiti*, Americas Quarterly (May 12, 2025), <https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/flows-of-guns-and-money-are-dooming-haiti/>; see also GI-TOC, *Living Together: The Gangs of Haiti – Part 1: The Death of a President* (Apr. 22, 2025), at 24:19 (noting that “the true extent of the problem is unknown” because people often fail to report kidnappings due to fear of reprisals from armed groups); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 13 (“35 per cent of victims were abducted while on roads or in boats, 30 per cent while at home, and 17 per cent on farmland. The other kidnappings took place at the exit of churches or markets.”); Jacqueline Charles, *Kenyan mission in Haiti says one of its cops is missing. Gang videos show lifeless body*, Miami Herald (Jun. 19, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article302813214.html> (reporting “a rise in kidnappings, with gang[s] suspected of abducting people to use as human shields against police drone attacks”); UN General Assembly (UNGA), *Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General*, ¶ 78, UN Doc. A/79/878-S/2025/247 (Jun. 17, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/247> (reporting that 154 children were kidnapped in 2024); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 16 (reporting 705 people kidnapped between February 24 and April 4, 2025); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 13 (reporting just 161 people kidnapped between January and March, a significant decrease since the previous quarter). Kidnappings mainly occur in the Artibonite and West Departments, although kidnappings have also been reported in the north of the country. BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 13 (63% of kidnappings occurred in the Artibonite Department, 35% in the West Department, and 2% in the Central Department); Kervenson Martial, *Residents in Northwest Haiti fought back against kidnapping attempt, now they call for help as gangs retaliate*, Haitian Times (Jun. 19, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/06/19/foiled-kidnapping-haiti-northwest/> (reporting on a kidnapping near Port-de-Paix, in the Northwest Department). But see BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 13 (reporting that “gangs in the capital have [recently] turned to more lucrative criminal activities, such as extortion or drug and arms trafficking”).

⁵⁷ See, e.g., Martial, *Residents in Northwest Haiti fought back against kidnapping attempt, now they call for help as gangs retaliate* (Jun. 19, 2025) (armed group members kidnapped a couple near Port-de-Paix and raped the wife); Haiti Libre, *Haiti - News : Zapping...* (Jun. 10, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45097-haiti-news-zapping.html> (armed group members killed a man they had kidnapped after his family was unable to pay the \$300,000 ransom); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 16 (“Information gathered by OHCHR indicates that those who have attempted to resist abduction were often shot and killed.”); UNICEF, *Haiti’s Children Under Siege: The staggering rise of child abuse and recruitment by armed groups* (Feb. 7, 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/press-releases/haitis-children-under-siege-staggering-rise-child-abuse-and-recruitment-armed-groups> (a 16-year-old was kidnapped, and beaten and raped for over a month until her kidnappers released her when they realized no one would pay for her ransom); Louis Chadrac, *Gran Grif Gang’s Carnage in Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 11, 2024), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/251941/gran-grif-gangs-carnage-in-petite-riviere-de-lartibonite> (reporting that “kidnapped people were killed along the way” during armed group attacks in Petite Rivière); see also note 242. Kidnappings are also sometimes videotaped and exhibited on social media. See, e.g., RHI News, *Haiti : SOS Journalistes exige la libération immédiate du journaliste Roger Claudy Israel et de son frère, pris en otage à Mirebalais* (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/haiti-sos-journalistes-exige-la-liberation-immediate-du-journaliste-roger-claudy-israel-et-de-son-frere-pris-en-otage-a-mirebalais/>.

⁵⁸ Piercin, *Unexplained disappearances raise questions in Haiti* (Apr. 26, 2025) (“The information sharing platform ‘Positivis Alerte’ . . . recorded 1,964 disappearances of people between January 2023 and March 2025. . . . From December 5 [2024] to March 14, 2025, the organization recorded sixteen new cases of disappearances, including thirteen in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. The Haitian state does not keep any count of the missing.”).

⁵⁹ Sanon & Coto, *Haitians fleeing gang violence swim across the country’s longest river* (Apr. 30, 2025) (the spokesperson for the Commission for Dialogue, Reconciliation and Awareness to Save the Artibonite, an activist group, says of the armed group attack on Petite Rivière, “[g]angs are invading the city everywhere. . . . [t]here are people trapped in their homes who can’t leave, and the guys are setting fire wherever they go”) (internal quotations omitted); GI-TOC, *Living Together: The Gangs of Haiti – Part 1: The Death of a President* (Apr. 22, 2025), at 32:53 (sharing a story about a mother who was forced to watch armed groups throw her two-month-old baby onto a fire); RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶ 84 (a woman was burned to death after armed groups set fire to her house with her inside); Blaise, *Two Haitian soldiers, dozen residents killed as gangs seize Delmas 30* (Feb. 26, 2025) (“Some victims were shot dead, while others were burned alive as fires spread through the neighborhood.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 9; BINUH, *United Nations Investigation Report Brings to 207 the Number of People Executed by the Wharf Jérémie* (Dec. 23, 2024); Robles, *Massacre in Haiti’s Capital Leaves Nearly 200 Dead, U.N. Says* (Dec. 8, 2024).

⁶⁰ See, e.g., Charles, *Kenyan mission in Haiti says one of its cops is missing. Gang videos show lifeless body* (Jun. 19, 2025) (reporting that “gang[s] are suspected of abducting people to use as human shields against police drone attacks”).

⁶¹ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 6, 8, 10 (noting that indiscriminate attacks are used “to spread panic and reduce the resistance of the local population”); see, e.g., Jacqueline Charles, *Thousands march against gangs in Haiti as Vatican is notified of murder of two nuns*, Miami Herald (Apr. 2, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article303346116.html>; Jean Daniel Sénat, *Mirebalais Under Fire: Armed Attacks Persist on April 1, 2025*, Le Nouvelliste (Apr. 1, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254775/mirebalais-under-fire-armed-attacks-persist-on-april-1-2025>; Charles, *Haiti media under siege as armed gangs target news outlets in Port-au-Prince* (Mar. 17, 2025) (“On Friday, automatic gunshots could be heard throughout Port-au-Prince where people brave enough to take to the streets were ducking stray bullets — even in restaurants. In a widely circulated video, gunmen could be seen in a high-rise and sporadically firing at anything moving.”); Blaise, *Two Haitian soldiers, dozen residents killed as gangs seize Delmas 30* (Feb. 26, 2025); UN News, *Haiti : la violence des gangs déplace 6.000 personnes en un mois* (Feb. 25, 2025) (“Entire families were brutally wiped out in their homes.”); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025). Cf. GI-TOC, *Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Issue 3* (Apr. 2025), pp. 7-8 (“In areas including Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets and Tabarre, gangs have reduced their indiscriminate attacks, allowing displaced residents to return, and increasing their extortion profits from local merchants or farmers. Comparatively, gangs such as the 103 Zombies, Grand Ravine and Ti Bois in Carrefour and Gressier have continued to aggressively expand their territory through attacks on the south-east regions of Kenscoff and Furcy.”).

⁶² BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 9, 14 (“In the first quarter [of 2025], at least 936 homes and other public and private buildings, including a hospital and three schools, were ransacked, vandalized, or burned by gangs.”); GI-TOC, *Last Chance? Breaking Haiti’s Political and Criminal Impasse* (Jan. 2024), p. 6 (“[T]he gangs have scaled up their strategy of systematically destroying homes and, increasingly, hospitals, prisons and police stations.”); HRW, *Haiti: Displacement Hits Record as Security Efforts Fall Short* (Jun. 25, 2025); RNDDH, *Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country* (Apr. 25, 2025), p. 11; RNDDH, *Fall of Two Communes in the Centre Department into the Hands of Armed Gangs: Transitional Authorities Worsen the Country’s Security Crisis* (Apr. 10, 2025), ¶ 9; Charles, *Thousands march against gangs in Haiti as Vatican is notified of murder of two nuns* (Apr. 2, 2025); Jean Daniel Sénat, *A Friday of Fires and Panic in Port-au-Prince*, Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 14, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254225/a-friday-of-fires-and-panic-in-port-au-prince>; Wethzer Piercin et al., *Gangs deploy new strategies in Port-au-Prince*, Ayibopost (Mar. 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/gangs-deploy-new-strategies-in-port-au-prince/>; FJKL, *Massacre de Kenscoff : La Fondation Je Klere (FJKL) Denonce la Desinvolture et le Cynisme du Conseil Présidentiel de Transition (CPT)* (Feb. 4, 2025), ¶ 28; Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025); see also Jean Daniel Sénat, *Port-au-Prince Under Pressure as Criminal Gangs Expand Control*, Le Nouvelliste (Apr. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/255057/port-au-prince-under-pressure-as-criminal-gangs-expand-control> (noting that “[a]lthough the sound of gunfire has decreased [in certain areas], this does not imply a reduction in assaults by the criminals, but rather a change in strategy,” with armed groups “dig[ging] passages between fences to move from one property to another without using the streets. . . . looting everything, . . . [and] set[ting] the houses on fire”) (internal quotations omitted);

Charles, [Haiti media under siege as armed gangs target news outlets in Port-au-Prince](#) (Mar. 17, 2025) (“Gang members are reportedly paying individuals to set fire to the buildings.”).

⁶³ Muggah, [Flows of Guns and Money Are Dooming Haiti](#) (May 12, 2025) (“Some gangsters livestream their exploits and use social media to intimidate their rivals and energize recruits while monetizing clicks and private donations in real time.”); UNSC, *Report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC] pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023)*, ¶ 17, UN Doc. S/2025/85 (Feb. 6, 2025), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4075292?ln=en&v=pdf> (hereinafter *Report of the UNODC*).

⁶⁴ BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 7-9 (also noting that some are “shot dead for not respecting the rules imposed by the gangs in these areas”); UN News, [Haiti : la violence des gangs déplace 6.000 personnes en un mois](#) (Feb. 25, 2025); BINUH, [United Nations Investigation Report Brings to 207 the Number of People Executed by the Wharf Jérémie](#) (Dec. 23, 2024); see also Rebecca Bruny, *An illegal prison built and operated by gangs in Jérusalem*, Ayibopost (Dec. 16, 2024), <https://ayibopost.com/an-illegal-prison-built-and-operated-by-gangs-in-jerusalem/> (“In the case of Jerusalem, residents say that if they are caught speaking ill of bandits or if they share any information about the area, they will be killed. « They do not search our phones systematically, according to one of AyiboPost’s sources. But if one of them asks to see our phone, we can’t refuse. Therefore, we are obliged to always remain on our guard. » For fear of being heard and being identified as moles, members of the population limit their topics of conversation. Several of them go so far as to refuse calls from people asking for news about the area. ‘Everyone distrusts everyone.’”).

⁶⁵ Amnesty International, [Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 44; GI-TOC, [Last Chance? Breaking Haiti’s Political and Criminal Impasse](#) (Jan. 2024), p. 9 (“[In] the disputed areas . . . civilians pay the highest toll. This is the case in Artibonite, but also in the heart of the capital, in Solino, Nazon and the surrounding Bas-Delmas area. Here, the police and the MSS, often supported by vigilante groups, confront the gangs, with no one actor able to impose total control. The situation turns into a violent game of cat and mouse between the authorities and the gangs, stoking further displacement from already largely depopulated and destroyed areas.”).

⁶⁶ Mark Shaw & Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, *Haiti is in a Political and Criminal Crisis that Should Not be Ignored*, War on the Rocks (Apr. 29, 2025), <https://warontherocks.com/2025/04/haiti-is-a-political-and-criminal-crisis-that-should-not-be-ignored/> (“A single day’s travel between two Haitian cities often involves paying a dozen or more illegal taxes to gang-run checkpoints.”); Odigène, [Transportation Sector Struggles amid Rising Insecurity](#) (Jan. 9, 2025) (“As of 2025, toll stations on land routes are still active, even as the condition of the roads continues to deteriorate. Toussaint Louverture International Airport and the Guy Malary terminal remain closed. To travel abroad, one must reach Cap-Haïtien either by helicopter or by road via National Highway #3. The state of maritime transport remains concerning, with patrol and coastal surveillance boats still an unfulfilled promise.”).

⁶⁷ See, e.g. BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 5, 10 (“Violent attacks on the cities of Mirebalais and Saut d’Eau (Central department) at the end of March were aimed at controlling access to the border with the Dominican Republic along a nearly 70 km stretch. It is important to note that gangs already control access to the Malpasse border point (Western department) on National Route 8. . . . The gangs are also believed to have carried out the[] attacks [in Kenscoff] to take control of the recently rehabilitated road linking Kenscoff to Jacmel, which is the only relatively safe route to the south of Haiti.”).

⁶⁸ See notes 37-38; see also, e.g., Jean Daniel Sénat, *Government Helicopter Hit by Gunfire, Leaving One Injured*, Le Nouvelliste (Apr. 2, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254813/government-helicopter-hit-by-gunfire-leaving-one-injured> (reporting that armed groups shot at a government helicopter flying over the commune of Saut d’Eau, in the Central Department).

⁶⁹ See BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 15; Jacqueline Charles, *Trump wants to cancel billions in spending for the UN. Why that’s bad news for Haiti*, Miami Herald (Jul. 3, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article309832925.html> (according to UN Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia, and the Americas Miroslav Jenča, Port-au-Prince is ““for all intents and purposes paralyzed by gangs and isolated as a result of the ongoing suspension of international commercial flights” into the country’s main airport”); OHCHR, [Restoring dignity: A global call to end the violence in Haiti](#) (Apr. 7, 2025) (UN Expert on Human Rights in Haiti William O’Neill says Port-au-Prince “is almost entirely controlled and surrounded by gangs, making . . . [it] a large open-air prison”) (internal quotations omitted); Charles, [Haiti’s capital is close to falling to armed gangs. Here’s what you need to know](#) (Mar. 25, 2025); Jacqueline Charles, *JetBlue Airways extends suspension on flights into Haiti until late April*, Miami Herald (Dec. 19, 2024), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article297367924.html>; see also Blaise, [Haiti’s domestic flights resume, sparking hope, skepticism and criticism](#) (Jun. 6, 2025) (although Sunrise Airways has agreed to resume domestic flights from Port-au-Prince airport beginning on June 12, economists are concerned that the nature of the agreement between the airline and the government ““means making the population [Haitian consumers] pay twice: once through high and often unjustified prices, and a second time through taxes.” . . . [and] resolves neither the insecurity affecting internal mobility nor the precarious situation facing many Haitians”); Dmitry Charles, *Sunrise Airways relancera le 12 juin ses vols domestiques à des prix jugés exorbitants*, Juno7 (Jun. 11, 2025), https://www.juno7.ht/sunrise-airways-relancera-le-12-juin-ses-vols-domesti/#google_vignette.

⁷⁰ Joyce Hackel, *Gangs seize roads leading to Haiti’s capital as police continue to lose control*, The World (Mar. 26, 2025), <https://theworld.org/stories/2025/03/26/gangs-seize-roads-leading-to-haitis-capital-as-police-continue-to-lose-control>; BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 18 (“Victims may also be kidnapped or raped at these checkpoints.”); BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 7 (“The majority of the victims [of armed group attacks in the neighbourhoods of Christ Roi, Nazon, Fort National, Saint Michel, and downtown Port-au-Prince in February and March] were killed while traveling in collective transportation vehicles (“tap taps”) in downtown Port-au-Prince.”); Odigène, [Transportation Sector Struggles amid Rising Insecurity](#) (Jan. 9, 2025) (“The greatest tragedy for the transportation sector in 2024 has been the repeated attacks on drivers. As of December 20, 2024, no fewer than 30 drivers had been killed—including three burned alive—nine kidnapped, and four injured by gunfire, according to Changeux Méhu of the Association of Haitian Owners and Drivers (APCH). . . . Passengers have not been spared either. During the same period, 198 passengers were kidnapped, 22 killed, and 46 injured by gunfire, according to the APCH representative.”); Mercy Corps, *Impact of Gang Violence on Food*

Systems in Haiti – 2024, p. 6 (Dec. 2024), <https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2024-12/impact-of-gang-violence-on-food-systems-in-haiti.pdf>.

⁷¹ GI-TOC, *Last Chance? Breaking Haiti's Political and Criminal Impasse* (Jan. 2024), p. 9 (“In all cases, the gangs’ domination enables them to further regulate people’s daily lives. In addition to monitoring individual behaviour, gang leaders operate as judges and advisors in their fiefdoms, settling disputes and conflicts, and enforcing law and order. This dynamic accentuates Haiti’s social and territorial fragmentation, characterized by dozens of leaders behaving like sovereigns, self-endowed with the right to spare life and decree death. It is a system of social domination that can turn against the population at any moment, as demonstrated by the Artibonite and Wharf Jérémie massacres in October and December 2024.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 14 (armed groups’ restrictions on daily life “are part of the gangs’ deliberate strategy to consolidate their criminal governance, gradually taking control of essential social services, and regulating their functioning, as is the case with schools in areas under their control”); see, e.g., Evens Sanon, *Gangs attack another town in Haiti’s central region, killing an 11-year-old child and three others*, AP News (Apr. 28, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gangs-petite-riviere-f2e10230a2c75a1ffd82d41ced928475> (an armed group leader announced a three-day shutdown of activities in the neighborhood of Carrefour, “which has been bereft of any government presence since gangs seized control of it in recent years,” demonstrating how much power armed groups have over areas within their control); RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie. Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶ 56 (“The use of telephones in Wharf Jérémie, as well as travel to and from the community, is strictly controlled by the armed bandits.”); Bruny, *An illegal prison built and operated by gangs in Jérusalem* (Dec. 16, 2024) (“In Jerusalem, a slum in Croix-des-Bouquets, armed gangs have set up their own prison to ‘maintain order.’ . . . Trials are organized under the supervision of the main leader. . . . Sentences depend on the crime committed, and gang members act as prison guards.”).

⁷² BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 7; *Report of the UNODC* (Feb. 4, 2025), ¶ 17; Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025); Bruny, *An illegal prison built and operated by gangs in Jérusalem* (Dec. 16, 2024) (describing tactics employed by armed groups – including distributing money and food, providing services, and punishing their own members for infractions – to “gain sympathy from hostage communities” and force the communities to establish relationships with them); see also Shaw & Le Cour Grandmaison, *Haiti is in a Political and Criminal Crisis that Should Not be Ignored* (Apr. 29, 2025) (“The gang violence in Haiti, while deadly, is also highly calculated. Gangs . . . systematically attack public and private state institutions. . . . [which] erodes public trust and accelerates the collapse of essential services, leaving the population increasingly vulnerable and seeking protection from the gangs.”).

⁷³ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 14; see also International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), *Haiti: Renewed clashes fuel a humanitarian crisis that has no end in sight* (Apr. 8, 2025), <https://www.icrc.org/en/article/haiti-renewed-clashes-fuel-humanitarian-crisis-has-no-end-sight> (“In the hardest-hit neighbourhoods, everything is in short supply: medical care, drinking water, food and even basic safety.”).

⁷⁴ IOM, *Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10*, pp. 3, 13 (Jun. 2025),

<https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-displacement-situation-haiti-round-10-june-2025> (reporting 1,287,593 people, and noting that 98% of those were displaced due to attacks and 1% due to fear of an attack); see also Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Social : 1.4 million people displaced in Haiti* (Jun. 24, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45193-haiti-social-14-million-people-displaced-in-haiti.html> (reporting 1.4 million IDPs, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)).

⁷⁵ IOM, *Haiti Sees Record Displacement as 1.3 Million Flee Violence* (Jun. 11, 2025), <https://www.iom.int/news/haiti-sees-record-displacement-13-million-flee-violence> (and represents a 24% increase from December 2024).

⁷⁶ IOM, *Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10* (Jun. 2025), p. 4 (noting that “in previous years, the majority of IDPs in provinces were people who fled the capital,” but that the increase of violence in the Central and Artibonite Departments means “that the majority of IDPs in provinces are no longer made up of people who fled the capital, but rather from other areas in provinces”).

⁷⁷ IOM, *Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10* (Jun. 2025), pp. 4, 6 (“98% of IDPs hosted in provinces are outside of sites/host families vs 2% in sites.”). Nevertheless, the number of makeshift IDP camps in provinces has increased from just 34 to 149 since December 2024 after attacks in the Central Department led to mass displacement in the region, although most are very sparsely populated. IOM, *Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10* (Jun. 2025), p. 4.

⁷⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), *Haiti – Increasing violence triggers urban exodus* (May 13, 2025), <https://www.internal-displacement.org/spotlights/haiti-increasing-violence-triggers-urban-exodus/> (40% of host communities reported being unable to continue to host IDPs due to limited resources, including food, and 15% “explicitly refus[ed] to do so”); IOM, *Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10* (Jun. 2025), p. 4; AlterPresse, *Haiti – Artibonite : Plus de 5,100 nouvelles personnes déplacées à Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite, sur fond d’attaques armées persistantes* (Jun. 19, 2025); IOM, *Violence Triggers Record Displacements in Port-au-Prince: Over 60,000 People in a Month* (Mar. 18, 2025), <https://www.iom.int/news/violence-triggers-record-displacements-port-au-prince-over-60000-people-month>; Mercy Corps, *Impact of Gang Violence on Food Systems in Haiti – 2024* (Dec. 2024), p. 7. In some cases, IDPs are discriminated against based on where they are from, with host communities refusing to accept them because of perceived association with armed groups. See, e.g., Ayibopost, *Ki plas Dwa Fanm yo an Ayiti nan mitan kriz peyi a ap fè fas la ?*, at 14:57 (Mar. 16, 2025), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ZJAIXELRvY> (“When we arrived [at the Ministry of Communication site], the people from Bois-Verna said they were upper-class people and would not let us invade space. We suffered a lot of struggle before the site was recognized and before the host community allowed us to stay. Even the people at Caraïbe (radio station) said we were gangs. They gave us a lot of problems.”).

⁷⁹ IOM, *Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10* (Jun. 2025), p. 6.

⁸⁰ IOM, *Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10* (Jun. 2025), p. 18 (35 schools accommodate 40% of the displaced population in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, 19 churches/temples accommodate 19%, and 43 public spaces – variously covered, uncovered, and fenced in – accommodate 41%).

⁸¹ UN News, *Gang violence displaces a record 1.3 million Haitians* (Jun. 11, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164286> (“‘Behind these [displacement] numbers are so many individual people whose suffering is immeasurable; children, mothers, the elderly, many of them forced to flee their homes multiple times, often with nothing, and now living in conditions that are neither safe nor sustainable,’ said Amy Pope, IOM Director General.”); RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶ 118 (IDPs “sleep on the ground, without blankets, beds or mattresses, and prepare food over wood fires”); IOM, *Haiti Displacement Triples Surpassing One Million as Humanitarian Crisis Worsens* (Jan. 14, 2025), <https://www.iom.int/news/haiti-displacement-triples-surpassing-one-million-humanitarian-crisis-worsens>.

⁸² RNDDH, *Poverty, insecurity, poor sanitation, overcrowding, and exposure to contagious diseases: The general living conditions in the reception sites are alarming.*, ¶¶ 34, 88 (Jan. 11, 2025), <https://web.rnddh.org/poverty-insecurity-poor-sanitation-overcrowding-and-exposure-to-contagious-diseases-the-general-living-conditions-in-the-reception-sites-are-alarming/?lang=en> (“[D]emographic data from twenty (20) monitored sites, or 34% of the sites, shows that: eight (8) sites are housing nearly twice the number of people they were designed for, and nine (9) others are hosting more than twice the number of people. Two (2) sites are hosting more than five (5) times the number of people they can accommodate, and one (1) site is housing more than six (6) times its capacity.”); IDMC, *Haiti – Increasing violence triggers urban exodus* (May 13, 2025); IOM, *Haiti Displacement Triples Surpassing One Million as Humanitarian Crisis Worsens* (Jan. 14, 2025).

⁸³ Alterpresse, *Crise : Appel urgent à soutenir les personnes déplacées dans les camps en Haïti* (Jun. 25, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31869> (also reporting that some IDP sites “serve as dumps”); Office de la Protection du Citoyen (OPC), *Étude sur la protection du droit des personnes déplacées en Haïti*, pp. 28-29, 49-50 (Apr. 2025) (“‘In some sites there are no showers or toilets at all. . . so people make do and find temporary solutions to shower. For toilets, they use plastic bags as needed. . . 41% of sites have no showers. . . On average, sites have between 2 and 6 toilets. However, 17% have no toilets available for IDPs. . . There are major difficulties in keeping the infrastructure, showers and toilets in good condition, particularly at the OPC site, where the toilets are clogged.”); Jacqueline Charles, *Aid cuts mean Haiti will need to do more to shoulder humanitarian response, UN says*, Miami Herald (Apr. 14, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article304002556.html> (describing a displacement site with just four latrines for over 7,000 IDPs); Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), *Haiti: Surge of violence displaces tens of thousands in Port-au-Prince* (Mar. 5, 2025), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/haiti-surge-violence-displaces-tens-thousands-port-au-prince> (“According to Solidarités International, displaced people in the camps are trying to survive on about 4 cups of water per day. This is far below the international emergency standard, which recommends 4 gallons of water per person per day.”); Mohor, *Aid in the crosshairs: Why access is growing harder in Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2025); RNDDH, *Poverty, insecurity, poor sanitation, overcrowding, and exposure to contagious diseases: The general living conditions in the reception sites are alarming.* (Jan. 11, 2025), ¶¶ 39, 46-50, 52-54, 58-59, 62-65, 81-82, 85, 89-96; Alterpresse, *Criminalité : Des milliers de personnes déplacées à Port-au-Prince toujours sous les menaces des gangs armés en Haïti* (Jan. 8, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31298>.

⁸⁴ Alterpresse, *Crise : Appel urgent à soutenir les personnes déplacées dans les camps en Haïti* (Jun. 25, 2025); UNICEF, *Flash Update #1 – IDP Response Following Armed Group Take-Over of Mirebalais and Saut d’eau* (Apr. 2025), pp. 1-3 (reporting water-borne and air-borne diseases among displaced people in the Central Department); OPC, *Étude sur la protection du droit des personnes déplacées en Haïti* (Apr. 2025), pp. 27, 47 (unsanitary conditions can lead to malaria, skin diseases such as scabies, and enteric diseases); Mohor, *Aid in the crosshairs: Why access is growing harder in Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2025); RNDDH, *Poverty, insecurity, poor sanitation, overcrowding, and exposure to contagious diseases: The general living conditions in the reception sites are alarming.* (Jan. 11, 2025), ¶¶ 91-92; see also notes 373-375 (discussing a resurgence of cholera in IDP sites).

⁸⁵ Haitian Times, *UN warns Haiti faces extreme hurricane threats* (Jun. 4, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/06/04/haiti-un-hurricane-warning-2025/> (the lack of proper shelters, drainage, and sanitation “leave families dangerously exposed to storms”); Juhakenson Blaise, *Sleepless weekend for thousands as heavy rains flood Port-au-Prince displacement camp*, Haitian Times (Apr. 14, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/04/14/haiti-weekend-of-rains-deprive-thousands-displaced-of-sleep/> (“‘Whenever it rains, there’s no space for the water to drain — it just rises straight into our shelters,’ said a refugee, who spoke on the condition of anonymity out of fear of retaliation while standing ankle-deep in a muddy puddle. ‘We can only sleep when the rain stops.’. . . With little to no adequate shelter, residents are exposed to an increased risk of disease outbreaks.”); see also IOM, *Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10* (Jun. 2025), p. 18 (“33% [of IDPs in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area] are accommodated in uncovered areas and are exposed to protection and security risks as well as climatic hazards.”).

⁸⁶ IOM, *Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10* (Jun. 2025), p. 18; OPC, *Étude sur la protection du droit des personnes déplacées en Haïti*, (Apr. 2025), pp. 29-50; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 9 (“[O]n 27 February . . . [armed groups] deliberately opened fire on a site for displaced persons.”); Jacqueline Charles, *It’s our history we are losing: Haitian gangs set fire to another media institution*, Miami Herald (Mar. 13, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article301989444.html> (“Funding shortages are leading to rapidly deteriorating conditions in displacement sites across Port-au-Prince with many of those who have been displaced living dangerously close to areas with active fighting. Last week, stray bullets led to the death of at least one person in a displacement camp and others being injured.”); RNDDH, *Poverty, insecurity, poor sanitation, overcrowding, and exposure to contagious diseases: The general living conditions in the reception sites are alarming.* (Jan. 11, 2025), p. 9 (describing displacement sites as “‘red zones’ where insecurity thrived” due to the lack of electricity, running water, public transit, and adequate police presence); Save the Children, *Haiti: Generation of Children Raised Amid Chaos 15 Years After Devastating Earthquake* (Jan. 8, 2025), <https://www.savethechildren.net/news/haiti-generation-children-raised-amid-chaos-15-years-after-devastating-earthquake>; Alterpresse, *Criminalité : Des milliers de personnes déplacées à Port-au-Prince toujours sous les menaces des gangs armés en Haïti* (Jan. 8, 2025); Pascale Solages, *The life and death of a displaced Haitian woman*, New Humanitarian (Dec. 18, 2024), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2024/12/18/life-and-death-displaced-haiti-violence->

woman (reporting on an incident that took place in October 2024, during which police allegedly shot a woman in a displacement camp). A network of healthcare organizations working in Haiti reported that there are armed group members “embedded” in some IDP camps.

⁸⁷ IOM, *Violence Triggers Record Displacements in Port-au-Prince: Over 60,000 People in a Month* (Mar. 18, 2025) (IOM’s Chief in Haiti described “[f]amilies . . . being uprooted time and again, forced to leave everything behind as they flee for safety,” many of whom “were already living in precarious conditions after previous displacements”) (internal quotations omitted); IOM, *IOM Chief Urges Greater Global Support to Haiti Amid Growing Crisis* (Apr. 15, 2025), <https://www.iom.int/news/iom-chief-urges-greater-global-support-haiti-amid-growing-crisis> (a mother told IOM Director General Amy Pope that “she had fled her neighborhood three times in two months”); *Alterpresse, Haïti-Criminalité : Plus de 23,000 personnes déplacées lors des récentes vagues de violences à Port-au-Prince* (Mar. 18, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31515>; Juhakenson Blaise, ‘I don’t know where else to go.’ Haitian women in displacement camps demand protection on International Women’s Rights Day, *Haitian Times* (Mar. 11, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/03/11/haitian-women-in-displacement-camps-demand-security/>; RNDDH, *Poverty, insecurity, poor sanitation, overcrowding, and exposure to contagious diseases: The general living conditions in the reception sites are alarming*, (Jan. 11, 2025), ¶¶ 35, 69, 71-72, 75, 89.

⁸⁸ IOM, *Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10* (Jun. 2025), p. 3.

⁸⁹ See notes 252-258 (discussing the lack of gender-sensitive infrastructure in IDP sites and sexual exploitation and abuse by men involved in camp management).

⁹⁰ HRW, *Haiti: Displacement Hits Record as Security Efforts Fall Short* (Jun. 25, 2025) (“The transitional government’s failure to develop a national, comprehensive plan for supporting internally displaced people has also hindered efforts to coordinate and sustain an effective response.”); Esther Kimberly Bazile, *Housing in Port-au-Prince: A Growing Luxury*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Jan. 9, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/252394/housing-in-port-au-prince-a-growing-luxury> (“In response to the crisis, the government announced a fund of one billion gourdes to support the displaced. However, this aid, primarily limited to the distribution of food kits, is widely regarded as insufficient by the beneficiaries. The scale of the needs far exceeds these occasional interventions. The displaced are primarily calling for sustainable solutions, such as secure returns to their homes or access to affordable housing.”); OPC, *Étude sur la protection du droit des personnes déplacées en Haïti*, (Apr. 2025), pp. 48, 51, 56; Blaise, *Sleepless weekend for thousands as heavy rains flood Port-au-Prince displacement camp* (Apr. 14, 2025); RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶¶ 119-20; RNDDH, *Poverty, insecurity, poor sanitation, overcrowding, and exposure to contagious diseases: The general living conditions in the reception sites are alarming*, (Jan. 11, 2025), ¶¶ 90-91, 95-97, 103; Ayibopost, *Ki plas Dwa Fanm yo an Ayiti nan mitan kriz peyi a ap fè fas la ?* (March 16, 2025), at 22:49 (“One of the things I witness is the complete absence of the state in the camps. Most of the organizations attending to the camps are NGOs or international organizations. The government is completely absent. For example, there are sites with one agent from the Ministry of Public Health, but it’s not the Ministry of Public Health providing the services—they just appoint someone to observe and receive reports. You can’t see the structural government or any protection mechanisms. The question of food, the Social Assistance Agency, or any institutions who are supposed to protect the citizens, you don’t see their presence.”). *But see* *iciHaiti, iciHaiti - Environment : Displaced people in camps get involved transforming their living environment* (Jun. 5, 2025), <https://www.icihaiti.com/en/news-45061-icihaiti-environment-displaced-people-in-camps-get-involved-in-cleaning-and-transforming-their-living-environment.html> (reporting that the Ministry of the Environment has launched a program that aims to improve living conditions in displacement camps and offer IDPs an income opportunity).

⁹¹ Charles, *Aid cuts mean Haiti will need to do more to shoulder humanitarian response, UN says* (Apr. 14, 2025); Mohor, *Aid in the crosshairs: Why access is growing harder in Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2025); *Alterpresse, Criminalité : Des milliers de personnes déplacées à Port-au-Prince toujours sous les menaces des gangs armés en Haïti* (Jan. 8, 2025) (“No institutional arrangements have been made to restore security and encourage the return of displaced families to their neighbourhoods, which are under the control of terrorist gangs.”).

⁹² Fonds National de L’Éducation (FNE), *Projet d'Appui aux Écoles et Familles d'Élèves Victimes de l'Insécurité*, p. 9 (Jun. 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/docs/Enquete-sur-les-ecoles-et-familles-deleves-victimes-de-linsecurite.pdf> (“Of the 6,244 [displaced] families surveyed, 6,102 (97.73%) stated that they had not received any form of humanitarian aid in the last six (6) months.”); UNICEF, *Flash Update #1 – IDP Response Following Armed Group Take-Over of Mirebalais and Saut d’eau* (Apr. 2025), pp. 1-2; OPC, *Étude sur la protection du droit des personnes déplacées en Haïti*, (Apr. 2025), pp. 51, 56; UN News, *Violence triggers record displacements in Haiti’s capital* (Mar. 19, 2025); Charles, *‘It’s our history we are losing.’ Haitian gangs set fire to another media institution* (Mar. 13, 2025); UNICEF, *Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report*, p. 3 (Jan. 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/documents/haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-january-2025>; RNDDH, *Poverty, insecurity, poor sanitation, overcrowding, and exposure to contagious diseases: The general living conditions in the reception sites are alarming*, (Jan. 11, 2025), ¶¶ 76, 80-81.

⁹³ Ayibopost, *Ki plas Dwa Fanm yo an Ayiti nan mitan kriz peyi a ap fè fas la ?* (March 16, 2025), at 20:49 (discussing drivers of transactional sex in IDP sites: “When assistance comes, if you have 620 families, they say they will take 60, they will take 40. Men in the community, oftentimes it is not the man that goes to woman, the woman goes to the men. She accepts to offer sex so that she can pass in the 60 to get something because she knows that she might not pass. Because there are people in the community that are very sadistic, if they say they will take 60 people, they will take 60 people outside [people outside that are not in the camp?], [people who are not in the camp and likely in their own homes].”).

⁹⁴ See Reporters Without Borders, *Haiti*, <https://rsf.org/en/country-haiti> (last visited Jul. 12, 2025) (Haiti fell 18 places in the World Press Freedom Index, going from 93rd in 2024 to 111th in 2025, out of 180 countries, with “[m]edia professionals . . . targeted by gangs and regularly subjected to threats, attacks, kidnappings and assassinations”); Pierre-Richard Luxama, Dánica Coto & Evens Sanon, *Journalists in Haiti defy bullets and censorship to cover unprecedented violence*, AP News (Apr. 3, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/journalists-haiti-media-press-gang-attacks-a28d55fed4433c8842290fb6e16fa4c9> (“Donning a bulletproof vest emblazoned with ‘PRESS’ on it is now a dangerous move in Haiti. What used to serve as a symbolic and physical

shield has become a target.”); see generally RNDDH, Press Release, [Multiplication des attaques armées contre la presse haïtiennes : Le RNDDH rappelle aux autorités de la transition, leur promesse de sécurité](#) (Mar. 17, 2025).

⁹⁵ Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), *2024 is deadliest year for journalists in CPJ history; almost 70% killed by Israel* (Feb. 12, 2025), <https://cpj.org/special-reports/2024-is-deadliest-year-for-journalists-in-cpj-history-almost-70-percent-killed-by-israel/>.

⁹⁶ RHI News, [Haïti – Des terroristes de Viv Ansanm prennent le contrôle d’une radio à Mirebalais et la rebaptisent « Taliban FM » : un journaliste libéré après paiement d’une rançon partielle...](#) (Apr. 24, 2025) (in April, members of Viv Ansanm took control of a radio station in Mirebalais, Radio Panic FM, and renamed it “Taliban FM”); Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Insecurity : «Viv Ansanm» multiplies attacks against Haitian media* (Mar. 20, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44513-haiti-insecurity-viv-ansanm-multiplies-attacks-against-haitian-media.html> (in March, armed individuals set on fire the offices of TV station Télé Pluriel); Conor Lennon, *Haitian media struggle to survive in face of attacks, revenue collapse*, UN News (Mar. 19, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/03/1161256> (Le Nouvelliste’s editor notes recent attacks against Radio Télévision Caraïbes, Radio Mélodie, and Télé Pluriel); Charles, [‘It’s our history we are losing.’ Haitian gangs set fire to another media institution](#) (Mar. 13, 2025) (in March, armed groups set fire to the premises of Radio Télévision Caraïbes; “prior to the latest attack, the radio station had already been forced to abandon its building and change its address because it was no longer safe for its employees”); BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 15.

⁹⁷ RNDDH, [Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country](#) (Apr. 25, 2025), ¶¶ 78-79 (reporting two journalists killed and seven injured during the armed group attack on the State University Hospital in December; a journalist and his brother kidnapped on March 31 during the armed group attack on Mirebalais; and numerous social media threats against journalists by armed groups); RHI News, [HAÏTI-OTAGES: le journaliste Roger Claudy Israel et son frère libérés...](#) (Apr. 21, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/haiti-otages-le-journaliste-roger-claudy-israel-et-son-frere-liberes/>; RHI News, [Haïti : SOS Journalistes exige la libération immédiate du journaliste Roger Claudy Israel et de son frère, pris en otage à Mirebalais](#) (Apr. 7, 2025); see also Luxama, Coto & Sanon, [Journalists in Haiti defy bullets and censorship to cover unprecedented violence](#) (Apr. 3, 2025) (“One gang leader said he would kidnap radio reporters and ensure they won’t ever talk into a microphone again, while another threatened a talk show host based outside of Haiti, saying that if he ever set foot in the country, it would be the last time he would do so.”).

⁹⁸ Luxama, Coto & Sanon, [Journalists in Haiti defy bullets and censorship to cover unprecedented violence](#) (Apr. 3, 2025).

⁹⁹ The hospital had been closed for months after being attacked by armed groups in March 2024. See notes 351-352.

¹⁰⁰ Jacqueline Charles & Johnny Fils-Aimé, *Journalists, police officer killed by gangs at reopening of Haiti’s largest hospital*, Miami Herald (Dec. 25, 2024), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article297549658.html> (“[Head of the press freedom group SOS journalists Guyler] Delva blamed the Haitian government for the incident, saying the attack is part of a larger problem in which journalists are being targeted by the police as well as gangs.”); Adams & Robles, [Massacre Upon Massacre: Haiti’s Bleak Spiral Into a Failed State](#) (Jan. 6, 2025) (“More than two dozen journalists caught in the ambush were trapped for two hours triaging seven wounded colleagues before they were rescued.”); Haiti Libre, [Haiti - Insecurity : «Viv Ansanm» multiplies attacks against Haitian media](#) (Mar. 20, 2025); Evens Sanon, *Mourners bury journalist killed in one of Haiti’s worst attacks on reporters*, UN News (Jan. 16, 2025), https://apnews.com/article/haiti-journalists-killed-dcb5738f24c1d94c17c95da58b96482d?utm_source=copy&utm_medium=share; Pierre Luxama, *A survivor of the worst gang attack on Haitian journalists says colleagues were cut down by bullets*, AP News (Dec. 25, 2024), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gang-violence-capital-journalists-ab0c6a3797baa5882e04c0aea00ce74d>.

¹⁰¹ Reporters Without Borders, [Haïti](#) (last visited Jul. 12, 2025); RNDDH, Press Release, [Multiplication des attaques armées contre la presse haïtiennes : Le RNDDH rappelle aux autorités de la transition, leur promesse de sécurité](#) (Mar. 17, 2025), ¶ 5 (pointing out that several attacks against journalists “were carried out in the space of a few days, with disconcerting ease, proving that on the one hand, the Viv Ansanm terrorist organization will not stop there, and the other, that the transitional authorities intend to do nothing to prevent the said organization from continuing its criminal activities”); Charles, [Haiti media under siege as armed gangs target news outlets in Port-au-Prince](#) (Mar. 17, 2025) (the head of SOS Journalistes Haiti “accused members of the country’s nine-member Transitional Presidential Council of endangering ‘the safety of members of the press in an obvious, persistent, stubborn and deliberate manner”); Adams & Robles, [Massacre Upon Massacre: Haiti’s Bleak Spiral Into a Failed State](#) (Jan. 6, 2025); Charles & Fils-Aimé, [Journalists, police officer killed by gangs at reopening of Haiti’s largest hospital](#) (Dec. 25, 2024); see, e.g., Alterpresse, [Assassinat de Jean Dominique : Le mutisme persistant de la Cour d’appel de Port-au-Prince et de la plus haute Cour d’Haïti](#) (Apr. 3, 2025) (reporting that the case of journalist Jean Dominique’s 2000 murder has been blocked for over a decade at both the Court of Appeal and the *Cour de Cassation* (Haiti’s Supreme Court)).

¹⁰² See, e.g., Lennon, [Haitian media struggle to survive in face of attacks, revenue collapse](#) (Mar. 19, 2025) (according to Le Nouvelliste’s editor and the CEO of Le National newspaper and Télévision-Radio Pacific, funding for the press sector is suffering due to the generalized insecurity and related economic decline).

¹⁰³ See Luxama, Coto & Sanon, [Journalists in Haiti defy bullets and censorship to cover unprecedented violence](#) (Apr. 3, 2025) (according to one videographer, “[j]ournalists are targets now, whether police or gangs”) (internal quotations omitted); Charles & Fils-Aimé, [Journalists, police officer killed by gangs at reopening of Haiti’s largest hospital](#) (Dec. 25, 2024) (The head of SOS Journalistes Haiti “blamed the Haitian government for the [armed group attack on journalists at the planned reopening of the State University Hospital], saying the attack is part of a larger problem in which journalists are being targeted by the police as well as gangs. Reporters have reported being harassed by police while on assignment. Earlier this year Haitian authorities issued a list of journalists they were seeking to arrest, claiming they were working with gangs.”).

¹⁰⁴ Reporters Without Borders, [Haïti](#) (last visited Jul. 12, 2025); RNDDH, [Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country](#) (Apr. 25, 2025), ¶¶ 76-79 (“[R]epression of demonstrations and the ease with which attacks on the media are recorded are, to say the least, warning signs of a totalitarian state jeopardizing the respect and enjoyment of fundamental freedoms.”); Luxama, Coto & Sanon, [Journalists in Haiti defy bullets and censorship to cover unprecedented violence](#) (Apr. 3, 2025) (“Haiti’s Online Media Collective has advised that journalists not

cover incidents involving armed groups. ‘It’s not just journalists who are the victims, it’s press freedom itself,’ said Obest Dimanche, the collective’s spokesperson.”); Lennon, *Haitian media struggle to survive in face of attacks, revenue collapse* (Mar. 19, 2025) (Eric Voli Bi, the head of Haiti’s UNESCO office says “[t]he attacks against the media are intended to intimidate them [civilians, students, and journalists] and end their essential mission of informing the public;” Frantz Duval, the editor of *Le Nouvelliste* adds that “[t]hose who continue to work are restricted to ever smaller areas. This means that are fewer news images and reports from places where there are violent clashes, because journalists no longer venture into these areas.”); Charles, *Haiti media under siege as armed gangs target news outlets in Port-au-Prince* (Mar. 17, 2025); see also Luxama, Coto & Sanon, *Journalists in Haiti defy bullets and censorship to cover unprecedented violence* (Apr. 3, 2025) (noting that “Haitians increasingly distrust the media, accusing local journalists of working for gangs”); GI-TOC, *Last Chance? Breaking Haiti’s Political and Criminal Impasse* (Jan. 2025), p. 10 (armed groups “periodically suspend internet networks in parts of the capital – by attacking the cables and terminals that link Haiti to the international network,” reducing communication capacity in general and contributing further to people’s isolation).

¹⁰⁵ Jacqueline Charles, *Why Haiti’s cities keep falling to gangs: New UN report provides disturbing insight*, Miami Herald (May 29, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article303864961.html>; Guest Author & Juhakenson Blaise, *Haiti’s National Police adds 739 officers to a depleted force*, Haitian Times (Jan. 13, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/01/13/739-new-police-officers-join-the-haitian-police-in-fight-against-gangs/>.

¹⁰⁶ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 24 (“As of 31 May, the national police possessed 116 armoured vehicles, 20 of which were non-operational while 20 others had been burned by gangs.”); RNDDH, *30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police (PNH): RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security*, ¶¶ 18, 37-38 (Jun. 12, 2025), https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/6-Rap-PNH-12Juin2025.ENG_-1.pdf (“[Armored vehicles] meant to allow officers to confront armed gangs. . . . were of very poor quality and are not fit for combat purposes. . . . [and can therefore] only be used for troop transport. . . . PNH officers have such limited access to modern defense equipment such as high-tech weapons, bulletproof vests, and armored vehicles.”); Wilner Bossou, *Sendika Polis la Mande pi Bon Pwoteksyon ak pi Bon Kondisyon Travay pou Goumen Kont Gang yo*, VOA (Feb. 25, 2025), <https://www.voanouvel.com/a/7987422.html?withmediaplayer=1>; Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025) (“A member of the Haitian police’s specialised UTAG anti-gang unit . . . [said] that Haitian officers sometimes have to borrow weapons from other units during operations because there is so little funding. . . . ‘We need tactical vehicles, including tanks to enter gang-controlled areas; we need ballistic helmets, bulletproof vests, ammunition in large quantities, and at least two helicopters.’”).

¹⁰⁷ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 21 (noting “the absence of a comprehensive national security strategy, and substantial difficulties in reorganizing the command structure to support intelligence-driven, rapid operations”); Charles, *Why Haiti’s cities keep falling to gangs: New UN report provides disturbing insight* (May 29, 2025) (GI-TOC’s Romain Le Cour Grandmaison explains that the PNH lacks “the minimum level of dialogue, communication, coordination and cooperation,” and requires better strategy, operational planning, training, “and maybe a new chain of command”) (internal quotations omitted); Dánica Coto, *Organization of American States under pressure from the US to help quell gang violence in Haiti*, AP News (May 22, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-oas-gang-violence-65be39eaa9c5a1fd9e2592d4fcb4b3f> (“[I]ntelligence and counterintelligence . . . is greatly lacking.”); Adams & Robles, *Massacre Upon Massacre: Haiti’s Bleak Spiral Into a Failed State* (Jan. 6, 2025) (discussing the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Health and the PNH prior to the planned reopening of the State University Hospital in December 2024 and the police’s failure to conduct a proper security assessment in advance; armed groups attacked the hospital on the eve of its planned reopening, killing three); see also UNSC, *Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council* (Feb. 24, 2025), p. 4 (“The abrupt shift in the security landscape of Haiti in recent years has strained the police force, requiring a transition from managing civil unrest to conducting complex anti-gang operations – demands that current recruitment, training and procurement efforts fail to meet.”).

¹⁰⁸ Onès Joseph, *Two people killed, at least 10 wounded by gangs in Haiti’s Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite*, Haitian Times (Apr. 29, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/04/29/new-gang-attack-in-petite-riviere-de-lartibonite/>; RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶ 149; GI-TOC, *Last Chance? Breaking Haiti’s Political and Criminal Impasse* (Jan. 2024), p. 6; see also Alterpresse, *Haïti-Criminalité : Le Spnh-17 dénonce un manque de soutien étatique à la Police nationale* (Jun. 9, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31805> (according to the Haitian National Police Union, Spnh-17, the lack of support for the PNH from the transitional authorities is contributing to the police’s inability to neutralize the armed groups).

¹⁰⁹ See note 448.

¹¹⁰ Haiti Libre, *Haiti - FLASH : France sends 4 tons of equipment and materials for the PNH special units* (Jun. 21, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45168-haiti-flash-france-sends-4-tons-of-equipment-and-materials-for-the-pnh-special-units.html>; RNDDH, *30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police (PNH): RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security* (Jun. 12, 2025), ¶ 17; RHI News, *« Les États-Unis renforcent la lutte contre les gangs en Haïti avec une nouvelle aide à la Police nationale »...* (Feb. 13, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/les-etats-unis-renforcent-la-lutte-contre-les-gangs-en-haiti-avec-une-nouvelle-aide-a-la-police-nationale/>; Jean Daniel Sénat, *Canada and UNODC Provide Vehicles to the Haitian National Police*, Le Nouvelliste (Feb. 6, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/253066/canada-and-unodc-provide-vehicles-to-the-haitian-national-police>; see also RNDDH, *30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police (PNH): RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security* (Jun. 12, 2025), ¶ 38 (“[The PNH] relies far too heavily on international cooperation for its supplies. This dependence places officers in a position of extreme vulnerability when facing armed members of the Viv Ansanm terrorist coalition, who, on their side, have access to modern and sophisticated weaponry.”).

¹¹¹ RNDDH, *30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police (PNH): RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security* (Jun. 12, 2025), ¶¶ 7-8 (“73% [of the new budget] is allocated to personnel expenses, including salaries, wages, and social benefits for police personnel. Only 27% is allocated to investment expenses, which include, among other things, the purchase of equipment and police materials, the construction and renovation of police infrastructure, etc.”); Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti police,*

army to get more money in 'war budget,' but overall increase still small, Miami Herald (Apr. 16, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article304346856.html> (discussing concerns from political and economic actors that the new funding is “being shifted from other priorities, such as the cleaning of canals in flood-prone communities and agriculture investments, while the government has shown no willingness to reduce its own spending,” and that “the government is paying for the changes by going deeper into debt, borrowing from treasury bonds”).

¹¹² The Haitian Armed Forces have a long history of being used as tools of political violence and were disbanded in 1995 before being reconstituted in 2024 as part of a so-called “integrated security strategy” to combat the armed groups. See IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024* (Dec. 2024), note 124.

