



**Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti:
Key Recent Developments
July 2025 through February 2026**

March 2026



About the Author

The Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) is a U.S.-based non-profit organization that works in solidarity with its Haiti-based sister organization, the *Bureau des Avocats Internationaux* (BAI), to drive systemic change in Haiti by helping Haitian activists and grassroots groups enforce their internationally-recognized human rights. BAI and IJDH combine strategies including: (a) litigation in Haiti, the United States and beyond; (b) public advocacy on the streets, in the press, in academia and on social media; (c) capacity building for grassroots groups and activists; (d) training of human rights lawyers; and (e) nurturing advocacy networks and collaborations worldwide. For nearly 30 years, BAI and IJDH have kept activists safe, rallied global allies to the fight for human rights in Haiti, and impelled the justice systems to serve marginalized communities.

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Table of Acronyms

BAI	<i>Bureau des Avocats Internationaux</i> (Office of International Lawyers)
BINUH	United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CPJ	Committee to Protect Journalists
DCPJ	<i>Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire</i> (Central Directorate of the Judicial Police)
FAd'H	Haitian Armed Forces
GSF	Gang Suppression Force
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IJDH	Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
MSF	<i>Médecins Sans Frontières</i> (Doctors Without Borders)
MSS	Multinational Security Support [Mission]
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PHTK	<i>Pati Ayisyen Tèt Kale</i> (Haitian Tèt Kale Party)
PNH	<i>Police Nationale d'Haïti</i> (Haitian National Police)
RNDDH	<i>Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains</i> (National Network for the Defense of Human Rights)
TPC	Haiti's Transitional Presidential Council (<i>Conseil Présidentiel de Transition – CPT</i>)
TPS	Temporary Protected Status
ULCC	<i>Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption</i> (Haiti's Anti-Corruption Unit)
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WFP	World Food Programme



Executive Summary

Haiti's governance, security, and human rights crisis continued to deteriorate since IJDH's last Update on Human Rights and Rule of Law in Haiti in July 2025. The government and international responses remain inadequate, and both Haiti's transitional government and the UN-authorized Multinational Security Support mission were replaced after failing to meet any material objectives. There is little indication that the replacement transitional government consolidated around the sitting (transitional) Prime Minister or the new UN-authorized Gang Suppression Force will transform the underlying causes of that failure, which include government corruption and abuses; an enabling international preference for short-term, militarized solutions; the willingness to marginalize Haiti's civil society in favor of corrupt or complicit elites; and a lack of committed and context-appropriate actions and funding.

This reporting period saw a further increase in violations of the right to life and security of the person that the government has been unable or unwilling to control, and in which it is increasingly complicit. Over 8,000 people were killed in 2025, and nearly 1.5 million are displaced. Armed groups continued to consolidate their control over large parts of the country, formalize their networks of checkpoints and extortion schemes, and use extreme brutality to assert their dominance over the population. Haiti's police remain weak and largely ineffective at controlling armed group violence. An increasing number of non-state actors, including civilian "defense" groups and foreign military contractors, are one troubling element of an increasingly militarized and extrajudicial crisis response. The proliferation of armed non-state actors is creating an ever-more fractured security environment, increasing civilian deaths and other abuses, and undermining government authority.

Persistent corruption and collusion between state actors and armed groups continue to undermine efforts to restore security and democratic governance. Credible allegations of corruption and complicity with criminal groups persist at the highest levels of government and within security institutions. Patterns of extrajudicial killings and widespread civilian harms by police and other government actors persist. Haiti's justice system remains largely unable to investigate or prosecute these and other serious crimes. Chronic under-resourcing and insecurity have rendered many courts virtually or completely non-operational, and impunity remains the norm for human rights abuses and corruption alike. Continued politicization of the judiciary and recent government initiatives to immunize high-level officials from accountability for corruption exacerbate these challenges. Persistent high rates of pretrial detention and inhumane prison conditions violate the human rights to due process and to life, among others.

The insecurity and humanitarian crises continue to disproportionately impact individuals already at the margins. Resources and protections are inadequate and particularly impacted by foreign assistance cuts and policy changes. This reporting period saw another material increase in sexual violence against women and girls, especially at displacement sites. Persistent marginalization of women and their needs – which violates Haitian women's right to equality and full participation in their government – continues to perpetuate inequality and weaken the transition and security responses to the crisis. Armed groups continue to exploit children's acute vulnerabilities to privation to recruit them. Harms against children – at the hands of all parties – are escalating. Planning for age-appropriate security response and community reintegration is inadequate.

Haiti's already catastrophic social and economic landscape has deteriorated further. Approximately 35% of Haitians live in extreme poverty and about 5.7 million are acutely food insecure. The World Food Program designated Haiti one of just five "famine hotspots" in the world. Widespread school and hospital closures continue to impact hundreds of thousands.

In the face of these combined challenges, foreign states – notably the Dominican Republic and the United States – continue to implement racist, inhumane, and in many cases illegal measures to restrict migration for Haitians and to deport those already within their borders. Haitians returned to Haiti are extremely vulnerable to further violence, exploitation, and displacement.

The international response to these challenges continues to reflect longstanding patterns that violate Haitians' rights to choose their government. It prioritizes short-term, militarized engagement while neglecting the structural causes of the crisis. Foreign interference once again dictated the composition of Haiti's new transitional government and continues to enable government corruption and dysfunction. Changes to the mandates of the UN-authorized military intervention and residual political office similarly raise concerns about the international community's commitments to Haitian sovereignty and human rights. At the same time, humanitarian funding has declined sharply even as needs continue to grow.