¹¹³ See Africa News, *OAS urged to do more to help Haiti fight gang violence* (May 23, 2025), <https://www.africanews.com/2025/05/23/oas-urged-to-do-more-to-help-haiti-fight-gang-violence/> (“Haiti’s defense minister Jean Michel Moïse said that ‘the army is very small, very embryonic,’ adding that the current urban warfare in Haiti is overwhelming them. ‘They were not prepared for this kind of challenge.’ The military currently has some 1,000 members with limited training.”); Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Security : PM announces strengthening of Haiti’s Armed Forces* (Jun. 1, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45030-haiti-security-pm-announces-strengthening-of-haiti-s-armed-forces.html>; Coto, *Organization of American States under pressure from the US to help quell gang violence in Haiti* (May 22, 2025); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 9-10; Odigène, *No Police Operations for Over 15 Days in Kenscoff, Says Mayor Massillon Jean* (Apr. 15, 2025) (reporting that FAd’H soldiers were deployed to Kenscoff “but were not actively operating” and “eventually . . . abandoned the site”); RNDDH, Press Release, *Multiplication des attaques armées contre la presse haïtiennes : Le RNDDH rapelle aux autorités de la transition, leur promesse de sécurité* (Mar. 17, 2025), ¶ 6 (“The FADH and MMAS military personnel . . . do not have adequate and sufficient resources to carry out large-scale operations and move around in large numbers.”); UNSC, *Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council* (Feb. 27, 2025), p. 4 (“The Haitian Armed Forces . . . have about 865 personnel, including 124 women, but remain poorly equipped.”); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025).

¹¹⁴ UNSC, *Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council* (Feb. 24, 2025), p. 4; Alterpresse, *Haïti – Sécurité : Le Rnddh exhorte à accueillir favorablement les policiers émigrés désirant revenir* (Jun. 18, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31839> (RNDDH’s Executive Director Pierre Espérance says, “[i]n November 2022, the PNH’s workforce was around 16,000 officers. Since then, more than 6,000 police officers have left the institution to flee insecurity, seek a better life, and provide for their families.”).

¹¹⁵ See BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 22 (reporting 12,788 officers as of June 20); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 20 (reporting 12,808 officers); see also Coto, *Organization of American States under pressure from the US to help quell gang violence in Haiti* (May 22, 2025) (reporting just one officer for every 12,000 residents); Guest Author & Blaise, *Haiti’s National Police adds 739 officers to a depleted force* (Jan. 13, 2025) (despite recruitment efforts, “[t]he current size of the police force in 2025 is still estimated to be well below the international standard of 2.2 officers per 1,000 residents”).

¹¹⁶ According to a UN source. See also Widlore Mérandcourt & Jérôme Wendy Norestyl, *Public Funds, Private Guards: Haiti’s Misused Police Force*, Ayibopost (May 1, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/public-funds-private-guards-haitis-misused-police-force/> (May 1, 2025) (“[H]undreds of police officers and soldiers are — officially or unofficially — assigned to protect businesspeople, government affiliates, former state officials, or even private companies. This practice forces the Haitian state to cover the monthly security costs of influential individuals, even as the National Police (PNH) and the army lack sufficient personnel to protect the general public from gang violence.”).

¹¹⁷ RNDDH, *30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police (PNH): RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security* (Jun. 12, 2025), ¶¶ 9, 27, 44, 48; Jacqueline Charles, *Gangs attack police station, prison in central Haiti town, more than 500 inmates escape*, Miami Herald (Mar. 31, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article303164291.html>; Bossou, *Sendika Polis la Mande pi Bon Pwoteksyon ak pi Bon Kondisyon Travay pou Goumen Kont Gang yo* (Feb. 25, 2025); Evens Sanon, *A police union in Haiti demands more protection after gangs kill a Kenyan police officer*, AP News (Feb. 24, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-police-union-gangs-violence-8513c01e665818f252c881681ce9c6e9>; Alterpresse, *Criminalité : Une insécurité programmée en Haïti, dénonce le Spnh-17 dans un sit-in devant le siège des autorités de la transition* (Feb. 24, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31451>; see also RNDDH, *30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police (PNH): RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security* (Jun. 12, 2025), ¶¶ 10-15 (according to the law, police officers who are harmed in the line of duty are supposed to get an allowance to support them and their dependents, but in practice, these allowances are often not provided).

¹¹⁸ RNDDH, *30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police (PNH): RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security* (Jun. 12, 2025), ¶¶ 4-6, 33 (“This situation, which does not appear to be of major concern to the members of the High Council of the National Police (CSPN), has been observed in several police stations, including the Port-au-Prince and Delmas police stations, and the Canapé-Vert substation, as well as in several specialized PNH units such as the Motorized Intervention Brigade (BIM), where officers live in unacceptable conditions, lacking the bare minimum in terms of infrastructure.”).

¹¹⁹ See, e.g., Blaise, *Haiti’s La Chapelle falls under gang control as police station torched and town sealed off* (Jun. 24, 2025) (the mayor of La Chapelle believes that the deployment of a PNH Anti-Gang Tactical Unit “in La Chapelle may have triggered the [armed groups’] assault [on the town], as gangs seek to eliminate any remaining law enforcement resistance”); GI-TOC, *Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Issue 3* (Apr. 2025), p. 7 (“[I]n Cité Soleil and Croix-des-Bouquets, groups including the 400 Mawozo, the Taliban Gang and Terre Noire gangs specifically targeted police families by torching their homes.”); Piercin et al., *Gangs deploy new strategies in Port-au-Prince* (Mar. 11, 2025) (“During . . . attacks [in Carrefour-Feuilles], some gangs targeted homes where police officers reside, after collecting information on them.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 5-7. RNDDH reports that at least 16 police officers have been

killed since the start of 2025. RNDDH, [*30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police \(PNH\): RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security*](#) (Jun. 12, 2025), ¶¶ 30-31.

¹²⁰ BINUH, [*Report of the Secretary-General*](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶¶ 19, 24; Blaise, [*Haiti's La Chapelle falls under gang control as police station torched and town sealed off*](#) (Jun. 24, 2025); Juhakenson Blaise & Onz Chéry, *Haitian National Police mark 30 years amid gang violence, sacrifice and shortfalls*, *Haitian Times* (Jun. 16, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/06/16/haitian-police-30-years-amid-insecurity/> (“armed groups . . . burned or destroyed 18 police stations”); RNDDH, [*30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police \(PNH\): RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security*](#) (Jun. 12, 2025), ¶ 29 (reporting at least ten attacks on police stations facilities in the last year); BINUH, [*Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025*](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 11; Joseph, [*Two people killed, at least 10 wounded by gangs in Haiti's Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite*](#) (Apr. 29, 2025); RNDDH, [*Fall of Two Communes in the Centre Department into the Hands of Armed Gangs: Transitional Authorities Worsen the Country's Security Crisis*](#) (Apr. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 6, 8, 32; Charles, [*Gangs attack police station, prison in central Haiti town, more than 500 inmates escape*](#) (Mar. 31, 2025); Charles, [*Kenyan mission in Haiti says one of its cops is missing. Gang videos show lifeless body*](#) (Jun. 19, 2025); Charles, [*Haiti media under siege as armed gangs target news outlets in Port-au-Prince*](#) (Mar. 17, 2025).

¹²¹ See, e.g., Odigène, [*No Police Operations for Over 15 Days in Kenscoff, Says Mayor Massillon Jean*](#) (Apr. 15, 2025); Charles, [*U.S., Caribbean community condemn plans by gangs, allies to overthrow Haiti government*](#) (Apr. 14, 2025) (reporting on an incident where armed group members allegedly lured police officers away from their posts, attacked them, and stole their bulletproof vests, weapons, ammunition, and ID cards).

¹²² BINUH, [*Report of the Secretary-General*](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 22. Cf. UNSC, *Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*, p. 2, UN Doc. S/2025/122 (Feb. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/S/2025/122> (as of December 31, 2024, 67 of Haiti's 412 police facilities were non-operational).

¹²³ [*Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti*](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 26 (“Since October 2024, at least four massacres have resulted in more than 500 killings . . . and neither the Haitian National Police nor any authority intervened to prevent them.”); Odigène, [*No Police Operations for Over 15 Days in Kenscoff, Says Mayor Massillon Jean*](#) (Apr. 15, 2025) (reporting that no police operations were carried out in Kenscoff for over 15 days, despite renewed offensives from armed groups); RNDDH, [*Fall of Two Communes in the Centre Department into the Hands of Armed Gangs: Transitional Authorities Worsen the Country's Security Crisis*](#) (Apr. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 5-6, 10 (“[D]espite repeated calls for help and reinforcements [from police and local self-defense groups in Mirebalais], no assistance came. . . . Police officers stationed at the Mirebalais Police Station and Civil Prison fled. . . . Reinforcements . . . only began arriving around 11:00 a.m., after the gangs had already inflicted major harm on the population.”); BINUH, [*Haiti Flash Report*](#) (April 2025), pp. 1, 12-13; BINUH, [*Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025*](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 10; Alterpresse, *Haiti-Criminalité : Barricades érigées à Port-au-Prince pour prévenir les attaques des gangs armés* (Mar. 19, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31519>; Onès Joseph, *PNH claims control in part of Artibonite after deadly gang attack*, *Haitian Times* (Mar. 5, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/03/05/pnh-take-control-petite-riviere-de-lartibonite/>; FJKL, [*Massacre de Kenscoff : La Fondasyon Je Klere \(FJKL\) Denonce la Desinvolture et le Cynisme du Conseil Présidentiel de Transition \(CPT\)*](#) (Feb. 4, 2025); Luxama, [*A survivor of the worst gang attack on Haitian journalists says colleagues were cut down by bullets*](#) (Dec. 25, 2024) (reporting that it took police two hours to respond to calls for help when armed groups attacked the planned reopening of the State University Hospital); Alterpresse, *Haiti : Aucun répit pour Pernier, sous la coupe des gangs, dans l'indifférence des autorités et des forces de l'ordre* (Dec. 9, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31205> (police failed to respond to distress calls by residents of Pernier, an area in Pétiön-Ville); BINUH, [*Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, October – December 2024*](#) (Dec. 2024), p. 5 (“Throughout the five days of the attack [in Wharf Jérémie], neither the police nor any other public authority intervened to protect the residents.”).

¹²⁴ HRW, [*Haiti: Displacement Hits Record as Security Efforts Fall Short*](#) (Jun. 25, 2025); La Presse, [*Des gangs attaquent une prison, 529 détenus s'évadent*](#) (Apr. 1, 2025), <https://www.lapresse.ca/international/caraibes/2025-04-01/haiti/des-gangs-attaquent-une-prison-529-detenus-s-evadent.php#>.

¹²⁵ Blaise, [*Haiti's La Chapelle falls under gang control as police station torched and town sealed off*](#) (Jun. 24, 2025) (“Authorities had received warnings as early as June 19 that La Chapelle was a target. Still, no proactive measures were taken. . . . By the time reinforcements arrived [on June 22], the gang had already taken complete control.”); [*Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti*](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 31 (“Despite several early-warning alerts [about attacks on Kenscoff], the Haitian National Police deployed only five hours after the attacks began, when 24 residents were already dead and approximately 70 residences had been burned down.”); Charles, [*Gangs attack police station, prison in central Haiti town, more than 500 inmates escape*](#) (Mar. 31, 2025) (The head of human rights group *Fondasyon Je Klere* “said that, as in other instances, armed gangs had announced that they would attack Mirebalais and ‘there was no resistance, there was no response. . . . The bandits always announce their attacks against the cities, against the prisons, against the police substations and they never have any resistance.”); Blaise, [*Two Haitian soldiers, dozen residents killed as gangs seize Delmas 30*](#) (Feb. 26, 2025) (reporting that a February 25 attack against Delmas 30 “was weeks in the making,” with “[r]umors of an impending takeover . . . circulat[ing] since early February”); Juhakenson Blaise, [*Haiti's government knew about deadly Kenscoff gang attack but did nothing to stop it*](#), *Haitian Times* (Jan. 31, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/01/31/government-had-intelligence-on-gang-attack-in-kenscoff/> (“Haitian PM Fils-Aimé revealed that the government had prior intelligence about the Kenscoff attack but failed to prevent it.”); see also Juhakenson Blaise, [*Port-au-Prince goes dark: Residents shut down Haiti's main power plant to demand security*](#), *Haitian Times* (May 20, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/05/20/mirebalais-residents-halt-haiti-electricity-production/> (“The residents’ [shut down of the Péligre power plant] . . . followed a gang-organized rara music event on May 11, announced publicly days earlier. No law enforcement intervention occurred despite the publicity on social media about this event. Locals say the spectacle, which celebrated the gang’s takeover of the town, symbolized the state’s failure to regain control.”).

¹²⁶ See, e.g., Jean Junior Celestin, [*Kenscoff Under Gang Fire*](#), *Le Nouvelliste* (Jan. 29, 2025), https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/252833/kenscoff-under-gang-fire#google_vignette (discussing the lack of police presence in Kafou Bèt); Adams & Robles, [*Massacre Upon Massacre: Haiti's Bleak Spiral Into a Failed State*](#) (Jan. 6, 2025) (discussing the

lack of police presence in Wharf Jérémie); Robles, [Massacre in Haiti's Capital Leaves Nearly 200 Dead, U.N. Says](#) (Dec. 8, 2024); see also Blaise & Chéry, [Haitian National Police mark 30 years amid gang violence, sacrifice and shortfalls](#) (Jun. 16, 2025) (“Fewer than 300 of Haiti’s 570 municipalities have a consistent police presence, according the Human Rights organization Center of Analysis and Research in Human Rights, CARDH.”); Charles, [Haitian, Kenyan police took control of a rural town – then the victory led to carnage](#) (Dec. 13, 2024) (in Petite Rivière in December, residents were caught between armed groups that attacked them in reprisal after police intervened and a civilian “defense” group that attacked suspected armed group members and sympathizers, “underscore[ing] how lack of information and police presence left the public vulnerable to attacks both from gangs and vigilante groups”).

¹²⁷ See RNDDH, [30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police \(PNH\): RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security](#) (Jun. 12, 2025), ¶¶ 20, 24; Joseph, [Gangs strike twice in one week in Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite, sending residents fleeing across the river](#) (May 2, 2025) (“Days after police claimed to have regained control of the communal section of Petite-Rivière, the Grand Grif gang launched another assault, torching more homes and forcing renewed displacement.”); RNDDH, [Fall of Two Communes in the Centre Department into the Hands of Armed Gangs: Transitional Authorities Worsen the Country’s Security Crisis](#) (Apr. 10, 2025), ¶ 11, 14-15 (“On the afternoon of April 3, 2025, the commune of Saut-d’Eau, which borders Mirebalais, fell to armed gangs. Some say this was facilitated by the redeployment of law enforcement to Mirebalais, leaving Saut-d’Eau vulnerable.”); BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 9-11 (describing the failure of the police, variously supported by the Haitian Armed Forces (Fad’H), the MSS, BSAP agents, and civilian “defense” groups, to restore security or prevent further attacks in Kenscoff and Mirebalais); Charles, [‘We are all by ourselves’: Haitians warn that fall of Port-au-Prince is imminent](#) (Mar. 20, 2025) (According to one security expert, “[w]hile recent offensives have inflicted some casualties on the gangs, they have failed to eliminate any key leaders or establish any sustainable control over the battlefield”) (internal quotations omitted); Joseph, [PNH claims control in part of Artibonite after deadly gang attack](#) (Mar. 5, 2025); UNSC, [Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council](#) (Feb. 24, 2025), p. 4; Celestin, [Kenscoff Under Gang Fire](#) (Jan. 29, 2025); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, [Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering](#) (Jan. 13, 2025) (“The Haitian police and the MSS do occasionally regain territory from gangs, but they are often forced to pull out again soon afterwards, simply allowing the armed groups to move back in. ‘They can’t stay after dark because they lack forward [operating] bases,’ said UN Expert on Human Rights in Haiti William O’Neill.”); see also Charles, [Haiti’s volatile capital is in a free fall. Here’s what its collapse could look like](#) (Mar. 24, 2025) (“Joint operations between the Kenya-led force and police have forced gang members to retreat in some areas. But security analysts are warning that without long-term police presence, gangs may reoccupy vacated areas.”); [Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 27 (“Simultaneous attacks in multiple communes of the West . . . and Artibonite Departments . . . have presented a significant challenge for security forces’ responses, in terms of both strategic planning and the coordination of operations.”).

¹²⁸ Juhakenson Blaise, [Police announce defensive measures as residents protest lack of action against gang threats in Port-au-Prince safe zone](#), *Haitian Times* (Mar. 21, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/03/21/police-announce-defensive-measures-as-residents-protest-lack-of-action-against-gang-threats-in-port-au-prince-safe-zone/> (as part of these new measures, police “have reinforced their presence in targeted areas, conducted body searches, set up checkpoints, and intensified identity verifications of people using main roads”); see also BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 20 (the government renewed the nationwide state of emergency from April 8 to July 31).

¹²⁹ Charles, [Haitian, Kenyan police took control of a rural town – then the victory led to carnage](#) (Dec. 13, 2024); see also BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 8-12 (discussing a number of attacks by armed groups against the population in retaliation for “defense” groups’ activities targeting armed group members); O’Neill, [Violence, Abuses and Hunger in Haiti](#) (Jan. 30, 2025) (“Gang leaders vowing revenge on whole neighborhoods because of these [vigilante] killings creat[es] the risk of a spread of violence throughout the population.”); Charles, [Haitian, Kenyan police took control of a rural town – then the victory led to carnage](#) (Dec. 13, 2024) (“Vanda Felbab-Brown, a security expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington, warned that ‘unrestrained brutality by the vigilante groups paradoxically strengthens the actors they are working against.’”).

¹³⁰ Rezo Nodwes, [Task-force de la Primature : fuite en avant et objectifs manqués à Bas-Delmas](#) (Mar. 2, 2025), <https://rezonodwes.com/?p=353143> (“The Task Force’s use of drones, combined with the inconsistency of operations in criminal strongholds, risks fueling a new wave of violence.”); Charles, [‘It’s our history we are losing.’ Haitian gangs set fire to another media institution](#) (Mar. 13, 2025) (the drone strikes have “had had a positive psychological effect in the population, but . . . [have] also made an already deteriorating and unpredictable security landscape even more menacing”); see also notes 136, 166.

¹³¹ Henry Shuldiner, [Drone Strikes Shake Haiti’s Gangs but Leave Legal and Strategic Questions](#), *InSight Crime* (Jun. 24, 2025), <https://insightcrime.org/news/drone-strikes-shake-haiti-gangs-leave-legal-strategic-questions/> (“[G]angs themselves are now attempting to acquire drones and explosives. In early June, three members of the Viv Ansanm . . . were arrested in the Dominican Republic while allegedly trying to purchase drones to use against Haitian police. . . . No gang-linked drone attacks have been reported so far, but shortly after authorities targeted Jimmy Chérizier, alias “Barbecue,” in a March drone strike, he released a video claiming that since drones had been used to try to assassinate him, he would now use them to assassinate anyone he wanted.”); Etienne Côte-Paluck, Manisha Ganguly & Tom Phillips, [‘The ground shook’: drone attacks help Haitian government wrest control of capital from criminal gangs](#) (Jul. 2, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/02/haiti-port-au-prince-drone-attacks-gangs>.

¹³² Shuldiner, [Drone Strikes Shake Haiti’s Gangs but Leave Legal and Strategic Questions](#) (Jun. 24, 2025) (discussing the lack of transparency around drone strike missions, which are reportedly being led by foreign security contractors and which many not be legal, and asserting that the drone strikes “are unlikely to offer a long-term solution to Haiti’s security crisis, as these [armed] groups continue to adapt to shifts in the government’s anti-gang strategy”); Frances Robles, [Haiti Is Using Drones to Fight Gangs. Here’s Why That’s Likely to Be Illegal](#), *NY Times* (Jun. 17, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/17/us/haiti-drones-gangs.html> (over three months of drone strikes – which Canadian police say may not be legal – have failed to capture or kill “a single high-value target”); RNDDH, [30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police \(PNH\): RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security](#) (Jun. 12, 2025), ¶¶ 21, 23, 46 (“[S]ince the use of kamikaze drones began, at least three hundred

(300) armed terrorist gang members have been killed, and more than four hundred (400) others have been injured, some of them seriously. . . . However, it must also be recognized that these operations remain ineffective to date, as no area has been permanently reclaimed and no major gang leader has been apprehended or held accountable.”); Charles, [Haiti’s volatile capital is in a free fall. Here’s what its collapse could look like](#) (Mar. 24, 2025).

¹³³ See BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 47 (“The security vacuum in Haiti has fueled the demand for private security companies and concomitant demand for weapons in recent decades. Estimates indicate that between 75,000 and 90,000 individuals would be working with roughly 100 private security companies in Haiti.”); [Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 71 (“[T]he majority of diplomatic representations in Haiti rely on private security companies, mostly Haitians, to provide security to their premises and personnel.”); Muggah, [Flows of Guns and Money Are Dooming Haiti](#) (May 12, 2025) (“[P]rivate security companies such as Black Mountain Solutions, GardaWorld, G4S, and Professional Security Services are reportedly expanding their operations to protect those who can afford to pay, with little regulatory oversight.”).

¹³⁴ Roberson Alphonse, *Private Security Firm Hired, Confirms Fritz Alphonse Jean*, Le Nouvelliste (Jun. 20, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/257399/private-security-firm-hired-confirms-fritz-alphonse-jean> (confirming that a private security firm has been hired to support Haitian security forces, but declining to specify which firm); David C. Adams, Frances Robles & Mark Mazzetti, *A Desperate Haiti Turns to Erik Prince, Trump Ally, in Fight Against Gangs*, NY Times (May 28, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/28/us/haiti-erik-prince-blackwater-gangs.html>.

¹³⁵ Adams, Robles & Mazzetti, [A Desperate Haiti Turns to Erik Prince, Trump Ally, in Fight Against Gangs](#) (May 28, 2025) (“Mr. Prince, the founder of [now-defunct] Blackwater Worldwide, signed a contract to take on the criminal groups that have been killing civilians and seizing control of vast areas of territory, according to senior Haitian and American government officials and several other security experts familiar with Mr. Prince’s work in Haiti.”); Stavroula Pabst, *Erik Prince Brings His Mercenaries To Haiti. What Could Go Wrong?*, Responsible Statecraft (Jun. 6, 2025), <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/erik-prince/> (discussing Prince’s history as the founder of private security firm Blackwater, which “left a legacy of disastrous mishaps, most infamously the 2007 Nisour massacre in Iraq, where Blackwater mercenaries killed 17 civilians”); see also note 139.

¹³⁶ Adams, Robles & Mazzetti, [A Desperate Haiti Turns to Erik Prince, Trump Ally, in Fight Against Gangs](#) (May 28, 2025); Shuldiner, [Drone Strikes Shake Haiti’s Gangs but Leave Legal and Strategic Questions](#) (Jun. 24, 2025) (“A task force housed in the office of interim Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé is coordinating the drone operations, but the specialized unit appears to be operating independently of Haiti’s main security forces. . . . The task force’s activities remain highly opaque. Little is known about who participates and who oversees the missions, although Fritz Alphonse Jean, the head of Haiti’s Transitional Presidential Council, acknowledged in a meeting with reporters that the government is using foreign contractors to help in the fight against armed gangs.”); Amanda Coletta, Widlore Mérancourt & Jonathan Baran, *Haiti turns to weaponized drones in fight against gangs*, Washington Post (Apr. 10, 2025), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/04/10/haiti-government-drones-gangs/> (noting the lack of clarity around who is responsible for the drone strikes: “Neither Haiti’s interim government nor its police have publicly claimed responsibility for them. But a Haitian government official said the unit is run by a task force created this year by interim prime minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé and the transitional presidential council.”); see also note 166.

¹³⁷ Haiti Libre, *Haiti - FLASH : BSAP agents in support to PNH and FAd’H (video)* (Apr. 4, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44619-haiti-flash-bsap-agents-in-support-to-pnh-and-fad-h-video.html>.

¹³⁸ BSAP is formally a government agency supposed to operate under the umbrella of the Haitian Environment Ministry, officially tasked with protecting environmentally sensitive areas. According to the UN Panel of Experts, BSAP has some 6,000 members, 95% of whom are not on any institutional payroll, who “perform de facto police work and engage in a range of criminal activities.” Many Haitians identify BSAP “as a primary threat to the stability of the country.” UNSC, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2700 (2023)*, ¶¶ 53, 65, 83-85, UN Doc. S/2024/704* (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/704>; Valéry Félix, *Ouanaminthe Police Station Attacked by BSAP Agents*, Le Nouvelliste (Apr. 21, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/255411/ouanaminthe-police-station-attacked-by-bsap-agents> (BSAP agents attacked the police station in Ouanaminthe in April, “in retaliation for the arrest of one of their colleagues by officers of the Polifront unit, acting on a warrant issued by an investigating judge”); Radio Télé Galaxie, X (Dec. 30, 2024), <https://x.com/rtvgalaxie/status/1873834319862432171> (reporting on altercations between BSAP and police officers in Lascachobas commune after BSAP agents severely beat a police officer); IJDH, [Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024](#) (Jun. 2024), notes 17, 49 and associated text.

¹³⁹ Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti’s presidential council confirms use of mercenaries in anti-gang fight*, Miami Herald (Jun. 21, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article309130295.html> (“The presence of foreign mercenaries in Haiti’s anti-gang fight and the lack of transparency around the players, most notably the former head of Blackwater, Erik Prince, and the rules of engagement, have been raising concerns both inside the country and in international circles.”); Pabst, [Erik Prince Brings His Mercenaries To Haiti. What Could Go Wrong?](#) (Jun. 6, 2025) (IJDH Executive Director Brian Concannon: “Having mercenaries just go in and start executing people... is going to be just like the U.N. [intervention in the past]. It’s going to continue to undermine the rule of law and the social fabric and lead to just more rebounds of more trampoline effects of increasing gang violence.”) (internal quotations omitted). As of writing, there is no mention of human rights monitoring or accountability mechanisms overseeing the functions of these private actors.

¹⁴⁰ [Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 55, 71 (“Arms and ammunition remain in high demand among . . . private security companies and self-defence groups, all of which contributes to fuelling arms trafficking. . . . In several of its reports, the Panel has raised concerns about the lack of oversight by Haitian authorities over the numerous private security companies in the country and their stockpiles.”); Muggah, [Flows of Guns and Money Are Dooming Haiti](#) (May 12, 2025) (“Some criminal groups reportedly obtain illegal arms from private security companies.”); BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶¶ 13, 47 (“Despite the arms embargo, some private security companies operating in Haiti continue to procure weapons and ammunition, contributing to its trafficking into Haiti. . . . According to the Panel of Experts, much of the material used by

private companies is acquired illicitly and regularly ends up with gangs.”); UNSC, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2700 (2023)* (Sep. 30, 2024), ¶¶ 53, 65; see also notes 469-475.

¹⁴¹ Juhakenson Blaise et al., *Haiti taps controversial BSAP forces to fight gangs; critics warn of past abuses*, Haitian Times (Apr. 16, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/04/16/protected-area-agents-eager-to-fight-gangs-but-their-role-remains-unclear/> (discussing concerns about the recruitment of BSAP from human rights advocates and political leaders, “who point to the brigade’s murky origins, inconsistent command structure, and lack of training standards as serious red flags”); Muggah, *Flows of Guns and Money Are Dooming Haiti* (May 12, 2025) (“[S]ome firms pay local commanders for ‘safe passage’ in gang-held neighborhoods.”).

¹⁴² The civilian self-protection movement – originally referred to as *Bwa Kale*, meaning “peeled stick” or, in slang, “no mercy” – was first started in April 2023 by residents of Port-au-Prince. The movement has since expanded to other departments, and is increasingly also responsible for abuses against the population. Jacqueline Charles, *Beheadings in a church highlight growing threat in Haiti: Self-defense brigades*, Miami Herald (Jun. 3, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article307519886.html?tbref=hp>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 11; IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024* (Jun. 2024), p. 5.

¹⁴³ Widlore Mérancourt & Amanda Coletta, *Vigilantes once fought Haiti’s gangs. Now it’s hard to tell them apart.*, Washington Post (Jul. 6, 2025), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/06/haiti-vigilante-self-defense-gangs/> (“[V]ictims, analysts, rights activists and U.N. officials say they are increasingly committing the same abuses [as armed groups], including against children, worsening lawlessness in the crisis-racked nation”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 16 (“Although these groups often serve as the last remaining security mechanisms in many areas, they violate fundamental human rights, including the right to life and the right to a fair trial, while simultaneously fuelling further violence in the form of retaliatory attacks by gangs.”); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025) (according to a source close to the UN, “[t]he Bwa Kale is gaining more and more strength; we see more lynching and more attacks, including in coordination with members of the [Haitian police], who are also desperate for support”) (internal quotations omitted); UN Human Rights Council (UN HRC), *Haiti: UN Human Rights Chief alarmed by widening violence as gangs expand reach* (Jun. 13, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/haiti-un-human-rights-chief-alarmed-widening-violence-gangs-expand-reach?sub-site=HRC> (“While law enforcement struggles to restore security, mob and self-defence groups are taking the matter into their own hands, leading to even more human rights abuses.”) (internal quotations omitted); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 8 (“During the reporting period, there was also a spike in abuses by self-defense groups and unorganized mobs. This uptick occurred amid a surge in human rights abuses linked to gang violence and the inability of law enforcement to protect the population.”).

¹⁴⁴ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 16 (reporting at least 101 people killed by “defense” groups between April 15 and June 20); Charles, *Beheadings in a church highlight growing threat in Haiti: Self-defense brigades* (Jun. 3, 2025) (reporting that armed “defense” groups killed at least 55 people during a massacre in May); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 11, 14 (“At least 189 people were killed [between January and March], accused of belonging to gangs or committing ordinary crimes.”); see also Haiti Libre, *Haiti - FLASH : Au moins 1 haïtien tué, blessé ou enlevé chaque heure en 2024* (Jan. 8, 2025) (“In 2024, the UN Human Rights Office documented 315 lynchings of gang members and people allegedly associated with them.”); note 282.

¹⁴⁵ Mérancourt & Coletta, *Vigilantes once fought Haiti’s gangs. Now it’s hard to tell them apart.* (Jul. 6, 2025) (“The methods the vigilantes use to determine who is and isn’t a gang member can be arbitrary. In some cases, analysts say, self-defense groups have attacked people for their hairstyle or because they had unfamiliar faces. Mary Rose Kesner Auguste Ducena, program director at the National Human Rights Defense Network, said the group has received reports of people killed or tortured by vigilantes because they were not carrying IDs — common in a country where gang violence has forced more than 1.3 million people from their homes, often without time to gather valuables or documents.”); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 8 (“[“Defense” groups] targeted, not only alleged gang members and their families, but also individuals they suspected of committing crimes.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 8, 11 (“[V]igilante groups have targeted the families of gang members or their close ones.”); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025) (“Just walking in the street without identity papers can be enough to raise suspicion.”); Charles, *Haitian, Kenyan police took control of a rural town – then the victory led to carnage* (Dec. 13, 2024) (After armed groups attacked Petite Rivière in December, “a so-called citizens’ defense group carried out its own attacks with machetes and knives on suspected gang members and sympathizers,” but “[n]o consideration was given . . . to people’s innocence or whether the victims had been coerced by the gangs;” victims included “a longtime spaghetti vendor who sold meals in the community and a popular soccer player who, while being questioned by police, was somehow set on fire by members of the vigilante group to the horror of his family, which watched the scene on video. . . . ‘There are people who had criminal ties to gangs but there are also people who were victims of personal vendettas.’”); see also Charles, *Beheadings in a church highlight growing threat in Haiti: Self-defense brigades* (Jun. 3, 2025) (according to Bertide Horace, who works with the activist group Commission for Dialogue, Reconciliation and Awareness to Save the Artibonite, “[t]hey never attack the gang, it’s always the population that ends up paying the price”) (internal quotations omitted); GI-TOC, *Living Together: The Gangs of Haiti – Part 2: Fighting Back* (Apr. 30, 2025), at 32:50 (the UN Expert on Human Rights in Haiti says the “defense” groups are “judge, jury, executioner” and that “there have been cases of women who are suspected of having been a gang member, [or] a girlfriend . . . of a gang member or leader, [and] they’ve been killed”).

¹⁴⁶ See, e.g., Mérancourt & Coletta, *Vigilantes once fought Haiti’s gangs. Now it’s hard to tell them apart.* (Jul. 6, 2025) (members of a “defense” group ambushed a Radio Galaxie journalist, continuing to hold him even after he identified himself as a journalist); Charles, *Beheadings in a church highlight growing threat in Haiti: Self-defense brigades* (Jun. 3, 2025) (a member of the activist group Commission for Dialogue, Reconciliation and Awareness to Save the Artibonite has received multiple death threats due to her public criticisms of the criminal actions of “defense” groups); Luxama, Coto & Sanon, *Journalists in Haiti defy bullets and censorship to cover unprecedented violence* (Apr. 3, 2025) (armed civilians demonstrating against the insecurity in Canapé Vert attacked at least ten journalists covering the demonstration); Henriot Dorcent, *Haiti’s Popular Resistance is Growing in Strength*

Little by Little, Haïti Liberté (Mar. 26, 2025), <https://haitiliberte.com/haitis-popular-resistance-is-growing-in-strength-little-by-little/>. According to information shared by Pascale Solages, the cofounder of Haitian feminist organization *Nègès Mawon*, staff members of her organization were targeted by a “defense” group while conducting a community survey. Solages said the “defense” group thought her staff were armed group members, even though they were wearing shirts and had badges that identified them as *Nègès Mawon* staff. The shirts and badges ultimately saved them, according to Solages, who said that instead of killing them outright, the “defense” group took the staff members to a police station and forced them to wait there until their supervisor arrived. Police told the staff members that they should not have been in the community in the first place and did not take any actions against the “defense” group, illustrating both the links between police and “defense” groups and the degree to which police are uninterested in protecting human rights defenders. Solages also shared a separate incident, in which one of her staff members had to be hidden in a safe house and was eventually forced to leave Port-au-Prince entirely after social media harassment claiming she was an armed group member put her in danger from “defense” groups. Here, too, police refused to take her complaint. *See also* notes 151-153.

¹⁴⁷ Charles, *Beheadings in a church highlight growing threat in Haiti: Self-defense brigades* (Jun. 3, 2025) (The attack was carried out by “seven different groups from nearby communities that joined forces. . . . Préal residents were [supposedly] targeted because they had refused to pay the local brigade to protect them from gangs or to pay to cross checkpoints. They also refused to form their own self-defense brigades.”); Louis Chadrac, *Massacre in Artibonite: Dozens of Peasants Killed in Préal*, *Le Nouvelliste* (May 21, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/256377/massacre-in-artibonite-dozens-of-peasants-killed-in-preval>.

¹⁴⁸ *See, e.g.*, Charles, *Beheadings in a church highlight growing threat in Haiti: Self-defense brigades* (Jun. 3, 2025); Mérancourt & Coletta, *Vigilantes once fought Haiti’s gangs. Now it’s hard to tell them apart*, (Jul. 6, 2025); *see also* BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 22 (reporting that a “police station in the Grand’Anse Department was stormed by a mob following allegations of excessive use of force by the police”).

¹⁴⁹ Mérancourt & Coletta, *Vigilantes once fought Haiti’s gangs. Now it’s hard to tell them apart*, (Jul. 6, 2025) (“Beyond the immediate problem of torture, summary executions and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment inflicted on the population . . . there’s a longer-term threat: the weapons being used today will remain in circulation, and could fuel the same gang violence we’re already struggling with.”) (internal quotations omitted); *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 55 (noting that “[a]rms and ammunition remain in high demand among . . . self-defence groups, . . . which contributes to fuelling arms trafficking”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 37 (discussing “reports that vigilante or so-called self-defence groups are using illegal high-calibre firearms and improvised weapons”).

¹⁵⁰ The extrajudicial violence and harassment from “defense” groups impedes the ability of civil society organizations to function and provide support, which is especially problematic because civil society organizations are often the only ones providing services in many areas. *See* notes 146, 261.

¹⁵¹ Charles, *Beheadings in a church highlight growing threat in Haiti: Self-defense brigades* (Jun. 3, 2025) (“The brigades. . . . have been indirectly deputized by government officials who repeatedly call for “a marriage” between the population and the police to push back encroaching armed groups. ‘The brigades, which effectively respond to the desperation of the population, can be understood as informal auxiliary forces of the public forces, and an extension of the power of the state,’ [Romain] Le Cour Grandmaison [a Haiti analyst at GI-TOC] said. ‘This reflects the blurred boundaries between the public forces and informal groups. The authorities’ acquiescence risks . . . giving rise to the creation of more brigades.”); Charles, *Haitian, Kenyan police took control of a rural town – then the victory led to carnage* (Dec. 13, 2024); *see, e.g.*, John Smith Justin, *Understanding Vigilance Brigades in the Fight Against Armed Attacks*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Jun. 26, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/257586/understanding-vigilance-brigades-in-the-fight-against-armed-attacks> (“According to [Port-au-Prince mayor] Youri Chevre, brigadiers play a major role in supporting law enforcement to enable citizens to go about their daily activities. . . . ‘Sometimes, they are more effective than the police because they know the neighborhoods perfectly. They are better positioned to monitor the entry of suspicious individuals into these areas.’ . . . Chevre assured that he is working on a plan to register the *brigadiers* in his commune to build public trust in this self-defense force. He also promised that they would receive training and would soon be compensated for their work.”); Charles, *Thousands march against gangs in Haiti as Vatican is notified of murder of two nuns* (Apr. 2, 2025) (reporting on a protest against the insecurity crisis “organized by a police officer who is assigned to the specialized unit inside the presidential palace, and heads a so-called citizens self-defense brigade for Canapé-Vert”).

¹⁵² Mérancourt & Coletta, *Vigilantes once fought Haiti’s gangs. Now it’s hard to tell them apart*, (Jul. 6, 2025) (reporting that “defense” groups “enjoy the backing of officials including the capital’s top prosecutor,” and that some “include current and former police officers”); *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 47-49; Charles, *Beheadings in a church highlight growing threat in Haiti: Self-defense brigades* (Jun. 3, 2025) (“The brigades are in contact with and fight alongside police forces, and some, like the one in Port-au-Prince’s Canape-Vert neighborhood, are led by police officers.”); *Alterpresse, Haïti-Criminalité : Des policiers et des brigadiers tués dans des affrontements avec les gangs à Port-au-Prince* (Apr. 24, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31638> (reporting on “[a] police intervention, accompanied by armed civilians, members of vigilance brigades from the neighboring Canapé Vert neighborhood, [that] reportedly resulted in deaths and injuries on both sides”); HRW, *Haiti: Escalating Violence Puts Population at Grave Risk* (Apr. 17, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/04/17/haiti-escalating-violence-puts-population-grave-risk>; Dorcent, *Haiti’s Popular Resistance is Growing in Strength Little by Little* (Mar. 26, 2025) (“The Haitian bourgeoisie, government, and PNH have weaponized many vigilante thugs manning barricades by giving them money, weapons, ammunition, and body armor.”); Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, *Haiti* (Mar. 14, 2025), <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/haiti/>; Haiti Libre, *Haïti - FLASH : Au moins 1 haïtien tué, blessé ou enlevé chaque heure en 2024* (Jan. 8, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/article-44014-haiti-flash-au-moins-1-haitien-tue-blesse-ou-enleve-chaque-heure-en-2024.html>; *see also* Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025) (“A Haitian politician, who also requested to speak anonymously, said the anarchic situation is leading many frustrated police officers to simply ‘eliminate’ any potential enemy. ‘They say: “there is no prison, there is no justice system”. So, as soon as they catch someone, they kill them or deliver them to the Bwa Kale population,’ he said. ‘The policy is that everything must be eliminated because there is no other measure to get rid of the suspects who come from lawless neighbourhoods.’”).

¹⁵³ Charles, [Haitian, Kenyan police took control of a rural town – then the victory led to carnage](#) (Dec. 13, 2024); GI-TOC, [Last Chance? Breaking Haiti's Political and Criminal Impasse](#) (Jan. 2024), p. 7 (“While these groups offer some protection to the population, as well as embodying a form of reconstruction of the social fabric, they operate outside any legal framework, contributing to territorial fragmentation and the erosion of citizens’ confidence in state protection.”); see also BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 15 (“The increased capacity of Port-au-Prince-based gangs to launch attacks in the Central and Artibonite departments and along key traffic routes in the Southeast department, particularly near the border town of Séguin, paired with the growing presence of self-defence groups in departments with limited police presence, could lead to a significant weakening of the state authority.”); Charles, [Beheadings in a church highlight growing threat in Haiti: Self-defense brigades](#) (Jun. 3, 2025) (Bertide Horace, of the Commission for Dialogue, Reconciliation and Awareness to Save the Artibonite, says “[p]eople are afraid to denounce the [“defense” groups] because the police have legitimized them, the justice system has legalized them”).

¹⁵⁴ See, e.g., Mérancourt & Coletta, [Vigilantes once fought Haiti's gangs. Now it's hard to tell them apart](#) (Jul. 6, 2025) (“‘People believe in the vigilante brigades because of the weakness of the justice system, but the reality is these brigades will eventually turn into gangs,’ said Marie Yolène Gilles, executive director of the human rights group Fondasyon Je Klere. . . . The U.N. office on drugs and crime said last week that several such groups have been colluding with gangs. In a sign of their power, the gang leader Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier backed vigilantes in Solino as they fought one of his rivals, the United Nations reported last year.”); Charles, [Beheadings in a church highlight growing threat in Haiti: Self-defense brigades](#) (Jun. 3, 2025). This dynamic is familiar – many of the armed groups currently inflicting violence on the population started out as civilian “defense” groups. Mérancourt & Coletta, [Vigilantes once fought Haiti's gangs. Now it's hard to tell them apart](#) (Jul. 6, 2025) (“After the dictatorship of François ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier and that of his son Jean-Claude (‘Baby Doc’) fell in 1986, mobs attacked suspected members of the Tonton Macoutes, the paramilitary forces that enforced their brutal reign. Many of the gangs that are currently terrorizing the country, analysts say, began as self-defense groups that formed in the 2000s to shield neighborhoods from violence.”).

¹⁵⁵ RNDDH, [Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country](#) (Apr. 25, 2025), p. 24 (“By protecting the presidential advisers indicted in the BNC corruption scandal for abuse of power, bribery solicitation, and passive corruption, by continuing to launder state funds, allocating the amounts designated for intelligence and information as personal expenses, and by deciding not to comply with the law in order to resume the flawed and corrupt process that led to the fraudulent awarding of the PNH restoration contract, the CPT and the transitional government have shown themselves to be incapable of fulfilling the great promise made to Haitian society to clean up public finances, to steer the country toward transparency, and to fight corruption within the public administration.”); OHCHR, [Haiti: Immediate action is needed to address the human rights crisis](#) (Feb. 27, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/02/haiti-immediate-action-needed-address-human-rights-crisis> (discussing the “massive impunity for crime, including serious human rights violations and abuses, partly due to corruption and poor governance,” which “has led to people having very little faith or trust in their institutions”).

¹⁵⁶ GI-TOC, [Last Chance? Breaking Haiti's Political and Criminal Impasse](#) (Jan. 2025), p. 10 (“The state’s inability to challenge criminal sovereignty exacerbates the institutional crisis and fuels gang-rule as a model of parallel governance. . . . This is one of the keys to understanding Haiti’s crisis: the criminals still operate within the politico-criminal ecosystem, not outside of it.”); RNDDH, [30th Anniversary of the Haitian National Police \(PNH\): RNDDH Commends the Struggle of Police Officers to Restore Security](#) (Jun. 12, 2025), ¶ 47 (“[H]ighlight[ing] the threat to democracy posed by the practice of politically appointed authorities directing teams tasked with conducting special operations against gangs, gangs that, for years, were used by those same authorities to obtain or retain power.”); see also ICG, [Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti](#) (Feb. 19, 2025), p. 10 (Crisis Group warns that collusion between state actors and armed groups will prevent the holding of free and fair elections).

¹⁵⁷ RHI News, [Haïti – Viv Ansanm et Gran Grif désignent organisations terroriste : le CPT fragilisé par les révélations de Magalie Habitant sur Louis Gérald Gilles...](#) (May 13, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/politique/haiti-viv-ansanm-et-gran-grif-designes-organisations-terroriste-le-cpt-fragilise-par-les-revelations-de-magalie-habitant-sur-louis-gerald-gilles/> (reporting on alleged ties between CPT member Louis Gérald Gilles, of the December 21 Agreement, and the *Viv Ansanm* armed group coalition); Rezo Nodwes, [Haitian Civil Society Groups Demand Prosecution of Transitional Council Members Over Alleged Corruption and Gang Collusion](#) (May 12, 2025), <https://reznodwes.com/?p=357312> (in May, a coalition of civil society organizations filed a formal complaint against the members of the TPC, accusing them of, *inter alia*, complicity with armed groups); RHI News, [“Haïti sous la menace d’un coup d’État orchestré par “Viv Ansanm” et alliés : collusion entre gangs armés et pouvoir pour le contrôle du pays, selon Pierre Espérance”](#)... (Mar. 28, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/haiti-sous-la-menace-dun-coup-detat-orchestre-par-viv-ansanm-et-allies-collusion-entre-gangs-armes-et-pouvoir-pour-le-controle-du-pays-selon-pierre-espe/> (RNDDH Executive Director Pierre Espérance alleged that the PHTK – represented on the TPC by the December 21 Agreement – and *Pitit Desalin* are supporting a coup effort orchestrated by *Viv Ansanm*); see also RHI News, [“Le pays a besoin d’une large concertation pour la mise en place d’un gouvernement provisoire”, selon Me Sonet Saint-Louis...](#) (Apr. 16, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/politique/le-pays-a-besoin-dune-large-concertation-pour-la-mise-en-place-dun-gouvernement-provisoire-selon-me-sonet-saint-louis/> (Haitian constitutional lawyer Sonet Saint-Louis says the TPC’s inaction against armed groups “is a sign that ‘Haiti is trapped’ in a system of complicity and political calculation”). As previously reported, four of the seven voting members come from organizations with documented ties to criminal groups. They “include affiliates of the Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK), known for its corruption, connections with gangs, and control of Haiti for the past dozen years [the December 21 Agreement]; supporters of former acting Prime Minister Claude Joseph, who served the last PHTK president [EDE/RED]; supporters of [former de facto prime Minister Ariel] Henry [the January 30 Collective]; and allies of putschist Guy Philippe, who has been convicted in the United States of money laundering related to cocaine trafficking [*Pitit Desalin*].” Pierre Espérance, [U.S. Military Planes Are in Haiti. Haitians Don’t Know Why.](#), Foreign Policy (Jun. 13, 2024), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/06/13/haiti-gangs-violence-us-military-planes-international-security-mission-kenya/>. In January, three of those members – representing the December 21 Agreement, the January 30 Collective, and the EDE/RED party – sent a letter to CARICOM arguing for a reconfiguration of the TPC, which was widely interpreted as giving legitimacy to the *Viv Ansanm* coalition. Charles, [Can Haiti's gangs help solve the political crisis? Some politicians seem to think so](#) (Jan. 14, 2025) (also noting that “[s]ome political observers have been quietly wondering if the government is seeking ways to negotiate with armed gangs based on certain appointments that were recently made for local mayors offices”).

¹⁵⁸ RHI News, *Haïti : Alix Didier Fils-Aimé accusé de freiner les opérations contre les chefs terroristes de Viv Ansanm...* (Jun. 8, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/politique/haïti-alix-didier-fils-aime-accuse-de-freiner-les-operations-contre-les-chefs-terroristes-de-viv-ansanm/> (the source also asserts that “the Prime Minister’s entourage, made up of former officials linked to the former regime, [is] suspected of taking advantage of the chaos to maintain their influence”).

¹⁵⁹ *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 32 (“[A] number of political and security figures are backing the attacks [in Kenscoff], in an attempt to secure power using gangs. . . . For the gangs, these alliances are aimed at securing their future and allowing them to continue their activities with impunity. For the politicians, it is a way to win electoral support in many of the gang-entrenched areas in preparation for any future election. Moreover, sources mentioned the possibility of the Viv Ansanm alliance taking power by force with the backing of political and security actors.”); Robert Muggah, *Flows of Guns and Money Are Dooming Haiti*, *Americas Quarterly* (May 12, 2025), <https://americasquarterly.org/article/flows-of-guns-and-money-are-dooming-haiti/> (“At home and abroad, Haiti’s elite . . . pay lip service to reform even as many cut back-room deals with criminal networks to protect their own fiefdoms.”); Francklyn B. Geffrard, *Magalie Habitant, Prophane Victor, Eliinor Devallon : les mécanismes d’une collusion politique et médiatique avec les gangs de « viv ansanm » dévoilés par des informations accablantes*, RHI News (Apr. 14, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/magalie-habitant-prophane-victor-eliinor-devallon-les-mecanismes-dune-collusion-politique-et-mediatique-avec-les-gangs-de-viv-ansanm-devoiles-par-des-informations-accablantes/> (“[The] direct involvement of Magalie Habitant, former director of the [National Solid Waste Management Service] SNGRS; former MP Prophane Victor; and the director of the Social Assistance Fund (CAS), Eliinor Devallon, in a vast criminal network supporting the ‘viv ansanm’ coalition. . . . demonstrate[s] that the compromise between politicians and gangs in Haiti has crossed an unprecedented threshold. It is no longer implicit tolerance, but deliberate orchestration, an underground pact structured around public figures, administrative services, economic mechanisms, and armed networks.”); Haiti Libre, *Haïti - FLASH : The Director of the Belladère Customs Office denies (video)* (Mar. 9, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44439-haiti-flash-the-director-of-the-belladere-customs-office-denies-video.html> (reporting on accusations by the Delegate of the Central Department against the Director of the Belladère Customs Office of weapons trafficking and bribery); Juhakenson Blaise, *Police target 16 ‘dangerous’ high profile figures with gang ties, including ex-lawmakers accused of destabilizing regions of Haiti*, *Haitian Times* (Feb. 19, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/02/19/police-actively-seeking-two-ex-parliamentarians-for-alleged-gang-ties/> (authorities issued arrest warrants for 16 individuals, including former Senator Néné Cassy – who has also been sanctioned by the Canadian, U.S., and Dominican governments for corruption and human rights violations – and former Kenscoff legislator Alfredo Antoine, for backing armed group members attacking Kenscoff); UN News, *Support for Haiti needed now ‘more than ever’, Security Council hears* (Jan. 22, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/01/1159341> (“Some reports indicate that powerful political and economic figures in Haiti use the eel industry to launder drug profits.”) (internal quotations omitted); UNODC, *Peace requires transformation: the fight against corruption in Haiti* (2025), <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2025/February/peace-requires-transformation-the-fight-against-corruption-in-haiti.html>; see also Shaw & Le Cour Grandmaison, *Haiti is in a Political and Criminal Crisis that Should Not be Ignored* (Apr. 29, 2025) (“The linkages between gangs and political officials have enabled gang leaders to impose protection racket schemes across the country.”).

¹⁶⁰ As of writing, foreign governments had sanctioned at least 11 Haitian officials for collusion with armed groups. See IJDH, *Foreign Sanctions Against Haitian Individuals (December 2020 – Present)*, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1RG0k34CaID3QmxHt1XW-S_C8Aeyj9Vum1qkhtmiopdo/edit (Last visited Jul. 13, 2025); see also notes 476-488.

¹⁶¹ RHI News, *Haïti : l’insécurité criminelle alimente la faim – quand le terrorisme de Gran Griff et Viv Ansanm bloque l’accès à la nourriture dans un pays à genoux...* (Jun. 13, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/haïti-linsecurite-criminelle-alimente-la-faim-quand-le-terrorisme-de-gran-griff-et-viv-ansanm-bloque-lacces-a-la-nourriture-dans-un-pays-a-genoux/> (accusing the PNH of being “infiltrated, at certain levels” by armed groups); Kervenson Martial, *Haitian police arrest 10 in escalating drug trafficking crackdown*, *Haitian Times* (Jun. 13, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/06/13/drug-marijuana-port-de-paix/> (discussing evidence of police complicity in drug trafficking); RNDDH, Press Release, *Multiplication des attaques armées contre la presse haïtiennes : Le RNDDH rappelle aux autorités de la transition, leur promesse de sécurité* (Mar. 17, 2025), ¶ 6 (“Many PNH officers accused of being members of armed gangs or colluding with bandits are still on duty.”); HRW, *Haiti: Events of 2024* (2025), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/haïti>; HRW, *Restoring Security, Rule of Law and Democratic Governance* (Dec. 9, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/09/restoring-security-rule-law-and-democratic-governance-haiti>.

¹⁶² *Report of the UNODC* (Feb. 4, 2025), ¶ 24 (“At least 1,000 firearms had been diverted from police stocks over the past four years. Allegedly corrupt Haitian National Police officers supply firearms and ammunition to gangs and criminal networks in Haiti.”); *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 61-64; BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 34.

¹⁶³ UN HRC, *Haiti: UN Human Rights Chief alarmed by widening violence as gangs expand reach* (Jun. 13, 2025); *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 46 (reporting over 556 individuals killed by police between March 3 and June 5, 2025); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025) pp. 5, 12 (noting that “police operations against gangs, as well as executions involving police members, accounted for 56 per cent of the [1,617] documented deaths and injuries” between January 1 and March 31); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 21 (reporting 702 people killed by police during operations against armed groups between January and March); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 28 (reporting at least 2,012 people killed during police operations between February 24 and April 4).

¹⁶⁴ *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 46 (reporting that 40% of the 556 people killed by police between March 3 and June 5 were not affiliated with armed groups); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 21 (“An estimated 79 per cent of those killed or injured were affiliated with gangs, while 21 per cent were members of the population.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025) p. 12 (“82 per cent of the casualties were associated with gangs, while the remaining 18 per cent were members of the population that were struck by stray bullets while on the streets or in their homes.”); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶¶ 28-29 (reporting that 73% of victims were affiliated with armed groups, while 27% “were hit when they were not involved in

acts of violence, often struck by stray bullets while in the streets or at home,” with documented incidents where “police fired gunshots from their armoured vehicles into areas where people were walking or selling goods on the streets”).

¹⁶⁵ BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025, ¶ 27 (“These included, among others, summary executions and incidents where insufficient precautionary measures were taken to protect civilians.”)).

¹⁶⁶ Coletta, Mérancourt & Baran, [Haiti turns to weaponized drones in fight against gangs](#) (Apr. 10, 2025) (“[A]nalysts, aid workers and other rights groups . . . say their use in Haiti’s densely populated capital, Port-au-Prince, adds fuel to a combustible conflict, endangers civilians, complicates the delivery of aid and may violate international law.”); see also Press Lakay, *Haiti-Crise : Fritz A. Jean confirme un manque de coordination entre la task-force et la PNH* (Jun. 21, 2025), https://presslakay.net/?p=61851#google_vignette (discussing the “lack of coordination between the task force and the PNH in the use of suicide drones,” as confirmed by TPC President Fritz Alphonse Jean); Shuldiner, [Drone Strikes Shake Haiti’s Gangs but Leave Legal and Strategic Questions](#) (Jun. 24, 2025) (“‘Many of the areas where gangs operate are also home to civilians,’ [AyiboPost editor-in-chief Widlore] Mérancourt added. ‘I can confirm that civilians were harmed [in drone attacks] – this comes from accounts provided by healthcare workers and includes women and children.’”).

¹⁶⁷ See notes 354-356.

¹⁶⁸ See, e.g., Dorcent, [Haiti’s Popular Resistance is Growing in Strength Little by Little](#) (Mar. 26, 2025).

¹⁶⁹ BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 27 (noting 89 documented cases of extrajudicial killings that resulted in 165 fatalities – including 13 children – and 37 injuries; 67 occurred in 2024 and 22 in 2025); see also BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 12 (reporting 65 extrajudicial executions, 50 by police, and 15 by Miragoâne government commissioner Jean Ernest Muscadin, who has executed at least 57 people in the communes of Nippes and Les Cayes since 2022); UN HRC, [Haiti: UN Human Rights Chief alarmed by widening violence as gangs expand reach](#) (Jun. 13, 2025); [Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 50-52, 54 (“During 2024, specialized police units were responsible for 281 summary executions (251 men, 22 women and 8 children). . . . On 7 February 2025, six farmers from the commune of Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite, including a 15-year-old boy, were arrested and later executed by Police officers.”); Martial, [Fear and outrage sweep Haiti’s northwest after police accused of killing Haitian American businessman](#) (Apr. 29, 2025) (police were accused of brutally executing a Haitian-American businessman in the Northwest Department); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 21 (“There have been reports that national police officers summarily executed 49 suspected gang members who were unarmed and not engaged in violence, as well as individuals who, when arrested, were unable to provide identification.”); BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 29; Amnesty International, [Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 23 (teenage boys are particularly at risk of being targeted by police for extrajudicial killings).

¹⁷⁰ BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 16-17.

¹⁷¹ RNDDH, [Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country](#) (Apr. 25, 2025), ¶ 114; see, e.g., Juhakenson Blaise, *Anti-gang protest shuts down Port-au-Prince; police fire tear gas*, *Haitian Times* (Apr. 3, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/04/03/haitian-capital-violence-port-au-prince-anti-gang/> (police used tear gas and live ammunition against protesters in Port-au-Prince in March and April; the former resulted in “the death of at least one protester and injuries to at least three others from police gunfire”); Charles, [Thousands march against gangs in Haiti as Vatican is notified of murder of two nuns](#) (Apr. 2, 2025); *Alterpresse*, *La Pnh reprime de Nouvelles mobilisations contre la criminalité en Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31545>; Dorcent, [Haiti’s Popular Resistance is Growing in Strength Little by Little](#) (Mar. 26, 2025); Roberson Alphonse, *PM Fils-Aimé Speaks Out Following Anti-Insecurity Protest*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Mar. 20, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254383/pm-fils-aime-speaks-out-following-anti-insecurity-protest>; Jean Junior Celestin, *Unrest and Demonstrations Shake Port-au-Prince This Thursday*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Feb. 20, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/253499/unrest-and-demonstrations-shake-port-au-prince-this-thursday>.

¹⁷² [Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 53 (reporting 32 investigations into 40 officers from October to December 2024, only 4 of whom were implicated in human rights abuses; of those investigations, 9 were closed, 25 were subject to administrative actions, and only 1 was sent for prosecution); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 21 (“From January to March, the Inspectorate General of the Haitian National Police [IGNPH] opened 22 investigations into 13 officers. . . . [regarding] nine cases of alleged human rights violations . . . [and] alleged extrajudicial executions primarily involving specialized police units. Six previously opened investigations were finalized, as a result of which it was recommended that three police officers be dismissed and four others placed on unpaid leave. As at [sic] April, those recommendations had not been implemented. Two of the cases were referred for prosecution.”); BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 18 (“[T]he IGPNH opened 67 investigations into the 96 incidents [between January and March], potentially involving . . . unlawful use of force by the police, which had been referred by the HRS in the last quarter of 2024. . . . No investigation has been finalized as of 31 March.”); BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 35 (“According to the information gathered by OHCHR during the reporting period, only 23 cases of human rights violations involving police officers were investigated by the General Police Inspectorate, with 3 of these cases being referred to the justice system for prosecution. . . . A case in point of this lack of accountability in relation to the execution of two Medecins Sans Frontieres’ (MSF) patients by alleged police elements on 11 November 2024. . . . As of February 2025, the IGPNH had yet to conclude its investigation into these alleged violations, and no one has been held accountable.”); see also BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 22 (“Minimal progress has been made in the police vetting process since its launch in June 2023. With 923 police officers and administrative personnel from the entire force identified for vetting, only six background checks have been conducted.”); Haiti Libre, [Haiti - FLASH : Au moins 1 haïtien tué, blessé ou enlevé chaque heure en 2024](#) (Jan. 8, 2025) (“The Haitian National Police, with the support of the international community, should also strengthen its oversight mechanism to hold accountable police officers who are allegedly involved in human rights violations.”).

¹⁷³ UNODC, [Peace requires transformation: the fight against corruption in Haiti](#) (2025); OHCHR, [Haiti: Immediate action is needed to address the human rights crisis](#) (Feb. 27, 2025); see also ICG, [Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti](#) (Feb.

19, 2025), p. 5 (“The [Transitional Presidential] council has itself been undermined by both allegations of corruption and rising tensions between its members and the groups that took part in the Jamaica summit.”).

¹⁷⁴ Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index: Haiti*, <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024/index/hti> (last visited Jul. 13, 2025).

¹⁷⁵ RNDDH, *Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country* (Apr. 25, 2025), ¶¶ 17-19 (TPC members’ monthly salary – 225,000 gourdes (approx. US\$1,700) – makes up just 2% of their monthly “allowance,” which includes line items like 75,000 gourdes (approx. US\$570) for “refrigerator filling expenses,” 3,500,000 gourdes (US\$26,600) for breakfast and lunch, and 2,500,000 gourdes (approx. US\$19,000) for “debit card;” they also grant themselves special allowances, up to 5,500,000 gourdes (approx. US\$41,900), for holidays and special occasions); Kettia JP Taylor, *Corruption : 500 000 gourdes par mois sans aucune fonction, les conjoints des Conseillers-présidents grassement monnayés*, Haiti Infos Pro (Apr. 5, 2025), <https://haitiinfospro.com/conseil-presidentiel-de-transition-les-conjoints-des-membres-remunerer-500-000-gourdes-par-mois-sans-aucune-fonction/> (reporting that these monthly “allowances” are “carefully concealed under different budget headings” and include “an envelope of 500,000 [approx. US\$3,800] gourdes intended for the ‘spouse’ of each councilor,” none of whom hold a public office, and “an additional 450,000 gourdes [approx. US\$3,400] for a ‘second residence,’ an unjustifiable premium in a country where thousands of families live in precarious camps or sleep in the open”). In a country where nearly half the population lives on less than US\$2.15 per day, these numbers are staggering. See note 295.

¹⁷⁶ RNDDH, *Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country* (Apr. 25, 2025), ¶ 82 (“[P]residential advisers consider[] the funds allocated for intelligence as personal allowances. They divide the available amount among themselves, each receiving five million (5,000,000) gourdes per month. Despite numerous calls from Haitian society in general, and civil society organizations in particular, urging them to renounce this amount, nothing has changed.”); Charles, *Haiti police, army to get more money in ‘war budget,’ but overall increase still small* (Apr. 16, 2025) (“The council . . . has been criticized for using intelligence money to fund its salaries in the amended 2024-25 budget.”); Taylor, *Corruption : 500 000 gourdes par mois sans aucune fonction, les conjoints des Conseillers-présidents grassement monnayés* (Apr. 5, 2025) (“[F]unds earmarked for state intelligence services, which are supposed to strengthen the fight against insecurity, are also being redistributed among the members of the Council. . . . This legal misappropriation of public funds by the CPT is not subject to any investigation, audit, or official questioning.”); see also Prensa Latina, *Another figure in Haiti’s political life accused of corruption* (May 22, 2025), <https://www.plenglish.com/news/2025/05/22/another-figure-in-haitis-political-life-accused-of-corruption/> (several human rights organizations accused TPC observer member Frinel Joseph of embezzling funds intended for intelligence services).

¹⁷⁷ The three members involved are Smith Augustin (representing EDE/RED), Louis Gérald Gilles (representing the December 21 Agreement), and Emmanuel Vertilaire (representing *Petit Desalin*). The three are accused of soliciting \$760,000 from the then-chairman of the *Banque Nationale de Credit* in exchange for allowing him to retain his position as chairman of the bank. BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, ¶¶ 5-7, UN Doc. S/2024/742 (Oct. 15, 2024), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4064139?ln=en&v=pdf>.

¹⁷⁸ *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 79; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 17; BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 25.

¹⁷⁹ See RNDDH, *Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country* (Apr. 25, 2025), ¶ 81 (“The handling of this case by the judiciary, as well as the behavior of the CPT, reveals the evident lack of willingness on the part of this body to respect its commitments to fight corruption.”).

¹⁸⁰ RHI News, *Haiti – Lutte contre la corruption : L’ULCC transmet six nouveaux rapports accablants à la justice, ECC salue “un pas important malgré l’inertie judiciaire”*... (May 14, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/haiti-lutte-contre-la-corruption-lulcc-transmet-six-nouveaux-rapports-accablants-a-la-justice-ecc-salue-un-pas-important-malgre-linertie-judiciaire/> (implicated institutions include the Departmental Tax Directorate of the Centre, the Office of Citizen Protection (OPC), the Office of Work-Related Accidents, Sickness and Maternity Insurance, the Directorate of Immigration and Emigration, as well as several Identity Document Reception and Delivery Centers); Juhakenson Blaise, *Haiti anti-corruption unit uncovers nearly \$2M in embezzled public funds*, Haitian Times (May 12, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/05/12/ulcc-targets-three-former-government-officials-for-corruption/> (“totaling over \$987,000 in public losses”); RHI News, *Soupçons de corruption, gestion illicite de fonds publics, et entrave à la justice : révélations accablantes de l’ULCC sur la gestion du CRLDI de Saint-Marc*... (May 11, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/soupcons-de-corruption-gestion-illicite-de-fonds-publics-et-entrave-a-la-justice-revelations-accablantes-de-lulcc-sur-la-gestion-du-crldi-de-saint-marc/> (among the alleged crimes are “corruption, financial mismanagement, favoritism, organized racketeering, and obstruction of the judicial process”); Michelson Césaire, *Scandale de corruption à l’OPC : 16,5 millions de gourdes auraient été détournées pour des voyages fictifs*, Le Nouvelliste (May 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/255996/scandale-de-corruption-a-lopc-165-millions-de-gourdes-auraient-ete-detournees-pour-des-voyages-fictifs>; Alterpresse, *Haiti – Accusations de corruption au Ministère de la jeunesse : le regroupement Ecc demande une enquête sur la ministre Niola Devalis Octavius* (Jul. 4, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31904> (a report by the ECC accused the Minister of Youth, Sports, and Civic Action of “abuses of power, financial irregularities and non-compliance with administrative procedures”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 27 (in February, a court issued a warrant for the former Director General of the National Pension Insurance Office, who is accused of “illegal procurement, abuse of office, and misappropriation of public property”); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 53 (“Corruption in customs administration is one of the key areas of concern. According to IMF, there is 50 per cent discrepancy between the value of goods formally exported from the Dominican Republic to Haiti and the value declared by Haiti of goods imported from the Dominican Republic.”); Michelson Césaire, *Authorities Issue Wanted Notice for Former Ombudsman Renan Hédouville*, Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 14, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254193/authorities-issue-wanted-notice-for-former-ombudsman-renan-hedouville> (the ULCC accused former head of the OPC “for illegal public contract awards, abuse of office, embezzlement of public property, and obstruction of justice”); Juhakenson Blaise, *Two former and one current Haitian high-ranking officials arrested on corruption charges*, Haitian Times (Feb. 11, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/02/11/two-former-haitian-officials->

[arrested-for-corruption/](#) (discussing corruption within the National Insurance Office, the National School Canteen Program, and the Social Assistance Fund); see also Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Politic : Rain of diplomatic appointments under political pressure* (Jun. 8, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45081-haiti-politic-rain-of-diplomatic-appointments-under-political-pressure.html> (reporting on allegations by sitting TPC President Fritz Alphonse Jean and Foreign Minister Harvel Jean-Baptiste that certain new diplomatic appointments were made under political pressure from members of the TPC and the Prime Minister); Alterpresse, *Haiti-Cpt-Polémique : Vives répliques entre les autorités de transition après les accusations de Fritz Jean sur des nominations diplomatiques jugées abusives* (Jun. 10, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31814>.

¹⁸¹ BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 33 (“Information gathered by OHCHR indicates passive corruption within the police institution, potentially undermining its effectiveness in combating the availability of firearms and ammunition and gang activities. . . . [T]he World Bank reported that the police would demand at least \$200 per container from economic operators to provide escort services for convoys transporting goods through gang-controlled areas.”); RHI News, *Scandale de corruption dans l’attribution d’un marché public : ECC exige l’annulation et des sanctions...* (Mar. 21, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/scandale-de-corruption-dans-lattribution-dun-marche-public-ecc-exige-lannulation-et-des-sanctions/> (the ECC Ensemble Contre la Corruption (ECC) exposed “massive corruption, collusion between bidders, and a blatant lack of transparency in the award process” for a major police catering contract); UNSC, *Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council* (Feb. 24, 2025), p. 4.

¹⁸² See notes 210-211 (discussing the creation of the new unit and civil society concerns around its effectiveness).

¹⁸³ *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 80-82 (“In November 2024, the Criminal Court of Hinche (Centre Department) sentenced an inspector at the Directorate General of Taxes to four years in prison for embezzlement of public funds, following investigations by the country’s anti-corruption unit. . . . [I]n February 2025, the Haitian National Police also arrested the former Director General of the National Insurance Office for embezzling public funds. Despite the anti-corruption unit’s continued investigation of high-profile cases, there have been only two successful prosecutions of this type in 20 years.”); RHI News, *Haiti – Lutte contre la corruption : L’ULCC transmet six nouveaux rapports accablants à la justice, ECC salue “un pas important malgré l’inertie judiciaire”...* (May 14, 2025) (“[F]rom 2006 to 2024, more than a hundred investigation reports were transmitted to the courts by the ULCC and UCREF, but only three judgments have been rendered to date.”); Blaise, *Haiti anti-corruption unit uncovers nearly \$2M in embezzled public funds* (May 12, 2025) (“Despite the scale of these offenses, the ULCC warns that Haiti’s justice system has rarely followed through. Between 2004 and 2024, the agency submitted 87 reports recommending criminal prosecution. Only one case led to a conviction, while four were closed—one through dismissal.”); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 37 (“Convictions for corruption are exceedingly rare and national anti-corruption and accountability mechanisms remain under-resourced.”); RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶ 16; Blaise, *Two former and one current Haitian high-ranking officials arrested on corruption charges* (Feb. 11, 2025). But see BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 17 (“Between January and March, several public administration officials or former officials were prosecuted for alleged acts of corruption.”).

¹⁸⁴ GI-TOC, *Living Together: The Gangs of Haiti – Part 1: The Death of a President* (Apr. 22, 2025), at 53:42; Invité.e, *The Fight For Haiti: A Documentary on the Petrocaribe Movement*, Ayibopost (Nov. 10, 2024), <https://ayibopost.com/opinion-the-fight-for-haiti/>.

¹⁸⁵ Alterpresse, *Assassinat de Jean Dominique : Le mutisme persistant de la Cour d’appel de Port-au-Prince et de la plus haute Cour d’Haïti* (Apr. 3, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31566>; RHI News, *Haiti – Lutte contre la corruption : L’ULCC transmet six nouveaux rapports accablants à la justice, ECC salue “un pas important malgré l’inertie judiciaire”...* (May 14, 2025); Haiti Libre, *Haiti - FLASH : Au moins 1 haïtien tué, blessé ou enlevé chaque heure en 2024* (Jan. 8, 2025); see also Aljany Narcisus, *Haiti’s Madan Sara face extortion and violence from gangs*, Haitian Times (Mar. 9, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/03/09/haiti-women-rights-fight-in-freefall/> (lawyer, feminist, and human rights activist Fabigaëlle Liboiron says, “Haiti’s systemic violence is not a coincidence but a reflection of a system that normalizes injustice”) (internal quotations omitted).

¹⁸⁶ See note 5 (discussing issues with its promulgation).

¹⁸⁷ Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, *Budget de la République, Decree establishing the Rectifying Budget of the Republic of Haiti. - Fiscal year 2024-2025*, p. 11 (Apr. 24, 2025) <https://www.mef.gouv.ht/budgets/lois> (the justice sector represents just 1.9 % of the government budget).

¹⁸⁸ BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 20 (noting attacks on courts by armed groups); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, ¶ 40, UN Doc. S/2025/28 (Jan. 13, 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/un_sg_report_on_haiti_-_13_january_2025.pdf (“Justice institutions are heavily impacted by gang violence, as a result of prevailing insecurity and deliberate attacks to render premises and infrastructure non-operational.”).

¹⁸⁹ Michelson Césaire, *Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance Operates Only on Paper after Relocation*, Le Nouvelliste (Apr. 22, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/255508/port-au-prince-court-of-first-instance-operates-only-on-paper-after-relocation> (due to a combination of insecurity-related challenges, persistent under-resourcing, and general dysfunction, the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance has “gone several years without criminal hearings, without holding assize sessions, and without civil court sessions,” with “litigants . . . left to fend for themselves”); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 37; HRW, *Haiti: Events of 2024* (2025); see also RNDDH, *Appareil judiciaire et Centres de détention en Haïti : Une Justice affaiblie, des résultats invisibles et la violation systématique des garanties judiciaires des détenus.es*, ¶¶ 45-49, 54, 60-62 (Nov. 7, 2024), https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/7-Rap-Justice-2023-2024-Prisons-07Nov2024.FR_.pdf (discussing attacks and threats against courthouses across Haiti in 2024).

¹⁹⁰ RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶ 13 (“During the 2023-2024 judicial year, only fifteen (15) of the country’s eighteen (18) courts of first instance held criminal hearings, during which only two hundred and forty-one (241) people were tried.”).

¹⁹¹ Césaire, *Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance Operates Only on Paper after Relocation* (Apr. 22, 2025).

¹⁹² RNDDH, *Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country* (Apr. 25, 2025), ¶¶ 71-73 (the space still lacks electricity, computers, fans, or air conditioning, and “no space has been set up for detainees;” the decision to relocate the Court and Prosecutor’s Office to this space for a period of nine months was taken despite a report produced by the Superior Council of the Judiciary concluding “that the space was not suitable for housing the court”); Césaire, *Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance Operates Only on Paper after Relocation* (Apr. 22, 2025) (“The dean of the Court of First Instance of Port-au-Prince, Me Bernard Saint-Vil. . . [says] ‘[w]e can’t schedule hearings because the rooms aren’t prepared for that. We still don’t have the means to receive the litigants.’ . . . ‘It’s a complete disaster here,’ says Jusnel Jean, a lawyer with the Port-au-Prince Bar. ‘Justice has been abandoned. The Ministry of Justice, which holds the investment budget, has done nothing to restore the justice system’s image. . . . The prosecutors, who are supposed to uphold social order, can’t preside over hearings in peace. There are no suitable conditions for the court to operate. . . . It’s the end of April, and there’s no indication that even one hearing will be held at this court due to the lack of infrastructure.’”); Michelson Césaire, *Due to Insecurity, Port-au-Prince Court Moves Operations to Delmas*, Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 24, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254510/due-to-insecurity-port-au-prince-court-moves-operations-to-delmas>. The Court has been forced to relocate multiple times over the last few years due to insecurity. BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 29; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 15; see also HRW, *Haiti: Events of 2024* (2025) (“[F]ew measures have been taken to relocate the courts or provide security for judicial officials.”).

¹⁹³ RHI News, *Réforme judiciaire et crise du personnel : “le RENAMAH interpelle les autorités sur l’effondrement des tribunaux haïtiens”*... (Apr. 23, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/reforme-judiciaire-et-crise-du-personnel-le-renamah-interpelle-les-autorites-sur-leffondrement-des-tribunaux-haitiens/> (“[D]ozens of peace courts are currently without judges or with a staff reduced to one or two magistrates. . . . The situation is equally worrying at the level of the courts of first instance and the country’s five courts of appeal. . . . In some courts of appeal, the staffing levels are no longer sufficient to organize regular hearings, and several courts risk closing their doors completely by June 2025.”).

¹⁹⁴ HRW, *Haiti: Events of 2024* (2025); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 37.

¹⁹⁵ UN HRC, *Interactive Dialogue with the High Commissioner and the Human Rights Expert on Haiti*, p. 3 (Mar. 28, 2025), <https://gchragd.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/HC-Report-on-Haiti.pdf>; BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶¶ 37-38 (“[R]eports highlight a continued lack of independence within the judiciary and pressure from influential figures, undermining the integrity of the legal system and eroding public trust in its ability to fairly uphold the law.”). Corruption is also a primary contributing factor to prison escapes. See note 218.

¹⁹⁶ The January arrests of former Deputy of Petite-Rivière in the Artibonite Prophane Victor and former director of the National Solid Waste Management Service Magalie Habitant for alleged ties with criminal groups and corruption are rare exceptions in a context where those with political or armed group connections often evade accountability. Juhakenson Blaise, *Haitian ex-lawmaker and former director arrested in ongoing gang crisis investigation*, Haitian Times (Jan. 14, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/01/14/ex-lawmaker-arrested-in-investigation-probe-for-alleged-gang-ties/> (noting that Victor has faced credible accusations of colluding with armed groups – including the *Gran Grif* group, which is largely responsible for the escalating violence in the Artibonite Department – since 2019); AP News, *Haitian police arrest ex-lawmaker long accused of arming gangs to influence elections* (Jan. 13, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-prophane-victor-arrested-gang-violence-ec37d1b677f8ffe4b98a8fe01e793af5>; GI-TOC, *Last Chance? Breaking Haiti’s Political and Criminal Impasse* (Jan. 2025), p. 14; see also IJDH, *Foreign Sanctions Against Haitian Individuals (December 2020 – Present)* (last visited Jul. 13, 2025) (Victor has been sanctioned by the Dominican Republic, Canada, the United States, and the UN for, *inter alia*, supporting armed groups).

¹⁹⁷ Prominent examples include armed group leader Jimmy Chérizier and former government officials Fednel Monchery and Joseph Pierre Richard Duplan, all of whom remain free despite having been charged for their involvement in the 2018 La Saline massacre. See note 209.

¹⁹⁸ Prison Insider, *Haiti: the root cause of prison escapes* (Mar. 25, 2025), <https://www.prison-insider.com/en/articles/a-l-origine-des-evasions>; AP News, *Haitian police arrest ex-lawmaker long accused of arming gangs to influence elections* (Jan. 13, 2025); see, e.g., Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Justice : Judge Merlan Bélabre suspended for 3 months by the CSPJ* (Jan. 19, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44095-haiti-justice-judge-merlan-belabre-suspended-for-3-months-by-the-cspj.html> (the Superior Council on Judicial Power (CSPJ) placed Judge Merlan Bélabre – who has been frequently criticized for his “questionable” release decisions – on leave for three months after he ordered the release of a school principal accused of raping and impregnating a 14-year-old girl).

¹⁹⁹ See Haiti Libre, *Haiti - News : Zapping...* (Jun. 22, 2025) (lawyer and former President of the Les Cayes Chamber of Commerce Pierre Antoine Borgat was assassinated in his office on June 19); *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 80-82 (“Interested parties seen to be influential often jeopardize [corruption] prosecutions by threatening prosecutors and judges if they do not act in their favour.”); RHI News, *Haiti : le cabinet de Me Guerby Blaise attaqué et pillé par des membres de “Viv Ansanm”*... (Jun. 10, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/haiti-le-cabinet-de-me-guerby-blaise-attaque-et-pille-par-des-membres-de-viv-ansanm/> (members of the *Viv Ansanm* coalition attacked one of the few remaining law offices in Port-au-Prince, beating the lawyer and stealing confidential files, electronic equipment, personal belongings, and furniture).

²⁰⁰ BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 38.

²⁰¹ Blaise, [Haitians reject draft constitution over concerns of fragmentation and weakened democracy](#) (Jun. 9, 2025); RHI News, *Avant-projet de Constitution haïtienne : “le pouvoir judiciaire rétrogradé à une simple autorité”, dénonce le professeur Sonet Saint-Louis...* (Jun. 2, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/politique/avant-projet-de-constitution-haitienne-le-pouvoir-judiciaire-retrograde-a-une-simple-autorite-denonce-le-professeur-sonet-saint-louis/> (constitutional scholar Sonet Saint-Louis warns that the proposed text “eliminates the judiciary as a sovereign power” and reduces it to a simple authority devoid of democratic legitimacy”) (internal quotations omitted).

²⁰² RNDDH, [Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques](#) (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶ 7-8, 13 (just 16 people were convicted of sexual crimes during the 2023-2024 judicial year, in comparison to the huge number of sexual crimes committed); see also notes 268-269.

²⁰³ GI-TOC, [Living Together: The Gangs of Haiti – Part 2: Fighting Back](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), at 27:30; BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), pp. 15-16 (reporting that no suspects have been arrested in connection with the armed group attack on Wharf Jérémie, and just one has been arrested in connection with the attacks on Kenscoff, and that “no action has been taken by the Port-au-Prince prosecutor’s office to investigate these attacks and identify their perpetrators”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 77; BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 39 (“Legal proceedings against those suspected of committing human rights violations and abuses have consistently failed to result in trials or convictions. . . . Entrenched impunity remains prevalent regarding killings committed by gangs possessing firearms as well as their alleged enablers.”); BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 53; GI-TOC, [Last Chance? Breaking Haiti’s Political and Criminal Impasse](#) (Jan. 2025), p. 14; HRW, [Haiti: Events of 2024](#) (2025); BINUH, [United Nations Investigation Report Brings to 207 the Number of People Executed by the Wharf Jérémie](#) (Dec. 23, 2024); Solages, [The life and death of a displaced Haitian woman](#) (Dec. 18, 2024) (A woman whose daughter was killed, allegedly by a (possibly former) police officer, “did not file a complaint because she did not believe it would make a difference. ‘I know who killed my daughter, but there is no justice in Haiti.’”); see also notes 474-475 (discussing the lack of progress in various arms trafficking cases in Haiti).

²⁰⁴ Over four years after the assassination of former President Jovenel Moïse on July 7, 2021, the Haitian investigation into his murder remains ineffectual and hampered by judicial dysfunction. Evens Sanon & Dánica Coto, *Haiti’s president was killed 4 years ago. The questions around his death remain unanswered*, AP News (Jun. 16, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-president-killed-moise-investigation-court-judge-3292934f132e2da95a72b147c33550c9> (“Not one suspect imprisoned in Haiti has faced trial after being charged in the killing of President Jovenel Moïse. . . . Gang violence, death threats and a crumbling judicial system have stalled an ongoing investigation defined by outbursts and tense exchanges between suspects and judges.”); RHI News, *L’audience des suspects dans l’assassinat de Jovenel Moïse à nouveau reportée à huitaine...* (Jan. 13, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/audience-des-suspects-dans-l-assassinat-de-jovenel-moise-a-nouveau-reportee-a-huitaine/>; see also Pierre-Richard Luxama, Dánica Coto & Evens Sanon, *Judges probing Haiti’s 2021 presidential assassination grill a former prime minister*, AP News (Jun. 25, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-jovenel-moise-claude-joseph-interrogated-court-7dd8d33366c043b92751034ca6922efa> (former acting Prime Minister Claude Joseph appeared in Court in June in connection with the investigation; President Moïse’s wife, Martine Moïse, and former police chief Léon Charles have thus far failed to respond to recent court summons).

²⁰⁵ Dorval was shot and killed outside his home hours after he had publicly denounced the PHTK government’s management of the country. BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 15; Roberson Alphonse, *Murder of Me Monferrier Dorval: a new judge steps aside*, Canada-Haiti Information Project (Dec. 5, 2023), <https://canada-haiti.ca/content/murder-me-monferrier-dorval-new-judge-steps-aside>.

²⁰⁶ Unidentified individuals shot and killed Charles and Duclair on June 29, 2021. Four years later, there has been no movement in the case. Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2025: Haiti* (2025), <https://freedomhouse.org/country/haiti/freedom-world/2025>.

²⁰⁷ Jeudy, the president of the LGBTQI+ advocacy organization *Kouraj*, was found dead in his home on November 25, 2019. Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2025: Haiti* (2025); HRW, *Haiti: Events of 2022* (2023), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/haiti>.

²⁰⁸ Invité.e, [The Fight For Haiti: A Documentary on the Petrocaribe Movement](#) (Nov. 10, 2024).

²⁰⁹ BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 39 (noting the lack of progress in investigations into the massacres in Grand Ravine (2017), La Saline (2018), and Bel Air (2019); “[i]n July 2024, the investigative judge concluded his investigation and indicted 30 individuals in relation to the 2018 massacre in La Saline, including political figures and gang leaders, without any convictions to date”).

²¹⁰ HPN Info, [Publication du décret instituant deux nouveaux pôles judiciaires spécialisés dans le système pénal haïtien](#) (Apr. 22, 2025), <https://www.hpninfo.com/post/publication-du-d%C3%A9cret-instituant-deux-nouveaux-p%C3%B4les-judiciaires-sp%C3%A9cialis%C3%A9s-dans-le-syst%C3%A8me-p%C3%A9nal-ha%C3%AB>; OHCHR, [Haiti: Immediate action is needed to address the human rights crisis](#) (Feb. 27, 2025). Some steps have been taken toward the implementation of these units: in late June, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security published a notice recruiting applicants for 10 new prosecutor positions for the specialized judicial units (Le Nouvelliste, *Ministère de la Justice et de la Sécurité Publique, Avis de Recrutement* (Jun. 25, 2025), <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DDPAcwSwJk-giHmwSlchA-dAxuE4HVq/view?usp=sharing>), and the Port-au-Prince Bar Association has conducted trainings for 150 lawyers on how to engage effectively with the new units (BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 30).

²¹¹ ECC et al., Press Release, *Publication par le pouvoir de transition du décret sur les poles judiciaires spécialisés : des organisations condamnent l’ignorance délibérée des recommandations citoyennes* (May 2, 2025), <https://ecc-haiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Communiqu%C3%A9-de-presse-Publication-par-le-pouvoir-de-transition-du-decret-sur-les-poles-judiciaires-specialises-des-organisations-condamnent-l-ignorance-deliberee-des-recommandations-citoyennes.pdf> (the ECC, *Justice et Paix Haïti*, *Nègès Mawon*, POHDH, and RNDDH note that the government has not incorporated any measures “to respond effectively

to the structural challenges and reform needs of the Haitian justice system,” demonstrating “a total lack of willingness to establish and maintain a corridor for consultation, dialogue and collaboration with civil society organizations;” and that “this decree can only be seen as an attempt to protect the interests of a ruling elite rather than serve the Haitian people’s quest for justice, since, by continuing a model that has already failed for several decades, the decree in question maintains impunity rather than putting an end to it”).

²¹² Junior Jean Celestin, *Aucune prison fonctionnelle dans la zone métropolitaine, le ministre de la Justice tire la sonnette d’alarme*, Le Nouvelliste (May 5, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/255851/aucune-prison-fonctionnelle-dans-la-zone-metropolitaine-le-ministre-de-la-justice-tire-la-sonnette-dalarme> (Justice and Public Security Minister Patrick Péliissier said there are over 7,000 people incarcerated across the country, far exceeding capacity); Charles, *‘We are all by ourselves’: Haitians warn that fall of Port-au-Prince is imminent* (Mar. 20, 2025) (908 people are currently incarcerated in Cap-Haïtien’s only prison, which has a capacity of 228; a prison intended to hold 80 minors currently holds over 400 men, women, and children); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 38 (the Center for the Rehabilitation of Minors in Conflict with the Law (CERMICOL) “is operating at five times its intended capacity,” holding 551 men, women, and children).

²¹³ Seven of the country’s 21 prisons – including the three largest – are non-functional due to “extensive gang-related damage.” UNSC, *Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council* (Feb. 27, 2025), p. 2; see also Celestin, *Aucune prison fonctionnelle dans la zone métropolitaine, le ministre de la Justice tire la sonnette d’alarme* (May 5, 2025) (“[M]any prisons and police stations serving as detention centers in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area have been destroyed, burned down, or have come under the control of armed gangs. This sad circumstance exacerbates the prison problem,” the [Justice and Public Security] minister said, recalling that there are currently no prisons in the metropolitan area.”); IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024* (Jun. 2024), p. 7.

²¹⁴ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 37. Cf. BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 32 (reporting 281%).

²¹⁵ A report by RNDDH revealed that “[i]n the West department, holding cells have become de facto prisons,” with people detained in holding cells for “days or even months in cramped, unventilated, and poorly lit cells,” including after they have already been convicted. In seven of the ten police stations that RNDDH monitored, the organization reported a lack of food (“[s]ometimes, cellmates share their food to prevent others from starving”); unsanitary conditions; and rampant disease among those detained in holding cells. See generally RNDDH, *Overcrowding, Unsanitary Conditions, and Spread of Contagious Diseases: RNDDH Demands Respect for the Human Dignity of Individuals Held in Police Stations* (May 30, 2025), <https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/5-RapM-Commissariat-et-Sous-Commissariat-30Mai2025.ENG.pdf>.

²¹⁶ RNDDH, *Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country* (Apr. 25, 2025), ¶¶ 64-65 (“At the beginning of the 2024-2025 judicial year, many promises were made by judicial heads to intensify correctional and criminal hearings. However, only a few rare criminal hearings have taken place to date in some jurisdictions. . . . These hearings were not scheduled based on the number of pending cases, so they have had no impact on the legal situation of the prison population.”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 34 (criminal hearings without jury assistance were held in Croix-des-Bouquets and Les Cayes “to address prolonged pretrial detention,” resulting in the prosecution of 132 defendants); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 19.

²¹⁷ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 37 (reporting that 5,854 out of 7,154 incarcerated persons across the country are in pretrial detention as of June 4); RNDDH, *Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country* (Apr. 25, 2025), ¶ 65 (“As of April 24, 2025, the Haitian prison population is estimated at 7,128 prisoners. . . . 82.17% [of whom] are awaiting trial.”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 32 (“As at [sic] 2 April, the prison population stood at 7,045 inmates. . . . Of that number, 5,809 (82 per cent) are in prolonged pretrial detention, while 1,236 have been convicted.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 17 (“As of 31 March 2025, 7,613 people were detained in Haiti’s prisons. . . . Eighty-three per cent of detainees were in pre-trial detention.”); see also RHI News, *Réforme judiciaire et crise du personnel : “le RENAMAH interpelle les autorités sur l’effondrement des tribunaux haïtiens”* (Apr. 23, 2025) (attributing the high rates of prolonged pretrial detention to judicial staffing issues and general judicial dysfunction); O’Neill, *Violence, Abuses and Hunger in Haiti* (Jan. 30, 2025) (“At least four out of every five detainees have never been convicted of any crime. They are awaiting trial, some for years now and often for petty offenses.”). Note that actual number of people currently held in pretrial detention may be slightly lower than reported due to the armed group attack on the Mirebalais prison on March 31. See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), note 35; Charles, *Gangs attack police station, prison in central Haiti town, more than 500 inmates escape* (Mar. 31, 2025) (noting that just 65 of the escapees had been before a judge and sentenced, with the rest held in pretrial detention; this roughly corresponds with the national pretrial detention rate); note 220.

²¹⁸ Prison Insider, *Haiti: the root cause of prison escapes* (Mar. 25, 2025) (according to Roberson Édouard, researcher in sociology and a co-founding member of the Centre for Research and Exchange on Security and Justice, “failures within the judicial system that are causing overcrowding in prisons and poor detention conditions,” combined with the strength of the armed groups and corruption among prison officers, are behind the high rate of escapes from Haitian prisons; “[s]everal reports have revealed that prison officers have colluded with gangs or engaged in corrupt behaviour as part of a strategy to relieve overcrowding in prisons”) (internal quotations omitted); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 32 (“Prison security operations are being severely affected by growing staff attrition. There are 716 prison security guards staffing the 14 working prisons, with a ratio of 11 prisoners per guard.”).

²¹⁹ Vibhu Mishra, *Haiti faces ‘point of no return’ as gang violence fuels chaos*, UN News (Apr. 21, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/04/1162436> (the attack on the Mirebalais prison was the fifth prison break in less than a year); see also Charles, *Gangs attack police station, prison in central Haiti town, more than 500 inmates escape* (Mar. 31, 2025) (“The

attack on the Mirebalais prison followed the same pattern as the attacks a year ago against the National Penitentiary in the capital and the Croix-des-Bouquet Civil prison on its outskirts. . . . ‘The same phenomenon was repeated and nothing was done to prevent it,’ [head of human rights group Fondasyon Je Klere Marie Yolene] Gi[l]les said.”).

²²⁰ BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 11 (reporting that the attack led to the escape of 515 individuals, including members of armed groups and persons being held in connection with an arms trafficking case); RNDDH, [Fall of Two Communes in the Centre Department into the Hands of Armed Gangs: Transitional Authorities Worsen the Country’s Security Crisis](#) (Apr. 10, 2025), ¶ 12 (reporting that 532 out of 533 people detained at the prison escaped; the one that failed to escape was killed by armed group members); Evens Sanon & Dánica Coto, [Gangs strike in Haiti’s heartland as hundreds flee under heavy gunfire](#), AP News (Mar. 31, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/central-haiti-gangs-attack-mirebalais-saut-deau-8d93113d77c7ee5c7b505368f99bcef9> (reporting at least 530 people escaped); Charles, [Gangs attack police station, prison in central Haiti town, more than 500 inmates escape](#) (Mar. 31, 2025) (reporting over 500 of 516 people detained at the prison escaped).

²²¹ RNDDH, [Fall of Two Communes in the Centre Department into the Hands of Armed Gangs: Transitional Authorities Worsen the Country’s Security Crisis](#) (Apr. 10, 2025), ¶ 7 (“Vehicles parked around and inside the prison were set ablaze. Office and IT equipment, along with firearms, were looted. The gangs then set fire to inmates’ mattresses. Although the structure suffered limited damage, the facility is currently unusable.”); BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 11; Charles, [Gangs attack police station, prison in central Haiti town, more than 500 inmates escape](#) (Mar. 31, 2025).

²²² Alterpresse, [Femmes et filles en danger au Cermicol : L’alerte de la Pohdh en Haïti](#) (May 5, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31668> (“More than 158 women and girls are crammed into two cramped and unsanitary spaces [in CERMICOL]. . . . The detainees receive only one meal a day, which is nutritionally inadequate.”); BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 17; Gérard Maxineau, [Six détenus s’évadent de la prison civile de Grande-Rivière du Nord](#), Le Nouvelliste (Apr. 15, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/255288/six-detenus-sevadent-de-la-prison-civile-de-grande-riviere-du-nord> (“[T]he Cap-Haïtien civil prison does not have food for the 905 incarcerated inmates.”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jan. 13, 2025), ¶ 37 (insecurity impedes the delivery of food and supplies); see also BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 37 (“A 24 March directive by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security concerning the decentralization of food supply to improve the dire conditions of detention has yet to be implemented.”).

²²³ See, e.g., Maxineau, [Six détenus s’évadent de la prison civile de Grande-Rivière du Nord](#) (Apr. 15, 2025) (the head of the prison in Cap-Haïtien launched “urgent appeal to the entire population of the city to come to the aid of the inmates of the . . . prison,” and thanked “the merchant Maurice Laroche who provided a batch of food supplies and basic necessities for the inmates”); Prison Insider, [Haiti: the root cause of prison escapes](#) (Mar. 25, 2025) (“Families are permitted to bring food to their relatives in prison, as the State does not possess the resources to adequately feed its prison population.”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶¶ 33, 35 (“The Haitian prison system relies heavily on international aid for healthcare, provisioning of food, social rehabilitation, reconstruction, staff training and equipment. The prison administration is working to address the funding gaps.”); see also BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 37 (“In April, the departure of a major non-governmental healthcare provider, previously conducting approximately 4,000 medical consultations per month across Haiti’s prisons, created a critical gap in prison medical services.”).

²²⁴ Prison Insider, [Haiti: the root cause of prison escapes](#) (Mar. 25, 2025).

²²⁵ Alterpresse, [Femmes et filles en danger au Cermicol : L’alerte de la Pohdh en Haïti](#) (May 5, 2025) (noting reports of tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and other diseases, the spread of which is exacerbated by poor hygiene and malnutrition); Prison Insider, [Haiti: the root cause of prison escapes](#) (Mar. 25, 2025) (“NGOs are no longer able to treat people in prison and deaths are being recorded, with hunger, infectious diseases and parasitic diseases being notable causes.”); O’Neill, [Violence, Abuses and Hunger in Haiti](#) (Jan. 30, 2025) (“In Port-au-Prince, Cap Haïtien, Fort Liberté, Les Cayes, Jérémie: every prison was the same—inhumane conditions, reports of prisoners dying of starvation due to inadequate nutrition, communicable diseases like TB and scabies rampant with little to no health care provided.”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jan. 13, 2025), ¶ 38 (“In late November, a Haitian human rights organization denounced the dire conditions of detention in Haitian prisons, drawing attention to the deplorable state of health of 18 men affected by severe malnutrition and skin diseases, who, owing to their condition, had been released from the Les Cayes prison (North Department). While the case was referred by the United Nations to service providers for medical and nutritional support, the lack of facilities for rapid and appropriate support led to the death of two detainees.”).

²²⁶ BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 17; see also HRW, [Haiti: Events of 2024](#) (2025) (“From January through October [2024], 168 detainees died, most from malnutrition-related diseases.”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jan. 13, 2025), ¶ 37 (“From September to November [2024], 26 inmates died, primarily from malnutrition-related illnesses, marking a 60 per cent decrease compared with the 61 deaths recorded in the previous three months.”). The government’s decentralization of food supply operations and a month-long NGO project to improve nutrition for incarcerated persons reportedly resulted in a decline in prison mortality. BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 33.

²²⁷ Alterpresse, [Femmes et filles en danger au Cermicol : L’alerte de la Pohdh en Haïti](#) (May 5, 2025) (“Designed to accommodate 100 children, the center [CERMICOL] now houses prisoners transferred from several other prisons destroyed or vandalized by gangs spreading terror in Haiti,” with at least one case “similar to sexual assault” reported.); Celestin, [Aucune prison fonctionnelle dans la zone métropolitaine, le ministre de la Justice tire la sonnette d’alarme](#) (May 5, 2025).

²²⁸ Alterpresse, [Femmes et filles en danger au Cermicol : L’alerte de la Pohdh en Haïti](#) (May 5, 2025) (POHDH says there has been no redevelopment of the CERMICOL detention center or hiring of additional staff, and that “[d]ue to a lack of resources, the authorities have been unable to isolate or transfer the alleged perpetrator [in a case similar to sexual assault] and follow up appropriately”).

²²⁹ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 38 (“the implementation of effective rehabilitation programmes [is] impossible”); Prison Insider, *Haiti: the root cause of prison escapes* (Mar. 25, 2025).

²³⁰ See, e.g., *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), Annex 3, note 109 and associated text (concluding that “[c]ases of sexual violence are rampant” based on cited reports, with “[p]recise figures . . . difficult to obtain due to widespread underreporting, different services provided and inconsistent data collection methodologies”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶¶ 53-54 (“Through the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements (MARA) on conflict-related sexual violence, from March to April BINUH documented 364 incidents involving 378 survivors (348 women, 28 girls and 2 boys). . . . From January to April, humanitarian partners reported 2,697 incidents of gender-based violence.”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 48 (“From October 2024 to February 2025, a total of 347 incidents involving 379 survivors (315 women, 63 girls and 1 man) were recorded under the arrangements developed by BINUH for the monitoring, analysis and reporting of conflict-related sexual violence. . . . In January and February, humanitarian actors reported 1,263 sexual and gender-based violence incidents.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 13; Mohor, *Aid in the crosshairs: Why access is growing harder in Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2025) (“No one is exempt from violence here, but the impact on women and girls is disproportionate. . . . The data [on sexual violence] keeps getting worse and worse year after year”); Jaqueline Charles, *Human Rights Watch supports UN peacekeeping mission for Haiti. But it has recommendations*, Miami Herald (Dec. 9, 2024), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article296777549.html> (“4,000 women and girls reported being sexual violated, including gang raped, according to the U.N.”); see also Quixote Center, *Haiti Arms Trafficking Webinar*, at 8:30 (Apr. 29, 2025), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OwYxF_BzPBA (featuring the UN Special Expert on Haiti reporting that “the incidents of rape and sexual violence are literally off the charts”).