I. Introduction

This reporting period¹ saw continued territorial capture and pervasive violence by armed groups; unremitting government dysfunction accompanied by dubious foreign engagement; and – as a result – further deterioration of the human rights and humanitarian situation from levels that had already earned Haiti outlier status on indexes tracking human suffering. Of particular note are the predictably¹ unsuccessful tenure and ending of both the transitional government created pursuant to the April 3, 2024 Political Accord for a Peaceful and Orderly Transition (**April 2024 Accord**) and the Multinational Security Support mission (**MSS**) imposed² by the international community. Both had proven ineffectual at resolving Haiti’s complex governance and security crisis,³ reflecting, among other failures, government corruption and abuses; an enabling international preference for short-term, militarized solutions; the willingness to marginalize Haiti’s civil society in favor of corrupt or complicit elites; and a lack of committed and context-appropriate actions and funding.⁴ Essentially none of the material benchmarks relating to holding elections, restoring government functions, and tackling the metastasizing insecurity relating to armed groups were met.⁵

The same deficiencies underlie both the successor government that took over as the April 2024 Accord mandate expired on February 7, 2026, and the Gang Suppression Force (**GSF**) that replaced the MSS on September 30, 2025. As the end of its mandate approached, the April 2024 Accord government devolved into a struggle for power, one that was resolved not by Haitians, but by international threats, backed by U.S. warships deployed off Haiti’s coast.⁶ The result has been a consolidation of power in the hands of a sole head of state (Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé), who had already been in power for a year and therefore shares the poor security and governance record of the Transitional Presidential Council (**TPC**) that appointed him.⁷ Several major political parties and civil society groups – with notable holdouts and critics – signed⁸ a National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections (**2026 Pact**),⁹ which recognizes his authority and sets out the new transitional government mandate. The 2026 Pact has been criticized for lacking a fixed term or effective controls against corruption and abuse, and for consolidating power.¹⁰

These features of the new transitional government are particularly troubling given Fils-Aimé’s long association with private sector elites implicated in corruption and crimes.¹¹ It likewise appears to be keeping in place a controversial decree issued by Fils-Aimé and the TPC in December 2025, which protects top former government officials from accountability for corruption and other gross misconduct.¹² The decree risks enabling impunity and corruption that fundamentally shaped the TPC’s dysfunction,¹³ and lies at the root of Haiti’s crisis as a whole.¹⁴ Fils-Aimé’s government has also kept the August/December 2026 election timeline¹⁵ adopted by the TPC when its 2025 benchmarks proved predictably unworkable.¹⁶ The new timeline appears equally unrealistic for holding elections that include the large and populous areas controlled by armed groups and comply with standards on fairness, inclusivity, and credibility.¹⁷ It also involves revived¹⁸ plans for constitutional amendment through an explicitly unconstitutional referendum.¹⁹ Seen as a whole, the new transitional government’s agenda appears to do little to address the factors precipitating Haiti’s governance collapse²⁰ or restore constitutional order, and may instead exacerbate the underlying drivers of social instability.²¹

As discussed more extensively in Section VIII below, the GSF likewise does not clearly solve for the challenges that plagued the MSS and made it ineffective.²² At the time of writing – five months into its one-year renewable mandate – the GSF is barely deployed, is underfunded, and lacks clearly defined operating procedures.²³ Moreover, changes to the mandate of the GSF and the complementary UN Integrated Office in Haiti (**BINUH**)²⁴ actually step back from their predecessor missions’ commitment to human rights principles and Haitian sovereignty.²⁵ These are compounded by the ongoing sharp cuts to foreign aid and changes to related policies that are weakening an already inadequate humanitarian response, with disproportionate impact on women and other marginalized groups.²⁶ Similarly, the continued flow of weapons and ammunition into Haiti – primarily from the United States – remains effectively unaddressed and fuels the scale and severity of the violence.²⁷

Finally, in what has become an increasingly militarized response to Haiti’s complex crisis, the Haitian government has continued its reliance on non-state actors for addressing armed group violence, including most notably private military contractors and local “defense” groups.²⁸ The former are linked with an

¹ Previous Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) Updates are available on the IJDH website at IJDH, *News and Resources Publications: Human Rights Updates*, <https://www.ijdh.org/news-and-resources/publications/> (last visited Mar. 11, 2026).

increased use of drones that have reaped escalating civilian casualties without significant impact on armed group capacity.²⁹ The latter are not only committing human rights violations, but are increasingly implicated in criminality that threatens to transform some of the “defense” groups into the very armed groups they arose to constrain.³⁰ The result has been devastating for Haitian civilians. Reports indicate that over half of Haitians killed in 2025 were killed not by armed groups, but by some element of the government’s security response, and that a growing number are being displaced due to government and MSS/GSF operations.³¹ This abdication and diffusion of authority over the legitimate use of force also undercuts government credibility, increases opportunities for corruption and government abuse, and further complicates power and security dynamics in a manner that impedes Haiti’s prospects for establishing peace and community reconciliation.³²

II. Violations of the right to life & security of the person

Catastrophic violence in Haiti has deepened further since IJDH’s last Update.³³ Armed groups, many now operating jointly under the banner of *Viv Ansanm*,³⁴ still control huge swaths of territory³⁵ and brutalize the population. Widespread killing and displacement have continued to increase. The resulting desperate economic and humanitarian situation (see Section VI) fuels ongoing recruitment by armed groups,³⁶ furthering cycles of violence. Haiti’s government security forces remain unable to effectively protect the population from armed groups. The transitional government has dramatically and opaquely increased its reliance on non-state actors – including civilian “defense” groups, private military contractors, and the newly-authorized GSF – to fill the vacuum. There have been few observable security gains and significant resulting human rights concerns, including growing civilian casualties and other human rights abuses, and expanding opportunities for abuse. In this context, the distinctions between civilians and combatants, and between state and non-state actors, have become increasingly blurry,³⁷ highlighting the continued breakdown of state control over security and of the rule of law, with attendant challenges to the transitional government’s ability to restore peace and constitutional order.³⁸

Violence by armed groups and related displacement

- Armed groups have retained control over large parts of the West,³⁹ Artibonite,⁴⁰ and Center Departments,⁴¹ and continued to expand into other regions previously considered safe.⁴² An estimated 80 to 90% of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area remains under their control.⁴³ Armed groups have strengthened their hold over key infrastructure and transportation – including roads, waterways, and air traffic⁴⁴ – as a means of curtailing freedom of movement,⁴⁵ increasing revenue, and establishing strategic bases.⁴⁶
- According to the UN, at least 8,100 people were killed due to armed group violence in Haiti in 2025.⁴⁷ Limited access to areas under armed group control means the real number may be even higher.⁴⁸ Armed groups continue to carry out large-scale attacks against the population in areas where they are consolidating territorial control, leading to mass deaths and displacement.⁴⁹ However, attacks in neighborhoods already solidly under their control have decreased (but not stopped), as the armed groups no longer need to use mass violence to assert their domination in those areas.⁵⁰
- Armed groups continue to use calculated brutality as a primary tactic for advancing their aims.⁵¹ Abuses include targeted executions;⁵² mutilation;⁵³ beating and torture;⁵⁴ sexual violence;⁵⁵ burning people;⁵⁶ using civilians as human shields;⁵⁷ indiscriminate shooting;⁵⁸ and looting and destroying property, especially through arson.⁵⁹ There has also been a resurgence of kidnappings by certain armed groups.⁶⁰ These are often accompanied by additional violence as a mechanism for extorting higher ransoms or punishing the families of those unable to pay.⁶¹ More generally, armed groups dictate most aspects of life in neighborhoods under their control, exploiting the absence of reliable state services to establish a system of criminal governance.⁶² They sometimes portray themselves as “protectors” of the population,⁶³ and UN reporting indicates the armed groups perform some governing functions, including by enforcing certain rules against their own members.⁶⁴ In practice, however, armed groups more often use their control to extort money while severely restricting movement⁶⁵ and inflicting violence on civilians who resist their authority or are suspected of collaborating with police or civilian “defense” groups.⁶⁶ For example, armed groups kill civilians who attempt to evade checkpoints or fail to pay tolls,⁶⁷ and sometimes attack even those who do pay.⁶⁸
- Insecurity-related displacement has increased further, with armed groups deliberately displacing communities to create strategic “buffer” zones between themselves and government security forces, and as a mechanism for social, economic, and territorial control.⁶⁹ As of January 2026, approximately

1.45 million people have been internally displaced due to the acute insecurity situation.⁷⁰ According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 80% of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are hosted in the provinces⁷¹ and 85% are staying with host families or otherwise outside of displacement sites.⁷² The remaining 15% – nearly all of whom are in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area⁷³ – are living in 229 makeshift and fluctuating displacement sites,⁷⁴ including schools, churches, and other public spaces.⁷⁵ Displacement, whether with host families or otherwise, continues to put significant strain on local resources, overburdening already struggling healthcare facilities and schools, driving up prices, and exacerbating tensions with host communities.⁷⁶ Displacement sites are overcrowded and lack adequate access to food, drinking water, and sanitation and health services, putting IDPs at increased risk of disease.⁷⁷ Hurricane Melissa in October 2025 exacerbated these vulnerabilities.⁷⁸ IDPs also remain at serious risk of violence from armed groups, with police virtually absent from displacement sites.⁷⁹ The situation for women and children – who make up the significant majority of the displaced population⁸⁰ – is particularly dire, including because they face an increased risk of sexual exploitation and abuse.⁸¹ Whatever state support or protections for IDPs exist remain inadequate.⁸² In fact, Haitian authorities have reportedly directed residents of downtown Port-au-Prince neighborhoods to vacate their homes in advance of planned security operations without offering housing alternatives, worsening the displacement crisis.⁸³ Humanitarian assistance is inconsistent and insufficient to meet needs, including as a result of continued funding cuts.⁸⁴ Some IDPs have also reported abuse and corruption among humanitarian actors.⁸⁵

- Targeted violence and impunity, alongside increased government repression,⁸⁶ continue to threaten freedom of press.⁸⁷ Threats and attacks by armed groups against journalists have continued to escalate, particularly against those reporting on criminal activities by armed groups.⁸⁸ In November 2025, the Committee to Protect Journalists reported five attacks by armed groups against radio stations in just six months.⁸⁹