²³¹ The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women make clear that the government is obligated to secure the human rights and safety of women and girls, including the rights to (i) equality, (ii) non-discrimination, (iii) freedom from violence, (iv) full political participation, and (v) access to justice and economic opportunities. In addition, the UNSC-adopted Women, Peace, and Security Agenda recognizes that both centering women’s leadership and addressing the distinct needs of women and girls – including confronting GBV in particular – are indispensable to effective peacebuilding and transitions, reflecting empirical evidence that this leads to more successful and sustainable security, political, and economic outcomes. See, e.g., IJDH, *CSW69 Parallel Event Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Outcome Document* (Mar. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/CSW69-Parallel-Event-Advancing-the-Rights-of-Haitian-Women-Outcome-Documents-FINAL-EN.pdf> (“The panel expressed confidence that the work of rebuilding Haiti and empowering Haiti’s women and girls can be done. Haiti’s history of liberty from enslavement and the accomplishments of its feminist movement are proof of what is possible with better practices, policies, and some resources. Specifically, they talked about the need to center women’s leadership and feminist priorities in Haiti’s transition. The failure of Haiti’s transitional government and its international partners to take seriously these imperatives – embodied in the globally adopted WPS Agenda – is impeding crisis resolution. It was noted that the Policy Framework for an Effective and Equitable Transition can help with adopting better policies but is being disregarded. Drawing on her global expertise and mandate, the Chair of the WGDAWG further affirmed that women being extremely underrepresented in Haiti’s transitional government ‘significantly undermines the chances of achieving lasting peace.’ She further noted that the transition represents an opportunity to advance women’s rights but risks regression in the absence of adherence to WPS principles.”); *Open letter to His Excellency Fritz Jean, President of the Presidential Transitional Council* (Mar. 19, 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/Open-Letter-Fritz-JEAN-FINAL-KR-FR-EN.pdf> (“To date, the transitional government has largely failed Haiti’s women and girls, breaching legal obligations under Haitian and international law and disregarding best practices for successful transitions. . . . The government’s failure to respond appropriately to the widespread GBV is illustrative of its broader failure to fulfill its clear legal obligations to secure the rights and needs of Haiti’s women and girls. Women and girls continue to face inequality and discrimination across all areas of public and private life, marginalization that exacerbates vulnerability to violence, displacement, poverty, and exploitation. The government has not fulfilled its obligation to address their distinct needs and dismantle the - often deliberately violent - distinct barriers they face. . . . These failures of government policy and prioritization do not simply violate the rights of Haiti’s women and girls and threaten their lives; they also exacerbate Haiti’s crisis and weaken [the] transitional government’s efforts to restore peace for all Haitians and set Haiti on a path of democratic stability and prosperity.”); *Open letter to His Excellency Lesli Voltaire, President of the Presidential Transitional Council* (Feb. 20, 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/Let-louvri-sou-VBG-Lettre-ouverte-sur-VBG-KR-FR-EN.pdf> (“urging the President of the TPC ‘to recall that centering women’s leadership and specific needs is an established best practice for restoring security and democracy, reflecting an empirical recognition that when women are included, outcomes are more effective and sustainable’ and emphasizing that ‘GBV is being used as a purposeful and insidious tactic for systematically destabilizing communities and wresting territorial control away from the Haitian state,’ in a manner recognized by the WPS agenda to be a threat to international peace and security, such that [c]onfronting GBV against Haiti’s women and girls is therefore indispensable for stabilizing and rebuilding Haiti and must become a central tenet of [the government’s] security and accountability policies”); RHI News, *Haiti – Violence sexuelle en temps de guerre : Rosy Auguste Ducena appelle à une reconnaissance internationale des crimes contre l’humanité* (Apr. 13, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/haiti-violence-sexuelle-en-temps-de-guerre-rosy-auguste-ducena-appelle-a-une-reconnaissance-internationale-des-crimes-contre-lhumanite/> (reporting on Haitian human rights advocate denouncing to the UNPFPAD “the persistent exclusion of women from decision-making spheres” and systematic disregard for constitutional quotas for women’s participation); see further IJDH, *CSW Parallel Event: Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Haiti’s Transition & Beyond* (Mar. 18, 2025), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pEXVaCX5Lf8>; IJDH, *Policy Framework for an Effective and Equitable Transition* (2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Policy-Framework-for-an-Effective-Transition-Empower-Womens-Participation-FOR-SIGNATURE-7.3-KR-FR-EN-FR.pdf>.

²³² See, e.g., *Open letter to His Excellency Fritz Jean, President of the Presidential Transitional Council* (Mar. 19, 2025) (“One particularly blatant example [of government failure to prioritize women’s leadership] is the transitional government’s own violation of the Constitutional obligation to ensure that women are appointed to at least 30% of all public positions. [The] TPC lacks any women with a vote and representation at the ministerial level has actually decreased.”); *Open letter to His Excellency Lesli Voltaire, President of the Presidential Transitional Council* (Feb. 20, 2025) (“For that reason we call on you to ensure that you consider and address the specific needs of women and girls in every government activity and remind you of your constitutional obligation to

ensure that at least 30% of all decision-making positions in your government and its instruments are secured for qualified women. We note with disappointment that, to date, the government of transition has failed to meet its Constitutional obligations in this regard, for example even regressing with respect to Ministerial appointments.”); IJDH, [CSW69 Parallel Event Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Outcome Document](#) (Mar. 2025) (“Haiti’s transitional government, notwithstanding its domestic and international legal obligations to ensure equal treatment of and reserve at minimum 30% of public roles for women, has paid scarce attention to women’s distinct needs and has repeatedly failed to respect equitable representation requirements. For example, there is only one woman on the Transitional Presidential Council, and she has no vote. Haiti has a long history of discriminating against women, especially with respect to public roles and leadership. Few women hold public office and political violence has been directed at women seeking to run or vote in elections, exacerbating the inequality. An effective and equitable transition thus requires purposeful planning to prevent and address gendered political violence – and thereby offers an opportunity to correct long-standing structural inequity, but advocates see little evidence of those necessary efforts.”); RHI News, [Haïti – Violence sexuelle en temps de guerre : Rosy Auguste Ducéna appelle à une reconnaissance internationale des crimes contre l’humanité...](#) (Apr. 13, 2025) (reporting on Haitian human rights advocate denouncing to the UN PFPAD “the persistent exclusion of women from decision-making spheres” and systematic disregard for constitutional quotas for women’s participation). Critically, merely ensuring the presence of women is not sufficient to meet this obligation, which requires facilitating “women’s empowered leadership,” a “feminist agenda” as reflected in policies and funding, and more specifically ensuring “conditions for women to participate at all levels of the electoral process as candidates and voters.” IJDH, [CSW69 Parallel Event Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Outcome Document](#) (Mar. 2025); see further IJDH, [CSW Parallel Event: Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Haiti’s Transition & Beyond](#) (Mar. 18, 2025).

²³³ See, e.g., [Open letter to His Excellency Lesli Voltaire, President of the Presidential Transitional Council](#) (Feb. 20, 2025) (denouncing unaddressed GBV and “the stunning . . . absence of services and recourse for survivors”).

²³⁴ See notes 253–258.

²³⁵ See also IJDH, [CSW Parallel Event: Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Haiti’s Transition & Beyond](#) (Mar. 18, 2025), at 27:38 (“This same government in the country [that doesn’t] respect the Constitution because this same government doesn’t respect the quota of [a] minimum of 30% of women in the government, and you want to reform the Constitution of a country but you don’t have the will to respect the same Constitution. You don’t have the will to dialogue, to have conversation[s] with civil society [and] with feminist organization[s] about how you can mobilize more resources, more people, more everything to address this crisis of GBV in the country . . . we have for now more than 1 million of displaced people in the country, and more than half of those people they are women and children.”).

²³⁶ Jacqueline Charles, ‘Haiti is one of the worst places on the planet to be a child.’ *UN groups sound alarm*, Miami Herald (Dec. 3, 2024), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article296451639.html> (“Children and families continue to experience unprecedented levels of lawlessness and brutality at the hands of the armed groups.”).

²³⁷ See, e.g., Amnesty International, *Lives at Risk: Chaotic and Abrupt Cuts to Foreign Aid Put Millions of Lives at Risk*, p. 19 (May 29, 2025), <https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/lives-at-risk-chaotic-and-abrupt-cuts-to-foreign-aid-put-millions-of-lives-at-risk/> (reporting catastrophic losses of AIDS treatment and prophylaxis – including for victims of sexual violence – with important impacts on adolescent girls and LGBTQI+ individuals); MSF, *Walking for hours to access maternal care in Haiti* (Apr. 30, 2025), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/walking-hours-access-maternal-care-haiti> (“A lack of functional health facilities in remote areas of Haiti’s South department is forcing pregnant women to take risks amid an alarming increase in maternal mortality. . . . The suspension of US funding, which covered 59 percent of Haiti’s humanitarian plan in 2024, could worsen the shortage of humanitarian actors, making maternal health even more difficult to access and potentially increasing maternal mortality.”); Charles, [Aid cuts mean Haiti will need to do more to shoulder humanitarian response, UN says](#) (Apr. 14, 2025) (“There are 128,000 Haitian children suffering from severe malnutrition who need ready-to-use food and other treatment. ‘If you don’t reach a child with treatment. . . they have a tenfold increase in their chance of dying, so it’s a really serious situation when we see funding cuts.”); Sadia Najma Kidwai, *Every Hour Counts in a Crisis: The US Funding Freeze Must Be Lifted Now*, Women’s Refugee Commission (Feb. 6, 2025), <https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/blog/every-hour-counts-in-a-crisis-the-us-funding-freeze-must-be-lifted-now/>; see also notes 489–502.

²³⁸ Fenel Péliissier, *Rape cases are increasing at a worrying rate in Port-au-Prince*, Ayibopost (Jun. 19, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/les-cas-de-violence-se-multiplient-a-un-rythme-inquietant-a-port-au-prince/> (reporting a “worrying trend” based on this Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA) organization statistic and parallel case increases reported by other feminist organizations and hospital officials); see also GBV AoR et al., *Haïti - Snapshot sur les incidents de VBG - Janvier - Mai 2025* (Jun. 19, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-vbg-janvier-mai-2025> (reporting 3,804 incidents of GBV from January to June 2025, 49% of which were rapes); BINUH, *UN Special Representative Patten urges for immediate action as sexual violence surges amid gang violence in Haiti* (Jun. 4, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/un-special-representative-patten-urges-immediate-action-sexual-violence-surges-amid-gang-violence> (“Since the beginning of the year, reports of sexual violence - particularly rape and gang rape - have surged at an alarming rate.”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 53 (“The period marked an increase in sexual violence committed by gangs . . . and often resulted in the killing of the victim.”). Cf. RNDH, [Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques](#) (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶¶ 7–8 (reporting “one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five (1,795) cases of violence against Women and Girls, including one thousand four hundred and twenty-six (1,426) cases of sexual violence, one hundred and ninety-seven (197) cases of physical violence and one hundred and eighteen (118) cases of economic violence” in 2024); SOFA, [Rapport Bilan 2024 Violences faites aux femmes](#), p. 30 (Jan. 2025), <https://sofahaiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Rapport-bilan-2024-sofa-1.pdf> (Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn registered and provided support to 1,289 victims of GBV in 2024); Nègès Mawon, *Droits des Femmes, des Filles et des minorités sexuelles en Haïti: Rapport sur les violences enregistrées de Janvier à octobre 2024*, p. 8 (Dec. 16, 2024), https://www.negesmawon.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/VBG_16_12_24-2.pdf (from January to October 2024, Nègès Mawon registered and provided support to 725 women and girls who were victims of sexual violence).

²³⁹ BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025) (“319 incidents of sexual violence were recorded, involving 333 survivors ... This represents an increase of 254 percent from the previous quarter.”); see also GBV Aor et al., [Snapshot sur les incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre \(VBG\) \(De janvier à décembre 2024\)](#) (Feb. 3, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-basees-sur-le-genre-vbg-de-janvier-decembre-2024> (“The number of GBV incidents reached 631 in December (an increase of 38% compared to October and November combined).”).

²⁴⁰ See, e.g., BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 17 (“It is likely that sexual violence is widespread and underreported, due to fear of retaliation, social stigma, and a lack of trust in institutions, especially the police and judiciary.”); GBV Aor et al., [Snapshot sur les incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre \(VBG\) \(De janvier à décembre 2024\)](#) (Feb. 3, 2025) (“It should be noted that the reports do not represent the magnitude of actual GBV cases, as these figures depend on the voluntary reporting of survivors.”); OHCHR, [Restoring dignity: A global call to end the violence in Haiti](#) (Apr. 7, 2025) (“The sexual violence is mostly underreported, due to fear of retaliation, social stigma, and a lack of trust in public institutions.”); Péliissier, [Rape cases are increasing at a worrying rate in Port-au-Prince](#) (Jun. 19, 2025) (reporting hospital official assessment that low formal case numbers can be explained by “fear of reprisals from gangs,” with victims “much more numerous [at] mobile clinics”). The UN Special Expert on Haiti has repeatedly cautioned that given the “off the charts” incidence of sexual violence, any reported numbers “would be misleadingly low.” O’Neill, [Violence, Abuses and Hunger in Haiti](#) (Jan. 30, 2025) (“My UN Human Rights colleagues (OHCHR) based in Haiti have stopped counting the number of rapes and cases of sexual violence because any statistic would be misleadingly low.”); Quixote Center, [Haiti Arms Trafficking Webinar](#) (Apr. 29, 2025), at 8:30 (“[T]he incidents of rape and sexual violence are literally off the charts. My UN colleagues have actually stopped counting the cases, because they know whatever number they come up with would be misleadingly low.”); Julian Resendiz, [US guns exacerbating violence in Haiti](#), ABC News (May 7, 2025), <https://www.abc27.com/border-report-tour/us-guns-exacerbating-violence-in-haiti/>.

²⁴¹ BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (April 14, 2025), ¶ 47 (“[A]rmed gangs weaponize sexual violence as a tool of terror, control and intimidation”); RHI News, [Haïti – Violence sexuelle en temps de guerre : Rosy Auguste Ducéna appelle à une reconnaissance internationale des crimes contre l’humanité...](#) (Apr. 13, 2025) (“The gang rapes recorded during the massacres and armed attacks are perpetrated with the aim of spreading and maintaining terror among the civilian population.”); BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 17 (“Armed gang members continue to commit sexual violence, including collective rape and sexual exploitation, as a tool to coerce, and assert dominance over communities.”); GBV Aor et al., [Snapshot sur les incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre \(VBG\) \(De janvier à décembre 2024\)](#) (Feb. 3, 2025) (finding that 64% of reported GBV incidents were perpetrated by armed group members). Reflecting a recognition of sexual violence being deployed as a tool of conflict, Haiti was featured in a UN panel discussion organized by the Office of the Special Rapporteur on Sexual Violence in Conflict on the International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict on June 19, 2025. “Sexual violence has become a strategic weapon of war, used by armed groups to terrorize and control entire communities. Collective rape, in particular, is common, and rape often accompanies other violence being perpetrated against women, like kidnapping.” UN Web TV, [International day for the elimination of sexual violence in conflict](#) (Jun. 19, 2025), <https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1q/k1qu8v0h40>.

²⁴² See, e.g., BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 13 (“The level of physical violence accompanying rape and gang rape remains significantly high... one case... a woman... reported being blinded and severely beaten by several gang members and then left unconscious”); BINUH, [UN Special Representative Patten urges for immediate action as sexual violence surges amid gang violence in Haiti](#) (Jun. 4, 2025) (“The situation has reached a breaking point. Since the beginning of the year, reports of sexual violence - particularly rape and gang rape - have surged at an alarming rate.”); BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 17 (“Most of the perpetrators used the threat of firearms to prevent victims from resisting. The ubiquitous presence of guns is central in the gangs’ use of violence, such as rape.”).

²⁴³ BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (April 14, 2025), ¶ 48 (“Collective rape was the most common violation” accounting for 61% of cases reported to the United Nations between October 2024 and February 2025, “a sharp increase from the previous reporting period”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶¶ 53-54 (reporting that “[c]ollective rape was the most common violation (76 per cent)” of those reported to BINUH and accounted for 45% of incidents reported by humanitarian actors (with rape accounting for 21% and 52% of GBV incidents reported, by those respective actors)).

²⁴⁴ BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 63.

²⁴⁵ See, e.g., Amnesty International, [Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025), pp. 20, 34-36 (reporting that “[g]ang members coerce girls into ‘relationships,’ ... exploit them in commercial sex,” and force them “to do chores, such as cooking and cleaning, as well as doing deliveries,” including the story of a seventeen-year-old girl who “resorted to dating a gang member for ‘protection,’” who “sometimes gave her money, but mostly beat her and treated her ‘like an animal’”); BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 13 (“Some victims were raped while being exploited to perform tasks for the benefit of gangs. For example, during the preparations for the attacks on Kenscoff in February and March ... a young girl, a resident of the area, was abducted in the area by members of the Grand Ravine gang and forced to serve as a guide through this mountainous commune. She spent two days, on 17 and 18 February, walking with her attackers, during which she was raped several times by several individuals.”); BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 10 (“Due to the strong grip of gangs over entire neighbourhoods, other women and girls were forced by gang members into so-called “relationships” with them, subjecting the victims to sexual exploitation for months.”); ActionAid, [Almost 9 in 10 going all day without eating as hunger in Haiti reaches record high](#) (Feb. 18, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/almost-9-10-going-all-day-without-eating-hunger-haiti-reaches-record-high-actionaid> (describing reports of girls as young as 15 being coerced into trading sex for food).

²⁴⁶ BINUH, [UN Special Representative Patten urges for immediate action as sexual violence surges amid gang violence in Haiti](#) (Jun. 4, 2025) (describing “a dramatic rise in documented cases of sexual slavery” over the past several months and “widespread atrocities perpetrated by armed groups, including conflict-related sexual violence and trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation”); RHI News, [Haïti – Violence sexuelle en temps de guerre : Rosy Auguste Ducéna appelle à une reconnaissance internationale des crimes contre l’humanité...](#) (Apr. 13, 2025) (“[s]exual slavery... has become so commonplace that it has blurred

the boundaries” and women are “so used to being raped and mutilated in our bodies and minds that we no longer even use the appropriate language to describe the abuses we suffer”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jan. 13, 2025), ¶ 56 (describing one incidence of a seventeen-year-old girl being kidnapped and held captive as a sexual slave for more than two years); UNICEF, [Haiti's Children Under Siege: The staggering rise of child abuse and recruitment by armed groups](#) (Feb. 7, 2025) (describing abduction of a sixteen-year-old girl who was kidnapped, “extensively beaten,” drugged, and “relentlessly raped” for approximately one month).

²⁴⁷ BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 17 (“Many victims were attacked in their homes, while others were abducted, raped in public spaces or after being intercepted while travelling in public transport.”); BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 13 (“in six cases, women were attacked and gang-raped by members of the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs while using public transport vehicles,” including one case where a woman “in addition to being raped, reported being blinded and severely beaten by several gang members and then left unconscious”); Amnesty International, [Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 31 (“Girls face further risks at the hands of gangs, including abductions and sexual attacks on their way to school or while running errands, on foot or on public transport. Girls are also harassed on the street by gang members, which can escalate to rape and other sexual violence, and are at times particularly targeted, including in their homes.”); GBV AoR et al., [Haiti - Snapshot sur les incidents de VBG - Janvier - Mai 2025](#) (Jun. 19, 2025) (reporting that 51% of incidents of GBV reported to service providers between January and June 2025 occurred in the home, 22% on roads, and 7% in displacement sites).

²⁴⁸ OCHA, *United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Haiti deeply disturbed by the tragic consequences of violence affecting children and displaced people* (May 10, 2025), <https://www.unocha.org/attachments/c285d3b2-f0bc-4293-82f5-45f21f2c6b52/OCHAHAITIEN.pdf> (describing the death of a six-year-old girl after being raped in a temporary displacement site); Amnesty International, [Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025), pp. 36-38 (describing rapes of girls as young as fourteen by members of armed groups and leaders of displacement camps); Pélissier, [Rape cases are increasing at a worrying rate in Port-au-Prince](#) (Jun. 19, 2025) (“The majority of survivors [of sexual violence] are aged between seventeen and sixty-six. . . . ‘Sometimes, it’s minors who could be my own sons who rape me,’ [a] . . . mother of three confides.”).

²⁴⁹ See, e.g., Amnesty International, [Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 38 (“Health services have traditionally been overstretched in Haiti, and gang violence has further crippled access to services for myriad reasons, including insecurity limiting the population’s movement and attacks on medical facilities . . . The girls interviewed by Amnesty International said that even when they do have access to health services after being assaulted, several barriers – including insecurity and financial constraints – prevented them from having sustained access to these services.”); see also UN Population Fund (UNFPA), *“A point of no return”: An urgent call to support women and girls in Haiti* (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://www.unfpa.org/news/%E2%80%9Cpoint-no-return%E2%80%9D-urgent-call-support-women-and-girls-haiti> (“pregnant women and new mothers [are] at severe risk of malnutrition”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 58 (“Preliminary estimates for the period March to June 2025 indicate that 48 per cent of the population will remain food insecure . . . [and] half of female-headed households are in phase 3 (acute food insecurity) and have had to go into debt to survive.”).

²⁵⁰ See, e.g., Narcisus, [Haiti’s Madan Sara face extortion and violence from gangs](#) (Mar. 9, 2025) (“With no safe place to work and no room in leadership, Haitian women are losing hard-fought ground in both the economic and political arenas.”); MSF, *Haitian women are trapped between violence and poverty in Port-au-Prince* (Feb. 11, 2025), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/haitian-women-are-trapped-between-violence-and-poverty-port-au-prince> (“‘Before, I could sell a few things to support myself,’ says Géralda, a mother of six and resident of Brooklyn. ‘But since the violence began, I barely leave the house anymore. I had to give up my business and now I have nothing left. I sent my children to their grandparents because I could no longer take care of them and I stayed here alone with my 6-month-old baby.’”); Care, [Haiti: Women and girls bear the brunt of rising hunger, displacement, and violence](#) (Apr. 14, 2025), <https://www.care.org/media-and-press/haiti-women-and-girls-bear-the-brunt-of-rising-hunger-displacement-and-violence/> (“Women have no means of livelihood.”) (internal quotations omitted); Jérôme Wendy Norestyl & Junior Legrand, *La prostitution devient de plus en plus risqué à Port-au-Prince*, Ayibopost (Jun. 20, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/la-prostitution-devient-de-plus-en-plus-risque-a-port-au-prince/> (describing impacts on sex workers: “[t]he informal practice of sex work, combined with widespread violence, facilitates abuse of all kinds against those involved”); see also note 338 (discussing the impact on women merchants central to Haiti’s informal food distribution networks, known as *Madan Sara*, who face daily extortion, violence, and insecurity, significantly limiting their ability to earn an income).

²⁵¹ ActionAid, [Almost 9 in 10 going all day without eating as hunger in Haiti reaches record high](#) (Feb. 18, 2025) (“Poverty and debt increase [women and girls’] vulnerability to exploitation and abuse, with reports of girls as young as 15 being coerced into trading sex for food.”); see also BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 54 (“Sexual violence is frequently linked to harmful coping mechanisms, including transactional sex, intimate partner violence, abductions, and harmful traditional practices.”); Amnesty International UK, Press Release, *Haiti: Children suffering gang recruitment, attacks and sexual violence amid escalating crisis – New Report* (Feb. 11, 2025), <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/haiti-children-suffering-gang-recruitment-attacks-and-sexual-violence-amid> (“Children involved in commercial sex acts are victims of sexual exploitation. A 16-year-old girl living in an area under the control of 5 Segon said she first got involved in commercial sex with gang members after she and her child had gone through repeated stretches without food.”); Care, [Haiti: Women and girls bear the brunt of rising hunger, displacement, and violence](#) (Apr. 14, 2025) (“[W]omen in Haiti are also navigating a society with extremely high levels of violence against women and girls, including sexual violence, which creates enormous risks in daily life. Moreover, armed violence has forced many educational institutions to shut down, which means girls are out of school and increasingly at risk of exploitation.”) (internal quotations omitted). Notably, transactional sex – which fundamentally reflects a power imbalance alongside harmful cultural and gender norms – is a common phenomenon in Haiti even outside the crisis, and occurs frequently, including in the context of education, work, politics, and religion. For a recently published examination of transactional sex trends and consequences in Haiti, see Margot de Greef, *Transactional Sex in Haiti – From the Education Sector to Gang Violence*, SPECTRUM Journal of Social Sciences (2025), <https://spectrum.aspur.rs/archive/v3/n2/3.pdf>.

²⁵² UNFPA, *Haiti Situation Report #3* (Jun. 7, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-situation-report-3-increasing-violence-haiti-continues-put-lives-women-and-girls-risk-may-2025> (55% of the 1 million displaced persons are women and girls); IOM, *International Women's Day 2025: Uplifting the Voices of Displaced and Migrant Women in Haiti* (2025), <https://haiti.iom.int/stories/international-womens-day-2025-uplifting-voices-displaced-and-migrant-women-haiti> (“Women-led households [in displacement settings] are particularly at risk.”). As discussed below, children counted on their own (both girls and boys) represent 53% of those displaced and experience distinct vulnerabilities. See notes 278-279.

²⁵³ See, e.g., BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (April 14, 2025), ¶ 48 (“There is a heightened risk of gender-based violence at displacement sites owing to inadequate lighting, distant water points and the lack of gender-sensitive infrastructure.”); GBV AoR et al., *Haiti - Snapshot sur les incidents de VBG - Janvier - Mai 2025* (Jun. 19, 2025) (61% of reported GBV incidents were against IDPs); RHI News, *Haiti – Violence sexuelle en temps de guerre : Rosy Auguste Ducéna appelle à une reconnaissance internationale des crimes contre l'humanité...* (Apr. 13, 2025) (“Even in the camps for internally displaced people, which are supposed to offer refuge, the danger persists.”); Blaise, *‘I don't know where else to go.’ Haitian women in displacement camps demand protection on International Women's Rights Day* (Mar. 11, 2025) (“[i]n displacement camps across Port-au-Prince ... women endure dangerous, unsanitary conditions ... [w]omen and children shower in the open, often in the same space as men ... pay 10 gourdes or about 76 cents just to use the toilet” and face risks of disease, violence, and harassment and sexual violence); IOM, *International Women's Day 2025: Uplifting the Voices of Displaced and Migrant Women in Haiti* (2025) (“For many [women and girls], displacement is a repeated ordeal, further deepening vulnerabilities. ... Overcrowding, lack of security, and weakened community protection mechanisms further heighten the risks of gender-based violence, exploitation, and abuse.”); UNFPA, *Haiti* (2025) (“As displacement rises, so do urgent needs – especially for women and girls, who face extreme risks including increased sexual violence, lack of healthcare and unsafe, overcrowded living conditions.”); OCHA, *United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Haiti deeply disturbed by the tragic consequences of violence affecting children and displaced people* (May 10, 2025) (describing the death of a six-year-old girl after being raped in a temporary displacement cite).

²⁵⁴ See, e.g., Amnesty International, *Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti* (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 36 (“Women and children’s groups said they have come across different situations of sexual violence in the context of camps, including rapes by camp residents and, at times, camp committee members in charge of the site. Displaced women and girls are also, at times, sexually exploited in exchange for assistance, or to access toilets.”); Ayibopost, *Ki plas Dwa Fanm yo an Ayiti nan mitan kriz peyi a ap fè fas la ?* (March 16, 2025), at 10:33-11:27, 12:16-13:07 (sharing personal experiences of being extorted for sex by camp managers in return for menstrual products and for sheltering tarps during a storm, the latter after the Civil Protection Office at the Ministry of Communication site said they had none); UNFPA, *Haiti* <https://www.unfpa.org/haiti> (2025) (“Exploitation and abuse have become entrenched, with people turning to damaging coping mechanisms to survive, such as providing sexual services in exchange for food or money.”).

²⁵⁵ See, e.g., Ayibopost, *Ki plas Dwa Fanm yo an Ayiti nan mitan kriz peyi a ap fè fas la ?* (March 16, 2025), at 19:05 (describing women and underage girls being driven to transactional sex by the famine at displacement sites).

²⁵⁶ Ayibopost, *Ki plas Dwa Fanm yo an Ayiti nan mitan kriz peyi a ap fè fas la ?* (March 16, 2025), at 22:49 (“One of the things I witness is the complete absence of the state in the camps. Most of the organizations attending to the camps are NGOs or international organizations. The government is completely absent. For example, there are sites with one agent from the Ministry of Public Health, but it’s not the Ministry of Public Health providing the services—they just appoint someone to observe and receive reports. You can’t see the structural government or any protection mechanisms. The question of food, the Social Assistance Agency, or any institutions who are supposed to protect the citizens, you don’t see their presence.”).

²⁵⁷ See, e.g., IOM, *International Women's Day 2025: Uplifting the Voices of Displaced and Migrant Women in Haiti* (2025) (“Solutions to displacement and migration challenges must prioritize women’s leadership and participation. Women must have a voice in decision-making processes at every level, from community-based initiatives to national policy discussions.”); see also IJDH, *CSW Parallel Event: Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Haiti’s Transition & Beyond* (Mar. 18, 2025).

²⁵⁸ For example, civil society efforts to strengthen protections by expanding and extending existing IACHR precautionary measures applicable to women and girls at displacement sites remain unanswered. Center for Gender and Refugee Studies (CGRS) at al., *Letter to Fernanda Alves dos Anjos re MC 340/10 – Situation of women and girl victims of sexual violence in Haiti Follow Up Letter* (Feb. 16, 2025), <https://cgrs.uclawsf.edu/our-work/publications/mc-34010-situation-women-and-girl-victims-sexual-violence-haiti-follow-up-lette-1> (“For more than two years, Petitioners have engaged with the Commission to highlight the ongoing need for Precautionary Measures to protect displaced women and girls first granted in the wake of the 2010 earthquake. For more than two years, the Commission has dragged its feet on taking definitive action falling squarely within its authority.”); see, e.g., IJDH, *CSW69 Parallel Event Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Outcome Document* (Mar. 2025) (“The panelists observed that the international response to the needs of Haiti’s women and girls has been inadequate – especially with respect to political empowerment . . . , and described patterns of engagement that can be harmful to civil society mobilizing and sometimes ‘creates crisis or maintains [Haiti] in crisis.’ Panelists noted that most funding flows to the state or to big organizations without involving or offering transparency to grassroots groups, even though it is often their work and data collection that is at the core of the programming. They also noted a need to de-racialize foreign responses to Haiti, contrasting them with the more robust support for Ukraine, for example. The Chair of the UN WGDAWG acknowledged that ‘the international community has not done enough and attention has been diverted to other conflicts in other regions in the world,’ noting further that international actors failed to call out the lack of women in Haiti’s transitional government and are not fulfilling the principles of the WPS Agenda with respect to advancing a just and democratic future for Haiti.”).

²⁵⁹ For example, the collapse of security, judicial, and health functions. See Sections II, IV, and VI.

²⁶⁰ See, e.g., Care, *Haiti: Women and girls bear the brunt of rising hunger, displacement, and violence* (Apr. 14, 2025) (“[Haiti’s protracted crisis] is increasing the vulnerability of women and girls. As heads of households, women are often left to manage the family daily survival alone Women and girls suffer disproportionately because they often face greater obstacles to access food and livelihoods.”) (internal quotations omitted); UNFPA, *“A point of no return”: An urgent call to support women and girls in Haiti* (Jun. 27, 2025) (“[E]very month more than 50,000 women will have no access to sexual and reproductive health services and

over 19,000 will be left without support against gender-based violence.”); HRW, [Haiti: Events of 2024](#) (2025) (“Survivors face severely limited or nonexistent access to protection and care services.”); see also Mohor, [Aid in the crosshairs: Why access is growing harder in Haiti](#) (Jan. 28, 2025) (publishing call by MSG Haiti mission head to “recognize the gendered consequences of the extreme levels of violence” in the context of humanitarian assistance cuts); note 240.

²⁶¹ See, e.g., IJDH, [CSW69 Parallel Event Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Outcome Document](#) (Mar. 2025) (“The Haitian members of the panel – all leaders of organizations working to support women and girls in Haiti – observed that Haiti’s government is failing its women and girls. ‘It is the responsibility of the government of Haiti to take care of the people of Haiti and somehow that has been lost in conversation.’ The government is not providing critical services, implementing policies that protect or advance women’s rights, nor acting as a credible partner to civil society organizations that risk their lives to fill the resulting gaps. . . . Haiti’s civil society has been left to do the work of their government, providing services as well as policy planning, agenda-setting, and mobilization around critical issues. . . . They do so even though Haitian civil society organizations – especially smaller ones working at the grassroots level – face enormous challenges and barriers to their work, most notably enormous physical danger and crisis-related harms like displacement and lack of basic necessities, along with limited and dwindling organizational resources.”); Amnesty International, [Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025), pp. 38-40 (“[Interviewed victims who] received medical care, . . . nearly all of them accessed it through international and local NGOs. . . . It was clear to Amnesty International’s researchers that international and local NGOs have stepped in to fill some of the gaps and exerted efforts to provide some level of psycho-social support in medical facilities and at displacement sites. But these services cannot remain largely reliant on civil society groups and need to be significantly scaled up, including ensuring the provision of more specialized care given the extent of the crisis.”); see also IJDH, [CSW Parallel Event: Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Haiti’s Transition & Beyond](#) (Mar. 18, 2025). An important additional dynamic emphasized by Haiti’s human rights advocates is that “even though Haiti’s government and its international partners hold the relative power and resources, they are failing to meet their legal and stated commitments to Haiti’s women and girls and it is Haiti’s civil society that is having to pressure them to do so.” There is likewise “a pattern of taking credit for civil society work even as local organizations are left out of consultations and decision-making – or see their painstaking contributions disregarded.” Recommendations for more effective assistance outcomes include ensuring that “[l]ocal organizations [a] part of decisions affecting program design and funding”; “center[ing] grassroots leadership, closely consider[ing] local perspectives and recommendations, and tackle[ing] root causes” of gendered harms; “prioritizing . . . sustainable funding, and accountab[le] partnership”; and “[e]mpowering grassroots feminist movements.” IJDH, [CSW69 Parallel Event Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Outcome Document](#) (Mar. 2025); see also IJDH, [CSW Parallel Event: Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Haiti’s Transition & Beyond](#) (Mar. 18, 2025).

²⁶² See, e.g., UN Office of the Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General, *Highlights of the Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for Secretary-General António Guterres* (May 21, 2025), <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/highlight/2025-05-21.html> (“Severe underfunding continues to hamper response efforts. Less than \$600,000 – which is just 5 per cent of the more than \$11 million required to support gender-based violence survivors – has been received to date, limiting obviously the capacity of our humanitarian partners to sustain and expand vital services, especially in high-risk areas of the country.”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (April 14, 2025), ¶ 49 (“[I]t is estimated that more than 750,000 people in need (70 per cent of whom are women and girls) are unable to benefit from services for survivors of gender-based violence owing to reduced international funding.”); Amnesty International, [Lives at Risk: Chaotic and Abrupt Cuts to Foreign Aid Put Millions of Lives at Risk](#) (May 29, 2025), p. 19 (reporting that “[a]s of 13 March 2025, UNAIDS reported that due to the US funding freeze, pre-exposure prophylaxis services were completely halted, except for pregnant and lactating women,” and organizations that provide children “post-rape services [] have also lost funding or shut down, leaving girls without the urgent health attention they need to prevent or treat HIV and other sexually transmitted infections, and unplanned pregnancies following violence”).

²⁶³ See, e.g., Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), *Public Health Situation Analysis – Haiti*, p. 21 (Oct. 4, 2024), <https://www.paho.org/en/documents/public-health-situation-analysis-haiti-4-october-2024> (“Haiti . . . has one of the highest maternal mortality ratios in the region, with 350 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births (81).”).

²⁶⁴ MSF, [Walking for hours to access maternal care in Haiti](#) (Apr. 30, 2025) (“A lack of functional health facilities in remote areas of Haiti’s South department is forcing pregnant women to take risks amid an alarming increase in maternal mortality . . . The suspension of US funding, which covered 59 percent of Haiti’s humanitarian plan in 2024, could worsen the shortage of humanitarian actors, making maternal health even more difficult to access and potentially increasing maternal mortality.”); Kidwai, [Every Hour Counts in a Crisis: The US Funding Freeze Must Be Lifted Now](#) (Feb. 6, 2025) (“[P]regnant women in places like Haiti and Gaza lost access to already-scant maternal healthcare services.”); see also Amnesty International, [Lives at Risk: Chaotic and Abrupt Cuts to Foreign Aid Put Millions of Lives at Risk](#) (May 29, 2025), p. 28 (noting particular concern for “people who have just given birth and newborns” who have been deported from the Dominican Republic to Haiti because of cuts to U.S. funding for organizations that would typically provide essential support). Reuters, [Dominican Republic ramping up deportation of Haitian migrants](#), VOA News (Jan. 28, 2025), <https://www.voanews.com/a/dominican-republic-ramping-up-deportation-of-haitian-migrants-/7952850.html>. Notably, the impact of widespread malnutrition represents an added vulnerability for pregnant and breastfeeding women, “increasing premature birth and maternal mortality.” ActionAid, [Almost 9 in 10 going all day without eating as hunger in Haiti reaches record high](#) (Feb. 18, 2025); see also notes 489-502.

²⁶⁵ Reuters, [Dominican Republic ramping up deportation of Haitian migrants](#) (Jan. 28, 2025) (“As spiraling violence in Haiti puts healthcare out of reach for most, Haitian mothers are seeking care at hospitals in neighboring Dominican Republic despite government policies there scaling up deportations.”); see also note 415.

²⁶⁶ RHI News, [Haiti – Violence sexuelle en temps de guerre : Rosy Auguste Ducéna appelle à une reconnaissance internationale des crimes contre l’humanité...](#) (Apr. 13, 2025) (describing psychological harms and forced cessation of education resulting from unwanted pregnancies in the context of criminalized abortion, and warning “against clandestine, often abusive, medical practices: ‘We have to risk our lives in unsafe abortions, performed by medical personnel who, taking advantage of the protection of clandestinity, extort a lot of money from us’”); Amnesty International, [Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 7 (reporting stories of girls being denied abortion care, using dangerous methods

to attempt abortion (resulting in long-term health consequences), attempting suicide out of psychological distress (with similarly significant health consequences), as well as obstetric complications for young bodies unprepared for pregnancy and birth; describing consequences for girls that include psychological distress rising to suicide attempts and loss of education and professional possibilities; and reporting that some victims of rape “resorted to unsafe methods to attempt to end their unwanted pregnancies”). Notably, there is evidence of poor health outcomes for any resulting children as well. Amnesty International, *Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti* (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 7.

²⁶⁷ See, e.g., BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 54 (“Despite the urgent need, access to essential gender-based violence response services remain critically limited. Of note, only 27 per cent of survivors were able to

seek treatment within the first 72 hours following rape.”); GBV Aor et al., *Snapshot sur les incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre (VBG) (De janvier à décembre 2024)* (Feb. 3, 2025) (“[S]ince the beginning of 2024, access to holistic care services, which include medical care, access to temporary accommodation, case management services including security and psychosocial support, remains low. Indeed, regarding medical care, 29% of rape incidents reported in December received treatment within 72 hours of the incident. The reasons for this low access include: the subsidy or post-rape kits available do not cover additional examinations (blood and urine tests, vaginal smears, etc.) and the treatment of genitourinary infections in particular. The limited geographical coverage, the unavailability of services, sometimes with forced closures, and the country’s security situation are major obstacles to accessing services. . . . Safe spaces and transit centers for temporary emergency accommodation for survivors are still too rare, precarious, and ill-adapted.”); Amnesty International, *Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti* (Feb. 12, 2025), pp. 38–40 (“UN and NGO representatives told Amnesty International that the extremely limited number of shelters that exist are overwhelmed.”); Mohor, *Aid in the crosshairs: Why access is growing harder in Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2025) (“[M]ore than 70% of the survivors came...72 hours [after the rape]...primarily due ... violence that sometimes don’t allow them to leave their area of residence because they fear being targeted [just for] living in gang-controlled areas” or because “so many ... patients are displaced.”).

²⁶⁸ See notes 210–211. The PNH also received a recent series of trainings in sexual violence investigation techniques and victim-appropriate conduct in several locations. BINUH, X (May 26, 2025), https://x.com/BINUH_UN/status/1927027214194721167 (“30 investigators (including 21 women) from 5 departments (Grand Sud & Ouest) were trained in sexual violence investigation techniques and survivor reception from May 19 to 21 in Les Cayes.”); BINUH, X (May 19, 2025), https://x.com/BINUH_UN/status/1924468046741012513 (“32 investigators (including 16 women) deployed in the Far North were trained in sexual violence investigation techniques in Cap-Haïtien from May 14 to 16, 2025.”). Other reported measures include community awareness and engagement activities and the formulation of a “protocol” for trauma-informed and effective reporting of allegations of sexual violence by PNH officers in connection with several such allegations in early February. BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶¶ 55–57; BINUH, *ECOSOC – Appel à la solidarité mondiale pour Haïti* (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/bulletin_du_binuh-juin_2025.pdf.

²⁶⁹ According to a memorandum prepared by the Haitian Women’s Collective (HWC) based on consultation with its local partners, “[o]n the side of the survivors, it is reported that if the reception ‘has evolved a little’ in some police stations, the investigations are struggling to succeed: few are the files sent to the prosecutor’s office, and even rarer those that are actually investigated in the investigation chamber or tried.” Moreover, the “few successes” (such as investigations and prosecutions of gendered crimes) “are too dispersed to establish a dynamic of lasting trust.” Survivors’ groups also identified insufficient post-complaint follow-up” as an issue: “many [survivors] abandon the procedure along the way, due to a lack of resources to travel or out of discouragement in the face of the slowness and lack of transparency of the judicial process.” See also, e.g., RHI News, *Haïti – Violence sexuelle en temps de guerre : Rosy Auguste Ducena appelle à une reconnaissance internationale des crimes contre l’humanité...* (Apr. 13, 2025) (reporting on a statement by Haitian human rights expert and RNDDH Program Director Rosy Auguste Ducena during the UN PFPAD 4th Session, who described “an entire society undermined by impunity from the home to the workplace: ‘In our domestic environments, at school, at university, at work, at home, in the homes of our loved ones, we are harassed, raped, beaten, executed. With impunity.’ . . . The Haitian judicial system. . . remains deaf to calls for justice. ‘Public action is rarely taken against our attackers[.] Between 2023 and 2024, 3,006 rapes and gang rapes were reported... only 59 men were convicted. . . [and] among those convicted of sexual crimes, 34, or 58%, received sentences below what they should have received.’ This impunity is accompanied by a refusal to acknowledge the specificities of gender-based violence. ‘Since femicide is not recognized in Haiti, related cases are considered simple assassinations or murders,’ [as part of a pattern of] poor legal classification that protects the perpetrators.”); RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶¶ 7–8, 13 (reporting that only 16 people were convicted of sexual crimes during the 2023–2024 judicial year, despite the huge number of sexual crimes committed); HRW, *Haiti: Events of 2024* (2025) (“Accountability for past and ongoing human rights violations, including massacres and sexual violence, remains nearly nonexistent.”); GBV Aor et al., *Snapshot sur les incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre (VBG) (De janvier à décembre 2024)* (Feb. 3, 2025) (“Furthermore, legal services remain expensive, and there is a lack of resources to support services and courts that are struggling to function.”); Amnesty International, *Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti* (Feb. 12, 2025), pp. 39–40 (“The widespread absence of the police in gang-controlled areas also meant that survivors simply had no one to go to, and they feared that authorities would end up associating them with the gangs . . . ‘If I as much as think about going to the police, I’m a dead person,’ said [a] 16-year-old girl from Martissant who is exploited in commercial sex with gang members. . . . For many interviewees, the notion of going to the police was out of the question due to the absolute absence of law-enforcement personnel in gang-controlled areas. . . . More broadly, as with survivors of other forms of violence by the gangs, girls who have been sexually assaulted are affected by the general impunity afforded to gang members. This continues to be the case despite the existence of a number of specialized police units to address sexual violence and for child protection.”); Péliissier, *Rape cases are increasing at a worrying rate in Port-au-Prince* (Jun. 19, 2025) (“[F]or gang rapes, the majority of survivors are unable to identify their attackers. Or when they can, they generally reside in areas still controlled by these men, making any legal action difficult.”); see also BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 10 (“The lack of law enforcement in neighbourhoods under the control of gangs enabled them to continue perpetrating acts of sexual violence, mainly against women and girls.”). A small number of investigations and prosecutions are

reported. BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 55 (“Between March and April 2025, across 13 jurisdictions, 130 cases of sexual violence were pending investigation, 77 were under investigation by examining judges, and seven cases had been closed.”); BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 16 (“Between January and February, investigating judges from 11 jurisdictions examined 114 rape cases, of which 39 were referred to the competent prosecutor’s office and one case to the juvenile court.”). According to a UN source, there are functional specialized units within the HNP – the l’Unité de lutte contre les crimes sexuels (ULCS) and the Brigade de Protection des Mineurs (BPM) – that support investigation of crimes reported by victims of sexual violence and minors, and recent trainings have further improved HNP’s GBV competence. However, [Haitian human rights expert Rosy Auguste Ducena, the Program Director of RNDH] described these units as “not functional at all on the ground.” The HWC offered the same “non-functional” assessment from its local partners and specifically criticized the BPM for lacking a mobile unit for unofficial border crossings, which “leav[es] many victims without appropriate care.” Per the HWC: “although the ULCS and the BPM have officially resumed service and benefit from new training and a slight increase in resources, they remain for many survivors and local organizations still ‘non-functional’ in their ability to translate these efforts into effective justice and comprehensive care for victims. The main challenge today remains to transform these symbolic advances into sustainable, coordinated mechanisms focused on the real needs of survivors.”

²⁷⁰ UNGA, [Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 17, 2025), ¶ 7 (reporting 2,269 grave violations, representing a 490% increase from the previous year); see also Jacqueline Charles, [Haiti is as dangerous for children as Gaza, UN report shows](#), Miami Herald (Jun. 19, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article309024635.html>.

²⁷¹ UNGA, [Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 17, 2025), ¶ 7 (reporting 2,269 grave violations, representing a 490% increase from the previous year); see also Charles, [Haiti is as dangerous for children as Gaza, UN report shows](#) (Jun. 19, 2025). A report published by Amnesty International during the reporting period provides an excellent overview of the human rights violations affecting Haiti’s children. Amnesty International, [Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025).

²⁷² UNICEF, [Haiti’s Children Under Siege: The staggering rise of child abuse and recruitment by armed groups](#) (Feb. 7, 2025) (“A staggering 1,000 per cent rise in sexual violence against children in Haiti has turned their bodies into battlegrounds. The 10-fold rise, recorded from 2023 to last year, comes as armed groups inflict unimaginable horrors on children.”); see also Charles, [Haiti is as dangerous for children as Gaza, UN report shows](#) (Jun. 19, 2025) (“The ‘number of verified incidents is but the bare minimum—and not the maximum—of the horrors children are being subjected to . . . We simply cannot get the full impact of what is happening in Haiti, but we know it’s horrific enough that it is already providing horrendous figures with the little information that we’re able to get now.”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (April 14, 2025), ¶ 67 (“[P]recise data on child trafficking and gang exploitation is unavailable owing to security concerns and other challenges that impede data collection.”); OCHA, [Today’s top news: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Myanmar, Haiti](#) (May 21, 2025), <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-occupied-palestinian-territory-syria-myanmar-haiti> (“[A]rmed violence and growing insecurity in Haiti continue to expose children – especially displaced children – to sexual violence and other severe protection risks.”); UNGA, [Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 17, 2025), ¶ 75 (reporting that 566 children, including 523 girls and 43 boys, were victims of rape or collective rape in 2024, primarily by members of armed groups). Because data related to abuses against children has not always been closely tracked in Haiti, percentage changes may reflect increased data gathering and methodological changes.

²⁷³ UNICEF, [Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report](#) (Jan. 2025) (reporting that 1,200,000 children are under threat in greater Port-au-Prince area); Amnesty International, [Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 16 (“Estimates put the number of children in Haiti living in areas controlled by or under the influence of armed gangs at more than 1 million.”); OHCHR, [Restoring dignity: A global call to end the violence in Haiti](#) (Apr. 7, 2025) (“The impact of gang violence on children is also staggering . . . many have witnessed the most horrific acts of violence, including killings, and some are trafficked and exploited by gangs, and provided with firearms.”); Alterpresse, [Criminalité : Plus de 40,000 enfants forcés à se déplacer depuis début 2025 - Une enfance brisée par les violences meurtrières des gangs en Haïti](#) (Apr. 8, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31579> (“Caught in a nightmare and deprived of a normal childhood, Haiti’s children are surviving in deadly zones under the control of armed groups, said Quebecer Chantal Sylvie Imbeault, national director of *Save the Children* in Haiti.”); Alterpresse, [Haïti risque de perdre toute une génération à cause de la persistance des violences des gangs](#) (Mar. 25, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31534> (“Haiti risks losing an entire generation due to persistent gang violence, warns Plan International, in an alert regarding widespread violations of children’s rights due to terror and other violence by armed gangs.”); O’Neill, [Violence, Abuses and Hunger in Haiti](#) (Jan. 30, 2025) (“I met a little girl, probably about five years-old, when I visited a site for internally displaced persons where she has been living for over a year after a gang raided her neighborhood, raping and killing and burning down houses. She told me she had not eaten in two days. She was thin yet her eyes burned bright and she said how much she wanted to go home. The face of an older girl, about 12, also stays with me. She has not gone to school for two years and desperately wants to continue her education. But she has no way to go to a school since there is none at the site and the nearby schools, even when open, are too expensive.”).

²⁷⁴ Alterpresse, [Criminalité : Plus de 40,000 enfants forcés à se déplacer depuis début 2025 - Une enfance brisée par les violences meurtrières des gangs en Haïti](#) (Apr. 8, 2025) (“One in four children now lives in neighborhoods where access to vital aid is limited, she notes.”).

²⁷⁵ IOM, [Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10](#) (Jun. 2025), p. 5.

²⁷⁶ UNICEF, [Education under attack in Haiti](#) (Feb. 28, 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/education-under-attack-haiti> (“In just one month, January this year, armed groups destroyed 47 schools in Haiti’s capital. With 284 schools destroyed in 2024, the relentless attacks on education are accelerating, leaving hundreds of thousands of children without a place to learn.”); OHCHR, [Restoring dignity: A global call to end the violence in Haiti](#) (Apr. 7, 2025); Ody Bien-Eugene, [Des enfants privés d’école dans la région métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince à cause de la violence des gangs](#), Juno 7 (Mar. 10, 2025), <https://www.juno7.ht/des-enfants-prives-decole-dans-la-region-metropolitai/> (“The Juno7 editorial team also visited shelters such as Darius Denis, Argentine

Bellegarde, and the Office for the Protection of Citizens (OPC), where many children are not enrolled in school. Parents explained that this is due either to their inability to pay school fees or to the closure of their children's schools due to gang violence, leaving them with no alternative to re-enrolling them elsewhere.”); *see also* notes 380-397. Displaced children are particularly impacted. Plan International, *Haiti displacement soars as children face education collapse and violence* (Jun. 20, 2025), <https://plan-international.org/haiti/news/2025/06/20/haiti-displacement-soars-as-children-face-education-collapse-and-violence/> (“Based on surveys, focus groups and interviews with over 200 internally displaced people, the findings revealed that more than 90% of children [in Haiti’s South and South-East departments] have been denied their fundamental right to education due to the prevailing violence and insecurity.”); *Alterpresse*, *Haïti risque de perdre toute une génération à cause de la persistance des violences des gangs* (Mar. 25, 2025) (reporting about the same findings that “[c]hildren cannot go to school to be educated,” and “do not have the opportunity to live their lives as children to the fullest,” with “[m]ore than nine (9) out of ten (10) children . . . deprived of their fundamental right to education due to violence and crime”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 64 (“As of May, over 1,600 schools remained closed in the West, Artibonite and Centre departments, up from 960 since the start of the year, affecting 1.2 million students and teachers.”); OPC, *Étude sur la protection du droit des personnes déplacées en Haïti*, (Apr. 2025), p. 32 (“In many sites, children are not attending school.”).