Government failure to protect civilians

- The Haitian National Police (PNH) continues to lack sufficient personnel, resources and equipment, and logistical and technical capabilities to effectively confront armed groups,⁹⁰ despite longstanding foreign initiatives to reinforce PNH infrastructure and operational capacity.⁹¹ The reconstituted Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H) likewise remain under-staffed, under-resourced, and largely unable to effectively support the PNH.⁹² The number of police officers currently on the force is unclear, with estimates ranging from 6,000 to over 13,000,⁹³ although an initiative to recruit 4,000 new officers is underway.⁹⁴ A UN official shared that the actual fighting capacity of the force is even lower – approximately 1,000 officers⁹⁵ – and U.S. acting ambassador to Haiti Henry Wooster claimed fewer than 400 officers were involved in armed operations.⁹⁶ Officers face immense danger from armed groups, with at least 27 killed since IJDH’s last Update in July 2025.⁹⁷ Armed groups also continue to attack, steal, and destroy police vehicles and infrastructure as a deliberate tactic to weaken PNH capacity.⁹⁸ As of August 31, 2025, 79 of the 413 police facilities in the country were non-operational.⁹⁹ Persistent leadership issues – both within the security forces and in the government more generally – and lack of coordination between central and department authorities exacerbate these challenges.¹⁰⁰
- Government security forces are conducting operations against armed groups and have reported limited gains in certain areas,¹⁰¹ but remain generally unable to project sufficient force, deploy in multiple locations, or hold territory.¹⁰² For example, security officials promised to reopen the main routes to Port-au-Prince by February 7, 2026, but as of writing, this has not been accomplished.¹⁰³ In other areas, police often do not respond to attacks – even when warned in advance of the impending violence¹⁰⁴ – or flee in the face of armed groups’ superior numbers and firepower.¹⁰⁵
- The transitional government has given an expanding and murky role to private security contractors in its security response.¹⁰⁶ Vectus Global, a private security company led by Erik Prince,¹⁰⁷ was initially contracted to assist a government-created task force operating independently of the PNH to deploy drones against armed groups.¹⁰⁸ According to Prince, the company now has two contracts with the government that would have it playing an expanded security role and a longer-term advisory role on restructuring revenue collection.¹⁰⁹ Which company actually holds those contracts, however, and the full extent to which private contractors are involved in state security operations remain unclear.¹¹⁰ There is also no evidence of human rights monitoring or accountability mechanisms overseeing their functions.¹¹¹ This is especially concerning in light of the task force’s increasing use of drone attacks that are likely illegal,¹¹² have already resulted in civilian casualties,¹¹³ and risk further destabilizing the already volatile security landscape while doing little to curb armed group violence to date.¹¹⁴ To date,

drone strikes have killed approximately 1,243 people, but have not affected any top armed group leaders.¹¹⁵

- Civilian-led “defense” groups have become an informal third arm of Haiti’s security apparatus as they continue to formalize their operations and deploy force absent pushback from, and often in coordination with, state security forces.¹¹⁶ Although some among them have prevented armed group incursions into new areas,¹¹⁷ “defense” groups are increasingly responsible for human rights abuses. “Defense” groups killed at least 676 people in 2025, including children.¹¹⁸ All the killings are extrajudicial and many target individuals on the basis of social factors, such as where they live or the clothes they wear, rather than direct evidence of affiliation with armed groups.¹¹⁹ Some “defense” groups also increasingly engage in criminal activities unrelated to community protection, including extortion and other violence,¹²⁰ and have even aligned themselves with certain armed groups.¹²¹ Chronic impunity and normalization of extrajudicial executions by state security forces fuel these abuses.¹²² The line between police and civilian “defense” groups is blurry, with police openly operating in tandem with armed civilians and facilitating their access to weapons (including from already inadequate PNH stockpiles)¹²³ and equipment.¹²⁴

III. Government misconduct, including institutionalized violence & corruption

Widespread government corruption and collusion with armed groups directly precipitated Haiti’s crisis¹²⁵ and continue to impede pathways to restoring security and constitutional order. These patterns are visible at all levels of the government, from the TPC and Prime Minister’s office to the PNH, and undermine state legitimacy and institutional trust. Alongside a persistent lack of meaningful investigations or accountability for these abuses,¹²⁶ the transitional government has taken concrete steps to silence dissent and further institutionalize impunity.¹²⁷ In this permissive environment, police and other government actors continue to use illegal, indiscriminate, and extrajudicial force.

- Persistent collusion between state actors and armed groups remains a significant barrier to restoring security and good governance in Haiti.¹²⁸ There are long-standing credible accusations of complicity with armed groups leveled against public officials at the highest level, including the TPC and Prime Minister Fils-Aimé,¹²⁹ which remain unanswered. New allegations against political and economic elites for financing criminal activities, employing armed groups to consolidate control, and complicity in weapons and drug trafficking schemes have continued to emerge.¹³⁰ One report states that the leader of a prominent armed group “maintains a network of individuals within governmental institutions, including security agencies, which enables him to evade arrest and facilitate his criminal activities.”¹³¹ Collusion between PNH officers and armed groups remains widespread, and there is consistent evidence that police officers – as well as the private security contractors operating alongside them¹³² – provide weapons to armed groups.¹³³
- Police killed 3,225 people in 2025, according to the UN.¹³⁴ At least 18% of those killed were unaffiliated with armed groups,¹³⁵ indicating a continued pattern of unlawful use of lethal force.¹³⁶ The increased use of drones and heavy weaponry – particularly in poor, heavily populated areas where avoiding harm to civilians is virtually impossible – continues to raise serious concerns around abuses and lack of accountability.¹³⁷ Drone strikes alone have killed at least 43 civilians, including 17 children, in the past year.¹³⁸ In addition, public prosecutors and police executed at least 275 people outside of the law since 2025,¹³⁹ and continue to arbitrarily arrest people found near the scene of an alleged crime.¹⁴⁰ Police officers have been implicated in kidnapping schemes,¹⁴¹ and there is evidence that the Haitian Coast Guard is charging sailors to protect them from armed groups attacking and extorting vessels.¹⁴² Efforts to investigate and prosecute these abuses are limited and impunity remains the norm.¹⁴³
- Pervasive corruption at all levels of government continues to undermine efforts to restore security and stability.¹⁴⁴ Haiti dropped further on Transparency International’s latest Corruption Index, now ranking 169th out of 180 countries.¹⁴⁵ Investigations by Haiti’s Anti-Corruption Unit (ULCC) have uncovered extensive and serious corruption in at least nine public institutions¹⁴⁶ and implicating several former public officials, including former President Michel Martelly.¹⁴⁷ Despite these efforts,¹⁴⁸ the vast majority of cases remain unprosecuted and impunity for financial crimes persists.¹⁴⁹ The TPC – which was the subject of multiple corruption scandals during its tenure¹⁵⁰ – used its last months in power to adopt a decree that effectively immunizes government actors from accountability and thereby enables further corruption.¹⁵¹ These dynamics reflect the patterns of impunity and corruption that precipitated

Haiti's current crisis, as exemplified by the embezzlement of over US\$2 billion from the PetroCaribe development fund by high-ranking government officials between 2008 and 2016, and the subsequent use of armed groups to suppress popular demands for accountability.¹⁵²

IV. Lack of access to justice & chronic impunity

Haiti's justice sector remains unable to deliver justice for Haitians due to persistent neglect and deliberate dismantling by successive corrupt governments,¹⁵³ compounded by the acute insecurity crisis. Entrenched corruption and politicization further drive impunity, which in turn fuels cycles of violence.¹⁵⁴ The resulting due process violations,¹⁵⁵ including consistently high rates of pretrial detention, are exacerbated by the inhumane conditions in Haiti's prisons and serious problems with prison administration. The implementation of a new penal code – published in June 2025 despite widespread concerns that the process was unconstitutional¹⁵⁶ – has been postponed indefinitely.¹⁵⁷

Justice sector dysfunction and chronic impunity

- Chronic under-resourcing of the justice sector, exacerbated by the acute insecurity crisis, continues to impede court operations.¹⁵⁸ In some areas, insecurity regularly prevents judicial staff from reaching courts, rendering them effectively non-operational.¹⁵⁹ In others, courts are closed entirely: for example, the Mirebalais Court of First Instance, Peace Court, and prosecutor's office have been closed since armed groups attacked Mirebalais in April 2025.¹⁶⁰ Chronic extended strikes by court personnel to protest low salaries and poor working conditions further hinder judicial function.¹⁶¹ As a result, the vast majority of cases remain unheard.¹⁶²
- Institutionalized corruption and politicization of the judiciary likewise continue to erode access to justice.¹⁶³ With few exceptions,¹⁶⁴ alleged criminals with links to political actors, access to money, or affiliations with armed groups avoid arrest¹⁶⁵ or are released without facing trial.¹⁶⁶ There is evidence that the new head of the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police (**DCPJ**) – responsible for conducting criminal investigations – has inappropriately interfered in cases, accepted bribes in exchange for releasing suspects, and operated outside judicial guarantees.¹⁶⁷
- The challenges described above perpetuate impunity, and grave human rights abuses, along with other crimes, continue to go unaddressed.¹⁶⁸ There has been minimal to no progress even in high-profile cases: in October, an appeals court ruled that the investigation into the assassination of former President Jovenel Moïse – which had made very little progress and was plagued by dysfunction and politicization from the outset – must be restarted due to procedural irregularities;¹⁶⁹ five years since the assassination of former Port-au-Prince Bar Association President Monferrier Dorval in 2020, a final indictment has been filed but there is still no investigating judge assigned to the case;¹⁷⁰ and investigations into the assassinations of political activist Antoinette Duclair, journalist Diego Charles, and LGBTQI+ activist Charlot Jeudy,¹⁷¹ the PetroCaribe corruption scandal,¹⁷² and numerous high-profile massacres¹⁷³ remain stalled. Government efforts to address impunity have been largely ineffective at best and deliberately obstructive at worst. The two specialized judicial units created by the transitional government in April 2025 to investigate and prosecute financial and mass crimes – criticized at the time for failing to consider the corruption and structural challenges that are at the root of Haiti's judicial dysfunction¹⁷⁴ – remain nonoperational.¹⁷⁵ In December 2025, the transitional government adopted a decree establishing procedures for the High Court of Justice, which is constitutionally mandated to address impunity for crimes committed by high-ranking government officials.¹⁷⁶ However, the decree actually serves to shield those officials from accountability, thereby enabling corruption and undermining the mandate of the nascent judicial unit tasked with addressing financial crimes.¹⁷⁷

Inhumane prison conditions

- Catastrophic overcrowding in Haiti's prisons remains an ongoing challenge,¹⁷⁸ exacerbated by government failures to restore prison capacity after armed group attacks forced several major prisons to close.¹⁷⁹ According to the UN, prisons are at three to eight times their intended capacity,¹⁸⁰ with so little space per person that detainees are forced to sleep in shifts.¹⁸¹ As a result, women and children continue to be held in the same facilities as men, putting them at heightened risk of violence, especially sexual violence.¹⁸² In July 2025, 13 people held in the Jacmel prison died due to severe overcrowding and extreme heat.¹⁸³ With limited government initiatives to reduce the number of people held in pretrial detention,¹⁸⁴ rates remain high at approximately 82%.¹⁸⁵ The underlying due process

violations raise serious concerns about the ability of any foreign mission to Haiti to detain individuals in accordance with applicable law.