²⁷⁷ UNICEF, *At least one million children facing emergency levels of food insecurity in Haiti* (Apr. 17, 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/press-releases/least-one-million-children-facing-emergency-levels-food-insecurity-haiti> (estimating that “[o]ver one million children are facing critical levels of food insecurity in Haiti” and “2.85 million children – or one quarter of the entire child population in Haiti – are facing consistently high levels of food insecurity across the country”); UNICEF, *Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report* (Jan. 2025) (reporting that 3,300,000 children are in need of humanitarian assistance); Amnesty International, *Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti* (Feb. 12, 2025), pp. 15-16 (“[O]ne in six children in the country are ‘one step away from faminelike conditions’ which are ‘characterised by acute malnutrition and a heightened risk of hunger-related death.’ . . . Several of the children interviewed by Amnesty International – as well as parents – said they had, at times, gone for days without food; practically all those who were displaced to camps said conditions in the sites were dire.”); *see also* UNICEF, *At least one million children facing emergency levels of food insecurity in Haiti* (Apr. 17, 2025) (“The impact on children is severe, with healthcare and life-saving treatment becoming increasingly inaccessible, putting children at greater risk of various forms of malnutrition and preventable disease.”).

²⁷⁸ IOM, *Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10* (Jun. 2025), p. 5 (53%); Plan International, *Haiti displacement soars as children face education collapse and violence* (June 20, 2025) (“Haiti confronts a deepening humanitarian emergency with over 1.3 million people internally displaced—including 700,000 children.”); *see also* *Alterpresse*, *Criminalité : Plus de 40,000 enfants forcés à se déplacer depuis début 2025 - Une enfance brisée par les violences meurtrières des gangs en Haïti* (Apr. 8, 2025) (“More than 40,000 children in Haiti have abandoned their homes since the beginning of 2025, due to the escalation of violence by armed gangs, notes the Save the Children organization in Haiti.”); *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 43 (“In January 2025, the United Nations Children’s Fund reported a nearly 50 per cent increase in the number of displaced children in Haiti since September 2024, with over one in eight children displaced and accounting for more than half of all displaced people.”); OCHA, *United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Haiti deeply disturbed by the tragic consequences of violence affecting children and displaced people* (May 10, 2025) (“Today, around one in eight children is displaced, deprived of stability, education, and often exposed to heightened risks of violence and exploitation. Every minute, a child in Haiti is displaced due to violence.”).

²⁷⁹ IOM, *Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10* (Jun. 2025), p. 5 (“Several stakeholders have reported cases of exploitation of displaced children in host families, particularly for domestic work.”); UN Office of the Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General, *Highlights of the Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for Secretary-General António Guterres* (May 21, 2025) (reporting OCHA findings that “armed violence and growing insecurity continue to expose children to sexual violence and other severe protection risks,” and concluding that “displaced boys and girls are especially vulnerable in this current environment in Haiti,” with displacement “exposing them to exploitation, . . . abuse, and . . . potential recruitment into armed gangs”); OPC, *Étude sur la protection du droit des personnes déplacées en Haïti*, (Apr. 2025), p. 32 (“In many sites, children are not attending school.”); *Alterpresse*, *Criminalité : Plus de 40,000 enfants forcés à se déplacer depuis début 2025 - Une enfance brisée par les violences meurtrières des gangs en Haïti* (Apr. 8, 2025) (“With increasing displacement, overcrowded shelters are putting children at greater risk of disease, exploitation and sexual violence.”). Multiple reports highlight greater vulnerability of displaced children to educational deprivations; *see, e.g.*, Aljany Narcisus, *Can relocating students save Haiti’s education system?*, *Haitian Times* (Apr. 2, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/04/02/school-relocation-port-au-prince/> (“Displaced students also face enrollment barriers due to lost ID documents — including voter cards, which double as national identification in Haiti. Without these, many cannot register for school or access education records, further complicating their return to classrooms.”); FNE, *Projet d’Appui aux Écoles et Familles d’Élèves Victimes de l’Insécurité* (Jun. 2025), p. 8 (“The survey revealed a number of reasons why children from displaced families drop out of school. These include: Lack of financial resources; Closure or destruction of original schools; Geographical remoteness or difficult access to schools; Refusal of enrolment by host schools; Loss of administrative documents required for registration; Health reasons or disability; The death of a parent; Discouraging or demotivating children.”).

²⁸⁰ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 63 (reporting that “children, as young as eight, mak[e] up 30 to 50 per cent of [armed group] ranks”); UNICEF, *Haiti’s Children Under Siege: The staggering rise of child abuse and recruitment by armed groups* (Feb. 7, 2025) (“Last year alone, child recruitment into armed groups surged by 70 per cent. Right now, up to half of all armed group members are children—some as young as eight years old.”); *Alterpresse*, *Criminalité : Plus de 40,000 enfants forcés à se déplacer depuis début 2025 - Une enfance brisée par les violences meurtrières des gangs en Haïti* (Apr. 8, 2025) (“They are also exposed to the constant danger of being recruited.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 14 (“UN agencies continue to sound the alarm about the increase in trafficking and exploitation of children by gangs. This is largely due to the lack of social services and socio-economic opportunities for families, who struggle to provide for their children’s basic needs.”); UN News, *Haiti: Massive surge in child armed group recruitment, warns UNICEF* (Feb. 28, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160641> (“[L]ast year, child recruitment into armed groups

‘surged by 70 per cent.’ . . . Eight to 10-year-olds are ‘used as messengers or informants’ while younger girls are tasked with domestic chores. ‘As they get older, the children are playing more and more active roles in terms of participating in acts of violence.’’); Frances Robles, *Gunfire and Bandits Make School an Impossible Dream for Haitian Children*, NY Times (Jan. 25, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/25/world/americas/haiti-children-schools.html> (“It is common to see 7-year-olds working as gang lookouts, experts say.”); see also UNGA, *Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 17, 2025), ¶ 72 (reporting that 302 children were recruited by armed groups in 2024, over half of whom were used in combat roles).

²⁸¹ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 63 (“Recruitment is driven by poverty, hunger, and the collapse of education and social services.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 14 (“UN agencies continue to sound the alarm about the increase in trafficking and exploitation of children by gangs. This is largely due to the lack of social services and socio-economic opportunities for families, who struggle to provide for their children’s basic needs.”); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 19 (“According to testimonies. . . the access and possession of firearms and ammunition by gangs, reinforces the perception of gangs’ power within the community, and contributes to a false sense of security among children and youth, suffering marginalization and social exclusion, that join them despite the inherent risks. . . . Despite many of the recruited children and youth wanting to leave gang life once they realize its implications, armed gang members maintain control through force or the threat of it, preventing children from leaving. Within the gangs, in some instances, children, usually boys, are provided with weapons and coerced into using them, turning them into active participants in criminal acts, such as kidnappings and ransacking, and in violent confrontations with rival gangs or law enforcement.”); UNICEF, *Haiti’s Children Under Siege: The staggering rise of child abuse and recruitment by armed groups* (Feb. 7, 2025) (“Many [children] are taken by force. Others are manipulated or driven by extreme poverty. It’s a lethal cycle: Children are recruited into the groups that fuel their own suffering.”); Amnesty International, *Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti* (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 21 (“In addition to hunger and immense need, children said they were compelled to do various tasks for gangs out of sheer fear even as gangs, at times, thrust weapons into their hands. Many said they were directly threatened with reprisals against themselves and their family members if they refused.”); O’Neill, *Violence, Abuses and Hunger in Haiti* (Jan. 30, 2025) (“On my last visit I interviewed three young boys, aged 16 to 17 years old who had managed to escape one of the most notorious gangs in Haiti, the G-9. I asked them why they had joined the gang. They answered it was because they had no job prospects, the state offered them no support and they needed to help their parents and siblings. They needed food and money. When I asked if they had been afraid of joining, one responded: ‘When you are hungry, you don’t think about fear.’”); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025) (“Hunger and devastation are driving more and more children and teenagers to join the[] ranks [of armed groups]. The armed groups are also taking advantage of years of poor governance and the current political vacuum to spread a political discourse that resonates with young people who have no good options.”); Save the Children, *Haiti: Generation of Children Raised Amid Chaos 15 Years After Devastating Earthquake* (Jan. 8, 2025) (“Desperation has pushed children into armed groups, seeking food and a sense of protection. . . . Many of the leaders of the armed groups today, and those in their ranks, were children themselves in 2010. . . . Their futures were derailed in the aftermath of the earthquake, and now they are leaving a new generation behind.”); Charles, *‘Haiti is one of the worst places on the planet to be a child.’ UN groups sound alarm* (Dec. 3, 2024) (“[C]hildren are increasingly being robbed of their innocence as they are turned into tools of violence.”) (internal quotations omitted). According to Connect 2 Ministries, which has been supporting children working as domestic servants (known as *restaveks*) since 2018, the Bureau for the Protection of Minors (BPM) has been unable to continue rescuing *restaveks* and fears many have been recruited by armed groups.

²⁸² See, e.g., Amnesty International, *Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti* (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 23 (“Irrespective of the tasks for which children are used by the gangs, any mere association with the groups exposes them to risk. Children described immense fear of the police and community members. They also spoke of being stigmatized and shamed by virtue of belonging to neighbourhoods under gang control. . . . Furthermore, teenage boys are particularly at risk, as the age for obtaining an identification card is 18 and they may appear older to policemen who do not always believe they are younger. . . . In late 2024, the UN’s reporting on the number of people killed and injured in the year’s third quarter stated that of the 1,223 killings registered between July and September, police carried out at least 96 extrajudicial executions, including of six children who were accused of being ‘antennas.’”); *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 50-52, 54 (“During 2024, specialized police units were responsible for 281 summary executions (251 men, 22 women and 8 children). . . . On 7 February 2025, six farmers from the commune of Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite, including a 15-year-old boy, were arrested and later executed by Police officers.”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 27 (reporting that 13 children were among 165 fatalities resulting from extrajudicial and attempted extrajudicial killings); *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), note 22 and associated text, ¶ 50 (summarizing BINUH reporting that in 2024, at least 18 children were among at least 596 people lynched by “defense” groups while 8 children were among the 281 summary executions perpetrated by specialized police units); UNGA, *Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 17, 2025), ¶ 74 (reporting that police and “defense” groups accounted for over 34 killings and maimings of children in 2024); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 12 (reporting that among 65 individuals extrajudicially by law enforcement officials, two were children).

²⁸³ UNGA, *Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 17, 2025), ¶ 73 (“The Haitian National Police detained 26 boys for their alleged association with armed gangs, in a penitentiary where minors are held alongside adults under harsh conditions.”); Amnesty International, *Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti* (Feb. 12, 2025), pp. 6, 23-27 (reporting that “[t]he Port-au-Prince Juvenile Court has not functioned since 2019 due to gang violence”; documenting arbitrary arrests of children based on location and their prolonged detention without conviction; and describing the detention of juveniles with adults – including children younger than 13, who under Haitian law cannot be held criminally liable, and children under 16, who under Haitian law should not be held in detention facilities); see also notes 227-229.

²⁸⁴ Amnesty International, *Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti* (Feb. 12, 2025), pp. 25-26 (concluding that “[t]hese testimonies and digital evidence highlight the extent of work needed to ensure effective community healing for any reintegration process to work” and that while “[g]overnment officials and representatives from the UN, as well as from international and Haitian NGOs involved in child protection told Amnesty International that preparations were

underway to set up a number of transit centres to receive children [and] the framework agreement and at least one transit centre exist, a fully-fledged demobilization and reintegration process had not started yet”). Cf. BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 14 (“It is also important to establish reintegration programmes for children in conflict with the law, especially those incarcerated for criminal activities related to their gang membership.”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶¶ 39, 53 (“In parallel, BINUH is collaborating with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to establish a systemic mechanism for the objective identification and rehabilitation of juveniles recruited by gangs. . . . UNICEF has demobilized and reintegrated over 140 children through a 2024 protocol with the government.”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (April 14, 2025), ¶ 38 (reporting that the UNSG “formally tasked the National Commission with supporting the reintegration of children and youth in conflict with the law” in March); UN News, [Haiti: Massive surge in child armed group recruitment, warns UNICEF](#) (Feb. 28, 2025) (“UNICEF is ‘working actively’ to support the release, demobilization and reintegration of child armed group members. . . . The initiative has proved successful, with more than 100 children demobilized and reintegrated last year and plans to continue the work in 2025.”). Among important considerations in setting up an effective response will be ensuring leadership by affected communities and avoiding top-down responses; as well as demobilization that takes into account the ongoing armed group territorial control and recruitment as well as deadly community stigma. Sufficient dedicated funding is likewise a serious barrier. See, e.g., Amnesty International, [Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 26.

²⁸⁵ Very little information is available on the distinct challenges faced by the LGBTQI+ community in Haiti. However, given the historic lack of legal protections and pervasive discrimination, this is a community particularly vulnerable to the crisis and in particular the loss of services resulting from the irresponsible U.S. aid cuts. Preliminary findings from an ongoing national survey of trans individuals launched by the *Réseau National de la Communauté Trans Haïtienne* (RNCTH) and Housing Works indicate significant discrimination against trans people on account of their gender identity with respect to key rights like safety, access to healthcare, and economic participation. For example, the vast majority of respondents reported having been the victim of violence or harassment because of their gender identity (63.4% multiple times, 14.9% once) and feeling unsafe as a trans person in their environments (50.5% never safe, 34.7 sometimes safe); most of the respondents reported that they lacked adequate or consistent access to healthcare adapted to their needs (56.4% none, 19.8% intermittent) and 78.2% had experienced discrimination in a healthcare establishment because of their gender identity; and 72.3% had experienced significant discrimination on the basis of gender identity when looking for work.

²⁸⁶ Charilien Jeanvil, *Haïti-Insécurité : Un fardeau supplémentaire pour les personnes handicapées* (May 5, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31671> (“Access to the job market is virtually impossible for people with disabilities. As a result, food insecurity, which affects more than half of the population, seriously affects people living with disabilities. . . . [L]ess than 10% of children with disabilities are literate, which [Dr. Michel Péan, coordinator of the Haitian Society for Aid to the Blind (Shaa)] believes is evidence of a disconnect between reality, the law, and the conventions ratified by Haiti.”) (internal quotations omitted); Amnesty International, [Haiti: “I’m a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?”: Gangs’ Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 8 (“Of the six children with disabilities [interviewed by Amnesty] who need and would benefit from assistive devices, only two had any equipment – one had a wheelchair, the other crutches, though their quality was in question. Assistive devices and prostheses particularly affect the developmental and educational outcomes of children with disabilities.”); RNDDH, [Poverty, insecurity, poor sanitation, overcrowding, and exposure to contagious diseases: The general living conditions in the reception sites are alarming](#) (Jan. 11, 2025), ¶ 102 (“Children, the elderly, pregnant or breastfeeding women, and people with mobility or sensory impairments suffer even more from this situation of vulnerability and deprivation.”).

²⁸⁷ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, *Atrocity Alert No. 439: Haiti, Central African Republic and Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory* (May 14, 2025), <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/atrocity-alert-no-439/> (“Over the last three years, gangs have increasingly launched attacks in the once peaceful Artibonite department, giving rise to a climate of fear and resulting in large parts of the region falling under gang control. The spread of violence to Artibonite, the nation’s breadbasket, has had devastating consequences, disrupting people’s livelihoods and compounding an already critical humanitarian emergency. Gangs have stolen crops and livestock, blocked irrigation systems, attacked and occupied agricultural lands, imposing taxes on farmers to access their own land. This has deepened food insecurity and worsened an already critical humanitarian crisis.”); GI-TOC, [Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Issue 3](#) (Apr. 2025), p. 3 (describing an attack in Kenscoff that “resulted in significant loss of life and disrupted agricultural activities, as many victims were working class individuals tending crops” and “leaked information that the Haitian National Police (HNP) was aware of the pending attack but allegedly chose not to act”); Shaw & Le Cour Grandmaison, [Haiti is in a Political and Criminal Crisis that Should Not be Ignored](#) (Apr. 29, 2025) (“In the Artibonite region, the agricultural heart of the country, the Gran Grif gang levies a tax on the farm laborers. When conflicts break out over the payment of taxes, or when groups of farmers try to resist — as they did in October 2024 — the reprisals are terrible.”); Hackel, [Gangs seize roads leading to Haiti’s capital as police continue to lose control](#) (Mar. 26, 2025) (“[Farmers] in this area under attack regularly. You don’t really know exactly where they will pop up. And they stole [farmers’] crops. They burn down their houses and kill them on a random basis.”); Mercy Corps, [Impact of Gang Violence on Food Systems in Haiti – 2024](#) (Dec. 2024), p. 4 (“Farmers in gang-controlled territories face intimidation, restricted access, and land disputes, leading to wide-scale abandonment of vital arable lands.”).

²⁸⁸ RHI News, *Des organisations paysannes réclament une enquête de l’ULCC sur la spoliation des terres de l’État dans le Nord-Est...* (Apr. 23, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/des-organisations-paysannes-reclament-une-enquete-de-lulcc-sur-la-spoliation-des-terres-de-letat-dans-le-nord-est/> (“[T]he Coordination of Resistance against Dappiyanp on peasant lands in the North and Northeast (KRDTN-NE) called for the opening of an investigation into what it describes as “organized dispossession of state land” for the benefit of powerful actors operating under the cover of public and private institutions . . . According to [the Coordination], this illegal exploitation is carried out with the complicity of local authorities, notaries, agents of the General Directorate of Taxes (DGI), and even actors in the judicial system.”).

²⁸⁹ Sanon & Coto, [A gang leader in Haiti is accused of massacring older people to avenge his son’s death](#) (Dec. 9, 2024) (describing a massacre of over 180 people by a leader of an armed group intent on targeting “elderly people and [Vodou] practitioners” in an alleged attempt to avenge what he claimed was the supernatural death of his son, reportedly following previous such targeted killings); Robles, [Massacre in Haiti’s Capital Leaves Nearly 200 Dead, U.N. Says](#) (Dec. 8, 2024) (“A leading Haitian human rights

group described the killings as the personal vendetta of a gang boss who had been told that witchcraft caused his son's fatal illness. . . . Older people who practiced Voodoo appeared to have been targeted, according to the group. That assessment was backed by another rights organization and a Cité Soleil resident. . . . [I]t was not the first time that [the leader] had been accused of killing older people who practice Voodoo. He is believed to have been responsible for the killings in 2021 of 12 elderly female practitioners.”); RNDDH, *Massacres à Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff et à Chateaublond : Le pouvoir de transition continue avec la politique de banalisation de la vie mise en œuvre depuis plusieurs années par les autorités étatiques* (Feb. 28, 2025), ¶ 21.

²⁹⁰ International Rescue Committee (IRC), 2025 Emergency Watchlist (2025), <https://www.rescue.org/watchlist> (the IRC placed Haiti 8th on its list of the 20 countries most at risk).

²⁹¹ UN News, *Haiti: WFP concerned over humanitarian situation as hurricane season begins* (Jun. 3, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164001#:~:text=The%202025%20Humanitarian%20Response%20Plan,causes%20of%20hunger%20and%20malnutrition> (“[A]t this moment when half of all Haitians are already going hungry, a single storm could push millions into a humanitarian catastrophe.”); Ellie Happel & Sherwanda Maxime, *Recent flooding in Port-de-Paix highlights the urgency of climate disorder and its uneven impacts in Haiti*, Open Global Rights (Mar. 31, 2025), <https://www.openglobalrights.org/recent-flooding-in-port-de-paix-highlights-urgency-of-climate-disorder-and-uneven-impacts-in-haiti/>; Center for Human Rights and Global Justice New York University School of Law & The Promise Institute for Human Rights UCLA School of Law, *Bay Kou Bliye, Pote Mak Sonje: Climate Injustice in Haiti and the Case for Reparations* (Oct. 12, 2024), <https://chrgj.org/2024-12-10-climate-injustice-haiti-case-for-reparations>; see, e.g., OCHA, *United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Haiti deeply disturbed by the tragic consequences of violence affecting children and displaced people* (May 10, 2025) (intense rainfall in early May resulted in significant flooding in Ouanaminthe and Ferrier, affecting over 3,000 families and causing significant damage); Gérard Maxineau, *Critical Need for Government Support in Cap-Haïtien amid Rain and Equipment Deficit*, Le Nouvelliste (Jan. 7, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/252360/critical-need-for-government-support-in-cap-haitien-amid-rain-and-equipment-deficit> (“Weeks of heavy rain [in Cap-Haïtien] have worsened an already precarious environmental situation. Flooded streets, layers of mud, and piles of garbage blocking major arteries have made daily life unbearable for residents.”); Charles & Fils-Aimé, *Journalists, police officer killed by gangs at reopening of Haiti’s largest hospital* (Dec. 25, 2024) (at least seven people died and 11,000 houses were flooded after heavy rain in Port-de-Paix); Flavien Janvier, *In Grand’Anse, Merchants, Madan Sara, and Farmers Seek Alternative Solutions*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 19, 2024), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/252094/in-grandanse-merchants-madan-sara-and-farmers-seek-alternative-solutions> (“[T]he blockage of agricultural paths due to landslides caused by heavy rains in recent weeks presents a new challenge for these contributors to the national economy.”).

²⁹² Haitian Times, *UN warns Haiti faces extreme hurricane threats* (Jun. 4, 2025) (preparations for Haiti’s hurricane season “are hitting roadblocks,” as “[h]umanitarian access remains limited, particularly in areas under gang control, and there are few pre-positioned emergency supplies across the country—something [UN spokesperson Stéphane] Dujarric attributed directly to underfunding”); UN News, *Haiti: WFP concerned over humanitarian situation as hurricane season begins* (Jun. 3, 2025) (“While in past years, WFP had humanitarian stocks ready in the country and could assist between a quarter to half a million people in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, ‘this year, we [WFP] start the hurricane season with an empty warehouse.’ . . . Unless resources are made available, the agency will have no capacity to respond—there are no contingency supplies, no logistical buffer, and no lifeline for the most vulnerable.”); Kervenson Martial, *Slow recovery in Port-de-Paix as storm leaves more than 270,000 affected in Northwest Haiti*, Haitian Times (Feb. 14, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/02/14/port-de-paix-flood-devastation/> (discussing government failures to respond to the impact of devastating floods in Port-de-Paix); Maxineau, *Critical Need for Government Support in Cap-Haïtien amid Rain and Equipment Deficit* (Jan. 7, 2025) (reporting on the “lack of resources and equipment” at the Northern Directorate of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications, and the lack of support from relevant authorities).

²⁹³ There is global recognition that France’s extortion of the “Independence Debt” from Haiti is a root cause of its underdevelopment, and that solutions to Haiti’s crises must include restitution of the Debt. See UN Permanent Forum on People of African Descent (UN PFPAD), *Preliminary Conclusions and Recommendations from the Fourth Session*, ¶¶ 43-44 (Apr. 14-17, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/racism/forum-people-african-descent/4th-session/preliminary-conclusions-recommendations-pfpad-4thsession.pdf> (acknowledging that Haiti’s crises “are deeply rooted in a series of complex and multidimensional factors . . . including a defining moment in global history: France’s imposition of an ‘independence debt’ on Haiti, the world’s first Black republic,” and calling for reparatory measures); IJDH, *Truth, Solidarity, and Repair: Haiti and the Global Movement for Reparations* (Apr. 8, 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/2025/04/projects/truth-solidarity-and-repair-haiti-and-the-global-movement-for-reparations/>; Amnesty International, *Haiti: Activists and organizations from Haiti and its diaspora urge France to address its colonial past in Haiti on the bicentenary of the “independence debt”* (Apr. 15, 2025), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr36/9258/2025/en/>; RHI News, *Haiti exige justice : le Kolektif Ayisyen Afwodesandan réclame la restitution de la rançon imposée par la France et des réparations historiques* (Apr. 15, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/haiti-exige-justice-le-kolektif-ayisyen-afwodesandan-reclame-la-restitution-de-la-rancon-imposee-par-la-france-et-des-reparations-historiques/>; Carl-Henry Cadet, *New York Event Urges Reparations for Haiti*, Le Nouvelliste (Apr. 14, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/255252/new-york-event-urges-reparations-for-haiti>; Ambassador Mark A. Green, *Haiti: Where the Descendants of Slaves Paid the Descendants of Slaveholders*, Wilson Center (Dec. 17, 2024), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/haiti-where-descendants-slaves-paid-descendants-slaveholders>. Most recently, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a joint French-Haitian commission to study the countries’ “shared past” and make recommendations for the future, and the French National Assembly adopted a resolution aimed at exploring ways to repay the “double debt.” Tom Nouvian & Sylvie Corbet, *France’s president says forcing Haiti to pay for its independence was unjust*, Associated Press (Apr. 17, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/france-haiti-debt-independence-injustice-339df651093e932d4d2607fd3f08025f>; Le Nouvelliste, *France Passes Resolution on Historic “Double Debt” Restitution* (Jun. 5, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/256870/france-passes-resolution-on-historic-double-debt-restitution>.

²⁹⁴ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 58 (“Between March and May 2025, the economy of Haiti continued to contract, with the World Bank projecting a 2.2 per cent decline in gross domestic product for the year.”); see also BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 52 (“The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean projects

that the country's gross domestic product will decline by 0.5 per cent in 2025, while the Economist Intelligence Unit expects a deeper decline of 2 per cent.”); World Food Programme (WFP) & Food and Agriculture Organizations of the United Nations (FAO), *Hunger Hotspots*, p. 26 (2025), https://www.fightfoodcrises.net/sites/default/files/resource/file/HungerHotspots2025_CD5684EN.pdf; Macarena Hermosilla, *Haiti faces growing threat of famine*, UPI (Jun. 17, 2025), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/06/17/haiti-famine-food-insecurity/1281750183695/.

²⁹⁵ World Bank, *The World Bank in Haiti* (Apr. 28, 2025), <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview> (37.6% are living in extreme poverty, defined as living on less than \$2.15 per day). This is a slight increase from 2024. See World Bank, *Macro Poverty Outlook for Haiti October 2024*, p. 2 (Oct. 1, 2024), <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099813510152410596/pdf/IDU-df92e9d8-c916-4e50-98f7-844ad9466383.pdf> (reporting 36.6% living in extreme poverty in 2024).

²⁹⁶ Institut Haïtien de Statistique d'Informatique, <https://ihsi.gouv.ht/> (last visited Jul. 12, 2025).

²⁹⁷ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 58 (reporting a 26.8% year-on-year increase in the Consumer Price Index); WFP & FAO, *Hunger Hotspots* (2025), p. 26 (“[Y]ear-on-year food inflation reach[ed] 37.5 percent in February 2025.”); RHI News, *Haiti : l'insécurité criminelle alimente la faim – quand le terrorisme de Gran Grif et Viv Ansanm bloque l'accès à la nourriture dans un pays à genoux...* (Jun. 13, 2025) (“The price of rice, oil, beans, drinking water, and even coal has increased by more than 60% in one year.”); Trading Economics, *Haiti Food Inflation*, <https://tradingeconomics.com/haiti/food-inflation> (last visited Jul. 14, 2025) (“Cost of food in Haiti increased 29.70 percent in April of 2025 over the same month in the previous year.”); Mercy Corps, *Impact of Gang Violence on Food Systems in Haiti – 2024* (Dec. 2024), p. 6 (“In October 2024, the average cost of a basic food basket rose to 26,385 gourdes, marking a 2% monthly increase. . . . The price of staple foods such as maize also increased significantly, with the Northwest and Southeast departments seeing a 10% hike.”); see also WFP, *Haiti*, https://www.wfp.org/countries/haiti?utm_source=chatgpt.com (last visited Jul. 10, 2025) (“Consumer prices for major food products [in Haiti] are 30 to 77 percent higher than in the Latin America and Caribbean region as a whole.”); Mercy Corps, *Impact of Gang Violence on Food Systems in Haiti – 2024* (Dec. 2024), p. 7 (“Already grappling with inflation and limited resources, host markets in Haiti have been overwhelmed by the influx of displaced individuals and the increased demand for essential commodities. This surge in demand has also generated significant price hikes, with the cost of vegetable oil and red beans rising by up to 15% in certain regions.”).

²⁹⁸ IPC, *Haiti: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot* (Apr. 14, 2025); Action Aid, *Almost 9 in 10 going all day without eating as hunger in Haiti reaches record high* (Feb. 18, 2025) (“17% [of those interviewed by ActionAid] reported having no income at all.”). The situation is particularly dire for displaced families. FNE, *Projet d'Appui aux Écoles et Familles d'Élèves Victimes de l'Insécurité* (Jun. 2025), p. 9 (“[A]lmost all the families interviewed had suffered a sharp deterioration in their economic situation as a result of their displacement. In fact, 5,877 families, representing 94.12% of the sample, claim to have lost their main sources of income due to the insecurity that forced them to flee their homes. Currently, 4,302 families, or 68.90%, live on less than 15,000 gourdes a month, a level of income that reflects the extreme precariousness of the majority of these households.”).

²⁹⁹ Press Release, Action Aid, *Haiti: More Than Half of the Population Facing Alarming Levels of Food Insecurity* (Apr. 29, 2025), <https://www.actionagainsthunger.org/press-releases/haiti-more-than-half-of-the-population-facing-alarming-levels-of-food-insecurity/>; IPC, *Haiti: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot* (Apr. 14, 2025); Action Aid, *Almost 9 in 10 going all day without eating as hunger in Haiti reaches record high* (Feb. 18, 2025) (“It has become more difficult to buy food Before, I could feed my whole family with 500 gourdes (US\$ 3.80). Now, 500 gourdes is only enough for one item. How can we possibly feed everyone with 500 gourdes a day? . . . 128 people [surveyed] (66%) said they could not meet any of their family's basic needs (food, water, clothing), whilst a further 11% said they could only meet some of their basic needs.”); Jean Junior Celestin, *Artibonite Entrepreneurs Condemn Insecurity's Effects on Economy and Agriculture*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 19, 2024), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/252101/artibonite-entrepreneurs-condemn-insecuritys-effects-on-economy-and-agriculture>; Switchboard, *Understanding Haiti and the Journeys of Haitian Migrants*, p. 15 (Nov. 2024), <https://www.switchboardta.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Haitian-Backgrounder-20241217.pdf> (noting that “inequality is substantial, with a wide gap between the wealthiest individuals and the rest of the population”); see also notes 327-335.

³⁰⁰ FNE, *Projet d'Appui aux Écoles et Familles d'Élèves Victimes de l'Insécurité* (Jun. 2025), p. 11 (“Of the 6,244 [displaced] families surveyed, 5,565, or 89.13%, claimed to have outstanding debts. This high level of indebtedness reflects a strategy of short-term economic survival in a context marked by loss of income, lack of humanitarian aid, and the impossibility of meeting essential needs, particularly those linked to schooling.”); Juhakenson Blaise, *Sorting garbage in Haiti: A source of income with health risks for disadvantaged families*, *Haitian Times* (Apr. 23, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/04/23/garbage-in-haiti-a-source-income-with-health-risks/> (in the absence of functioning waste management systems, some Haitians have resorted to informal waste collection to support their families, which exposes them to significant health risks); Action Aid, *Almost 9 in 10 going all day without eating as hunger in Haiti reaches record high* (Feb. 18, 2025) (“More than 85% of those surveyed by ActionAid have fallen into debt Poverty and debt increase [women and girls'] vulnerability to exploitation and abuse, with reports of girls as young as 15 being coerced into trading sex for food.”); see also notes 327-335.

³⁰¹ Bazile, *Housing in Port-au-Prince: A Growing Luxury* (Jan. 9, 2025) (“In ‘secure’ zones, the cost of even basic housing often exceeds \$3,000 USD, an astronomical sum in a country where most people survive on less than \$2 a day. . . . The surge in rental prices is not only a consequence of the massive displacement but also a symptom of a declining economy and a housing market ill-suited to the needs of the population.”); see also Miami Law Human Rights Clinic & Konbit Ayisyen pou Lojman Altènatif, *Criminalization of Homelessness in the Caribbean: A Baseline Assessment in Haiti* (Mar. 2025), <https://miami.app.box.com/s/jva9pa9fcslethtba6iv7kph7fshydeo> (being unhoused exposes Haitians to additional harms).

³⁰² These include a new 1% U.S. tax on remittances that could cost Haiti over US\$60 million per year; the termination of the humanitarian parole program for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, which allowed Haitian nationals to work legally in the United States; and the U.S. government's designation of the *Viv Ansanm* and *Gran Grif* armed groups as terrorist organizations, which experts say could make banks and other financial systems unwilling to send remittances to Haiti for fear of

being charged with providing material assistance to those groups. Helen Dempster et al., *Even at 1 Percent, the US Remittance Tax Hits Poor Countries Hard*, Center for Global Development (Jul. 1, 2025), <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/even-1-percent-us-remittance-tax-hits-poor-countries-hard> (estimating an annual loss of US\$60.8 million in remittances due to the tax); Jacqueline Charles, *Trump's move to tax money sent abroad could devastate Latin America, Caribbean economies*, Miami Herald (Jun. 19, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article308942895.html> (“[F]or every \$10 dollars remitted to Haiti in 2020 — when the country received \$3.8 billion from abroad — at least \$8 came from the U.S. . . . ‘Haiti’s dependence on remittances is significant in a moment where . . . the state has already collapsed, and income basically depends on remittance flows. So the implications of these are far more complex.’”); Jacqueline Charles, *Trump administration designates Haiti’s powerful armed gangs as foreign, global terrorists* (Jun. 19, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article305515216.html>; see also notes 422-430, 488.

³⁰³ Switchboard, *Understanding Haiti and the Journeys of Haitian Migrants* (Nov. 2024), p. 15 (noting that “inequality is substantial, with a wide gap between the wealthiest individuals and the rest of the population”).

³⁰⁴ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 52 (“The prospects for economic recovery in Haiti in 2025 remain constrained by entrenched security challenges, which continue to disrupt supply chains across the country, weaken logistics and dampen economic activity.”).

³⁰⁵ Persistent foreign interference created an over-reliance on foreign imports, which has in turn made the Haitian gourde extremely vulnerable to fluctuations on the global market, significantly impacting the economy and further limiting many Haitians’ ability to purchase food. See generally Sandra Wisner & Brian Concannon, *Debt and Dependence: Foreign Interference in Haiti and the Importance of Non-State Actor Accountability*, Northwestern Law Journal of Human Rights (2023), <https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1252&context=njihr>; Sandra C. Wisner, *Starved for Justice: International Complicity in Systemic Violations of the Right to Food in Haiti*, HRLR Online (May 10, 2022), <https://hrlr.law.columbia.edu/hrlr-online/starved-for-justice-international-complicity-in-systemic-violations-of-the-right-to-food-in-haiti/>; see also Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025); Switchboard, *Understanding Haiti and the Journeys of Haitian Migrants* (Nov. 2024), p. 15.

³⁰⁶ GI-TOC, *Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti: Issue 3* (Apr. 2025), p. 8 (“[G]angs have turned to extortion as a primary revenue stream. . . . Each advance by the gangs leads not only to an explosion of violence, but also to the creation of local cells with one or more leaders, one of whose main tasks is to establish a local extortion regime, particularly against businesses in the area, residents in some cases, and also against people wishing to travel on the highways, through the immediate creation of checkpoints. . . . [E]xtortion by criminal groups has become widespread in rural areas, sometimes in a less visible or at least less documented way than in the capital. . . . In Artibonite, gangs have targeted farmers, traders and markets, enforcing so-called protection fees and seizing goods. The Gran Grif gang, under pressure from joint operations of the Haitian National Police and the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, has begun extorting smaller communities such as Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite and Dessalines. In Port-au-Prince, extortion now also affects businesses and public officials, further undermining state authority.”).

³⁰⁷ GI-TOC, *Last Chance? Breaking Haiti’s Political and Criminal Impasse* (Jan. 2025), p. 10 (“[I]t is impossible to move goods in, out or around large parts of the country without paying taxes to the gangs. . . . Haiti’s gangs have therefore established a mafia-like model that is so entrenched that the country can barely function without their consent.”); *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 85 (“The Wharf Jérémie and La Saline gangs . . . continue to extort trucks along the routes leading to and from the National Port Authority port. . . . [I]n January 2025, the two gangs each raised their extortion amount per container leaving the port from between \$200 and \$300 to between \$500 and \$1,000.”); Jacqueline Charles, *Rubio’s plan to designate Haiti’s gangs as terrorists could deepen humanitarian crisis*, Miami Herald (May 1, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article305429801.html> (“Their extortion racket is so extensive that the country’s finance minister, Alfred Metellus, estimates that gangs, which charge \$2,000 to allow passage for a shipping container, are pulling as much as \$75 million a year from the ransoms they charge to allow goods transiting through the Dominican Republic to arrive at their destinations.”); GI-TOC, *Living Together: The Gangs of Haiti – Part 2: Fighting Back* (Apr. 30, 2025), at 26:45, (“[R]esearch carried out by the GI[-TOC] has shown that the business of checkpoints in Haiti has in some cases become highly structured and bureaucratized. For example, if you are someone who regularly passes through checkpoints, you can ask for a pass that allows you to pay a lump sum just once a week, rather than deal with the daily delays that checkpoints create. . . . Over the course of a day, some checkpoints can make up to US\$8,000, and given the GDP per capita in Haiti is around US\$1,700 annually, you can see how much money these checkpoints are generating in relative terms.”); Alterpresse, *Haiti-DR: Dominican traders pay ransoms to Haitian gangs to maintain border trade* (May 16, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31712> (“Dominican economic operators . . . must pay up to 20,000.00 US dollars per month . . . to armed groups in Haiti to allow the continuation of commercial activities between the two countries.”); Joseph, *Gangs strike twice in one week in Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite, sending residents fleeing across the river* (May 2, 2025); UN HRC, *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 18; Odigène, *Transportation Sector Struggles amid Rising Insecurity* (Jan. 9, 2025); Mercy Corps, *Impact of Gang Violence on Food Systems in Haiti – 2024* (Dec. 2024), p. 7 (“The methods employed by gangs operating along these routes include setting up toll booths, charging fees that range from 500 to 5,000 Haitian gourdes, ambushing vehicles to confiscate goods, and using intimidation to deter transporters from taking the different roads.”).

³⁰⁸ See notes 56, 61.

³⁰⁹ *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025) ¶¶ 83-84; Juhakenson Blaise, *Gangs blamed for pulverizing Haiti’s lam veritab sector, threatening cultural fare like tonmtom*, Haitian Times (May 13, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/05/13/lam-veritab-faces-insecurity-conservation-issues/>; IPC, *Haiti: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot* (Apr. 14, 2025); UN HRC, *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 18; Alterpresse, *Haiti-Crime: Several injured in armed attacks in Delmas* (Mar. 24, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31531>; Aljany Narcius, *Haiti’s Madan Sara fight for survival as insecurity threatens the engine of Haiti’s informal economy*, Haitian Times (Mar. 21, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/03/21/haiti-madan-sara-insecurity/>; Jean Daniel Sénat, *Port-au-Prince Caught Between Armed Attacks and Mass Exodus*, Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 17, 2025),

<https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254276/port-au-prince-caught-between-armed-attacks-and-mass-exodus>; Action Aid, *Almost 9 in 10 going all day without eating as hunger in Haiti reaches record high* (Feb. 18, 2025); Celestin, *Artibonite Entrepreneurs Condemn Insecurity's Effects on Economy and Agriculture* (Dec. 19, 2024); Mercy Corps, *Impact of Gang Violence on Food Systems in Haiti – 2024* (Dec. 2024), pp. 6-7; Celestin, *La Gonâve Island Feels the Pressure of Port-au-Prince's Turmoil* (Dec. 5, 2024); see also Flavien Janvier, *In Grand'Anse, Merchants, Madan Sara, and Farmers Seek Alternative Solutions* (Dec. 19, 2024) (explaining the burdensome and expensive routes suppliers are taking due to insecurity).

³¹⁰ Blaise, *Port-au-Prince goes dark: Residents shut down Haiti's main power plant to demand security* (May 20, 2025) (“[The] Péligre [plant] alone supplies over 30% of the country’s electricity. The plant’s closure with no reopening date in sight highlights the government’s vulnerability to armed groups and social instability. . . . Just a few days since the residents’ protest, the shutdown of Péligre is already hitting Port-au-Prince hard. Hospitals, businesses and homes that depend on electricity from EDH are now without power. Darkness has increased the risk of crime and further disrupted daily life. . . . Yet for many in the capital, blackouts are nothing new. ‘We’ve been living in darkness for years. . . . At this point, I feel like we’re affecting the blackout more than it’s affecting us.’ Syntya Belizaire, a medical biologist and entrepreneur in Delmas, agrees with Joseph. She said she routinely charges her phone at neighbors’ homes and uses a generator at times—though now she’s out of fuel.”); Dimitry Charles, *The Péligre power plant sabotaged once again by angry residents*, Juno7 (Jun. 18, 2025), https://www.juno7.ht/centrale-de-peligre-sabotee-une-nouvelle-fois/#google_vignette (residents shut down the plant again in June; in Port-au-Prince, “[o]nly homes with solar panels or inverter systems . . . able to maintain a minimum level of lighting”); Juhakenson Blaise, *The only pressure we have left’: Port-au-Prince hit by second blackout as residents weaponize power cuts*, Haitian Times (Jun. 20, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/06/20/second-blackout-in-port-au-prince/>.

³¹¹ Blaise, *Port-au-Prince goes dark: Residents shut down Haiti's main power plant to demand security* (May 20, 2025) (“On May 13, the Association of Petroleum and Energy Professionals (APPE) warned in a letter to Prime Minister Fils-Aimé of an imminent breakdown in the fuel supply chain. The Varreux Terminal—the country’s main fuel depot—is in an area controlled by the Viv Ansanm gang alliance. . . . Gangs are demanding exorbitant fees from fuel transporters, effectively blocking movement.”); see also BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 58 (the price of fuel “remains burdensome for Haitian consumers amid stagnant incomes”); O’Neill, *Violence Abuses and Hunger in Haiti* (Jan. 30, 2025) (“A fuel shortage has rendered dysfunctional the few institutions still trying to function including health clinics, government offices, banks, markets and small businesses.”); Alterpresse, *Crime: Thousands of displaced people in Port-au-Prince still under threat from armed gangs in Haiti* (Jan. 8, 2025) (reporting that armed groups siphon gasoline from motorcycle taxis).

³¹² BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 17 (armed groups set fire to the central public market in the Central Department on June 8); RHI News, *Haïti : l'insécurité criminelle alimente la faim – quand le terrorisme de Gran Grif et Viv Ansanm bloque l'accès à la nourriture dans un pays à genoux* (Jun. 13, 2025) (“Popular markets such as Croix-des-Bossales, Pont-Morin, and Mirebalais are now operating at a slow pace or have even closed, under threat from armed gangs.”); RNDDH, *Fall of Two Communes in the Centre Department into the Hands of Armed Gangs: Transitional Authorities Worsen the Country's Security Crisis* (Apr. 10, 2025), ¶ 9 (armed groups burned down the Mirebalais public market during their attack on the town on March 31); Narcisus, *Haiti's Madan Sara fight for survival as insecurity threatens the engine of Haiti's informal economy* (Mar. 21, 2025) (“Port-au-Prince’s once-iconic markets, like Croix-des-Bossales, Hyppolite and Tête Bœuf, were thriving hubs for Madan Sara [women traders who form the backbone of Haiti’s informal economy]. Today, gang violence has changed everything. Many merchants no longer dare go [to markets] for fear of extortion, attacks, or even death. This insecurity has directly impacted their trade, limiting customer access, driving up prices due to supply chain disruptions. . . . Between 2018 and 2023, gangs burned down or looted more than 60 Haitian markets, causing losses estimated at several million dollars.”); Lennon, *Haitian media struggle to survive in face of attacks, revenue collapses* (Mar. 19, 2025) (armed groups destroyed several construction companies, killing one employee); Piercin et al., *Gangs deploy new strategies in Port-au-Prince* (Mar. 11, 2025 (discussing armed group control over Salomon Market, in Port-au-Prince); Chadrac, *Father Mackenzy Célestin Raises Alarm Over Montrouis Crisis* (Jan. 16, 2025) (insecurity in Montrouis has led to “the complete stagnation of economic life . . . , exemplified by the closure of several businesses . . . which employed many people”) (internal quotations omitted).

³¹³ See notes 280-282.

³¹⁴ HRW, *Haiti: Events of 2024* (2025) (“Forty-five percent of the population lacks access to clean drinking water, and 7 out of 10 people do not have access to an improved sanitation system.”); Press Release, UNICEF, *Japan and UNICEF Commit to Strengthening Healthcare and Safe Water for Crisis-Affected Populations in Haiti* (Mar. 13, 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/press-releases/japan-and-unicef-commit-strengthening-healthcare-and-safe-water-crisis-affected> (“For many families, finding safe drinking water has become a daily struggle.”).

³¹⁵ Juhakenson Blaise, *Cholera spreads in Haiti's displacement camps, deepening humanitarian crisis*, Haitian Times (May 19, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/05/19/haiti-cholera-outbreak-threat/> (“Doctors Without Borders emphasized the urgent need for universal access to safe drinking water and medical care to halt the spread of cholera.”); HRW, *Haiti: Events of 2024* (2025).

³¹⁶ Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Social : Only 43% of Haitians in rural areas have access to drinking water* (Jan. 7, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44012-haiti-social-only-43-of-haitians-in-rural-areas-have-access-to-drinking-water.html> (“Only 43% of Haitians living in rural areas have access to safe drinking water The poorest communities are the most affected, with only 28% having access to basic drinking water, compared to 95% for the richest.”).

³¹⁷ Esther Kimberly Bazile, *Médecins Sans Frontières Raises Alarm Over Cholera Outbreak in Haiti*, Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 14, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254192/medecins-sans-frontieres-raises-alarm-over-cholera-outbreak-in-haiti>; UNICEF, *Japan and UNICEF Commit to Strengthening Healthcare and Safe Water for Crisis-Affected Populations in Haiti* (Mar. 13, 2025); see also note 83.

³¹⁸ Samaritan’s Purse, *Providing Clean Water Sources in Haiti* (Apr. 24, 2025), <https://www.samaritans-purse.org.uk/article/providing-clean-water-sources-in-haiti>.

- ³¹⁹ Onès Joseph, *Water shortage devastates acres of farmlands in Grandmont, Artibonite, Haitian Times* (Apr. 24, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/04/24/water-shortage-in-grandmont-agriculture-infrastructure-missing-in-gonaives-plain/>.
- ³²⁰ UN News, *UN's Ban apologizes to people of Haiti, outlines new plan to fight cholera epidemic and help communities* (Dec. 1, 2016), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/12/546732>.
- ³²¹ See IJDH, *Broken UN Promises Lead to Haiti Cholera Resurgence* (Oct. 11, 2022), https://www.ijdh.org/press_release/broken-un-promises-lead-to-haiti-cholera-resurgence/.
- ³²² See Martial, *Slow recovery in Port-de-Paix as storm leaves more than 270,000 affected in Northwest Haiti* (Feb. 14, 2025); O'Neill, *Violence Abuses and Hunger in Haiti* (Jan. 30, 2025); Maxineau, *Critical Need for Government Support in Cap-Haïtien amid Rain and Equipment Deficit* (Jan. 7, 2025).
- ³²³ Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Social : Only 43% of Haitians in rural areas have access to drinking water* (Jan. 7, 2025) (attributing the lack of access to water to “decades of underfunding, inadequate infrastructure and a general lack of resilience of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services in the face of major natural hazards”); Joseph, *Water shortage devastates acres of farmlands in Grandmont, Artibonite, Haitian Times* (Apr. 24, 2025) (reporting on calls “for a stronger national policy to build infrastructure resilience” in response to water shortages impacting the agricultural sector). But see Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Jacmel : Inauguration of the Lafond Drinking Water Supply System* (Mar. 18, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44504-haiti-jacmel-inauguration-of-the-lafond-drinking-water-supply-system.html> (“[On] March 17, 2025, the National Directorate of Drinking Water and Sanitation (DINEPA) . . . inaugurated the Lafond Drinking Water Supply System (SAEP) in the municipality of Jacmel. . . . [which] aims to provide a reliable and sustainable drinking water service to the residents of Lafond.”).
- ³²⁴ Samaritan's Purse, *Providing Clean Water Sources in Haiti* (Apr. 24, 2025) (discussing the “lingering effects of drought and prior earthquake damage to water storage tanks” on access to clean drinking water).
- ³²⁵ Bazile, *Médecins Sans Frontières Raises Alarm Over Cholera Outbreak in Haiti* (Mar. 14, 2025).
- ³²⁶ ICRC, *Haiti: Renewed clashes fuel a humanitarian crisis that has no end in sight* (Apr. 8, 2025) (“In the hardest-hit neighbourhoods, everything is in short supply: medical care, drinking water, food and even basic safety.”); see also Charles, *Haiti's capital is close to falling to armed gangs. Here's what you need to know* (Mar. 25, 2025) (discussing the implications of armed group attempts to secure control over the neighborhoods of Canapé-Vert, Pacot, Turgeau, and Debussy: “[these] are among the oldest and wealthier residential neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, and also the main source of water for the capital”).
- ³²⁷ IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024* (Dec. 2024), p. 10; IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024* (Jun. 2024), p. 10.
- ³²⁸ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 61 (“Haiti is facing its worst levels of food insecurity since the 2010 earthquake.”); Action Aid, *Almost 9 in 10 going all day without eating as hunger in Haiti reaches record high* (Feb. 18, 2025) (ActionAid's Country Director in Haiti, said: “What we're witnessing in Haiti isn't a food shortage – it's a full-blown hunger crisis driven by violence, inflation and systemic neglect. The markets still have food, but millions simply cannot afford it.”); RHI News, *Haiti : l'insécurité criminelle alimente la faim – quand le terrorisme de Gran Grif et Viv Ansanm bloque l'accès à la nourriture dans un pays à genoux* (Jun. 13, 2025) (“At this rate, humanitarian experts warn, Haiti is at risk of widespread famine, where hunger will no longer become a side effect of the security crisis, but a systemic weapon of domination used by terrorist groups to consolidate their power, subjugate the population, and further weaken what remains of public authority.”).
- ³²⁹ WFP, *FAO and WFP early warning report reveals worsening hunger in 13 hotspots: Five with immediate risk of starvation* (Jun. 16, 2025), <https://www.wfp.org/news/fao-and-wfp-early-warning-report-reveals-worsening-hunger-13-hotspots-five-immediate-risk>; see also WFP & FAO, *Hunger Hotspots* (2025), p. 26 (“Haiti remains a hotspot of highest concern for the third consecutive edition”); OHCHR, *Haiti: Immediate action is needed to address the human rights crisis* (Feb. 27, 2025) (WFP also noted that this is the first time in history that there is famine in the Western Hemisphere).
- ³³⁰ IPC, *Haiti*, p. 1 (Apr. 14, 2025), https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar_Jun2025_Report_French.pdf (5.71 million, over half of the population, are facing high levels of acute food insecurity); Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Social : Food security in Haiti continues to deteriorate (March - June 2025)* (Apr. 15, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44700-haiti-social-food-security-in-haiti-continues-to-deteriorate-march-june-2025.html>.
- ³³¹ IPC, *Haiti* (Apr. 14, 2025), p. 2.
- ³³² Compare IPC, *Haiti* (Apr. 14, 2025), p. 2, with WFP, *Hunger in Haiti reaches historic high with one-in-two Haitians now in acute hunger* (Sept. 30, 2024), <https://www.wfp.org/news/hunger-haiti-reaches-historic-high-one-two-haitians-now-acute-hunger> (reporting 6,000 people facing experiencing famine-level food insecurity).
- ³³³ See notes 264, 277; see also IPC, *Haiti* (Apr. 14, 2025), p. 9 (reporting that female-headed households are increasingly affected by food insecurity).
- ³³⁴ UN News, *Record hunger in Haiti amid rising needs* (Apr. 17, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/04/1162391#:~:text=The%20UN%20agency%20and%20partners,life%2Dsaving%20treatment%20this%20year>. This represents an increase from November 2024, when an IPC acute malnutrition analysis of Haiti found that “nearly 277,000 children aged 6 to 59 months are facing or expected to face acute malnutrition between December 2023 and November 2024, including 125,000 children who are severely malnourished.” IPC, *Nearly 277,000 children suffering acute malnutrition, 125,000 severely malnourished* (Mar. 8, 2024), https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_Acute_Malnutrition_Dec2023_Nov2024_Report_French.pdf.