- The state remains unable to provide incarcerated persons with access to adequate food, clean water, sanitation, and healthcare.¹⁸⁶ There is evidence that money allocated to provide food to incarcerated persons is being corruptly diverted elsewhere.¹⁸⁷ Just three doctors serve the prison system and all are based in Port-au-Prince, leaving most of the over 7,000 persons incarcerated across Haiti’s 14 facilities without access to health professionals.¹⁸⁸ The health consequences are dire, with 134 incarcerated individuals – nearly 2% of the prison population – dying in 2025, most “due to lack of medical care, unsanitary cell conditions, insufficient food, and limited access to drinking water.”¹⁸⁹
- Deepening insecurity, corruption, chronic under-resourcing, and staffing shortages exacerbated by overcrowding continue to impact prison security and administration.¹⁹⁰ According to Haitian human rights organization Fondasyon Je Klere, for each prison officer there are over ten incarcerated persons, and detainees sometimes control the keys to their own cells.¹⁹¹ Authorities also continue to incarcerate people in makeshift cells at police stations, putting them at increased risk of violence from supervising officers with whom they share the space.¹⁹²

V. Lack of equal rights & protections

Haiti’s worsening violence, humanitarian crisis, and accompanying collapse of services continue to disproportionately impact individuals with marginalized identities. A high-level UN official described Port-au-Prince as “the worst place in the world to be a woman,”¹⁹³ reflecting the continuing surge in gender-based violence (GBV)^{II} that is weaponized by armed groups. Longstanding inequality and discrimination, which restrict women’s educational and economic opportunities, enforce economic and social dependence on men, and normalize GBV, result in disproportionate and distinct impacts on women and girls from the general insecurity, food scarcity, economic collapse, and other stressors like Hurricane Melissa described in this Update.¹⁹⁴ These in turn push women towards greater dependency and harmful survival strategies, and thereby further entrench and deepen the underlying inequities.¹⁹⁵ Efforts to prevent and address GBV are “grossly inadequate,”¹⁹⁶ and are illustrative of a general failure to fully address the distinct needs of women and girls and their unequal status, including ensuring that women are fully included among those making decisions and governing Haiti.¹⁹⁷ Examples include the scant presence of women in Haiti’s transitional government¹⁹⁸ and the changes to UN mandates that remove all references to “gender” and the importance of including women and youth in government.¹⁹⁹ The impression is one of retrenchment on women’s rights, which UN human rights experts called “a strategic failure” that threatens Haiti’s long-term prospects for peace, democratic government, and economic prosperity.²⁰⁰ Haiti’s future is also at risk due to ongoing failures to protect children from harms and to implement effective measures for demobilization and reintegration that adequately take into account armed group recruitment of minors – who are estimated to make up half of their members.²⁰¹ Other groups made vulnerable by their unequal status in society, like LGBTQI+ individuals and persons with disabilities, continue to experience disparate impacts from the crisis that are compounded by shrinking support.

- GBV has continued to soar, with sexual violence the most common reported violation that overwhelmingly affects women and girls.²⁰² Reported incidents for 2025 were 25% higher than for the previous year, albeit “a fraction of the true scale” at 8,000.²⁰³ Over 7,400 incidents were reported in the first nine months of 2025, of which more than 4,100 involved sexual assault or rape – or more than one reported act of gendered violence every hour (an average of 27 cases per day).²⁰⁴ These numbers significantly undercount the true GBV incidence in Haiti because fear of retaliation, revictimization, and social exclusion – alongside limited services for victims and lack of trust in the justice system – result in chronic underreporting.²⁰⁵
- Much of the ongoing surge in GBV is attributable to armed groups,²⁰⁶ which continue to weaponize sexual violence as a means of spreading terror, holding territory, demonstrating power, and punishing people living under the control of rival groups.²⁰⁷ Rape by multiple perpetrators, with reports of up to

^{II} According to the UN, GBV is “an umbrella term for any harmful act that is perpetrated against a person’s will and that is based on socially ascribed (i.e. gender) differences between males and females. It includes acts that inflict physical, sexual or mental harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion, and other deprivations of liberty. These acts can occur in public or in private.” UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Gender-based Violence*, <https://www.unhcr.org/gbv-toolkit/test/> (last visited Mar. 11, 2026).

20 aggressors at a time,²⁰⁸ remains the most common form of sexual violence.²⁰⁹ Other GBV includes psychological and economic harm, human trafficking, forced relationships, forced prostitution, and sexual slavery; GBV is also often accompanied by use of weapons, kidnapping, physical violence, and killing.²¹⁰ Attacks are particularly prevalent in areas controlled by armed groups, on public transportation, at displacement sites, and in remote communities.²¹¹ Victims include both the very young and the very old,²¹² indicating an enormous breakdown of social norms. The attacks are also often accompanied by significant physical, psychological, economic, and social consequences for survivors. These include unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions; debilitating physical impairments and sexually transmitted infections (STIs);²¹³ acute stigma and social rejection;²¹⁴ and severe psychological trauma and suicidal ideation – all of which individually and jointly create enormous economic burdens and barriers for survivor women and girls that can compound already gendered poverty in the long term.²¹⁵ Omnipresent GBV also impedes the ability of women and girls to safely transit through and transact in public spaces, reducing their opportunities for economic activities and access to services.²¹⁶ This exacerbates gendered dependencies and pressures towards transactional or survival sex.²¹⁷

- Women and girls make up the majority of those displaced²¹⁸ and are subject to additional vulnerabilities at displacement sites due to the lack of security, privacy, and services; the desperate humanitarian situation; and abusive management.²¹⁹ Displaced women and girls are disproportionately exposed to GBV.²²⁰ They also suffer gendered health impacts;²²¹ are subjected to sexual exploitation and abuse, including at the hands of displacement site managers;²²² and are frequently driven to survival sex by desperate need.²²³ Further, women are extremely under-represented in displacement site management, consideration of gender-specific vulnerabilities is limited, and there are few gender-sensitive protection measures or services in place.²²⁴
- The distinct needs of women and girls – whether for protection, recourse, specialized medical care, or other basic needs and services – are not being met, and are disproportionately disrupted in the ongoing breakdown of government functions and services described in this Update (see Sections I, II, and VI).²²⁵ Dedicated funding is a fraction of assessed and rising needs,²²⁶ and has been especially impacted by foreign assistance cuts and policies that specifically limit reproductive care for women and girls.²²⁷ The scarcity of services and resources – combined with insecurity, the cost of care, the costs and infeasibility of transportation, limited information, and, for survivors of GBV, fears about reprisals or stigma – render desperately needed medical and psychological care, shelter, and economic support largely unattainable.²²⁸ For the same reasons, survivors of GBV experience significant barriers to accessing timely medical and prophylactic care, increasing the risk and impact of unwanted pregnancies, STIs, and physical impairment due to the assaults.²²⁹ The GBV-derived unwanted pregnancies and STIs also render the general lack of adequate reproductive and sexual healthcare, compounded by the lingering ban on abortion²³⁰ and reduced access to contraception, more acutely harmful.²³¹ Further, survivors of GBV generally lack recourse to effective police and legal protections due to procedural hurdles, inadequate investigations, judicial dysfunction, institutionalized mistreatment of survivors and indifference to GBV, lack of legal representation, and threats or fear of retaliation.²³² There have been some measures undertaken to improve institutional protections and responses for GBV,²³³ but they have been described by the Global Protection Cluster as “limited and uneven,” and impunity remains the norm.²³⁴
- Haiti’s children are bearing the brunt of the crisis²³⁵ as both victims and, increasingly, perpetrators²³⁶ of acute harms. Violations against children include killing and maiming, recruitment into armed groups, exploitation, abduction and trafficking, displacement, abandonment (especially for children born of rape²³⁷), and denial of humanitarian access;²³⁸ as well as psychological trauma from witnessing or participating in horrific violence.²³⁹ Sexual violence against minors (primarily girls), including collective rape, has become particularly prevalent, with some children dying from the sexual assaults.²⁴⁰ Child rape survivors are experiencing STIs, severe physical injuries, and pregnancies – which in turn pose significant risks to girls’ immature bodies alongside the added psychological trauma, social stigma, and long-term obligations associated with bearing a child conceived from rape.²⁴¹ Children, especially those from poor households, are distinctly vulnerable to violence and privations more generally;²⁴² they represent 52% of IDPs;²⁴³ they are more sensitive to food insecurity;²⁴⁴ and they are being deprived of their educations, with at least one in four kids out of school.²⁴⁵ Armed groups are weaponizing that vulnerability for recruitment, which remains high.²⁴⁶ Child-focused protections and services are lacking,²⁴⁷ and there is evidence of children being extrajudicially killed, beaten, arbitrarily arrested, and inhumanely detained or mistreated in custody.²⁴⁸

There have been some efforts to incorporate age-appropriate and reintegration-oriented practices,²⁴⁹ but they fall woefully short of what is needed given the scale of child recruitment and the special needs of victimized children.²⁵⁰

- Other marginalized groups likewise continue to face discrimination, exclusion, and violence,²⁵¹ and U.S. foreign assistance policy changes are likely to adversely impact dedicated funding and programs.²⁵² Discrimination and negative attitudes based on sexual orientation and gender identity persist;²⁵³ protections and funding are insufficient – and likely to deteriorate;²⁵⁴ and there are reports of distinctly degrading and punitive treatment of LGBTQI+^{III} individuals kidnapped by armed groups.²⁵⁵ Armed groups likewise attacked individuals they accused of “mystical” practices or witchcraft²⁵⁶ and rural farmers (“*peyizan*”),²⁵⁷ who also face adverse impacts from funding cuts²⁵⁸ and continued land grabs.²⁵⁹ Persons with disabilities and the elderly continued to face significant barriers to accessing services and navigating insecurity and displacement, and to experience discrimination and stigma.²⁶⁰