³³⁵ OHCHR, [Haiti: Immediate action is needed to address the human rights crisis](#) (Feb. 27, 2025) (“The cost is so great, for a very poor population, that even before this crisis, they ate twice a day, now, people are eating, if they are lucky, once a day.”); ActionAid, [Almost 9 in 10 going all day without eating as hunger in Haiti reaches record high](#) (Feb. 18, 2025) (“Haiti’s hunger crisis has reached alarming levels, with almost all families (99%) surveyed by ActionAid regularly skipping meals and 95% reporting that they’ve gone to bed hungry in the past month. . . . Of those surveyed, 88% said a family member had gone an entire day without eating in the past month, and almost one in 10 had gone 24 hours without eating at least 10 times.”); see also UNICEF, [At least one million children facing emergency levels of food insecurity in Haiti](#) (Apr. 17, 2025) (“‘We are looking at a scenario where parents can no longer provide care and nutrition to their children as a result of ongoing violence, extreme poverty, and a persistent economic crisis,’ said Geeta Narayan, UNICEF Representative in Haiti. . . . With worsening food insecurity and unrest, the crisis has resulted in a nutrition crisis for families.”).

³³⁶ WFP & FAO, [Hunger Hotspots](#) (Jun. 2025), p. 26; RHI News, [Haïti : l’insécurité criminelle alimente la faim – quand le terrorisme de Gran Grif et Viv Ansanm bloque l’accès à la nourriture dans un pays à genoux...](#) (Jun. 13, 2025); FAO, *The Republic Haiti: Critical levels of acute food insecurity likely to worsen amid heightened insecurity*, p. 1 (Jun. 4, 2025), <https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/573a2c1b-82b6-40bc-97c9-f1a4d4d7e43d/content>.

³³⁷ WFP, [Haiti](#) (last visited Jul. 14, 2025); RHI News, [Haïti : l’insécurité criminelle alimente la faim – quand le terrorisme de Gran Grif et Viv Ansanm bloque l’accès à la nourriture dans un pays à genoux...](#) (Jun. 13, 2025); Narcisus, [Haiti’s Madan Sara fight for survival as insecurity threatens the engine of Haiti’s informal economy](#) (Mar. 21, 2025); Mercy Corps, [Impact of Gang Violence on Food Systems in Haiti – 2024](#) (Dec. 2024), pp. 6-7; Jean Junior Celestin, *La Gonâve Island Feels the Pressure of Port-au-Prince’s Turmoil*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 5, 2024), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/251822/la-gonave-island-feels-the-pressure-of-port-au-princes-turmoil>; Mercy Corps, [Impact of Gang Violence on Food Systems in Haiti – 2024](#) (Dec. 2024), pp. 10-11 (repeated closures of Haiti’s main airport and seaport in 2024 led to shortages of essential food items and agricultural inputs); see also note 312.

³³⁸ Narcisus, [Haiti’s Madan Sara fight for survival as insecurity threatens the engine of Haiti’s informal economy](#) (Mar. 21, 2025) (“Weekly trade travel has dropped, with 80% now making no more than three trips. . . . These disruptions have hurt sales, with 36% of Madan Sara earning less than 50,000 gourdes (\$390) per week, while only 8% surpass 750,000 gourdes (\$5,800). . . . Cases of extortion have also surged. While seven merchants reported being extorted in 2023, 12 faced this issue in January 2024 alone. . . . Jocelyne Jean Louis, coordinator of Rassemblement des Madan Sara d’Haïti (RAMSA), states that more than 13,000 Madan Sara were directly affected by insecurity in 2024, many losing their capital or suffering violence from armed gangs. . . . ‘People call us the *poto mitan* (pillars of society), yet we are left on our own. Every day, we risk our lives to buy our goods. If we stop, an entire economic chain collapses.”); Narcisus, [Haiti’s Madan Sara face extortion and violence from gangs](#) (Mar. 9, 2025); Ronaldo Junior Dieudonné, *Haiti-Insécurité : les Madan Sara au premier rang des victimes oubliées de cette spirale de violence*, Clin d’Oeil (Jan. 7, 2025), <https://clindoeilinfo.com/haiti-insecurite-les-madan-sara-au-premier-rang-des-victimes-oubliees-de-cette-spirale-de-violence/>; see also BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (April 14, 2025), ¶ 52 (“The cumulative impact of the security and economic crisis on the traditional women vendors known as Madan Sara is likely to remain significant.”).

³³⁹ Mercy Corps, [Impact of Gang Violence on Food Systems in Haiti – 2024](#) (Dec. 2024), pp. 8-9 (“The [Artibonite] region, which is known as the agricultural heartland of Haiti, has been particularly impacted by the rise in gang activity and extortion, forcing farmers to relinquish over 3,000 hectares of agricultural land and significantly reducing local food production. This decline is further exacerbated by limited access to essential agricultural inputs like seeds, fertilizers, and equipment, all increasingly difficult to obtain due to supply chain disruptions and rising cost.”); Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, [Atrocity Alert No. 439: Haiti, Central African Republic and Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory](#) (May 14, 2025); Shaw & Le Cour Grandmaison, [Haiti is in a Political and Criminal Crisis that Should Not be Ignored](#) (Apr. 29, 2025).

³⁴⁰ RHI News, [Haïti : l’insécurité criminelle alimente la faim – quand le terrorisme de Gran Grif et Viv Ansanm bloque l’accès à la nourriture dans un pays à genoux...](#) (Jun. 13, 2025) (“Many farmers can no longer reach their fields for fear of kidnapping or violence. Irrigation systems are abandoned. Harvests are rotting in the field due to lack of transport.”); BINUH, [Haiti Flash Report](#) (April 2025), p. 11 (“[T]he violence [in Kenscoff] has severely disrupted agricultural production in a commune where a large portion of the population depends on farming for their livelihood, and which supplies several markets in the capital with fruits and vegetables.”); Hackel, [Gangs seize roads leading to Haiti’s capital as police continue to lose control](#) (Mar. 26, 2025) (discussing the impact of armed group attacks in Kenscoff, where the majority of vegetables consumed in Port-au-Prince are grown, on the availability and cost of food in the capital); Kervenson Martial, *Thieves cripple \$5M irrigation system in Haiti, leaving farmers without water*, Haitian Times (Mar. 19, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/03/19/bassin-bleu-irrigation/> (describing the theft and vandalism of a solar-powered irrigation system in Bassin-Bleu, leaving “many farmers with crippling financial losses, as they watch their crops wither with no immediate solution in sight. . . . pushing some farmers into severe debt as they struggle to recover from the economic blow”); Chadrac, [Father Mackenzy Célestin Raises Alarm Over Montrouis Crisis](#) (Jan. 16, 2025) (reporting that “farmers [in Montrouis] can no longer work the land” due to insecurity); Celestin, [Artibonite Entrepreneurs Condemn Insecurity’s Effects on Economy and Agriculture](#) (Dec. 19, 2024) (“In Savien, gangs control a strategic point where they block water, depriving downstream farmers of this resource. The few farmers who manage to get some water and cultivate must pay the gangs to access their land. Even when they succeed in producing, there is no guarantee they can harvest because sometimes the gangs themselves seize the crops.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also notes 287-288.

³⁴¹ ActionAid, [Almost 9 in 10 going all day without eating as hunger in Haiti reaches record high](#) (Feb. 18, 2025); see also notes 294-303.

³⁴² Wisner, [Starved for Justice: International Complicity in Systemic Violations of the Right to Food in Haiti](#) (May 10, 2022).

³⁴³ Edxon Francisque et al., *Standing their ground: Haitian farmers seek support in quest to live off the land*, Haitian Times (May 1, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/05/01/haiti-agriculture-labor-day-farmers-seek-support/> (farmers “do not have access to credit to invest in more crops and machinery nor any reliable and safe roads for farm-to-market delivery on a large scale”); Onès Joseph, [Water shortage devastates acres of farmlands in Grandmont, Artibonite](#) (Apr. 24, 2025); Charles, [Haiti police, army to get more money in ‘war budget,’ but overall increase still small](#) (Apr. 16, 2025) (“There is . . . concern that the revised [2024-2025]

budget will mean less money for food production and public works, which though not a priority in the capital are vital necessities in rural communities where torrential rains this week pose the risk of landslides and deaths. . . . ‘When you are pulling money out of public works and agriculture to put in social programs. and security it may not seem like a bad thing, but in the mid-term and long-term you are going to pay for it because you’re going to get less infrastructure, and you are going to get less food production.’”); IPC, *Haiti: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot* (Apr. 14, 2025) (under-modernization of agricultural systems leads to lower production). Cf. RHI News, *Haiti : l'insécurité criminelle alimente la faim – quand le terrorisme de Gran Grif et Viv Ansanm bloque l'accès à la nourriture dans un pays à genoux...* (Jun. 13, 2025) (“Local production is collapsing, increasing dependence on imports—themselves slowed by port blockades and the soaring dollar.”); Mercy Corps, *Impact of Gang Violence on Food Systems in Haiti – 2024* (Dec. 2024), p. 9 (“[T]he decline in domestic production has forced Haiti into a greater reliance on costly imports.”); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025) (“Limited production is forcing Haitians to depend on imports for survival, but the prices are often too high for families to afford.”).

³⁴⁴ WFP & FAO, *Hunger Hotspots* (Jun. 2025), p. 26.

³⁴⁵ Edith M. Lederer, *UN food agency appeals for \$46 million to help 2 million Haitians facing severe hunger*, AP News (Jun. 5, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-humanitarian-hunger-food-emergency-catastrophic-appeal-3bd37012f9b15c1395fb3ac2806198c4> (“The WFP, the world’s largest humanitarian organization, is among the U.N. agencies facing funding cuts, mainly from the United States, which provided nearly half of its funding in 2024. . . . [T]he agency is facing a dramatic situation now with food stocks only until July to assist with emergencies, new displacements or hurricanes. . . . ‘This year, we start the hurricane season with an empty warehouse where we have no stocks for assisting any emergency, or we have no cash neither to go and buy (food) locally if it was possible in some areas, or to do a rapid humanitarian response. . . . We are very concerned that a single storm can put hundreds of thousands of people in Haiti again into humanitarian catastrophe and hunger.’ WFP normally provides a meal every day for around 500,000 school children, but that number will be cut in half without additional resources.”); UNICEF, *At least one million children facing emergency levels of food insecurity in Haiti* (Apr. 17, 2025) (“UNICEF’s nutrition programme under the Humanitarian Action for Children appeal currently faces a critical 70% funding gap, limiting our ability to reach the most vulnerable. In 2025 so far, UNICEF and its partners have treated over 4,600 children with severe acute malnutrition (SAM), representing only 3.6% of the 129,000 children projected to need life-saving treatment this year.”); ActionAid, *Almost 9 in 10 going all day without eating as hunger in Haiti reaches record high* (Feb. 18, 2025) (“The levels of hunger, suffering and death in Haiti are beyond disturbing, world powers are looking away or – even worse – actively disrupting humanitarian efforts. People will starve to death in the coming months unless urgent funding is released.”) (internal quotations omitted); *see also* BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 61 (emphasizing the importance of food security interventions “in mitigating the broader crisis”); notes 489-502.

³⁴⁶ Claudy Junior Pierre, *Healthcare System Trapped by Insecurity*, Le Nouvelliste (May 20, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/256343/healthcare-system-trapped-by-insecurity> (“[I]nsecurity—since reaching its peak in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince—has made the health system a prime target.”); Mohor, *Aid in the crosshairs: Why access is growing harder in Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2025); OHCHR, Press Release, *Haiti: UN expert William O’Neill says deeply concerned by attacks on health care sector* (Jan. 3, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/01/haiti-un-expert-william-oneill-says-deeply-concerned-attacks-health-care> (“The UN’s Designated Expert on Human Rights in Haiti, William O’Neill, said today he was deeply concerned that the outrageous attacks on hospitals, clinics, and health care workers by gangs in Haiti in December have further weakened a health care system that was already near collapse. . . . ‘Criminal gangs have murdered and kidnapped physicians, nurses and health care workers, including humanitarian workers. The gangs have burned, ransacked, and destroyed many hospitals and clinics, forcing many to close or suspend their operations.’ . . . Gang members’ repeated threats to attack health premises indicate that these are intentional assaults on the health care system, and not random spasms of violence.”).

³⁴⁷ HRW, *Haiti: Events of 2024* (2025) (“As the system crumbles under violence and instability, two out of five Haitians do not have access to urgently needed medical care.”); RNDDH, *Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country* (Apr. 25, 2025), ¶ 117; Jacqueline Charles, *Gang attacks force closure of Haiti’s ‘beacon of hope’ hospital as health crisis grows*, Miami Herald (Apr. 24, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article304902171.html>.

³⁴⁸ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 67; *see also* Charles, *Haiti’s capital is close to falling to armed gangs. Here’s what you need to know* (Mar. 25, 2025) (reporting that 27% of hospitals in Port-au-Prince are functioning).

³⁴⁹ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 67; *see also* Kazim Alam, *The forgotten conflict: Humanitarian crisis in Haiti deepens amid intense gang wars*, TRT Global (May 26, 2025), <https://trt.global/world/article/ddedafb849a3> (MSF’s head of operations support unit says approximately 60% of healthcare facilities in Port-au-Prince are either closed or nonfunctional); UNICEF, *At least one million children facing emergency levels of food insecurity in Haiti* (Apr. 17, 2025) (“[L]ess than 50 per cent of health facilities in Port-au-Prince [are] . . . fully operational.”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (April 14, 2025), ¶ 59 (“39 per cent of healthcare facilities in Port-au-Prince remain closed.”); Mohor, *Aid in the crosshairs: Why access is growing harder in Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2025) (“[O]nly 30% of all health facilities are functioning.”); OCHA, *Haiti: Armed attacks and displacements in the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince – Situation Report #9 (14 to 27 December)* (Jan. 4, 2025) (“In the [Port-au-Prince metropolitan area] ZMPAP, 41 per cent of facilities with beds are closed, and a further 22 per cent are only partially functioning.”).

³⁵⁰ Jacqueline Charles, *Key trauma center in Haiti goes up in flames after gangs attack with Molotov cocktails*, Miami Herald (Dec. 18, 2024), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article297252659.html> (the attack destroyed “[t]wo CT-scanners, a brand-new 3D X-Ray imaging machine, the lab, operating rooms and the pediatric ward,” and came after two weeks of threats from armed groups, who reportedly “said, if you don’t give us cash, then we’ll burn it down”) (internal quotations omitted); *see also* Pierre, *Healthcare System Trapped by Insecurity* (May 20, 2025) (“Soon, Bernard Mevs Hospital . . . may face the same fate as Saint François d’Assise Hospital, vandalized and looted on March 4, 2024. The sad fate of being forgotten and of isolated recovery efforts.”).

³⁵¹ Sanon, [Mourners bury journalist killed in one of Haiti's worst attacks on reporters](#) (Jan. 16, 2025); Adams & Robles, [Massacre Upon Massacre: Haiti's Bleak Spiral Into a Failed State](#) (Jan. 6, 2025) (reporting on the lack of medical care available for victims of the armed group attack on the planned reopening of the State University Hospital in December: "They ripped their own clothing to fashion tourniquets and used tampons to stanch the bleeding because, witnesses said, the few doctors at the hospital ran for their lives."); Luxama, [A survivor of the worst gang attack on Haitian journalists says colleagues were cut down by bullets](#) (Dec. 25, 2024); see also notes 99-100.

³⁵² BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 14; David C. Adams & Frances Robles, [After \\$30 Million in U.S. Aid, Haiti's Biggest Hospital Goes Up in Smoke](#), NY Times (Mar. 15, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/15/us/haiti-hospital-fire-usaid.html> ("The damage was estimated at \$3 million to \$4 million and could set the project [to reopen the hospital] back another two years — if the security situation ever improves enough for the hospital to reopen, he said."); Haiti Libre, [Haiti - FLASH : Bandits loot and partially set fire to the General Hospital \(video\)](#) (Feb. 14, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44275-haiti-flash-bandits-loot-and-partially-set-fire-to-the-general-hospital-video.html> ("Several departments : ophthalmology, orthopedics, operating room, pharmacy and archives were reportedly destroyed by fire . . . the bandits taking everything that had not yet been looted.").

³⁵³ Charles, [Gang attacks force closure of Haiti's 'beacon of hope' hospital as health crisis grows](#) (Apr. 24, 2025) ("Weeks after evacuating the facility, the hospital's executive management has now informed staff in an internal note that the doors will remain closed 'until further notice.' The team cited 'the worrying security situation prevailing in the city.' . . . 'They removed the solar panels, broke into the church and clinic, and stole medications along with medical and dental equipment, including the new X-ray and sonogram machines.' . . . [T]he facility is now a gang headquarters."); Charles, [Gangs attack police station, prison in central Haiti town, more than 500 inmates escape](#) (Mar. 31, 2025); see also Charles, [Thousands march against gangs in Haiti as Vatican is notified of murder of two nuns](#) (Apr. 2, 2025) ("The brutal attacks on Mirebalais threaten one of Haiti's most critical hospitals. If Mirebalais falls, Haiti's health system faces collapse. Hundreds of thousands will be left without life-saving care.") (internal quotations omitted).

³⁵⁴ Mohor, [Aid in the crosshairs: Why access is growing harder in Haiti](#) (Jan. 28, 2025).

³⁵⁵ MSF, [Haiti : MSF vehicles shot amid escalating violence in Port-au-Prince](#) (Mar. 17, 2025), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/haiti-msf-vehicles-shot-amid-escalating-violence-port-au-prince>.

³⁵⁶ MSF, ["Extremely painful decision": MSF withdraws from two facilities in Port-au-Prince](#) (Apr. 8, 2025), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/extremely-painful-decision-msf-withdraws-two-facilities-port-au-prince>; BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 14 ("On 15 March, four Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) vehicles, duly identified and evacuating their staff, were reportedly targeted by police gunfire in Turgeau (Port-au-Prince). Although the incident did not result in any deaths, some MSF staff members were slightly injured. The vehicles reportedly received at least 15 bullet holes."); see also MSF, [Haiti : MSF vehicles shot amid escalating violence in Port-au-Prince](#) (Mar. 17, 2025) ("This is the second time in less than four months that MSF has been forced to suspend operations at the health facility. On November 22, 2024, MSF halted all activities in Port-au-Prince following multiple attacks and repeated threats against medical staff [by police and civilians].").

³⁵⁷ Haitian Times, [Violence in Port-au-Prince pushes last trauma hospitals to the brink](#) (May 7, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/05/07/haiti-msf-hospital-violence-2025/> ("Doctors Without Borders, known by its French acronym MSF, said its Tabarre Hospital is dangerously close to turning away new patients amid a surge in casualties. The 50-bed facility has already expanded capacity by 50 percent, but now regularly treats more than 70 trauma patients at a time. Makeshift rooms in meeting spaces are being used to accommodate the overflow. . . . 'In just one month, the number of hospitals able to treat trauma cases fell from four to two,' [MSF coordinator Dr. Seybou] Diarra said. 'If violence doesn't ease, more people will die from treatable injuries. . . . It's becoming nearly impossible for Haitians to get trauma care.'"); MSF, ["Extremely painful decision": MSF withdraws from two facilities in Port-au-Prince](#) (Apr. 8, 2025) ("MSF teams noted an alarming increase in the number of victims of violence."); MSF, [Haiti: Surge of violence displaces tens of thousands in Port-au-Prince](#) (Mar. 5, 2025) ("From February 24 to March 2, the MSF medical teams at the Turgeau Emergency Center treated 314 patients, including 90 direct victims of violence—twice the usual number. Some patients requiring surgery were transferred to the MSF hospital in Tabarre, where the capacity for trauma care was expanded from 50 to 75 beds. For the past 10 days, the hospital has been running at near full capacity, with teams working under extreme pressure to admit new patients."); Charles, [Gang attacks force closure of Haiti's 'beacon of hope' hospital as health crisis grows](#) (Apr. 24, 2025) ("Before its closure, the University Hospital of Mirebalais served nearly 850 patients a day, including providing maternal care and advanced cancer treatment. Two other hospitals in the area — St. Therese in Hinche and the 200-bed Albert Schweitzer Hospital in the Artibonite — are now coming under increased strain and face critical shortages of oxygen, emergency medical kits and other supplies. . . . The two facilities have treated more than 200 patients for gunshot wounds, strokes, suspected cholera and malnutrition, since the Mirebalais hospital closure. St. Therese has received more than 3,500 internally displaced people —tripling its outpatient caseload."). A network of healthcare organizations working in Haiti reported that many clinics in the North and North-East Departments are overwhelmed by the influx of people fleeing north. See also Fenel Pélissier & Rolph Louis-Jeune, [Psychiatric patients victims of violence in Port-au-Prince due to medication shortage](#), Ayibopost (Jan. 24, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/psychiatric-patients-victims-of-violence-in-port-au-prince-due-to-medication-shortage/> ("[H]ealth personnel are prioritizing the most urgent cases to be diagnosed, which risks affecting the quality of care.") (internal quotations omitted).

³⁵⁸ OHCHR, Press Release, [Haiti: UN expert William O'Neill says deeply concerned by attacks on health care sector](#) (Jan. 3, 2025); Charles, [Key trauma center in Haiti goes up in flames after gangs attack with Molotov cocktails](#) (Dec. 18, 2024) ("Most of the capital's hospitals, including the largest public medical facility known as the General Hospital, are overrun by armed gangs and if they are not, then getting to them requires money or traveling through gang territory."). According to the Head of the MSF mission in Haiti, recent attacks by police and civilians against MSF ambulances have forced the organization to stop using them in some cases, further complicating access to hospitals and impacting quality of care. Mohor, [Aid in the crosshairs: Why access is growing harder in Haiti](#) (Jan. 28, 2025) ("[W]e are still maintaining a reduction of ambulance referrals. This has an impact on the quality

of care because sometimes some of those patients have to take public transport – a motorcycle or a van – instead of an MSF ambulance. But in some of the communities we work, the population themselves advised us against continuing ambulance referrals because they understand the risks well... And even in critical situations, the patients [refuse] to leave the area to seek secondary healthcare because of the risks of having the police identify and target them.”).

³⁵⁹ Péliissier & Louis-Jeune, *Psychiatric patients victims of violence in Port-au-Prince due to medication shortage* (Jan. 24, 2025) (“The context of violence in Haiti, the blocking of roads, as well as the closure of airports and ports have seriously affected the Haitian health system, particularly the pharmaceutical sector. . . . For the month of November 2024, th[e] [Saint-Damien] hospital has only received 43% of [medicine] orders placed with its suppliers. . . . Local laboratories, struggling to import the raw materials needed to manufacture drugs, have been forced to reduce their production. Medical analysis laboratories are also affected, facing a shortage of essential inputs to carry out diagnoses. . . . Faced with multiple blockages linked in particular to the closure of supply chains in Haiti, some entrepreneurs are turning to the Dominican Republic. However the toll booths set up by armed bandits on national roads impact the prices of products.”); Alam, *The forgotten conflict: Humanitarian crisis in Haiti deepens amid intense gang wars* (May 26, 2025); Charles, *Gang attacks force closure of Haiti’s ‘beacon of hope’ hospital as health crisis grows* (Apr. 24, 2025) (“In Port-au-Prince . . . gunshot victims are dying due to a lack of blood supply and oxygen.”); UNICEF, *Flash Update #1 – IDP Response Following Armed Group Take-Over of Mirebalais and Saut d’eau* (Apr. 20, 2025), p. 3; BINUH, *Haiti Flash Report* (April 2025), p. 11; Reuters, *Dominican Republic ramping up deportation of Haitian migrants* (Jan. 28, 2025); see also Adams & Robles, *Massacre Upon Massacre: Haiti’s Bleak Spiral Into a Failed State* (Jan. 6, 2025) (during the attack on the planned reopening of the State University Hospital, the facility “had nothing ‘available to treat the victims.’ . . . Dr. Blema. . . defended the hospital’s dearth of supplies, saying he had intended to open the facility ‘gradually’ as an outpatient clinic, which would not have been for treating gunshot wounds”).

³⁶⁰ Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025); see also UNICEF, *At least one million children facing emergency levels of food insecurity in Haiti* (Apr. 17, 2025) (reporting that two of the three main public hospitals in Port-au-Prince have shut down).

³⁶¹ Adams & Robles, *After \$30 Million in U.S. Aid, Haiti’s Biggest Hospital Goes Up in Smoke* (Mar. 15, 2025); Claudy Junior Pierre, *Health Sector in Crisis: Four Ministers in Just One Year*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Jan. 7, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/252334/health-sector-in-crisis-four-ministers-in-just-one-year>.

³⁶² Charles, *Aid cuts mean Haiti will need to do more to shoulder humanitarian response, UN says* (Apr. 14, 2025) (the medical director of a UNICEF-funded primary-care health center in Gonaïves said the facility would be forced to shut down without the agency’s continued support); Partners in Health, *Decades of Progress at Risk: U.S. Aid Cuts Threaten Haiti’s Healthcare* (Feb. 26, 2025), <https://www.pih.org/article/decades-progress-risk-us-aid-cuts-threaten-haitis-healthcare> (“Funding freezes implemented by the U.S. government are straining already fragile public health infrastructure and overburdening essential care delivery programs. . . . This interruption destabilizes decades of progress in global health, amplifies the risk of preventable deaths, and weakens emergency preparedness.”); Germina Pierre Louis, *USAID chaos: Foreign funds freeze threatens success of Haiti’s fight against HIV*, *Haitian Times* (Feb. 6, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/02/06/usa-id-chaos-threatens-haiti-progress-against-hiv/> (discussing the impact of the Trump administration’s suspension of the U.S. Agency for International Development and foreign aid freeze on the availability of antiretroviral medication to patients with HIV); Jacqueline Charles, *Treatment for HIV, AIDS in Haiti hit by U.S. foreign aid halt despite waivers from Rubio*, *Miami Herald* (Feb. 6, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article299824009.html> (“In Haiti, where the U.S. has been the single largest aid donor, at least four hospitals report having received a notice to stop programs. All reported being confused about the waiver process, and whether or not they could continue working if they have medications or if they can keep funding they already have.”); see also notes 489-502.

³⁶³ Kervenson Martial, *Haiti recruits new medical workers while longtime nurses go unpaid and patients wait for care*, *Haitian Times* (May 13, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/05/13/haiti-recruits-new-medical-workers-while-longtime-nurses-go-unpaid-and-patients-wait-for-care/> (“Many of these facilities have gone without adequate staffing or pay, and for some nurses, the wait for a paycheck has stretched as long as five to eight years.”).

³⁶⁴ Alam, *The forgotten conflict: Humanitarian crisis in Haiti deepens amid intense gang wars* (May 26, 2025); Pierre, *Healthcare System Trapped by Insecurity* (May 20, 2025) (“[T]he Haitian Medical Association (AMH) [stated]. . . . Doctors, nurses, technicians—those whose homes and clinics have been affected or burned—are driven into exile, into anxiety, or into silence.”) (internal quotations omitted); Sandrine Exil, *A country in post-traumatic stress: The unseen effects of Haiti’s violent crisis*, *EFE* (Mar. 30, 2025), <https://efe.com/en/latest-news/2025-03-30/a-country-in-post-traumatic-stress-the-unseen-effects-of-haitis-violent-crisis/> (“Although no official data exists on the country’s “brain drain,” the lack of medical personnel is straining the healthcare system.”); Adams & Robles, *After \$30 Million in U.S. Aid, Haiti’s Biggest Hospital Goes Up in Smoke* (Mar. 15, 2025); OHCHR, Press Release, *Haiti: UN expert William O’Neill says deeply concerned by attacks on health care sector* (Jan. 3, 2025) (noting “the high number of medical staff fleeing the country fearing for their lives”); see also Fenel Péliissier & Jérôme Wendy Norestyl, *The UEH faces attrition crisis among professors*, *Ayibopost* (Feb. 26, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/the-ueh-faces-attrition-crisis-among-professors/> (discussing the impact of insecurity on the State University of Haiti’s Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy).

³⁶⁵ Jude Mary Cénat et al., *Armed gang violence in Haiti: a public mental health plan to navigate the horror and overcoming trauma*, *The Lancet* (May 2025), [https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanam/article/PIIS2667-193X\(25\)00075-4/fulltext](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanam/article/PIIS2667-193X(25)00075-4/fulltext) (“Over the past five years, relentless violence has fueled a surge in trauma-related disorders—PTSD, depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideations.”); Exil, *A country in post-traumatic stress: The unseen effects of Haiti’s violent crisis* (Mar. 30, 2025) (“Haiti’s ongoing violence and severe medication shortages have pushed thousands to the brink of mental collapse. . . . Haitian psychologist Ronald Florestal sums it up with a chilling statement: ‘More people in Haiti have died from depression than from bullets.’ Despair is a silent disease that spreads rapidly. Jean-Robert Augustin, a psychiatrist specializing in trauma, warns that Haiti is suffering from a state of ‘collective post-traumatic stress.’”).

³⁶⁶ UNICEF, *Flash Update #1 – IDP Response Following Armed Group Take-Over of Mirebalais and Saut d’eau* (Apr. 2025), pp. 2, 4; BINUH, *Haiti Flash Report* (April 2025), pp. 11-12; Alterpresse, *Haiti risque de perdre toute une génération à cause de la persistance des violences des gangs* (Mar. 25, 2025); UN News, *Haiti: Massive surge in child armed group recruitment, warns UNICEF* (Feb. 28, 2025) (“Videos [of an armed group attack] capture piercing screams of children lying on the floor, motionless with fear, . . . said [UNICEF’s representative in Haiti], calling the scene a ‘chilling reminder that these attacks do damage far beyond the classroom walls.’ . . . [T]he impact of being recruited into a gang at an early age . . . [is] ‘indescribable’ damage. ‘At that age, the child’s brain is still forming. They haven’t developed their understanding of the world. And so, to be to be part of an armed group where you are surrounded by violence at all times and where you yourself may be forced to commit acts of violence, has a profound effect on the child.’”); OHCHR, *Haiti: Immediate action is needed to address the human rights crisis* (Feb. 27, 2025) (“The mental and emotional toll [on children] is immeasurable. . . . Those who have committed horrendous abuses will require support to deal with the mental trauma or the consequences of that as they go forward in their lives. They will need psychosocial support and access to reintegration and rehabilitation, much like demobilized child soldiers in other parts of the world.”); see also notes 270-284.

³⁶⁷ ICRC, *Haiti: Renewed clashes fuel a humanitarian crisis that has no end in sight* (Apr. 8, 2025); BINUH, *Haiti Flash Report* (April 2025), pp. 11-12; Amnesty International UK, Press Release, *Haiti: Children suffering gang recruitment, attacks and sexual violence amid escalating crisis – New Report* (Feb. 11, 2025); Pascale Solages, *Six Haitian women’s struggles to recover from rape by gangs*, New Humanitarian (Feb. 4, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/02/04/six-haitian-women-struggles-recover-rape-gangs>; see also notes 238-251, 266.

³⁶⁸ Partners in Health, *Meet Six PIHers Leading Mental Health Care Around the World* (May 28, 2025), <https://www.pih.org/article/meet-six-pihers-leading-mental-health-care-around-world>; IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024* (Dec. 2024), note 440.

³⁶⁹ Cénat et al., *Armed gang violence in Haiti: a public mental health plan to navigate the horror and overcoming trauma* (May 2025) (“[M]ost mental health services have shut down, and the majority of mental health professionals have left the country.”); BINUH, *Haiti Flash Report* (April 2025), pp. 11-12 (efforts by national non-governmental organizations and medical services providers to offer psychosocial support activities “remain insufficient in the face of the extent the suffering and the psychological trauma experienced by survivors, particularly children, who have suffered or witnessed this violence, including sexual violence”); Pélissier & Louis-Jeune, *Psychiatric patients victims of violence in Port-au-Prince due to medication shortage* (Jan. 24, 2025) (“The unavailability of medicines has disastrous consequences for patients in vulnerable conditions, such as those suffering from mental disorders. As an alternative . . . mental health professionals prescribe older compounds to their patients to compensate for the scarcity of appropriate medications. ‘These drugs, generally less used, cause many more side effects on patients and are also starting to be out of stock.’ . . . The closure of the Mars and Kline Center, the only public psychiatric center, in March 2024, forced certain families to care of their sick loved ones at home, often at the cost of great difficulties, particularly to ensure the administration of treatment.”); see also Exil, *A country in post-traumatic stress: The unseen effects of Haiti’s violent crisis* (Mar. 30, 2025) (“75% of female survivors of sexual violence do not receive adequate psychological care.”); note 267.

³⁷⁰ Pélissier & Louis-Jeune, *Psychiatric patients victims of violence in Port-au-Prince due to medication shortage* (Jan. 24, 2025) (“[P]eople suffering from mental disorders, found in the streets, are frequently victims during major waves of violence in Port-au-Prince.”).

³⁷¹ Your Encelotti Louis, Brooke Betson & Samy Auguste, *Anxiety and depression screening reveals the importance of advancing mental health support for Haitian healthcare providers*, Cambridge Prisms: Global Mental Health (Jan. 22, 2025), <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/global-mental-health/article/anxiety-and-depression-screening-reveals-the-importance-of-advancing-mental-health-support-for-haitian-healthcare-providers/CCC5EFE14F5F415C5C34966D89DBEC33> (“The results revealed that 84% of the 106 participants experienced mild to severe symptoms of depression, while 69% reported mild to severe symptoms of anxiety. This study also found that social determinants, including community violence, economic and social instability, and poverty, are among the most detrimental contributing factors to the mental health of Haitian healthcare providers. Despite the acute need for support, 76% of participants also reported having either no awareness or no access to mental health support.”).

³⁷² IJDH, *Broken UN Promises Lead to Haiti Cholera Resurgence* (Oct. 11, 2022).

³⁷³ Blaise, *Cholera spreads in Haiti’s displacement camps, deepening humanitarian crisis* (May 19, 2025) (also noting that “[t]he fatality rate now stands at 1.65%, surpassing the emergency threshold”); ICRC, *Haiti: Renewed clashes fuel a humanitarian crisis that has no end in sight* (Apr. 8, 2025) (“Haiti is . . . experiencing an alarming resurgence of cholera: in March 2025, 200 cases were reported in Cité Soleil, a neighbourhood that has been repeatedly subjected to armed violence, as well as in several displaced persons camps near the capital.”); Charles, *Haiti’s capital is close to falling to armed gangs. Here’s what you need to know* (Mar. 25, 2025); Bazile, *Médecins Sans Frontières Raises Alarm Over Cholera Outbreak in Haiti* (Mar. 14, 2025) (MSF fears “a resurgence and a peak of the epidemic”) (internal quotations omitted).

³⁷⁴ Blaise, *Cholera spreads in Haiti’s displacement camps, deepening humanitarian crisis* (May 19, 2025); Bazile, *Médecins Sans Frontières Raises Alarm Over Cholera Outbreak in Haiti* (Mar. 14, 2025); see also notes 314-326.

³⁷⁵ Blaise, *Cholera spreads in Haiti’s displacement camps, deepening humanitarian crisis* (May 19, 2025) (“Initial cases surfaced March 20 in at least three IDP sites in Port-au-Prince, where sanitation is severely lacking.”); Bazile, *Médecins Sans Frontières Raises Alarm Over Cholera Outbreak in Haiti* (Mar. 14, 2025).

³⁷⁶ MSF, *Haiti: Surge of violence displaces tens of thousands in Port-au-Prince* (Mar. 5, 2025).

³⁷⁷ See Action Contre la Faim, *What is Cholera?* (updated Apr. 22, 2025), <https://www.actioncontrelafaim.org/en/headline/what-is-cholera/>. Cf. ActionAid, *Almost 9 in 10 going all day without eating as hunger in Haiti reaches record high* (Feb. 18, 2025) (discussing the link between emergency-level hunger and health complications, including increased risk of disease).

³⁷⁸ See Jacinta Osborne, *Senator Kevin Parker Calls for Immediate Restoration of U.S. Foreign Aid to Haiti* (Mar. 13, 2025), <https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025/kevin-s-parker/senator-kevin-parker-calls-immediate-restoration-us> (noting that organizations like the IOM received U.S. funding to provide support for, *inter alia*, communities impacted by cholera); see also notes 489-502.

³⁷⁹ OCHA, *Latin America & The Caribbean Weekly Situation Update* (May 30, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/latin-america-caribbean-weekly-situation-update-30-may-2025>; see also Charles, *Gang attacks force closure of Haiti's 'beacon of hope' hospital as health crisis grows* (Apr. 24, 2025) (following the closure of the University Hospital of Mirebalais, the Albert Schweitzer Hospital “transformed its Cholera Treatment Center into a refuge for those fleeing the violence”).

³⁸⁰ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (April 14, 2025), ¶ 63 (“43 per cent of internally displaced persons in the capital [are] sheltering in schools.”); Alterpresse, *Haiti risque de perdre toute une génération à cause de la persistance des violences des gangs* (Mar. 25, 2025); Bien-Eugene, *Des enfants privés d'école dans la région métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince à cause de la violence des gangs* (Mar. 10, 2025); UNICEF, *Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report* (Jan. 2025), p. 4; see also note 80.

³⁸¹ UN News, *Haiti: Massive surge in child armed group recruitment, warns UNICEF* (Feb. 28, 2025) (“[A]rmed groups destroyed 47 schools in Haiti’s capital Port-au-Prince, adding to the 284 schools destroyed in 2024.”); see also RNDDH, *Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country* (Apr. 25, 2025), p. 28 (“The already shaky health and education systems have been further weakened by the closure and looting of other school and health infrastructures.”).

³⁸² Plan International, *Haiti displacement soars as children face education collapse and violence* (Jun. 20, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-displacement-soars-children-face-education-collapse-and-violence>. Most of these closures are in the West and Artibonite Departments. BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 59 (959 schools in the West and Artibonite departments closed as of January 31); UNICEF, *Haiti: Humanitarian Situation Report No. 3*, p. 3 (May 8, 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/media/5996/file/Haiti-Humanitarian-SitRep-No.3-March-2025.pdf.pdf.pdf>; iciHaiti, *iciHaiti - Insecurity : Many schools, colleges and universities closed* (Jun. 17, 2025), <https://www.icihaiti.com/en/news-45145-icihaiti-insecurity-many-schools-colleges-and-universities-closed.html> (a survey by the Haitian Progressive Parents’ Union revealed the shutdown of 347 public and 51 private schools between February and March 2025).

³⁸³ iciHaiti, *iciHaiti - Insecurity : Many schools, colleges and universities closed* (Jun. 17, 2025) (“12 faculties of the State University of Haiti, 50 private universities, seven training centers under the supervision of ministries, and 29 teacher training colleges [are closed]. In addition, 34 vocational training centers in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area have also ceased operations, impacting technical and vocational programs.”); Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Education : Nearly 70 university schools closed due to violence* (May 11, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44879-haiti-education-nearly-70-university-schools-closed-due-to-violence.html>; see also John Smith Justin, *Distress Call from the Dean of the Faculty of Law in Support of UEH*, Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 28, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254709/distress-call-from-the-dean-of-the-faculty-of-law-in-support-of-ueh> (“In a first for its existence, UEH is losing access to all of its entities due to the violence of armed gangs, which now control over 80% of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. Of the 11 UEH entities, only the Ecole normale supérieure (ENS) has not encountered difficulties in welcoming its students and delivering classes, after its premises were set on fire by bandits from the ‘Viv ansanm’ coalition. . . . A few weeks ago, the Faculty of Human Sciences (FASCH), the Institute for African Studies and Research of Haiti (IERAH), and the National Institute of Management and Advanced International Studies (INAGHEI) were still able to operate from their premises located on Avenue Christophe. The most recent attacks by bandits from Carrefour-Feuilles in that area, on March 13, forced the administration to suspend all academic activities in these faculties, without knowing for certain when they will be able to reopen.”); John Smith Justin, *University Activities Paralyzed as Armed Gangs Invade Avenue Christophe*, Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 14, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254163/university-activities-paralyzed-as-armed-gangs-invade-avenue-christophe> (the State University of Haiti’s Faculty of Human Sciences suspended all in-person administrative and academic activities in March due to insecurity, while students from Institute of African Studies and Research of Haiti had mostly moved online due to the deteriorating security situation in the area).

³⁸⁴ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 64.

³⁸⁵ Plan International, *Haiti displacement soars as children face education collapse and violence* (Jun. 20, 2025) (166 schools were forced to relocate); FNE, *Projet d'Appui aux Écoles et Familles d'Élèves Victimes de l'Insécurité* (Jun. 2025), pp. 4, 12 (187 schools out of 422 schools surveyed have been forced to relocate, and “are often operating in very precarious conditions, with few resources and insufficient aid”).

³⁸⁶ See, e.g., Justin, *University Activities Paralyzed as Armed Gangs Invade Avenue Christophe* (Mar. 14, 2025) (students from the Faculty of Human Sciences were trapped in the faculty building for hours as armed groups attempted to seize control of the surrounding area); Evens Sanon, *Gangs unleash new attack on Haiti's capital as police vow to hold them back*, AP News (Mar. 12, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gangs-capital-violence-port-au-prince-53a9932015795bdf540725d7f1e371df> (students at a Catholic school in Port-au-Prince were forced to evacuate due to heavy gunfire in the area).

³⁸⁷ See, e.g., Péliissier & Norestyl, *The UEH faces attrition crisis among professors* (Feb. 26, 2025) (the road where the State University of Haiti’s Faculty of Sciences is located has been impassable since February 2024 due to armed group violence).

³⁸⁸ See, e.g., Chadrac, *Father Mackenzy Célestin Raises Alarm Over Montrouis Crisis* (Jan. 16, 2025) (a resident of Montrouis, a town in the Artibonite Department that has come under attack, “observed that the silence of the victims’ families masks their fear and pain—a psychosis that compels parents to keep their children home, even during school hours”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Robles, *Gunfire and Bandits Make School an Impossible Dream for Haitian Children* (Jan. 25, 2025) (discussing the risks associated with sending children to school).

³⁸⁹ Narcisus, *Can relocating students save Haiti's education system?* (Apr. 2, 2025) (“Before, we were 30 per class. Now, we are 60, sometimes more. . . . Teachers, already overwhelmed, now struggle to manage double the workload, with little additional support.”) (internal quotations omitted).

³⁹⁰ FNE, [Projet d'Appui aux Écoles et Familles d'Élèves Victimes de l'Insécurité](#) (Jun. 2025), p. 14 (“Of the 422 schools surveyed, 392 (92.89%) claim to receive no subsidy to maintain their teaching and administrative activities.”); Narcisus, [Can relocating students save Haiti's education system?](#) (Apr. 2, 2025) (“[T]he government has relocated nearly 20 schools in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area in an effort to provide a safe learning environment for thousands of students. Still, many more remain out of school. While the relocations offer temporary relief, overcrowding, teacher shortages and continued violence threaten the plan's sustainability. Parents, students and education experts are questioning whether the government's response is enough — or merely a stopgap in a collapsing system.”); Jonasson Odigène, *De « ti pa ti pa » à « m a debat », la lente agonie de l'école en Haïti*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Jan. 24, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/252635/de-ti-pa-ti-pa-a-m-a-debat-la-lente-agonie-de-lecole-en-haiti> (although the government has relocated some schools, it has not provided support to private schools or schools in the South Department, “which are forced to accommodate students fleeing the capital and its surrounding areas”); see also Bien-Eugene, [Des enfants privés d'école dans la région métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince à cause de la violence des gangs](#) (Mar. 10, 2025) (after the Claire Heureuse National School began to be used as an informal displacement site, “[s]chool officials called a meeting with parents . . . to inform them of a possible relocation of the school, but no concrete solution has yet been proposed”).

³⁹¹ Flavien Janvier, *Universities in Jérémie Severely Affected by Insecurity*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Feb. 21, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/253505/universities-in-jeremie-severely-affected-by-insecurity>; Switchboard, [Understanding Haiti and the Journeys of Haitian Migrants](#) (Nov. 2024), p. 10 (“[T]he state's underinvestment in education has created challenges for public education, including lack of materials, unpaid or absentee teachers, and insufficient classroom space.”).

³⁹² Switchboard, [Understanding Haiti and the Journeys of Haitian Migrants](#) (Nov. 2024), p. 10 (“Eighty percent of primary education institutions in Haiti are private, particularly the country's best schools. The demand for public education far exceeds the supply. . . . Religious organizations and other private actors have filled this gap between educational needs and state funding for schools, though these private options are often prohibitively expensive.”); see also FNE, [Projet d'Appui aux Écoles et Familles d'Élèves Victimes de l'Insécurité](#) (Jun. 2025), p. 4 (“[S]ome public schools in Port-au-Prince are now being used as shelters for displaced persons.”).

³⁹³ See FNE, [Projet d'Appui aux Écoles et Familles d'Élèves Victimes de l'Insécurité](#) (Jun. 2025), pp. 4, 8 (“[L]ack of financial resources stands out as the main cause of children dropping out of school: 2,330 families, or 37.32% of the sample, said they were unable to send their children to school due to economic constraints.”); see, e.g., Bien-Eugene, [Des enfants privés d'école dans la région métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince à cause de la violence des gangs](#) (Mar. 10, 2025) (“Jeannie's. . . child, who attended the Cœurs-Unis middle school on Avenue Poupelard, now has to travel to Delmas every morning [after their school was relocated]. ‘Transportation costs have increased considerably, whereas before, my child could walk to school,’ she laments. This situation weighs heavily on the already tight budgets of many families, making access to education even more difficult.”).

³⁹⁴ RHI News, *Haïti : l'UNNOH appelle à la solidarité internationale en faveur des enseignants en grève depuis janvier...* (May 7, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/culture-education/haiti-lunnoh-appelle-a-la-solidarite-internationale-en-faveur-des-enseignants-en-greve-depuis-janvier/> (the National Teachers' Union of Haiti says teachers are demanding, “educational reform, salary alignment, payment of arrears, the appointment of qualified teachers, as well as material and nutritional support in schools,” and condemns the government's failure to address their concerns); Kervenson Martial, *Teachers occupy Haiti's northwest education office over unmet promises*, *Haitian Times* (Apr. 28, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/04/28/striking-teachers-seize-northwest-menfp-office/> (“Many teachers say they have not been paid in more than two years.”); Narcisus, [Can relocating students save Haiti's education system?](#) (Apr. 2, 2025); Onz Chéry, *Some teachers go back to school as Haitian government vows to meet strike demands*, *Haitian Times* (Jan. 30, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/01/30/public-school-teachers-strike-partially-pause/> (“As the prospect of a fourth week [of strikes] loomed . . . students also protest[ed] in the streets to call for action and disrupt[ed] some private schools' operations.”).

³⁹⁵ Plan International, *Children in Haiti in danger and out of school because of armed violence* (Mar. 20, 2025), <https://plan-international.org/news/2025/03/20/children-in-haiti-in-danger-and-out-of-school-because-of-armed-violence/>; Péliissier & Norestyl, [The UEH faces attrition crisis among professors](#) (Feb. 26, 2025); Robles, [Gunfire and Bandits Make School an Impossible Dream for Haitian Children](#) (Jan. 25, 2025) (“Schools have also had to cope with a plunge in the numbers of teachers and staff, many of whom either were killed or left the country. Haiti's schools have lost about one-fourth of their teachers, according to government officials”).

³⁹⁶ Martial, [Teachers occupy Haiti's northwest education office over unmet promises](#) (Apr. 28, 2025); Narcisus, [Can relocating students save Haiti's education system?](#) (Apr. 2, 2025).

³⁹⁷ Martial, [Teachers occupy Haiti's northwest education office over unmet promises](#) (Apr. 28, 2025) (“Last year, the Northwest Department recorded a dismal high school's final exam pass rate of under 30%—one of the lowest in the country. Out of nearly 6,500 candidates, only 1,933 passed the exam.”).

³⁹⁸ Global Justice Clinic (GJC), *Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic* (Jun. 2025), <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zZUyVNLZHVvnDIjsGuu8NzSHFAF7cdsS/view>; Haitian Bridge Alliance (HBA), *Haitian Bridge Alliance Condemns Renewed Travel Ban as Racist and Discriminatory* (Jun. 5, 2025), <https://haitianbridgealliance.org/haïtian-bridge-alliance-condemns-renewed-travel-ban-as-racist-and-discriminatory/> (“[The travel ban] is not about national security — this is about systemic racism, xenophobia, and the criminalization of Black, Brown, and Muslim bodies globally,” said Guerline Jozef, Executive Director of Haitian Bridge Alliance. ‘Once again, U.S. immigration policy is being weaponized to deny entry, dignity, and basic human rights to people from countries that have long borne the brunt of colonialism, Western intervention, and economic extraction. This is the same administration that deport Black immigrants only to import White refugees from South Africa under the false claim of genocide.’”); Edxon Francisque, *Anti-Haitian Protests in the Dominican Republic Turn Violent as Group Calls for Mass Deportations*, *Haitian Times* (Mar. 31, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/03/31/anti-haitian-protests-dominican-republic-hoyo-de-frisa/>; CGRS, [#WelcomeWithDignity Decries Revocation of Haiti TPS, Attacks on Immigrant Communities](#) (Feb. 21, 2025), <https://cgrs.uclawsf.edu/news/welcomewithdignity-decries-revocation-haiti-tps-attacks-immigrant-communities> (“The decision

to revoke TPS is yet another cruel attack on Haitian immigrants, who have long been subject to inhumane and discriminatory policies, as well as violent anti-Black rhetoric by the president and his allies,” said Blaine Booke, Legal Director of the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies (CGRS).”); Bridget Wooding, *Guest Opinion: “The Dominican Republic Must End Collective Deportations of Haitians”*, Global Detention Project (Dec. 4, 2024), <https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/guest-opinion-the-dominican-republic-must-end-collective-deportations-of-haitians> (“[T]he causes of undocumented migration are not being addressed; instead, hate speech and xenophobic practices are being fostered that perpetuate historical narratives of racism and anti-Haitianism.”).

³⁹⁹ See generally GJC, *Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic* (Jun. 2025); Al Jazeera, *Nowhere to Belong* (May 28, 2025), <https://www.aljazeera.com/video/fault-lines/2025/5/28/nowhere-to-belong>.

⁴⁰⁰ UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2024* (Jun. 12, 2025), <https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/global-trends-report-2024.pdf> (“The number of Haitian refugees and asylum-seekers grew by 72,700 during the year [2024] to reach 423,300.”).

⁴⁰¹ UNHCR, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2024* (Jun. 12, 2025) (423,300).

⁴⁰² See note 37.

⁴⁰³ See notes 405–430; see also Al Jazeera, *Dominican Republic Boosts Security on Border with Crisis-Ridden Haiti* (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/7/dominican-republic-boosts-security-on-border-with-crisis-ridden-haiti> (reporting on the Dominican Republic’s increased militarization of the border with Haiti and ongoing construction of a border wall “to bolster border security and tighten migration control in response to escalating instability in neighbouring Haiti”); HaitiLibre, *Haiti - FLASH: The Dominican Republic Sends 800 Soldiers as Reinforcements to the Border* (May 14, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44900-haiti-flash-the-dominican-republic-sends-800-soldiers-as-reinforcements-to-the-border.html>.

⁴⁰⁴ Sebastián Rodríguez, *Invisible Chains: The Harsh Reality of Haitian Migrants Trapped by Policy and Prejudice*, Mixed Migration Centre (Apr. 29, 2025), <https://mixedmigration.org/invisible-chains-the-harsh-reality-of-haitian-migrants/> (“Many migrants begin their journey not just from Haiti, but from countries like Brazil and Chile – where they initially sought refuge – only to face renewed pressures to migrate. The route often takes them through the Darién Gap, a treacherous stretch of jungle between Panama and Colombia, fraught with danger – particularly for women and girls, who are exposed to heightened risks of sexual and gender-based violence.”); Sandrine Exil, *Haiti’s Silent Exodus: Driven into the Sea in Search of Hope*, El País (Dec. 2, 2024), <https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-12-02/haitis-silent-exodus-driven-into-the-the-sea-in-search-of-hope.html> (“The Haitian migrant boat phenomenon represents one of the most devastating immigration crises in Latin America and the Caribbean, with thousands of people risking their lives in flimsy vessels to escape violence, poverty and hopelessness in Haiti. . . . According to statements by relatives, traffickers charge between \$3,000 and \$5,000 per person per trip, in a country where the minimum wage is just over \$116 per month.”); see also *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 45 (discussing vulnerability to smugglers).

⁴⁰⁵ See, e.g., Jacqueline Charles, *UN migration head calls conditions in Haiti ‘brutal,’ wants to talk to U.S. aid*, Miami Herald (Apr. 16, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article304320096.html> (discussing removals from United States, the Dominican Republic, Turks and Caicos, and the Bahamas).

⁴⁰⁶ See, e.g., UN HRC, *Interactive Dialogue with the High Commissioner and the Human Rights Expert on Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), p. 16 (the International Service for Human Rights, together with more than 50 organisations, notes that “[d]uring this time, the return of Haitians to Haiti is an ongoing human right violation”); Charles, *‘We are all by ourselves’: Haitians warn that fall of Port-au-Prince is imminent* (Mar. 20, 2025) (“‘The continued removal of individuals to a nation engulfed in crisis is not just cruel — it is a direct affront to the United States’ legal and moral obligations under international law,’ said Guerline Jozef, co-founder of the San Diego Haitian Bridge Alliance. . . . The deportations ‘constitute a clear violation of international human rights law,’ she added, saying they ‘disregard the fundamental legal protections owed to individuals facing persecution.’”).

⁴⁰⁷ Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Justice : «Les États Unis ne doivent renvoyer personne en Haïti» dicit William O’Neill, expert de l’ONU* (Jul. 5, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/article-45271-haiti-justice-les-etats-unis-ne-doivent-renvoyer-personne-en-haiti-dixit-william-o-neill-expert-de-l-onu.html> (the UN Expert on Human Rights in Haiti said “nowhere is safe in Haiti today” and “reiterate[d] the calls made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to all States not to forcibly return anyone to Haiti, including those whose asylum claims have been rejected or who have been determined not to be in need of international protection”); AFP, *UN Human Rights Expert Urges Nations to Refrain from Expelling Haitians*, Le Nouvelliste (Mar. 11, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/254058/un-human-rights-expert-urges-nations-to-refrain-from-expelling-haitians>; Evens Sanon, *Haiti has 1 million displaced people, mostly from gang violence. It’s tripled over the past year*, AP News (Jan. 14, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-internally-displaced-gang-violence-un-iom-8cf38a678f02e970ecf1713a77975640> (IOM official says “deportation or any forced returns to countries that are already facing mounting security and humanitarian challenges is not something that is going to be beneficial to the group”) (internal quotations omitted).

⁴⁰⁸ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 66.

⁴⁰⁹ Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Migration: 119,000 Irregular Haitians Expelled in 4 Months* (May 12, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44890-haiti-migration-119-000-irregular-haitians-expelled-in-4-months.html> (representing a 71% increase from the same period in 2024); see also Dirección General de Migración, *The DGM Deported 34,190 Illegal Haitians in May, Figures Show a Trajectory of Sustained Growth* (Jun. 12, 2025), <https://migracion.gob.do/en/the-dgm-deported-34190-illegal-haitians-in-may-figures-show-a-trajectory-of-sustained-growth/>; GJC, *Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic* (Jun. 10, 2025), p. 7 (“If Dominican authorities continue deportations at current rates, the state will deport more than 360,000 people to Haiti in 2025.”); HaitiLibre,

Haiti - Dominican Republic: More than 180,000 Haitians Repatriated in 6 Months (Apr. 2, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44608-haiti-dominican-republic-more-than-180-000-haitians-repatriated-in-6-months.html> (“According to figures from the Directorate General of Migration (DGM) for the period from October 2024 to March 2025 (six months), the Dominican Republic repatriated to Haiti more than 180,000 Haitians in an irregular migration situation in Dominican territory.”); AFP, [UN Human Rights Expert Urges Nations to Refrain from Expelling Haitians](#) (Mar. 11, 2025) (the UN “expects 350,000 deportations in 2025”); Jessica Hasbun & Eve Brennan, *Dominican Republic to Deport Thousands of Haitian Migrants*, CNN (Mar. 1, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/01/02/americas/dominican-republic-deport-haitians-intl-latam/index.html> (“The Dominican Republic deported more than 276,000 Haitians in 2024. . . . In the last three months of the year alone, over 94,000 people were deported under a new operation aiming to remove up to 10,000 undocumented Haitians per week.”). But see BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 66 (reporting 108,583 deportations from January to June).

⁴¹⁰ GJC, [Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic](#) (Jun. 2025), pp. 11-14 (detailing numerous instances of racial profiling by Dominican immigration authorities); REDMA *Condemns the Dominican Republic’s State-sanctioned Cruelty and Terror Masked as Immigration Policy* (May 20, 2025), <https://docs.google.com/document/d/10nK6mJPbEakwJL2niAPTn0aC5s9khFKSi5Fn5o9Nb6o/edit?tab=t.0> (“Immigration agents have . . . detained Black Dominican women and teenagers who do not possess identity documents.”); Wooding, [Guest Opinion: “The Dominican Republic Must End Collective Deportations of Haitians”](#) (Dec. 4, 2024) (“To undertake these mass deportations, Dominican security agencies are arbitrarily detaining large numbers of people based on skin colour, reflecting a discriminatory attitude to migration control, which has historic roots and continues to grow and be ever more visible. These measures are not just affecting undocumented immigrants, but also people residing legally, like Dominicans of Haitian ancestry.”); see, e.g., Hogla Enecia Pérez & Frances Robles, *Desperate Haitians Who Fled to the Dominican Republic Are Being Sent Back in Cages*, NY Times (Dec. 9, 2024), <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/09/world/americas/haiti-dominican-republic-cage-trucks.html> (“Rose-Mieline Florvil, 24, who lived in the Dominican Republic for less than a year, said immigration agents recently raided her house in Santiago, in the northern part of the country, one day before dawn and said something along the lines of ‘Black woman, come here.’”).

⁴¹¹ GJC, [Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic](#) (Jun. 2025), p. 12 (“In one incident, migration officials detained a man ‘like an animal,’ without giving him time to hand over his identity card. In another, a witness reported watching a guard rip up an identification document that a Haitian national was presenting.”).

⁴¹² GJC, [Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), pp. 14-15 (“These [c]age-like trucks fitted with iron bars that appear designed to carry livestock’ generally carry 80 to 100 people, although the official holding capacity is around 30 people.”); Pérez & Robles, [Desperate Haitians Who Fled to the Dominican Republic Are Being Sent Back in Cages](#) (Dec. 9, 2024); Wooding, [Guest Opinion: “The Dominican Republic Must End Collective Deportations of Haitians”](#) (Dec. 4, 2024) (“The detention and deportation process poses significant health risks, as authorities often crowd deportees and returnees into overheated vehicles and detention facilities and regularly deny them access to medical assistance, WASH, and adequate food.”).

⁴¹³ GJC, [Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), pp. 12, 14-15 (“An IOM protection coordinator in Haiti confirmed that migrants have arrived upon deportation injured from beatings. She stated that the rights abuses are ‘the most extreme I have ever seen.’ . . . Attesting to the severity of the violence, the Groupe d’Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés, or Support Group for Repatriated People and Refugees (GARR), accused Dominican authorities of ‘hunting’ Haitians and stated that some are extorted, raped, or held in prison without water or food and subjected to beatings ‘if they dare to say a word.’”); Dánica Coto, *Haitian Migrants Share Harrowing Stories of Abuse as Dominican Republic Ramps Up Deportations*, AP News (Feb. 11, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/deportations-dominican-republic-haiti-abuses-dde6322cd255d9b41a11028863ed900e>; see also Wooding, [Guest Opinion: “The Dominican Republic Must End Collective Deportations of Haitians”](#) (Dec. 4, 2024) (“It is unclear whether there is consistent gender segregation in detention facilities, a lack of which increases the risk of gender-based violence.”).

⁴¹⁴ GJC, [Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), pp. 15-17; REDMA *Condemns the Dominican Republic’s State-sanctioned Cruelty and Terror Masked as Immigration Policy* (May 20, 2025) (“Haitian child protection authorities reported that on May 8th, a baby of approximately 5 or 6 months of age was deported from the Dominican Republic without either parent.”); Coto, [Haitian Migrants Share Harrowing Stories of Abuse as Dominican Republic Ramps Up Deportations](#) (Feb. 11, 2025).

⁴¹⁵ Haiti Libre, *Haiti - FLASH: 2,188 Illegal Haitians Arrested in Dominican Hospitals in 1 Month* (Jun. 2, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45035-haiti-flash-2-188-illegal-haitians-arrested-in-dominican-hospitals-in-1-month.html> (“[O]fficials reportedly arrested 2,188 Haitian migrants in public hospitals between April 21, 2025 and May 30, 2025.”); Diario Libre, *ONU: 900 haitianas embarazadas o lactantes fueron deportadas en un mes desde República Dominicana* (May 20, 2025), <https://www.diariolibre.com/mundo/caribe/2025/05/20/onu-900-haitianas-embarazadas-deportadas-en-un-mes-desde-rd/3120149>; REDMA *Condemns the Dominican Republic’s State-sanctioned Cruelty and Terror Masked as Immigration Policy* (May 20, 2025) (“These measures, along with the razing of an entire community of people of Haitian descent and violent attacks on human rights defenders, are emblematic of the increasingly cruel and rampant nature of rights violations against people of Haitian descent occurring in the Dominican Republic. . . . Haitian authorities and organizations have confirmed that pregnant women, as well as postpartum women and their newborns, are being deported to Haiti in increasing numbers. In five days at the end of April, Haitian authorities documented that 154 newborns (not counting their mothers) were deported at one official border crossing. . . . There is already one confirmed death due to this policy.”); Bridget Wooding, *Guest Opinion: “Cruelty Is Not My Flag: Contesting Arbitrary Detention and Deportations from the Dominican Republic”*, Global Detention Project (Apr. 29, 2025), <https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/guest-opinion-cruelty-is-not-my-flag-contesting-arbitrary-detention-and-deportations-from-the-dominican-republic>; Jean Junior Celestin, *Dominican Authorities Launch Aggressive Operation Against Haitians*, Le Nouvelliste (Apr. 21, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/255462/dominican-authorities-launch-aggressive-operation-against-haitians> (“‘Anyone who comes to a hospital must show their immigration status. Deporting a mother and a newborn after three days is a flagrant violation of human rights. . . . In this context, many women have decided not to go to the

hospital for the care they need. If these women give birth at home, they are at great risk—even of dying.’ . . . [M]any Haitians who showed up at hospitals without an up-to-date immigration status have been taken away by immigration officers.”); see also GJC, *Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic* (Jun. 10, 2025), p. 18 (“Over the past few years, the Abinader administration has specifically targeted pregnant, lactating, and postpartum women for migration enforcement.”); UN News, *Haiti: Mass displacement and deportation surge amid violence* (Feb. 28, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/04/1162786> (“The sharp increase in extremely vulnerable deportees — especially women, children, and newborns — is alarming. Since 22 April, IOM and partners have assisted an average of 15 pregnant women and 15 lactating mothers daily at the Belladère and Ouanaminthe border crossings.”); Masaya Llavneras Blanco, *The Dominican Republic’s expulsion of thousands of Haitians shows the brutality of mass deportations*, *The Conversation* (Jan. 7, 2025), <https://theconversation.com/the-dominican-republics-expulsion-of-thousands-of-haitians-shows-the-brutality-of-mass-deportations-245545> (finding that “lactating women have been forcefully separated from their infants”).

⁴¹⁶ Charles, *UN migration head calls conditions in Haiti ‘brutal,’ wants to talk to U.S. aid* (Apr. 16, 2025) (“The Trump administration returned 40 Haitians on Tuesday, the administration’s third deportation flight this year.”); *Alterpresse, Haïti-Migration : Rapatriement de 27 Haïtiens et 3 Dominicains dans leurs pays respectifs par les garde-côtes américains* (Mar. 18, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31514>; David Goodhue, *Coast Guard stops a sailboat carrying over 100 Haitian migrants near the Florida Keys*, *Miami Herald* (Feb. 10, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article300087684.html> (the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted a boat carrying over 130 Haitian migrants and returned them to Haiti); Jacqueline Charles, X (Jan. 13, 2025), <https://x.com/Jacquiecharles/status/1878916284890464530>; see also Adam Taylor & Martine Powers, *Trump proposal to repatriate Ukrainians, Haitians would use foreign aid funds*, *Washington Post* (May 20, 2025), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/05/20/trump-deportations-ukrainians-haitians/> (“The Trump administration has devised plans to spend up to \$250 million earmarked for foreign assistance to fund instead the removal and return of people from active conflict zones, including 700,000 Ukrainian and Haitian migrants who fled to the United States amid extreme, ongoing violence back home, according to draft internal documents. . . . The draft documents were labeled predecisional, and a DHS spokesperson called them ‘outdated.’ Even so, DHS and the State Department signed an agreement last week that details the same process, and includes the \$250 million figure in foreign assistance funding that would support it, but does not name any specific nationalities that would be targeted for voluntary return.”).

⁴¹⁷ See U.S. Embassy in Haiti, *Alert: Haiti Security Alert* (Jun. 24, 2025), <https://ht.usembassy.gov/alert-haiti-security-alert-june-24-2025/>.

⁴¹⁸ Jacqueline Charles & Syra Ortiz Blanes, *After labeling transfers to Guantánamo as ‘fake news,’ Trump deports Haitians from there*, *Miami Herald* (Jun. 25, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article308884995.html> (“Only days after Trump administration officials denied plans to transfer undocumented migrants to an American naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, before deporting them, a U.S. military plane flew 20 Haitians from the military installation to Port-au-Prince on Tuesday. While 11 of the migrants who landed back in Haiti’s gang-controlled capital had been picked up at sea near The Bahamas while reportedly en route to Florida, nine others had been transferred to Guantánamo from Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention in the United States. . . . [O]ne of President Donald Trump’s first official acts upon returning to the White House earlier this year was ordering officials to prepare Guantánamo to hold as many as 30,000 migrants. Trump’s directive marked a dramatic expansion of the facility’s use for immigration enforcement as part of his mass deportation campaign.”); see also John Hudson & Alex Horton, *Trump to ramp up transfers to Guantánamo, including citizens of allies*, *Washington Post* (Jun. 11, 2025), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/06/10/trump-guantanamo-deportations/>.

⁴¹⁹ Charles & Blanes, *After labeling transfers to Guantánamo as ‘fake news,’ Trump deports Haitians from there* (Jun. 20, 2025) (“‘Guantánamo is a black site designed for secrecy and exclusion. Haitian immigrants—and asylum seekers—are once again being subjected to the same cruel, barbaric and inhumane treatment they were subjected in the 1990s, held without access to counsel, without notice to their families or legal advocates and deported under the cover of darkness,’ [Haitian Bridge Alliance executive director Guerline] Jozef said. ‘These individuals have been stripped of their most basic rights under U.S. and international law.’”); see also HBA, *Haitian Bridge Alliance Urges President Trump to Reconsider Proposal to Detain Migrants at Guantánamo Bay, Calls for Humane Immigration Policies* (Jan. 31, 2025), <https://haitianbridgealliance.org/haitian-bridge-alliance-urges-president-trump-to-reconsider-proposal-to-detain-migrants-at-guantanamo-bay-calls-for-humane-immigration-policies/> (discussing Guantánamo Bay’s “troubling history of migrant detention,” with over 34,000 Haitians “kept in appalling conditions, subjected to inadequate medical care, and denied access to proper asylum procedures” between 1991 and 1993).

⁴²⁰ See U.S. Department of State, *Terrorist Designations of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif* (May 2, 2025), <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/terrorist-designations-of-viv-ansanm-and-gran-grif/>; see also notes 487-488.

⁴²¹ Soufan Center, *Haiti Struggles with Criminal Insurgency as U.S. Designates Gangs as Terror Groups* (May 22, 2025), <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-may-22/> (“As seen with the thousands of Venezuelan migrants with alleged ties to Tren de Aragua being sent to the infamous Center for Terrorism Confinement (CECOT) mega-prison in El Salvador, there is concern that Haitian migrants in the U.S. may now be targeted for affiliations with the gangs designated by the state department and potentially be sent to the same prison.”); Quixote Center, *The Foreign Terrorist Designation* (May 16, 2025), <https://quixote.org/posts/the-foreign-terrorist-designation>; Demian Bio, *U.S. Move To Designate Haitian Gangs [sic] As Terrorists Likely An Excuse To Increase Deportations, Expert Says*, *Latin Times* (Apr. 22, 2025), <https://www.latintimes.com/us-move-designate-haitian-gangs-terrorists-likely-excuse-increase-deportations-expert-says-581394>.

⁴²² Chase Harrison & Khalea Robertson, *Tracking Trump and Latin America: Migration – Hondurans and Nicaraguans to Lose TPS, AS/COA* (Jul. 7, 2025), <https://www.as-coa.org/articles/tracking-trump-and-latin-america-migration-ban-travel-cuba-haiti-and-venezuela>; CGRS, *Trump’s Return: Executive Actions Threatening the Rights and Protection of Refugees and Migrants* (Jan. 24, 2025), <https://cgrs.uclawsf.edu/our-work/publications/trumps-return-executive-actions-threatening-rights-and-protection-refugees-and>; see also Suzanne Gamboa & Fredlyn Pierre Louis, *As Trump pledges mass deportation, he’s creating more*

undocumented people, NBC News (Jun. 19, 2025), <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-deportation-undocumented-immigrants-policy-change-rcna213356> (“‘We’ve just seen no effort to improve legal pathways and, if anything, things have gotten worse,” said Stuart Anderson, executive director for the National Foundation for American Policy, a public policy group focused on trade, immigration and related issues.”); HBA, *Haitian Bridge Alliance Denounces DHS Decision Terminating CHNV Parole Program: “Over 530,000 Lives Thrown into Crisis” Under Secretary Noem & President Trump* (Jun. 12, 2025), <https://haitianbridgealliance.org/haitian-bridge-alliance-denounces-dhs-decision-terminating-chnv-parole-program-over-530000-lives-thrown-into-crisis-under-secretary-noem-president-trump/> (“[T]he Department of Homeland Security’s decision to terminate [a humanitarian parole program for Haitians]. . . . is a calculated move . . . to dismantle lawful pathways that served both humanitarian and strategic purposes.”); Speaking Out of Place, *Disspelling the Myths and Correcting the Record About Haitian Migrants: A Conversation with Human Rights Activists Gabrielle Apollon and Pooja Bhatia*, at 14:36 (2025), <https://speakingoutofplace.com/2025/06/21/disspelling-the-myths-and-correcting-the-record-about-haitian-migrants-a-conversation-with-human-rights-activists-gabrielle-apollo-and-pooja-bhatia/> (discussing a “long history of examples of ways where when Haitians attempt to access the immigration system, the US changes the rules to then prevent them from coming”).

⁴²³ Federal Register, *Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans* (Mar. 25, 2025), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/25/2025-05128/termination-of-parole-processes-for-cubans-haitians-nicaraguans-and-venezuelans>; Quixote Center, *Unpacking Humanitarian Parole Amidst May 30 Supreme Court Ruling* (Jun. 12, 2025), <https://quixote.org/posts/unpacking-humanitarian-parole-amidst-may-30-supreme-court-ruling>; U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), *DHS Releases Statement on Major SCOTUS Victory for Trump Administration and the American People on Ending the CHNV Parole Program* (May 30, 2025), <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/05/30/dhs-releases-statement-major-scotus-victory-trump-administration-and-american>. The CHNV parole program, introduced in January 2023, permitted entry for up to 30,000 Haitian, Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan beneficiaries per month. The program allowed U.S.-based sponsors with legal status and adequate finances to apply online for Haitians outside of the United States. DHS, *Implementation of a Parole Process for Haitians* (Jan. 9, 2023), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/01/09/2023-00255/implementation-of-a-parole-process-for-haitians>. Note that the CHNV program, while being a lifeline for many, ultimately excluded many of the most vulnerable Haitians from protection. See IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024* (Dec. 2024), p. 12.

⁴²⁴ Quixote Center, *Unpacking Humanitarian Parole Amidst May 30 Supreme Court Ruling* (Jun. 12, 2025); Haitian Times, *Calling SCOTUS decision on migrant parole ‘a crime against humanity,’ advocates vow to keep fighting* (May 31, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/05/31/scotus-haitian-parole-decision/>; HBA, *Haitian Bridge Alliance Denounces DHS Decision Terminating CHNV Parole Program: “Over 530,000 Lives Thrown into Crisis” Under Secretary Noem & President Trump* (Jun. 12, 2025) (the termination impacts over 530,000 beneficiaries from all four countries). DHS has already begun sending termination notices to CHNV beneficiaries, telling them to “self-deport.” DHS, *DHS Issues Notices of termination for the CHNV Parole Program, Encourages Parolees to Self-Deport Immediately* (Jun. 12, 2025), <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/06/12/dhs-issues-notices-termination-chnv-parole-program-encourages-parolees-self-deport>.

⁴²⁵ On January 20, President Trump issued an Executive Order ending access to asylum at ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border. He also cancelled approximately 30,000 appointments for inspection made through the phone app CBP One, which allowed migrants “without entry documents to schedule appointments at designated ports of entry on the southern border” wherein they could request asylum. American Immigration Council, *Challenging the Shutdown of Asylum Access at Ports of Entry* (Jun. 11, 2025), <https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/litigation/challenging-shutdown-asylum-access-ports-entry/>; RHI News, *L’administration Trump met fin au statut légal de milliers de migrants entrés via l’application CBP One...* (Apr. 9, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/ladministration-trump-met-fin-au-statut-legal-de-milliers-de-migrants-entres-via-lapplication-cbp-one/>; White House, *Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats* (Jan. 20, 2025), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-united-states-from-foreign-terrorists-and-othernational-security-and-public-safety-threats/>. In July, a federal court in Washington, DC, struck down the Executive Order as unconstitutional and in violation of U.S. immigration law, although the U.S. government is expected to appeal the ruling. Jasmine Garsd, *Federal judge strikes down Trump’s order suspending asylum access at the southern border*, NPR (Jul. 2, 2025), <https://www.npr.org/2025/07/02/nx-s1-5455076/judge-rules-against-trump-asylum-ban>; see generally CGRS, *CGRS Input on Externalization of Migration and the Impact on the Human Rights of Migrants* (Jun. 9, 2025), <https://cgrs.uclawsf.edu/our-work/publications/cgrs-input-externalization-migration-and-impact-human-rights-migrants>. “The Trump administration is [also] moving to fast-track cases in immigration court by allowing judges to drop ‘legally deficient asylum cases without a hearing,’” with the aim of “increase[ing] the number of deportation orders issued before people can have what is considered a ‘merits hearing’ that allows them to make their case in court.” Ximena Bustillo, *Trump moves to speed up asylum cases without court hearings*, NPR (Apr. 15, 2025), <https://www.npr.org/2025/04/15/g-s1-60430/trump-asylum-immigration>; Executive Office of Immigration Review, *Pretermission of Legally Insufficient Applications for Asylum* (Apr. 11, 2025), <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1396411/dl?inline>. The Biden administration had already significantly curtailed access to asylum. See IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024* (Jun. 2024), note 521 and associated text; IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024* (Dec. 2024), note 507 and associated text.

⁴²⁶ See generally CGRS et al., *The Impact of U.S. Immigration and Border Externalization Policies on Haitian and Other Black Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Migrants* (Apr. 7, 2025), <https://cgrs.uclawsf.edu/our-work/publications/impact-us-immigration-and-border-externalization-policies-haitian-and-other>; see also RHI News, *L’administration Trump met fin au statut légal de milliers de migrants entrés via l’application CBP One...* (Apr. 9, 2025) (“[A]ccording to a September 2024 report from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Haitians were among the top nationalities to obtain appointments through the CBP One app, alongside Venezuelans, Cubans, and Mexicans.”).

⁴²⁷ CWS, *Daily State of Play: Trump’s Indefinite Refugee Ban and Funding Halt* (Jul. 15, 2025), <https://cwsglobal.org/blog/daily-state-of-play-trumps-indefinite-refugee-ban-and-funding-halt/>; White House, *Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program* (Jan. 20, 2025), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/realigning-the-united-states-refugee-admissions-program/>. Even prior to the suspension, “[v]ery few Haitian nationals . . . gained access to the U.S. Refugee Admissions

Program (USRAP), despite the UN Refugee Agency highlighting the international protection needs of Haitians.” Switchboard, *Understanding Haiti and the Journeys of Haitian Migrants* (Nov. 24, 2024), p. 32.

⁴²⁸ The visa ban took effect on June 9, and prevents any Haitians who did not already hold a valid visa or U.S. legal permanent resident status from entering the country. White House, *Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restricts the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats* (Jun. 4, 2025), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/06/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-restricts-the-entry-of-foreign-nationals-to-protect-the-united-states-from-foreign-terrorists-and-other-national-security-and-public-safety-threats/>. The ban “is likely to carry significant social, legal, and economic consequences.” American Immigration Council, *Analysis of Trump’s New Travel Ban* (Jun. 6, 2025), <https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/analysis-trump-travel-ban/>; see also Nora Gámez Torres & Jacqueline Charles, *Separate from kids in Cuba and Haiti by Trump travel ban, parents plead for help*, Miami Herald (Jun. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article308330840.html>; IRC, *What is President Trump’s latest travel ban* (Jun. 26, 2025), <https://www.rescue.org/article/trump-latest-travel-ban> (“While the ban provides specific exceptions for Afghan Special Immigrant Visa holders and certain persecuted minorities from Iran, it will exclude the arrival of most others from the listed countries. This includes the family members of refugees and people granted asylum who are already in the US. There is no waiver for urgent humanitarian circumstances. This proclamation could have far-reaching impacts on the lives of many American families, including refugees, asylees and green card holders, seeking to be reunified with their loved ones.”); RHI News, *Vives condamnations internationales contre l’interdiction d’entrée décrétée par les États-Unis : les pays visés dont Haïti, dénoncent une mesure discriminatoire, les ONG alertent sur une crise humanitaire...* (Jun. 8, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/politique/vives-condamnations-internationales-contre-linterdiction-dentree-decretee-par-les-etats-unis-les-pays-vises-dont-haiti-denoncent-une-mesure-discriminatoire-les-ong-alertent-sur-u/> (“Several governments and international human rights organizations view it as a discriminatory and politically motivated measure with dramatic consequences for millions of families.”).

⁴²⁹ TPS is a form of relief granted “due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), *Temporary Protected States* <https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status> (last visited Jul. 15, 2025).

⁴³⁰ In February, DHS partially vacated the Biden-era re-extension of TPS for Haitian nationals, announcing that the program – which had originally been extended until February 3, 2026 – would expire on August 3, 2025. The termination was set to go into effect on September 2, 2025. Federal Register, *Termination of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status* (Jul. 1, 2025), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/07/01/2025-12224/termination-of-the-designation-of-haiti-for-temporary-protected-status>. However, on July 1, in response to a legal challenge from Haitian beneficiaries of TPS, a judge in U.S. federal court ruled that DHS does not have the authority to terminate TPS before February 3, 2026. Haitian Evangelical Clergy Association et al. vs. Donald J. Trump et al., Memorandum Decision and Order to Show Cause (Jul. 1, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nyed.528747/gov.uscourts.nyed.528747.63.0_1.pdf?eType=EmailBlastContent&eld=f8db3f1f-d687-4994-b7b3-c2601412c17f. The decision protects over 500,000 Haitians living in the United States from possible deportation, although the U.S. government has stated it will appeal. Joe Walsh, *Judge says Trump administration can’t end protected status for Haitian migrants this year*, CBS News (Jul. 2, 2025), <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-administration-haiti-tps-judge-ruling/>; see also DHS, *DHS Terminates Haiti TPS, Encourages Haitians to Obtain Lawful Status* (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/06/27/dhs-terminates-haiti-tps-encourages-haitians-obtain-lawful-status> (urging TPS holders to “take advantage of the Department’s resources in returning to Haiti”); Rebecca Santana, *rump administration throws out protections from deportation for roughly half a million Haitians*, AP News (Feb. 20, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-trump-homeland-security-temporary-status-immigration-8fafbf744d0cdbeffb58be73fb0a8879> (TPS beneficiaries “could be eligible to be removed from the country by August”). Immigration advocates strongly opposed the government’s decision to terminate TPS. See American Civil Liberties Union, *TPS Holders Challenge Shortening of Humanitarian Relief for 500,000 Haitians* (Mar. 21, 2025), <https://www.aclusocal.org/en/press-releases/tps-holders-challenge-shortening-humanitarian-relief-500000-haitians> (“‘The administration’s partial vacatur for Haiti not only robs over 500,000 Haitians living in the U.S. of legal status and work permits,’ said Guerline Jozef, Executive Director of Haitian Bridge Alliance, ‘but it will also place them in acute danger if they are forced to return to a country that is in the midst of an unprecedented economic and political crisis.’ . . . Since Congress established TPS in 1990, no administration has ever moved to rescind it early, before the time period authorized by the law, until now.”); Rep. Frederica S. Wilson et al., *Congresswoman Frederica Wilson Leads Congressional Letter Objecting to the Rescission of Haitian TPS*, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 26, 2025), [https://wilson.house.gov/media/press-releases/congresswoman-frederica-wilson-leads-congressional-letter-objecting-to-the-rescission-of-haitian-tps](https://wilson.house.gov/media/press-releases/congresswoman-frederica-wilson-leads-congressional-letter-objecting-to-the-rescission-of-haitian-tps;); CGRS, *#WelcomeWithDignity Decries Revocation of Haiti TPS, Attacks on Immigrant Communities* (Feb. 21, 2025).

⁴³¹ Wooding, *Guest Opinion: “The Dominican Republic Must End Collective Deportations of Haitians”* (Dec. 4, 2024).

⁴³² Hannah Adely, *Imprisonment, Murder, Extortion: Why U.S. Deportees to Haiti Are Being Targeted by Gangs*, NorthJersey (Mar. 12, 2025), <https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/2025/03/12/us-deportees-haiti-gangs-police-targets-prison/81766301007/> (“Deportees, especially those deported for criminal matters, have long been viewed by authorities and citizens as outsiders and are blamed for bringing crime and violence to Haiti. . . . The criminal deportees are seen ‘as killers,’ and that ‘they should be detained when they first arrive to teach them a lesson.’ [Executive Director of Alternative Chance, a support program for criminal deportees in Haiti, Michelle] Karshan said. . . . [D]eportees ‘have been robbed, denied jobs and housing for which they were qualified, shunned in their neighborhoods, and physically attacked on account of their physical appearance and speech, denoting their status as deportees from the U.S.’ . . . On Feb. 4, the first group of Haitian migrants deported since Trump’s return to the White House — 21 men in total — were brought to police holding cells and held for eight days without charge. . . . They included 12 men convicted of crimes in the U.S. and nine who had no criminal record. . . . The 21 were held in a crowded cell with no beds, no provisions and forced to use the travel monies they were given, which equals \$38, to buy food and water, Karshan said. Their imprisonment sparked fears that Haiti was reviving a banned practice. . . . [of] routinely imprison[ing] deportees who had criminal convictions in the U.S. and extort[ing] relatives for thousands of dollars.”).

⁴³³ GJC, [Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), p. 17 (“Dominican authorities frequently deport unaccompanied children to Haiti despite insufficient resources to receive or properly care for them, leaving the children at the whims of, and at risk of forced recruitment by, armed groups.”); Coto, [Haitian Migrants Share Harrowing Stories of Abuse as Dominican Republic Ramps Up Deportations](#) (Feb. 11, 2025); see also Speaking Out of Place, [Dispelling the Myths and Correcting the Record About Haitian Migrants: A Conversation with Human Rights Activists Gabrielle Apollon and Pooja Bhatia](#) (2025), at 27:29 (discussing how deportations can actually fuel the insecurity crisis: “You deporting unaccompanied children to a place where forced child recruitment [by armed groups] . . . is up 70%, you are essentially delivering children into the hands of gang leaders to do their bidding.”).

⁴³⁴ With the exception of one deportation flight in June returning Haitians held at a migrant facility in Guantánamo Bay to Port-au-Prince. Charles & Blanes, [After labeling transfers to Guantánamo as ‘fake news,’ Trump deports Haitians from there](#) (Jun. 25, 2025).

⁴³⁵ [Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 44 (“Many deportees lack the resources to return to their communities of origin, while the vast majority cannot go back due to widespread insecurity. In many cases, their home communities have already been displaced, leaving them nowhere to return to.”); Adely, [Imprisonment, Murder, Extortion: Why U.S. Deportees to Haiti Are Being Targeted by Gangs](#) (Mar. 12, 2025) (“Gangs have set up tolls along the roads and demanded payment from passerby, crippling transport of goods and making travel dangerous for all, including deportees, [UN Expert on Human Rights in Haiti William] O’Neill added. ‘If they have family or support networks in the capital, how do they get back? . . . How are they going to get back and what do they face in the capital, with violence and shortages of everything, and a million already displaced?’”); Coto, [Haitian Migrants Share Harrowing Stories of Abuse as Dominican Republic Ramps Up Deportations](#) (Feb. 11, 2025).

⁴³⁶ See, e.g., GJC, [Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), p. 12 (“The number of people being deported to Haiti far exceeds the capacity of agencies and organizations offering reintegration assistance and exposes people to exploitation, trafficking, violence, and other grave harms. Between October and December 2024, the IOM provided assistance to nearly 8,000 migrants upon deportation, approximately 11 percent of all individuals deported from the Dominican Republic to Haiti during that period.”); Juhakenson Blaise, *First group of 21 deportees under Trump arrives in Haiti*, *Haitian Times* (Feb. 5, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/02/05/first-21-haitians-deported-under-trump/> (the head of Haiti’s National Office of Migration claims the “the office provided food, water and a sum of 5,000 gourdes, around \$40, to help each [deported] person travel back to their homes from the migration office at the airport,” but “[a]ccording to reports, no special provisions were made to support . . . [returnees]’ reintegration”); see also Charles, [UN migration head calls conditions in Haiti ‘brutal,’ wants to talk to U.S. aid](#) (Apr. 16, 2025) (“Until recently, U.N. staffers in Haiti would have joined their Haitian colleagues at the Office of National Migration in helping the deportees get home by providing them with bus fare. But recent cuts in funding by the Trump administration has left the agency able to assist only those being returned across the land border with the Dominican Republic, which last year pledged to send back approximately 15,000 Haitians a month.”); Jacqueline Charles, *U.S. aid cuts are making it difficult to help Haitians affected by gang violence, UN says*, *Miami Herald* (Feb. 28, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article301121109.html> (“[A]lready the drop in funding means there isn’t enough money to help Haitians who are being forcibly returned to Haiti resettle in the country, much less return to their homes.”); notes 489-502.

⁴³⁷ See Charles, [UN migration head calls conditions in Haiti ‘brutal,’ wants to talk to U.S. aid](#) (Apr. 16, 2025) (according to IOM director general Amy Pope, “[t]he people who come home are not reintegrated; are not able to stay home, so then, they try [to leave] again.”).

⁴³⁸ GJC, [Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), p. 12; Blanco, [The Dominican Republic’s expulsion of thousands of Haitians shows the brutality of mass deportations](#) (Jan. 7, 2025); see also Coto, [Haitian Migrants Share Harrowing Stories of Abuse as Dominican Republic Ramps Up Deportations](#) (Feb. 11, 2025) (“Mack, a Haitian who only gave his first name to speak freely about smuggling, said he ferries migrants across the border up to six times a week. He charges \$3 per person, and then offers \$8 to Dominican border guards: ‘If you pay them, they will let you through,’ he said.”).

⁴³⁹ The international community’s legacy of harmful interference in Haiti includes centuries of extractive and racist policies that have undermined Haiti’s development and sovereignty; military occupation and interventions resulting in a myriad of grave harms; and persistent support for successive undemocratic and illegitimate regimes that have deliberately weakened Haiti’s government structures. For a more extensive discussion of these patterns, see Speaking Out of Place, [Dispelling the Myths and Correcting the Record About Haitian Migrants: A Conversation with Human Rights Activists Gabrielle Apollon and Pooja Bhatia](#) (2025), at 21:01; Amy Wilentz, *JD Vance’s Slanders Are Far From the Worst Thing the US Has Done to Haitians* (Sep. 11, 2024), <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/vance-blinken-haiti-us-aid/>; Brian Concannon Jr., Kristina Fried & Sasha Filippova, *Restitution for Haiti, Reparations for All: Haiti’s Place in the Global Reparations Movement*, University of Miami Inter-American Law Review (Dec. 13, 2023), <https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2673&context=umialr>; Wisner & Concannon, [Debt and Dependence: Foreign Interference in Haiti and the Importance of Non-State Actor Accountability](#) (2023); Sandra Wisner & Kristina Fried, *Unfolding Haiti’s Garment Industry: Decades of Unaccountable Foreign Interference*, *Opinio Juris* (Apr. 12, 2022), <https://opiniojuris.org/2022/04/12/unfolding-haitis-garment-industry-decades-of-unaccountable-foreign-interference/>; Wisner, [Starved for Justice: International Complicity in Systemic Violations of the Right to Food in Haiti](#) (May 10, 2022).

⁴⁴⁰ See, e.g., UN Web TV, [Haiti - Security Council, 9953rd meeting](#) (Jul. 2, 2025).

⁴⁴¹ See, e.g., Charles, [Trump wants to cancel billions in spending for the UN. Why that’s bad news for Haiti](#) (Jul. 3, 2025) (“The [Trump administration’s funding] cutback request is raising alarms among international observers, who believe the cuts undermine U.S. foreign policy and endanger the lives of Haitians at a moment they face a worsening humanitarian crisis and the Trump administration seeks to terminate deportation protections for their compatriots in the U.S. ‘We’re very much seeing the U.S. go through, in some ways, a bipolar approach to how it’s dealing with these global crises,’ said Daniel Forti, a senior U.N. analyst

with the International Crisis Group. ‘You have sort of two sides of the U.S. government taking different approaches to this, and we’re not sure which one’s going to prevail.’ . . . Experts say the drastic cuts to the U.N., along with the scrapping of USAID programs, undermine a fundamental stated goal of current U.S. policy: stopping migration. The longer the violence, hunger and human-rights violations continue in Haiti, the greater the push for people to leave.”).

⁴⁴² As reported in IJDH’s previous Updates, the United States and CARICOM oversaw the transitional process in spring 2024 and reportedly advocated strongly for the inclusion of certain PHTK-affiliated groups. Since then, members of those groups have attempted to coopt the transitional process; been credibly accused of colluding with and legitimizing armed groups; and been implicated in a massive corruption scandal. Jacqueline Charles, *Some Haiti leaders seek to reconfigure political transition panel amid bribery scandal*, Miami Herald (Jan. 8, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article298196483.html> (“The [corruption] scandal, which members of the foreign diplomatic corps ignored for months, has laid bare the shortsightedness of the transition, which was rushed through as a powerful coalition of armed gangs led a deadly assault on the capital in late February and March. In helping forge the new structure, neither Washington nor Haitian leaders put in place mechanisms to deal with corruption or to clearly define what rights and privileges members of the executive panel had.”); IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024* (Dec. 2024), p. 13; IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024* (Jun. 2024), p. 14; see also Dorcent, *Haiti’s Popular Resistance is Growing in Strength Little by Little* (Mar. 26, 2025) (calling the TPC and Prime Minister Fils-Aimé’s government “agents of Western powers”); Beatrice Lindstrom, *With Haiti on the Brink of Collapse, a Reckoning for US Policy on Haiti*, Just Security (Mar. 9, 2024), <https://www.justsecurity.org/93193/with-haiti-on-the-brink-of-collapse-a-reckoning-for-us-policy-on-haiti/> (“Foreign governments like the United States, who play an outsized role in Haitian politics, have long maintained support for PHTK and Henry over widespread civil society calls for an inclusive political transition”). The same international actors who advocated for those PHTK-affiliated groups’ inclusion in the TPC have remained largely silent about these abuses – which have seriously undermined the TPC’s credibility to restore security and move the country toward elections – even as they condemn “any actions to destabilize” the Council by criminal groups. See CARICOM, *Statement from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM): Situation in Haiti* (Apr. 13, 2025), <https://caricom.org/statement-from-the-caribbean-community-caricom-situation-in-haiti-13-april-2025/>; U.S. Department of State, *Support of the Haitian Transitional Government and CARICOM* (Apr. 13, 2025), <https://www.state.gov/support-of-the-haitian-transitional-government-and-caricom/>; Government of the United Kingdom, *The UK firmly rejects all acts designed to destabilize Haiti: UK statement at the UN Security Council* (Apr. 21, 2025), <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-firmly-rejects-all-acts-designed-to-destabilise-haiti-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>; Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères, *Haiti - Joint statement from France and the United Kingdom on the political situation* (Apr. 16, 2025), <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/haiti/news/article/haiti-joint-statement-from-france-and-the-united-kingdom-on-the-political>; BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 3; see also CARICOM, *CARICOM Remains a Key Advocate for Haiti* (Feb. 7, 2025), <https://caricom.org/caricom-remains-a-key-advocate-for-haiti/> (CARICOM reiterated its support for the transitional government and called the establishment of the TPC “a key milestone”).

⁴⁴³ Security Council Report, *Haiti: Closed Consultations* (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/06/haiti-closed-consultations-2.php>.

⁴⁴⁴ See notes 133-141.

⁴⁴⁵ Charles, *Trump wants to cancel billions in spending for the UN. Why that’s bad news for Haiti* (Jul. 3, 2025); see also Section VII. Emigration pressures.

⁴⁴⁶ UNSC, *Resolution 2699* (2023), UN Doc. S/RES/2699 (2023) (Oct. 2, 2023), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4022890?ln=en>.

⁴⁴⁷ See Haiti Libre, *Haiti - Security : Relief of members of the Bahamas vanguard in Haiti* (May 6, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-44848-haiti-security-relief-of-members-of-the-bahamas-vanguard-in-haiti.html> (in May, the Bahamian government sent a team of officers (exact number unknown) in advance of a planned 150-person contingent, which has yet to be deployed); Jean Daniel Sénat, *Fresh Jamaican Troops Join Multinational Mission in Port-au-Prince*, Le Nouvelliste (Apr. 15, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/255301/fresh-jamaican-troops-join-multinational-mission-in-port-au-prince> (after a second deployment of personnel from Jamaica in April, the MSS was composed of 797 officers from Kenya, 150 soldiers from Guatemala, 68 soldiers from El Salvador, 42 police and military personnel from Jamaica, and 2 soldiers from Belize); Juhakenson Blaise, *70 Salvadoran soldiers arrive in Haiti to bolster multinational mission against gangs*, Haitian Times (Feb. 4, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/02/04/70-salvadoran-soldiers-join-ayiti-mss/> (reporting the number of Salvadoran personnel as 78); Reuters, *Another 75 Guatemalan soldiers arrive in Haiti to battle gangs* (Jan. 5, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/another-75-guatemalan-soldiers-arrive-haiti-battle-gangs-2025-01-04/>. The number of officers deployed may actually decrease, as 400 Kenyan officers were expected to return to Kenya upon the expiry of their one-year contract. See Opala & Le-Cour-Grandmaison, *A wasted opportunity?* (May 14, 2025). As of writing, however, they remain in Haiti.

⁴⁴⁸ Compare U.S. Congress, *Haiti in Crisis: Developments Related to the Multinational Security Support Mission* (Jun. 3, 2025), <https://www.congress.gov/ers-product/IN12331> (“Almost a year after the first Kenyan officers arrived, experts assess that the MSS remains underfunded, understaffed, and unable to quell gang-related violence.”), and Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, *Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering* (Jan. 13, 2025) (“More than six months after [the MSS] deploying to help police wrest back control, rampant gangs have gained more territory and power while access to vital humanitarian aid for desperate civilians has dwindled. . . . ‘Since the mission’s arrival, gangs have taken several villages and at least seven key towns that had been spared,’ said Himmler Rébu, a retired Haitian army colonel and former presidential candidate. . . . One of the deployed Kenyan police officers agreed to an interview with The New Humanitarian, but only if he was quoted anonymously as he wasn’t supposed to talk to the media. ‘The Haitian population does not yet understand well what we are doing. They are waiting for results,’ he said. ‘But they must understand that more than 80% of the Ouest Department [around Port-au-Prince] is under gang control. This would require a massive deployment and large-scale operations, and neither the [Haitian police] nor the MSS have the means for that.’”),

and Joseph, [Gangs strike twice in one week in Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite, sending residents fleeing across the river](#) (May 2, 2025), and Charles, [Kenyan mission in Haiti says one of its cops is missing. Gang videos show lifeless body](#) (Jun. 19, 2025), and Charles, [‘We are all by ourselves’: Haitians warn that fall of Port-au-Prince is imminent](#) (Mar. 20, 2025), and Blaise, [Kenyan police officer injured by gang gunfire amid wave of violence in Haiti](#) (Mar. 19, 2025), and Jacqueline Charles, [The U.S. is Haiti’s largest aid donor. Now Trump is freezing all foreign aid for 90 days](#), Miami Herald (Jan. 25, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article299141705.html>, with Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, [Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering](#) (Jan. 13, 2025) (then-BINUH head María Isabel Salvador and MSS mission commander Godfrey Otunge claim that the MSS “has met needs more adequately” and that Kenyan officers have recaptures several police stations); Adams & Robles, [Massacre Upon Massacre: Haiti’s Bleak Spiral Into a Failed State](#) (Jan. 6, 2025) (“The U.S. State Department . . . defended its record, noting that a recent operation with the police led to the death of a high-profile gang member.”).

⁴⁴⁹ IJDH, [Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024](#) (Dec. 2024), notes 536-39 and associated text; IJDH, [Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024](#) (Jun. 2024), notes 555, 561 and associated text.

⁴⁵⁰ The UN Trust Fund for the MSS, which depends entirely on voluntary contributions, has received just US\$110.9 million. The amount of funding falls far short of the US\$600 million that Kenyan officials estimate the mission would need annually to sustain itself. U.S. Congress, [Haiti in Crisis: Developments Related to the Multinational Security Support Mission](#) (Jun. 3, 2025); Jacqueline Charles, [International effort to help Haiti fight deadly gangs is in danger of falling apart](#), Miami Herald (May 2, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article305476401.html> (May 2, 2025) (“Of that [\$110.9 million], \$21 million in cash has been disbursed to date, leaving a cash balance of approximately \$90 million.”); see also U.S. Department of State, [Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau at the Organization of American States General Assembly](#) (Jun. 26, 2025), <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/06/deputy-secretary-of-state-christopher-landau-at-the-organization-of-american-states-general-assembly/> (Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Christopher Landau says “the United States has committed almost a billion dollars to this force” but “cannot continue shouldering this heavy financial burden”); Opala & Le-Cour-Grandmaison, [A wasted opportunity?](#) (May 14, 2025) (“[In April] the US indicated that it could withdraw support for the MSS, and called on other donors to contribute. This appeal has so far gone unanswered, illustrating the paralysis of the Security Council in the face of US foot-dragging and the lack of a concrete strategic plan to address the crisis.”); Da Rin, [UN Paralysed on Haiti despite Gang Threat to Government](#) (Apr. 25, 2025) (“Until now, the U.S. has been the mission’s main financial backer. But the acting U.S. representative to the UN said on Monday that America cannot continue shouldering such a significant financial burden.”) (internal quotations omitted); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 79; RNDDH, Press Release, [Multiplication des attaques armées contre la presse haïtiennes : Le RNDDH rappelle aux autorités de la transition, leur promesse de sécurité](#) (Mar. 17, 2025), ¶ 6 (the MSS “do[es] not have sufficient resources to carry out large-scale operations or to move about in large numbers”); Jacqueline Charles, [Caribbean nations haven’t sent all forces to Haiti to join Kenya-led mission. Here’s why](#), Miami Herald (Feb. 25, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article300907619.html> (discussing the impact of the United States’ freeze on a US\$15 million cash contribution intended to encourage other donors); Charles, [As gangs prepare to attack Haiti’s capital, U.S. freezes critical aid for security mission](#) (Feb. 5, 2025); Charles, [The U.S. is Haiti’s largest aid donor. Now Trump is freezing all foreign aid for 90 days](#) (Jan. 25, 2025); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, [Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering](#) (Jan. 13, 2025) (“Wary of the lack of results, foreign governments have been reluctant to stump up the money they pledged to the mission’s trust fund. According to several sources, it now has around \$100 million — far less than the \$600 million needed. There are concerns that the United States, which promised \$300 million, may pull back once Donald Trump takes office next week.”).

⁴⁵¹ Opala & Le-Cour-Grandmaison, [A wasted opportunity?](#) (May 14, 2025) (“‘We didn’t get what we expected,’ a police source in contact with the contingent in Port-au-Prince said, adding that the equipment – guns and armoured personnel vehicles – is either inadequate or substandard, putting the Kenyan forces at further risk.”); Dickinson, [Haiti ‘awash’ with guns leaving population ‘absolutely terrified’](#) (Apr. 17, 2025) (according to the UN Expert on Human Rights in Haiti, arms trafficking of high caliber weapons, including those that pierce armor, is “very dangerous because the Haitian National police and the multinational security support mission led by Kenya are really relying on their armoured vehicles to provide them protection,” with “recent incidents in which a Kenyan police officer was injured by a projectile inside his vehicle”); Edwin Okoth, [Kenyan police in Haiti suffer more casualties in clashes with gangs](#), Reuters (Apr. 1, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/kenyan-police-haiti-suffer-more-casualties-clashes-with-gangs-2025-04-01/> (“[T]hree [Kenyan] officers said the gangs were attacking them on an increasingly regular basis and complained that their equipment was inadequate. They said one of the officers was shot in the head after a bullet pierced his helmet and the other was hit in the ear when a gunshot penetrated the walls of an armoured vehicle. Twenty armoured vehicles have been grounded since this weekend after officers refused to use them, complaining that this was the second time a vehicle had failed to stop a bullet, the three officers said.”); O’Neill, [Violence, Abuses and Hunger in Haiti](#) (Jan. 30, 2025) (“[MSS personnel] lack helicopters, drones, night-vision goggles and the armored vehicles necessary to operate in dense urban neighborhoods under gang control. For example, the tires on the vehicles were easily punctured by simple bullets shot by the gangs who disabled a vehicle worth over half a million dollars. It took weeks to replace the tires with dense rubber tires that are bullet-resistant.”); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, [Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering](#) (Jan. 13, 2025) (“While the gangs appear able to smuggle large amounts of heavy weaponry and ammunition into Haiti with ease – mostly from the United States – the Kenyan and Haitian police forces are short of equipment and lack both air and maritime support. The US military has been sending dozens of MaxxPro Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles to Haiti, but several security experts told The New Humanitarian they weren’t really effective.”).

⁴⁵² Charles, [International effort to help Haiti fight deadly gangs is in danger of falling apart](#) (May 2, 2025) (“With the current deployment at 1,000 personnel, which is less than 40% of the anticipated 2,500, the mission ‘is operating at sub-optimal level in terms of numbers of officers in theater, types and range of assets available to the mission,’ [said Kenya’s National Security Minister Monica Juma]. . . . But that’s not the mission’s only problem. In recent weeks, its numbers have also shrunk as Caribbean nations continued to put their own deployments on hold. Jamaica, which recently sent 26 soldiers and cops to replace its first contingent,

still has not fully deployed its promised 250 officers. Belize, which had two soldiers in Port-au-Prince, has pulled them out and is currently reassessing. The Bahamas, which also has yet to fully deploy, just downsized its six officers to three.”); Da Rin, [UN Paralyzed on Haiti despite Gang Threat to Government](#) (Apr. 25, 2025); Charles, [Caribbean nations haven't sent all forces to Haiti to join Kenya-led mission. Here's why](#) (Feb. 15, 2025); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, [Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering](#) (Jan. 13, 2025) (“[M]ost countries that pledged support to the MSS mission have failed to follow through.”); Emmanuel Joseph, [Barbados to provide technical support, not troops to Haiti](#), Barbados Today (Jan. 8, 2025), <https://barbadostoday.bb/2025/01/08/barbados-to-provide-technical-support-not-troops-to-haiti/> (“[Barbados] reversed its decision to send troops to Haiti, citing escalating dangers and insufficient strategic planning at the global level, Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister Kerrie Symmonds announced. Barbados will now only offer technical assistance, marking a significant shift in its approach to the crisis in a fellow CARICOM member state. Expressing concerns that the environment in Haiti has become more dangerous, Symmonds indicated that Barbados does not want to take any chances at this time.”); Adams & Robles, [Massacre Upon Massacre: Haiti's Bleak Spiral Into a Failed State](#) (Jan. 6, 2025).

⁴⁵³ Opala & Le-Cour-Grandmaison, [A wasted opportunity?](#) (May 14, 2025) (“[T]he mission’s base, located on the tarmac of Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, cannot be extended at present, preventing additional deployments.”); Mary Wambui, [261 officers stranded as deployment to Haiti stalls due to lack of equipment, support](#), Eastleigh Voice (Apr. 22, 2025), <https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/national/140805/261-officers-stranded-as-deployment-to-haiti-stalls-due-to-lack-of-equipment-and-logistical-support> (261 Kenyan officers are “trained and mission-ready” but have not been deployed “due to a lack of equipment and logistical support”).

⁴⁵⁴ GI-TOC, [Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Issue 3](#) (Apr. 2025), pp. 1, 4; Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, [Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering](#) (Jan. 13, 2025).

⁴⁵⁵ Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, [Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering](#) (Jan. 13, 2025) (“Maria Isabel Salvador, head of BINUH, the UN’s political mission in Haiti, told The New Humanitarian she believes the MSS was flawed from the start. Instead of being ‘based on demand’, it is based on ‘what countries offered’, she said. ‘The 2,500 figure came from adding up offers of certain numbers by countries, instead of really assessing actual needs, what is objectively required. Somehow, no clear diagnosis of the situation was made, so no gaps or needs were addressed.’”); Opala & Le-Cour-Grandmaison, [A wasted opportunity?](#) (May 14, 2025) (“[B]eyond units and equipment, the MSS lacked initial operational and tactical support to plan its deployment, a situation that continues. The result is that the design of the mission no longer reflects the reality of the situation.”); Charles, [International effort to help Haiti fight deadly gangs is in danger of falling apart](#) (May 2, 2025) (“[N]early a year after the arrival of the first 200 Kenyan police officers in June of 2024, the Multinational Security Support mission is in danger of falling apart amid a worsening humanitarian and security crisis in Haiti, a lack of strategy by the United States and paralysis at the U.N. Security Council.”); Charles, [‘We are all by ourselves’: Haitians warn that fall of Port-au-Prince is imminent](#) (Mar. 20, 2025) (“The belief that a domestic Haitian police force, riddled with corruption and internal divisions, can somehow partner with an under-resourced international mission to retake the city . . . is flawed.”).

⁴⁵⁶ Security Council Report, [Haiti: Closed Consultations](#) (Jun. 27, 2025) (the current contract for the mission’s Life Support Area – a training area and support hub for MSS personnel, currently funded by the United States – is set to expire on September 30); Opala & Le-Cour-Grandmaison, [A wasted opportunity?](#) (May 14, 2025) (“These include, crucially, the salaries of around 1 000 international staff and an upcoming payment of US\$200 million to the service provider responsible for managing the operational base. The UN, which manages the trust fund for Haiti, has warned that without ‘timely, decisive and concrete international assistance’ the MSS will be left in limbo.”).

⁴⁵⁷ Security Council Report, [Haiti: Closed Consultations](#) (Jun. 27, 2025).

⁴⁵⁸ RHI News, [La République dominicaine et le Kenya concluent un accord pour soutenir la mission de sécurité en Haïti](#) (May 13, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/politique/la-republique-dominicaine-et-le-kenya-concluent-un-accord-pour-soutenir-la-mission-de-securite-en-haiti/> (describing medical evacuation and extraction available to Kenyan MSS officers but not Haitian police); GI-TOC, [Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti, Issue 3](#) (Apr. 2025), pp. 1, 3 (“[S]erious flaws in coordination, dialogue and trust between the HNP and the MSS. . . [make it difficult for] the HNP and the MSS to deploy rapidly in different theatres of operations, particularly when these are geographically distant, and to maintain control of the territory, repel the gangs and gain ground against them.”); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, [Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering](#) (Jan. 13, 2025) (“[T]here was one [MSS] officer who had wounds serious enough for them to be flown to the Dominican Republic for medical treatment. However, this potentially life-saving evacuation allowance, which was included in the MSS mission’s protocols, is not available to Haitian police. . . ‘The relationship isn’t always cordial,’ said Ricardo Germain, a Haitian security expert based in Port-au-Prince. ‘Mistrust is an important factor and is sometimes due to the language barrier. During joint patrolling operations, Haitian police officers speak Kreyol and the Kenyans Swahili language, while English and French were supposed to be the spoken languages.’ . . Haitian police say they also resent the fact that they are underpaid compared to the Kenyans – about \$230 a month versus \$1,000, according to the UTAG policeman.”).

⁴⁵⁹ The United States’ proposal was supported by CARICOM and many countries in Latin America, but China and Russia were strongly opposed, citing “the present chaotic situation in Haiti as well as the past failings of U.N. interventions.” Charles, [Human Rights Watch supports UN peacekeeping mission for Haiti. But it has recommendations](#) (Dec. 9, 2024); see also IJDH, [Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024](#) (Dec. 2024), p. 13. More recently, the U.S. government has also put pressure on the Organization of American States (OAS) to send a mission to Haiti composed of OAS Member States, noting that “if the OAS is unwilling or unable to play a constructive role in Haiti, then we must seriously ask ourselves why the OAS exists” (internal quotations omitted). The United States’ proposal “does not appear to enjoy the support of states from the region.” Security Council Report, [Haiti: Closed Consultations](#) (Jun. 27, 2025); see also Jacqueline Charles, [Rubio suggests OAS play greater role in Haiti, including mobilizing ‘a force,’ Miami Herald](#) (May 20, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article306837796.html> (in proposing an OAS mission, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged that “we are seeking to come up with an alternative strategy, because the one in place right now isn’t working and Haiti is headed in a very bad direction very quickly”) (internal quotations omitted).

⁴⁶⁰ UNSC, [Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council](#) (Feb. 27, 2025), pp. 8-12. The UN Security Council will consider the Secretary-General's plan on July 15, 2025. Security Council Report, [Haiti: Closed Consultations](#) (Jun. 27, 2025) (noting that Kenya sent a letter to the Security Council requesting its "expeditious consideration" of the Secretary-General's plan in light of the MSS' persistent funding and personnel challenges).

⁴⁶¹ UNSC, [Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council](#) (Feb. 27, 2025), pp. 8-12 (the plan "requires significant investment from the [UN] peacekeeping budget. . . . [and] scaled-up voluntary contributions. . . . [and] personnel contributions [from Member States]"); UN News, [Guterres urges Caribbean leaders to keep pushing for peace, climate action](#) (Feb. 19, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160296> ("[The UN Secretary-General] intends to present a proposal similar to the one for Somalia, in which the UN assumes responsibility for the structural and logistical expenditures necessary to put the force in place. Salaries are paid through a [MSS] trust fund that already exists").

⁴⁶² See IJDH, [Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024](#) (Dec. 2024), notes 554-55 and associated text.

⁴⁶³ See, e.g., BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 49 (noting just five in-mission trainings for 123 personnel on prevention of human rights abuses, including sexual exploitation and abuse).

⁴⁶⁴ See IJDH, [Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024](#) (Jun. 2024), notes 565-67 and associated text.

⁴⁶⁵ BINUH, [Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025](#) (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 19; Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti, X (Feb. 5, 2025), <https://x.com/MSSMHaiti/status/1887356761989919195>.

⁴⁶⁶ Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti, X (May 7, 2025), <https://x.com/MSSMHaiti/status/1919966269459333468>; see also IJDH, [Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024](#) (Dec. 2024), note 544 and associated text (outlining MSS policies aimed at guiding its conduct, including standard operating procedures related to the Complaints and Reporting Mechanism).

⁴⁶⁷ [Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti](#), X (May 7, 2025).

⁴⁶⁸ See BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 50 (reporting that the steering committee includes representatives of civil society organizations, without offering details as to identity of representatives or the selection process); [Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti](#), X (May 7, 2025) (discussing only the participation of "representatives from MSS, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the Haitian National Police," without any mention of civil society representation). A representative of a civil society organization involved in ongoing consultations about the Mechanism criticized the selection process for lacking transparency. Per the source, the steering committee includes representatives from human rights organizations Combite pour la Paix et le Développement and Bureau des Droits Humains en Haïti, feminist organization Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn, LGBTQI+ rights organization SEROvie, child protection organization l'Organisation des Coeurs pour le Changement des Enfants Démunis d'Haïti; disability rights organization Centre de Support aux Personnes Handicapées, and minority rights organization Heritage.

⁴⁶⁹ BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 41 ("According to UNODC, despite the reinforcement of the arms embargo, trafficking in weapons and ammunition persists and armed violence continues to rise, with increasingly high-calibre firearms and ammunition being obtained by gangs in Haiti. . . . In September 2024, the UN Panel of Experts on Haiti's reports . . . stated that reinforcement of the embargo remained weak, with regular violations occurring."); [Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 58; OHCHR, [Haiti: Immediate action is needed to address the human rights crisis](#) (Feb. 27, 2025) ("There is a lack of political will, frankly, to fully implement the UN arms embargo.").

⁴⁷⁰ Muggah, [Flows of Guns and Money Are Dooming Haiti](#) (May 12, 2025); Dickinson, [Haiti 'awash' with guns leaving population 'absolutely terrified'](#) (Apr. 17, 2025) (UN Expert on Human Rights in Haiti: "The gangs have access to an increasing number of high calibre weapons, and a seemingly endless supply of ammunition and some gangs have weapons that pierce armour. . . . Gangs use these firearms, to take territory, to keep out other gangs and to battle with the police, but also to control and dominate people and commit many types of human rights violations simply because they have this power that that literally flows from their possession of firearms."); Jacqui Wakefield, Christopher Giles & Joshua Cheetham, [Smugglers' paradise: How US guns flow to gang-ravaged Haiti](#), BBC (Apr. 16, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly15pp707go>; BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶¶ 12-13 ("Experts estimate the number of firearms circulating illicitly in the country to be between 270,000 and 500,000. . . . The use of these firearms, has fuelled a destructive cycle of violence in Haiti, leading to severe human rights abuses."); Amnesty International, [Haiti: 'I'm a Child, Why Did This Happen to Me?': Gangs' Assault on Childhood in Haiti](#) (Feb. 12, 2025), p. 47 ("Gangs in Haiti rely on an array of weapons to commit human rights abuses. There is no precise and detailed data, but the most recent estimate by experts puts the number of firearms in circulation in Haiti at 600,000.").

⁴⁷¹ Muggah, [Flows of Guns and Money Are Dooming Haiti](#) (May 12, 2025) ("A UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) analysis confirms that approximately 70% of weapons recovered in Haitian operations originate from U.S.-licensed dealers, with some also trafficked through other Caribbean islands."); Dickinson, [Haiti 'awash' with guns leaving population 'absolutely terrified'](#) (Apr. 17, 2025); Wakefield, Giles & Cheetham, [Smugglers' paradise: How US guns flow to gang-ravaged Haiti](#) (Apr. 16, 2025) (one expert described the United States "as a 'supermarket' feeding an arms race among gangs that have brought chaos to the Caribbean island nation"); BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 43. Some weapons, still originating in the United States, are being smuggled in via the Dominican Republic and Jamaica (as part of the long-standing "guns for ganja" trade), while others are reportedly coming from Colombia. Dickinson, [Haiti 'awash' with guns leaving population 'absolutely terrified'](#) (Apr. 17, 2025); BINUH, [Situation of human rights in Haiti](#) (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶¶ 42, 45; see also [Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti](#) (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶¶ 65-68 (discussing the involvement of corrupt Dominican security agents in arms trafficking from the Dominican Republic to Haiti).

⁴⁷² IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024* (Dec. 2024), notes 562-65 and associated text.

⁴⁷³ U.S. controls on outbound shipments are weak, and a number of proposed initiatives remain unimplemented. Quixote Center, *Summary of Weapons Trafficking Legislation* (May 2025), https://quixote.org/files/inline-files/updated_bill_summary_6.2025_kl_0.pdf (summarizing proposed anti-trafficking legislation, including the Stop Arming Cartels Act, the Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act, and the Caribbean Anti-Smuggling of Trafficked Arms Act); Haitian Times, *China accuses US of fueling Haiti's crisis with failed arms embargo* (Apr. 23, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/04/23/china-us-haiti-un-debate-2025/> (“China’s representative to the United Nations accused the United States of enabling gang violence in Haiti, saying Washington’s ‘perfunctory’ implementation of the arms embargo has allowed illegal weapons to flood the country.”); Dickinson, *Haiti ‘awash’ with guns leaving population ‘absolutely terrified’* (Apr. 17, 2025) (UN Human Rights Expert in Haiti: “On the US side, there is been an ongoing lack of commitment in terms of inspecting outgoing shipments, although inspections have increased a bit lately under domestic pressure in the United States.”); Wakefield, Giles & Cheetham, *Smugglers’ paradise: How US guns flow to gang-ravaged Haiti* (Apr. 16, 2025) (“The UN panel said last September that US searches had increased, but ‘the vast majority of the 200 containers heading from South Florida to Haiti every week are not inspected’. A former official with the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), Bill Kullman, told the BBC that checks on outgoing cargo are ‘very scattershot’ and the volume of shipments is ‘incredible.’ . . . ‘First and foremost, US authorities are not doing enough,’ says [Haiti expert at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime] Mr Le Cour. . . [He] says international scrutiny of the problem has increased, but there is no visible impact: ‘We know we have the diagnosis, we know what the symptoms are, but we’re not doing anything to actually cure it.’”); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶¶ 43-44; see also RHI News, *L’impunité des fabricants d’armes aux États-Unis renforce les réseaux criminels au Mexique et en Haïti* . . . (Jun. 7, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/politique/limpunite-des-fabricants-darmes-aux-etats-unis-renforce-les-reseaux-criminels-au-mexique-et-en-haiti/> (“The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously dismissed a \$10 billion lawsuit filed by the Mexican government against several U.S. arms manufacturers accused of fueling the illegal arms trade to cartels. . . . The parallels between Mexico and Haiti highlight a global system in which arms manufacturers enjoy near-total legal immunity in the United States, while their products fuel transnational security crises.”); Naticia Duncan & Anthony Lugg, *Caribbean leaders pledge to join forces to fight gang violence and support Haiti*, *The Guardian* (Jul. 9, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/09/haiti-violence-caribbean-community> (“[O]utgoing chair of Caricom, Mia Mottley, the prime minister of Barbados . . . pointed to the issue of gun trafficking from the US to the Caribbean: ‘Regrettably I’ve said over and over we pay a high price for the second amendment rights of the United States of America’s citizens.’”).

⁴⁷⁴ *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 12 (“In Haiti, most of the officials met by the Panel who work in institutions expected to enforce the arms embargo are still unaware of its precise provisions. Enforcement of the arms embargo remains very limited due to a lack of resources within customs and other law enforcement agencies. In addition, the lack of access of such agencies to most ports of entry and exit by air, sea and land prevents effective implementation of the embargo. . . . No seizures of arms or related materiel at ports of entry have been officially reported since . . . August 2024.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 16 (arms trafficking suspects arrested in March were detained in the Mirebalais prison, but escaped during the armed group attack on the prison later that month); Dickinson, *Haiti ‘awash’ with guns leaving population ‘absolutely terrified’* (Apr. 17, 2025) (UN Expert on Human Rights in Haiti: “The head of the Haitian frontier police told me they only have 350 officers to guard a 400 km border. They have one drone, insufficient vehicles and admit they cannot even control the official border crossings. There is a failure at the ports; there is not a single scanner in the whole country. A large metal scanner could check what is coming in these containers.”) (internal quotations omitted); Wakefield, Giles & Cheetham, *Smugglers’ paradise: How US guns flow to gang-ravaged Haiti* (Apr. 16, 2025) (“Police said they were seeking a man called Wilmane Jean, who is named in the customs data as the consignee for the shipment - the person responsible for receiving it. The BBC understands from sources in Haiti that he is a customs broker, is on the run and is suspected of being connected with gang activity in the north of the country. A previous UN report says Haitian customs operations suffer from a lack of capacity, corruption among senior officials, and threats and attacks from gangs.”); BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 26 (“The ability of the General Administration of Customs and specialized police units to combat weapons smuggling is significantly hindered by several interconnected challenges. . . . include[ing] severe underfunding and understaffing, inadequate resources and technology to effectively monitor ports, airports, and land border crossings, the inefficiency of inter-agency cooperation, as well as corruption and lack of oversight.”); UNSC, *Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council* (Feb. 27, 2025), p. 4 (“Limited institutional capacities, inadequate infrastructure, corruption and resource constraints hinder customs enforcement at ports, airports and land border crossings. . . . The 1,771-km coastline of Haiti remains highly vulnerable due to the lack of patrol capabilities and surveillance mechanisms. The Haitian Coast Guard, under the National Police, operates with only three functional patrol boats and fewer than 150 personnel, leaving critical entry points exposed to trafficking and other criminal activities. Ports such as Port-de-Paix in the north-west and smaller southern ports are hotspots for illicit trafficking in weapons, drugs and persons.”).

⁴⁷⁵ BINUH, *Situation of human rights in Haiti* (Mar. 28, 2025), ¶ 24 (“[N]ational authorities are increasing their efforts to curb the illicit trafficking of firearms and ammunition into Haiti, with the support of the international community. Two specialized units of the Haitian National Police are actively contributing to the fight against arms trafficking as part of their broader mandates: the Anti-Narcotics Unit (Bureau de Lutte contre le Trafic de Stupéfiants, BLTS) and Polifront, a unit responsible for border security. Additionally, the Transnational Criminal Investigation Unit of Haiti (Unité d’Enquête Criminelle Transnationale d’Haïti, UECT), a unit dedicated to investigating transnational crimes, was established in February 2024, although it is still in its early stages of development.”); see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, January – March 2025* (Apr. 30, 2025), p. 16 (“Legal proceedings related to arms trafficking in Haiti are progressing slowly. In July 2022, a police operation in Port-de-Paix led to the seizure of weapons, but also triggered a political and judicial crisis, after the arrest of three senior officials, including the Government Commissioner, accused of releasing two suspects without following legal procedures. As of March 2025, the case was still pending before the Court of Appeal in Port-au-Prince. Meanwhile, the investigation into a shipment of arms and 15,000 rounds of ammunition sent from Florida to the Episcopal Church of Haiti is making little progress, although six people are in custody in connection with the case.”). According to the most recent report from the UNODC, the number of firearms seized in Haiti has steady decreased since 2021. However, if the first four months of 2025 are any indication, seizures are expected to increase

again in 2025. UNSC, *Report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023)*, Annex, UN Doc. S/2025/420 (Jun. 27, 2025), https://documents.un.org/symbol-explorer?s=S/2025/420&i=S/2025/420_1752259981458 (reporting 401 seizures in 2021, 342 in 2022, 265 in 2023, 271 in 2024, and 126 in the first four months of 2025).

⁴⁷⁶ Since IJDH's last Update, the Canadian government announced sanctions on *Canaan* armed group member Jeff "Gwo Lwa" Larose, former head of National Palace security Dimitri Hérard, and former BSAP director Jeantel Joseph. Global Affairs Canada, *Canada imposes additional sanctions against individuals linked to crisis in Haiti* (Mar. 21, 2025), <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2025/03/canada-imposes-additional-sanctions-against-individuals-linked-to-crisis-in-haiti.html>; see also Jacqueline Charles, *Former head of Haiti President Moïse's security unit, two others sanctioned by Canada*, Miami Herald (Mar. 21, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article302542559.html>. In March, the Dominican Republic designated at least 26 criminal groups in Haiti as "terrorist organizations," authorizing the National Council for Counter-Terrorism and the National Directorate for Counter-Terrorism to take "appropriate measures to prevent incursions by the aforementioned groups into national territory or against Dominican interests abroad." Le Nouvelliste, *Dominican Republic Designates 26 Gangs as Terrorist Organizations* (Mar. 6, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/253877/dominican-republic-designates-26-gangs-as-terrorist-organizations>.

⁴⁷⁷ See Jacqueline Charles, *U.S. to designate Haiti gangs as foreign terrorists, opening way to use Salvador prison* (Apr. 18, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article304464536.html> ("[D]espite the multiple sanctions, the gangs have grown stronger.").

⁴⁷⁸ *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 9 ("[The UN Panel of Experts] observed that there was a general lack of awareness of the sanctions regime, as well as some reluctance to implement it among certain Haitian authorities. In addition, on the basis of what officials from relevant government institutions told the Panel, the asset freeze and travel ban are not being effectively enforced in Haiti."); RHI News, *Haïti : Le ministre de la Justice ordonne le gel des avoirs des individus sanctionnés par l'ONU...* (May 15, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/culture-education/haiti-le-ministre-de-la-justice-ordonne-le-gel-des-avoirs-des-individus-sanctionnes-par-lonu/> ("Since the adoption of the first international sanctions in 2022 and their strengthening in 2023 and 2024, no concrete judicial measures have been taken on Haitian territory."); GI-TOC, *Last Chance? Breaking Haiti's Political and Criminal Impasse* (Jan. 2025), p. 14 ("The current security impasse also reflects Haiti's systemic impunity, the weakness of the judiciary and the failings of international mechanisms in tackling the root causes of corruption and violence. While the reports penned by the UN Panel of Experts on Haiti clearly expose the links between Haiti's gangs and political and economic players (both Haitian and foreign), the UN Security Council and Haiti's judicial institutions are still failing to act on this information. If we add to these the lists of bilateral sanctions imposed by the United States, Canada and the Dominican Republic against a large part of the country's ruling class and economic sector, up to and including former presidents, we realize that while the diagnosis seems clear, few steps are being taken to ensure that judicial investigations, and possible arrest warrants, are opened and issued against the actors cited."); see also *Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti* (Jun. 10, 2025), ¶ 11 (as of June, the United States still had not replied to a November 2024 request from the UN Panel of Experts enquiring "about the potential identification and subsequent freezing of assets belonging to sanctioned individuals").

⁴⁷⁹ UNSC, *Resolution 2752 (2024)*, UN Doc. S/RES/2752 (2024) (Oct. 18, 2024), [https://docs.un.org/S/RES/2752\(2024\)](https://docs.un.org/S/RES/2752(2024)).

⁴⁸⁰ The government commissioner's announcement came in response to an order from the Minister of Justice, directing the Port-of-Prince Court of First Instance to freeze all assets belonging to individuals sanctioned under the regime established by the UN Security Council. The government commissioner noted that "the bank accounts and assets of these individuals have been automatically frozen by the banks in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2653." Le Quotidien 509, *Sanctions de l'ONU : Les avoirs bancaires de six chefs de gang et de Prophane Victor déjà bloqués* (Jun. 11, 2025), <https://lequotidien509.com/sanctions-de-lonu-les-avoirs-bancaires-de-six-chefs-de-gang-et-de-prophane-victor-deja-bloques/>; RHI News, *Haïti : Le ministre de la Justice ordonne le gel des avoirs des individus sanctionnés par l'ONU...* (May 15, 2025); see also BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 31.

⁴⁸¹ *G9 an Fanmi* armed group leader and *Viv Ansanm* spokesperson Jimmy "Barbeque" Chérizier; *5 Segonn* armed group leader Johnson "Izo" Andre; *Grand Ravine* armed group leader Renel "Ti Lapli" Destina; *400 Mavozo* armed group leader Wilson "Lanmo San Jou" Joseph; *Kraze Barye* armed group leader Vitel'Homme Innocent; former deputy Prophane Victor; and *Gran Grif* armed group leader Luckson Elan. UNSC, *Resolution 2653 (2022)*, UN Doc. S/RES/2653 (2022) (Oct. 21, 2022), [https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2653\(2022\)](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2653(2022)); UNSC, Press Release, *Security Council 2653 Sanctions Committee Adds 4 Entries to Its Sanctions List* (Dec. 8, 2023), <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15520.doc.htm>; UNSC, Press Release, *Security Council 2653 Sanctions Committee Adds 2 Entries to Its Sanctions List* (Sep. 27, 2024), <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15837.doc.htm>.

⁴⁸² IJDH, *Foreign Sanctions Against Haitian Individuals (December 2020 – Present)* (last visited Jul. 13, 2025).

⁴⁸³ See IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024* (Dec. 2024), notes 571-73 and associated text; IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024* (Jun. 2024), note 581 and associated text.

⁴⁸⁴ Jake Johnston, *State Dept. Awards \$60K for Pool Maintenance to Company Owned by Sanctioned Individual*, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) (Jun. 4, 2025), <https://cepr.net/publications/state-dept-awards-60k-for-pool-maintenance-to-company-owned-by-sanctioned-individual/> ("An analysis of government contracting data shows that Succar's firm has received more than a dozen contracts from the US Embassy since 2019, totaling more than \$1.4 million. . . . Nearly \$400,000 of that total was obligated after the Canadian sanctions"); Government of Canada, *Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Haiti)* (Mar. 1, 2023), <https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2023/2023-03-01/html/sor-dors25-eng.html>.

⁴⁸⁵ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, *Treasury Sanctions Former Haitian President for Drug Trafficking* (Aug. 20, 2024), <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2542>.

⁴⁸⁶ Réalité Info, *Sanctionné mais Libre : Michel Martelly défie les États-Unis en toute impunité* (Mar. 19, 2025), <https://realiteinfo.com/sanctionne-mais-libre-michel-martelly-defie-les-etats-unis-en-toute-impunite/> (“Many Haitians see the former president as the embodiment of a system of corruption that has dragged the country into its current turmoil. His apparent impunity reinforces the notion of a two-tiered justice system, in which international sanctions appear more like declarations of intent than truly binding instruments.”).

⁴⁸⁷ The U.S. Department of State designated *Viv Ansanm* and *Gran Grif* as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. U.S. Department of State, *Terrorist Designations of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif* (May 2, 2025); Office of Foreign Assets Control, *Counter Terrorism Designations* (May 2, 2025), <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250502>.

⁴⁸⁸ Charles, *Trump administration designates Haiti’s powerful armed gangs as foreign, global terrorists* (Jun. 19, 2025) (“Both designations come with clauses . . . that define any payment of any kind, any material support of any kind— as little as a cup of tea, a pencil or a cup of coffee, or a toy —as material support and come with very lengthy criminal penalties and very robust financial penalties.”) (internal quotations omitted); Romain Le-Cour-Grandmaison & Matt Herbert, *Haiti: How US terrorist designations could deepen criminal rue and humanitarian tragedy*, GI-TOC (May 8, 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/haiti-how-us-terrorist-designations-could-deepen-criminal-rule-and-humanitarian-tragedy/>; Quixote Center, *The Foreign Terrorist Designation* (May 16, 2025); Miami Herald, *Designating Haiti’s gangs as terrorists risks humanitarian aid* (May 11, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/article306063001.html> (“Under U.S. law, providing “material support” to designated groups becomes a federal crime, a broad definition that can include food, fuel or medical supplies. This could criminalize humanitarian workers who must negotiate access with gangs or pay tolls to deliver aid. Already operating under dangerous conditions, many aid groups may now pull out entirely — tightening the gangs’ grip on neighborhoods and deepening the suffering of those trapped inside them.”); Mikaël Ponge, *Gangs haitiens classés «terroristes» par Washington: «Les effets négatifs risquent de dépasser largement les avantages»*, RFI (May 3, 2025),

<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/am%C3%A9riques/20250503-gangs-ha%C3%Aftiens-class%C3%A9s-terroristes-les-effets-n%C3%A9gatifs-risquent-de-d%C3%A9passer-largement-ses-avantages> (warning that the designation “is a highly political tool” and could significantly complicate violence reduction efforts and humanitarian activities while having little impact on armed groups themselves, who are already operating outside any legal framework); CEPR, *The New York Times, Miami Herald, and AP Talk to Jake Johnston About US Designations of Haitian Gangs as “Terrorist Organizations”* (May 2, 2025), <https://cepr.net/publications/the-new-york-times-miami-herald-and-ap-talk-to-jake-johnston-about-us-designations-of-haitian-gangs-as-terrorist-organizations/> (“The effect of this policy is likely to be the further isolation of Haiti, a de facto embargo that harms those most impoverished and does little to alter the power of the gangs.”); Emiliano Rodríguez Mego & David C. Adams, *Trump Labels Haiti’s Powerful Gangs as Terrorists*, NY Times (May 2, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/02/world/americas/trump-haiti-gangs-terrorists.html> (“Depending on how it is enforced, the declaration could end nearly all trade with Haiti, some experts say, since virtually no goods can move in or out of the capital, Port-au-Prince, without the payment of fees to the gangs, which control much of the city.”). *But see* BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General* (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 5 (noting that “[v]arious civil society organizations, including the Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains and the Centre d’Analyse et de Recherche sur les Droits de l’Homme, along with national experts and some diaspora groups, broadly supported the designation, expressing hope for enhanced international support in the fight against gangs”).

⁴⁸⁹ Compare Financial Tracking Service, *Haiti 2025*, <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/96/summary/2025> (last visited Jul. 15, 2025) (showing that the 2025 humanitarian response fund has just US\$75.1 million of the required 908.2 million as of June 16) *with* IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024* (Jun. 2024), p. 14 (reporting that the 2024 humanitarian response plan was 22% funded – or approximately US\$148 million of the required US\$673.8 million – in June 2024).

⁴⁹⁰ RHI News, *Le nombre de déplacés de force dans le monde atteint un niveau record de 122 millions, l’ONU alerte sur l’explosion silencieuse des crises oubliées, notamment en Haïti...* (Jun. 12, 2025) (“Haiti is becoming a protracted displacement crisis, similar to those we see in Africa or the Middle East, but with a dramatically insufficient level of international attention.”) (internal quotations omitted); Charles, *Gang violence in Haiti has displaced nearly 1.3 million people. It’s a new record* (Jun. 12, 2025); MSF, *Haiti: Surge of violence displaces tens of thousands in Port-au-Prince* (Mar. 5, 2025); *see also* Charles, *U.S. aid cuts are making it difficult to help Haitians affected by gang violence, UN says* (Feb. 28, 2025) (noting that the humanitarian response plan for 2024 was “less than 50% funded despite the worsening humanitarian situation”).

⁴⁹¹ Financial Tracking Service, *Haiti 2025* (last visited Jul. 15, 2025).

⁴⁹² This time last year, the 2024 humanitarian response plan was 22% funded. *See* IJDH, *Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – December 2023 through May 2024* (Jun. 2024), p. 14.

⁴⁹³ The Trump administration eliminated 83% of USAID programs earlier this year, and in June announced that all USAID overseas positions would be eliminated by September 30. Joseph Gedeon & Robert Tait, *Trump administration to cut all USAID overseas roles in dramatic restructuring*, The Guardian (Jun. 11, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jun/10/trump-fires-usaid-overseas-employees>.

⁴⁹⁴ *See* Amnesty International, *Lives at Risk: Chaotic and Abrupt Cuts to Foreign Aid Put Millions of Lives at Risk*, pp. 2-6 (2025), <https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Lives-at-Risk-Chaotic-and-Abrupt-Cuts-to-Foreign-Aid-Put-Millions-of-Lives-at-Risk.pdf> (outlining U.S. foreign aid cuts and offering “an initial assessment of the devastating impacts of the wide scale, arbitrary and abrupt stoppage of the United States’ foreign assistance to thousands of life-saving humanitarian, health, and human rights initiatives globally in response to the executive order ‘Reevaluating and realigning United States Foreign Aid’ issued by President Donald Trump on 20 January 2025”); Charles, *U.S. aid cuts are making it difficult to help Haitians affected by gang violence, UN says* (Feb. 28, 2025) (“The U.N.’s humanitarian coordinator for Haiti, Ulrika Richardson, said the United States’ financial cut is already around \$90 million.”); *see also* Charles, *Trump wants to cancel billions in spending for the UN. Why that’s*

[bad news for Haiti](#) (Jul. 3, 2025) (“The Trump administration, which already slashed its contributions to the U.N. earlier this year as part of global foreign-aid cuts, is seeking to cancel \$9.4 billion in spending previously approved by Congress. The package of cuts, voted on last month by the House but not yet the Senate, includes \$2 billion in foreign aid that would jeopardize U.N. programs worldwide, including in Haiti. . . . Included in the Trump administration’s cuts package are total eliminations of U.S. voluntary contributions to international organizations and programs like the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations Development Program and the United Nations Population Fund. The proposal also suggests completely eliminating the money for the U.N. peacekeeping budget — which would leave millions of people at risk all over the world. More than 25% of that budget comes from the U.S.”).

⁴⁹⁵ UN News, [Haiti: Massive surge in child armed group recruitment, warns UNICEF](#) (Feb. 28, 2025); Financial Tracking Service, [Haiti 2024](#), <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/96/summary/2024> (last visited Jul. 15, 2025) (57.4%); *see also* Andres Pacheco-Giron, [USAID dismantling: What it could mean for Haiti](#), *Haitian Times* (Feb. 7, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/02/07/usa-id-dismantling-haiti-impact/> (showing allocations of U.S. funding for various sectors in 2024); ACAPS, [Haiti: Anticipated implications of US funding freeze](#) (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20250221_ACAPS_Haiti-anticipated_implications_of_US_funding_freeze.pdf.

⁴⁹⁶ *See, e.g.*, BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶ 64 (“Only 24.5 per cent of the funds requested for gender-based violence response were received in 2024.”); *see also* IJDH, [Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments – June through November 2024](#) (Dec. 2024), p. 14.

⁴⁹⁷ Mishra, [Haiti faces ‘point of no return’ as gang violence fuels chaos](#) (Apr. 21, 2025) (UN operations in Haiti are “becoming unsustainable due to funding shortfalls”); Charles, [UN migration head calls conditions in Haiti ‘brutal,’ wants to talk to U.S. aid](#) (Apr. 16, 2025) (the funding cuts have overall reduced the number of humanitarian aid groups able to assist in the country); Jacqueline Charles, [UN: Critical humanitarian air services in Haiti faces ‘imminent’ shutdown without funds](#), *Miami Herald* (Feb. 7, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article299932914.html> (“The United Nations humanitarian air service in Haiti, which has served as a critical live-saving bridge between gang-controlled Port-au-Prince and the rest of the country, is ‘at risk of an imminent shutdown’ if it doesn’t raise nearly \$4 million to keep it running over the next three months.”).

⁴⁹⁸ Charles, [Aid cuts mean Haiti will need to do more to shoulder humanitarian response, UN says](#) (Apr. 14, 2025) (“There are 128,000 Haitian children suffering from severe malnutrition who need ready-to-use food and other treatment. ‘If you don’t reach a child with treatment. . . . they have a tenfold increase in their chance of dying, so it’s a really serious situation when we see funding cuts.”); Dánica Coto, [Upheaval at Inter-American Foundation slashes critical aid in Haiti, report says](#), *AP News* (Apr. 4, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-trump-interamerican-foundation-grants-29332b27090af6349eac237eb1e76fac> (efforts by the Trump administration to dismantle the Inter-American Foundation “already resulted in an estimated 500 to 600 Haitians being denied medical care each month; in some 14,500 Haitians losing access to seed loans, tools and other services; and in 40% fewer loans being available”); MSF, [Haiti: Surge of violence displaces tens of thousands in Port-au-Prince](#) (Mar. 5, 2025) (“For over a month, the suspension of US funding has deprived many humanitarian organizations of their resources, forcing groups like Solidarités International to suspend the distribution of drinking water in displacement camps.”); UN News, [Haiti: Massive surge in child armed group recruitment, warns UNICEF](#) (Feb. 28, 2025) (the lack of funding is impacting education support for over half a million children); UNICEF, [Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report](#) (Jan. 2025), pp. 1, 3, 5 (the 2025 Humanitarian Action for Children appeal is only 10% funded, “leaving many vulnerable women and children without critical lifesaving assistance;” USAID funding accounted for approximately 75% of UNICEF’s Nutrition program budget, leaving children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women at distinct risk of higher morbidity and mortality rates, and impacted staffing and other operations for 19 UNICEF water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) cluster partners); Jake Johnston, [Where Does the Money Go? A Look at USAID Spending in Haiti](#), *CEPR* (Feb. 4, 2025), <https://cepr.net/publications/a-look-at-usaid-spending-in-haiti/> (discussing the impact of the USAID on WFP and IOM, which “have been the two largest recipients of USAID funding in recent years”); Charles, [As part of Trump aid freeze, police contractors are laid off in Haiti amid gang attacks](#) (Jan. 28, 2025) (“In Haiti, U.S. assistance represented 59.4% of all humanitarian aid last year, according to United Nations data. It pays for life-saving health programs including access to HIV/AIDS treatment, anti-corruption efforts, security assistance, reproductive programs and support for elections. . . . ‘Even a three-month stop has very severe negative consequences around the world and in Haiti, for saving people’s lives and for preserving U.S. credibility, U.S. soft power,’ said Vanda Felbab-Brown, an expert on non-state armed groups around the world at the Brookings Institution.”); Charles, [The U.S. is Haiti’s largest aid donor. Now Trump is freezing all foreign aid for 90 days](#) (Jan. 25, 2025) (“Haitians and providers of services in the country say the halt in aid is a catastrophic blow to a country in which the government is already operating on a shoestring budget of \$2.5 billion for about 12 million people. . . . The most vulnerable, those who are already marginalized by poverty and systemic inequities, will unjustly bear the brunt of this decision. The halt not only puts millions of lives at risk right now but could fuel further HIV drug resistances, risking a resurgence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic—one of the deadliest in history.”) (internal quotations omitted); Amnesty International, [Lives at Risk: Chaotic and Abrupt Cuts to Foreign Aid Put Millions of Lives at Risk](#) (2025), p. 19 (“[I]n Haiti foreign aid accounts for 97% of the funding for the AIDS response, and the US funds 62% of HIV treatment. As of 3 March 2025, 128 sites (out of 181 nationally) previously funded by PEPFAR [the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief] had stopped working, severely impacting services for key populations and adolescent girls. As of 13 March 2025, UNAIDS reported that due to the US funding freeze, pre-exposure prophylaxis services were completely halted, except for pregnant and lactating women.”).

⁴⁹⁹ Charles, [UN migration head calls conditions in Haiti ‘brutal,’ wants to talk to U.S. aid](#) (Apr. 16, 2025) (IOM director general Amy Pope: “Our staff expressed concern to me about getting back and forth to the sites where we work or to the office. We’ve had staff who’ve been kidnapped. We’ve had staff who have had to shelter because of gang violence. So it’s being felt, the money, the financial pressures, the lack of partners.”) (internal quotations omitted); *Alterpresse*, [Criminalité : Plus de 40,000 enfants forcés à se déplacer depuis début 2025 - Une enfance brisée par les violences meurtrières des gangs en Haïti](#) (Apr. 8, 2025) (“Roadblocks and violence against aid workers have increased by 75 percent compared to the same period last year (2024). . . . Of a population of 11.5 million people, approximately 2.7 million, including approximately 1 million children, live in areas where violence is hampering humanitarian efforts.”) (internal quotations omitted); Blaise, [Kenyan police officer injured by gang gunfire amid wave](#)

[of violence in Haiti](#) (Mar. 19, 2025) (“Food for the Poor closed its main office in Port-au-Prince, citing an unbearable surge in violence.”); Charles, [As gangs prepare to attack Haiti’s capital, U.S. freezes critical aid for security mission](#) (Feb. 5, 2025) (reporting that attacks in Kenscoff forced international aid workers to stay at home); Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, [Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering](#) (Jan. 13, 2025); see also UNGA, [Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 17, 2025), ¶ 78 (reporting 728 incidents of denial of humanitarian access by armed groups in 2024; 394 of those were attributed to interference in humanitarian delivery through the use of roadblocks).

⁵⁰⁰ Quixote Center, [The Foreign Terrorist Designation](#) (May 16, 2025) (“NGOs, churches, and other non-profit entities have to pay tolls to get humanitarian assistance to where it is needed most. They don’t have any choice.”); Muggah, [Flows of Guns and Money Are Dooming Haiti](#) (May 12, 2025); Charles, [Rubio’s plan to designate Haiti’s gangs as terrorists could deepen humanitarian crisis](#) (May 1, 2025) (“The reality is that almost no commercial or humanitarian activity takes place in or near Port-au-Prince without some level of negotiation or payment to gangs.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also note 488 (discussing the impact of the U.S. terrorist designation on humanitarian aid organizations).

⁵⁰¹ Mohor, Maçon & Kiage, [Haiti in-depth: Why the Kenya-led security mission is floundering](#) (Jan. 13, 2025) (“The director of another NGO working in Haiti, who asked to speak anonymously to avoid worsening access issues, explained how – even before reaching the gangs’ checkpoints – aid groups have to go through those set up by the Haitian police and the Bwa Kale. With them, negotiations for access are harder, because there is now a tendency to consider that NGOs support gangs.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also Mohor, [Aid in the crosshairs: Why access is growing harder in Haiti](#) (Jan. 28, 2025) (MSF’s head of mission in Haiti explains that “[t]he reason it is possible for us [to use roads] is because we negotiate that passage and that access, and that’s something that we have done since forever. As we do in all places in the world, we establish a dialogue with everybody: the authorities, armed groups, and self-defence groups. It’s just that in some parts of the world, access from authorities, including the police, are given to humanitarian organisations, and that is not something we are seeing in Haiti. In Haiti, we struggle to obtain respect from authorities that are supposed to protect everyone, including humanitarian agencies; our principle of impartiality is being challenged.”).

⁵⁰² Johnston, [Where Does the Money Go? A Look at USAID Spending in Haiti](#) (Feb. 4, 2025) (noting that Haiti’s reliance on foreign aid is “a consequence of decades of aid policies that weakened Haiti’s government and outsourced provision of services,” and that bad aid policies have “contributed to the outsourcing of the country’s democracy and . . . given foreign powers even greater leverage over the nation’s politics”); see generally Jake Johnston, *Aid State: Elite Panic, Disaster Capitalism, and the Battle to Control Haiti* (2024). Additional critiques from a feminist perspective include the exclusion of feminist and grassroots advocates from decision-making; marginalizing civil society activities directed at political advocacy; the tendency to direct funding “to the state or to big organizations without involving or offering transparency to grassroots groups, even though it is often their work and data collection that is at the core of the programming”; “a pattern of taking credit for civil society work even as local organizations are left out of consultations and decision-making – or see their painstaking contributions disregarded”; “the creation of barriers to funding for grassroots groups through applying unreasonable standards”; and racialized inequalities in international focus and support. Recommendations include “constructive international engagement to support [the] feminist movement in Haiti by prioritizing local leadership, sustainable funding, and accountab[le] partnership”; “invest[ing] more purposefully in grassroots women’s voices and feminist activists,” “funding grassroots women’s organizations, inviting Haitian women leaders to participate in high level dialogues, and fostering the development of independent women’s funds,” as well as moving “beyond bilateral implementation partnerships” and instead “working with organizations as part of a network or through collective funds or trusts models in order to permit for more collaborative, complementary design and implementation with broader geographical reach.” IJDH, [CSW69 Parallel Event Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Outcome Document](#) (Mar. 2025); see also IJDH, [CSW Parallel Event: Advancing the Rights of Haitian Women & Girls: Haiti’s Transition & Beyond](#) (Mar. 18, 2025).

⁵⁰³ BINUH’s mandate was renewed for just 6.5 months, as opposed to the usual 12. UNSC, *Resolution 2785 (2025)*, UN Doc. S/RES/2785 (2025) (Jul. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2785%20%282025%29>. Note that Carlos G. Ruiz Massieu replaced María Isabel Salvador as Special Representative for Haiti and Head of BINUH on July 2. UN Secretary-General, *Mr. Carlos G. Ruiz Massieu of Mexico – Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti* (Jul. 2, 2025), <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/personnel-appointments/2025-07-02/mr-carlos-g-ruiz-massieu%C2%A0of-mexico-special-representative-of-the-secretary-general-for-haiti-and%C2%A0head-of-the-united-nations-integrated-office-haiti>.

⁵⁰⁴ BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 71 (the suspension of international flights to the Port-au-Prince airport is “significantly hindering the mobility of BINUH personnel”); BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Apr. 14, 2025), ¶¶ 70-72 (“BINUH maintains a skeleton team of 17 international personnel and 42 national personnel on the ground, while other personnel work remotely. . . . Gang violence continues to disrupt critical services on which BINUH depends. . . . Without enhanced security and logistical support, it is unlikely that BINUH will be able to deploy any personnel beyond its current footprint.”); UNSC, *The question concerning Haiti - Security Council, 9902nd meeting* (Apr. 21, 2025), <https://www.un.org/en/SC360/sc9902-Haiti-21-Apr-2025> (“The US representative expressed concern that BINUH, operating with a skeleton staff and limited medical support, could not fulfill its mandate amid the security crisis.”); Charles, [Trump wants to cancel billions in spending for the UN. Why that’s bad news for Haiti](#) (Jul. 3, 2025) (discussing the impact of the UN’s long-standing liquidity problem, exacerbated by additional proposed U.S. funding cuts, on BINUH, which UN Assistant Secretary-General Miroslav Jenča acknowledged “was not designed to operate in the hostile environment the U.N. is facing today”).

⁵⁰⁵ UNSC, [Letter dated 24 February 2025 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council](#) (Feb. 27, 2025), pp. 10-11.

⁵⁰⁶ BINUH, [Report of the Secretary-General](#) (Jun. 27, 2025), ¶ 72 (noting that the UN Secretariat has proposed revising BINUH’s mission concept to “prioritize mission tasks, reduce staffing and rationalize resources to enable mandate implementation under the prevailing security conditions”).