VI. Collapse of economic & social rights

Haiti’s already-catastrophic social and economic landscape continues to deteriorate.²⁶¹ Armed group violence is deepening poverty and fueling Haiti’s hunger crisis. Widespread closures of medical facilities and schools continue to drive the collapse of the health and education sectors. Hurricane Melissa’s humanitarian toll highlights the compounding impacts of climate events, which are exacerbated by chronic under-funding of prevention and response plans.²⁶² That social and economic fragility is the result of long-term under-investment and institutional dysfunction rooted in persistent foreign interference and extraction, as well as corruption and mismanagement by Haitian officials.²⁶³ Sustainable solutions to Haiti’s intersecting crises will require addressing these structural drivers, including through reparations for past foreign harms.²⁶⁴

Economy in decline

- Haiti’s economy continued its seventh consecutive year of decline through the end of 2025.²⁶⁵ Approximately half the population lives below the poverty line,²⁶⁶ with 35% living in extreme poverty.²⁶⁷ Inflation remains high at 25% as of December 2025,²⁶⁸ reflecting enormous rises in the cost of essential goods.²⁶⁹ The price of basic food products, in particular, is exceptionally high.²⁷⁰ As a result, many families are unable to afford bare necessities²⁷¹ and are increasingly forced to resort to harmful coping strategies that further impoverish them.²⁷²
- Insecurity exacerbates the long-term structural drivers of Haiti’s economic decline.²⁷³ Armed groups continue to impoverish Haitians through increasingly professionalized extortion and protection schemes,²⁷⁴ and an ever-expanding network of checkpoints where victims are forced to pay huge sums of money to pass.²⁷⁵ Forced displacement by armed groups is reshaping Haiti’s economy as fleeing residents abandon businesses and property.²⁷⁶ More generally, the insecurity continues to disrupt trade flows, increase transportation costs, and impact commercial activity, resulting in job losses, reduced access to goods, and higher prices.²⁷⁷ The cost of fuel, in particular, has surged due to persistent shortages exacerbated by armed group control of key roads, impacting the transport sector, agricultural production, and public safety.²⁷⁸

Access to water

- Access to drinking water, sanitation, and basic hygiene remains limited,²⁷⁹ particularly in rural areas.²⁸⁰ Displacement sites are also especially impacted, with many people forced to drink contaminated water.²⁸¹ In Port-au-Prince, a government study testing commercially-produced drinking water sachets found that over 80% of those analyzed were contaminated and posed a health risk.²⁸² According to UNICEF, over one million children lack access to drinkable water.²⁸³ Lack of access to clean water and sanitation continues to aggravate the spread of cholera and water-borne diseases;²⁸⁴ the UN’s 2016 promise to improve Haiti’s water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure as part of its plan to eliminate UN-introduced cholera remains unfulfilled.²⁸⁵ The wide-ranging impacts of lacking adequate access to drinking water go beyond just public health, and also affect household food security and economic resilience.²⁸⁶

^{III} Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer/Questioning, Intersex, and other sexual orientations and gender identities.

- Haiti’s longstanding problems with water access and sanitation are rooted in government failures to invest in infrastructure and manage resources,²⁸⁷ made worse by environmental challenges²⁸⁸ and insecurity.²⁸⁹ The October 2025 Hurricane Melissa and related flooding resulted in drinking water shortages and contamination.²⁹⁰ Armed group violence is impeding the delivery of drinking water and critical sanitation supplies to displacement sites and isolated areas, compounding the already disproportionate lack of access in those communities.²⁹¹

Access to food

- Haiti – identified by the World Food Programme (**WFP**) and Food and Agriculture Organization as one of five “hunger hotspots” in the world²⁹² – remains in the midst of one of the worst hunger crisis in its history.²⁹³ Approximately 5.7 million Haitians, or about half the population, continue to face acute food insecurity.²⁹⁴ The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (**IPC**) predicts that the hunger crisis will overall deteriorate further and 5.9 million people will likely face acute food insecurity by June 2026,²⁹⁵ although there have been some marginal reductions in the number of Haitians at higher emergency^{IV} and famine^V levels of food insecurity.²⁹⁶ Many households, particularly among IDPs, are unable to meet their nutritional needs, with people forced to skip meals or fast for days, reduce non-food expenditures, and engage in harmful coping mechanisms.²⁹⁷ Women and children are particularly acutely impacted²⁹⁸ and the WFP estimates that over 288,000 children under the age of five – over 7% – will suffer from acute malnutrition.²⁹⁹
- Insecurity and inflated food prices are the immediate drivers of Haiti’s acute food crisis.³⁰⁰ Targeted attacks by armed groups on agricultural infrastructure and increased violence in Haiti’s main agricultural areas more generally have destroyed crops and forced farmers to abandon their land, impeding food production.³⁰¹ Even when food is being produced, armed group control of key transportation routes regularly prevents it from reaching markets, leading to further supply shortages.³⁰² For example, armed groups continue to attack and extort Madan Sara – the women traders who form the backbone of Haiti’s food distribution network – on their way to market.³⁰³ As a result, the food that is available is prohibitively expensive for many: according to the WFP, more than half of Haitian households cannot afford their basic food needs.³⁰⁴ Armed groups are weaponizing this hunger crisis, alongside the lack of socio-economic opportunities, to recruit children to their ranks, fueling the cycle of violence and privations.³⁰⁵
- Persistent foreign interference with Haiti’s food sovereignty – exacerbated by agricultural policy failures and neglect³⁰⁶ and environmental challenges impacting food production³⁰⁷ – is a longer-term driver of Haiti’s protracted food crisis.³⁰⁸ Further reductions to already inadequate humanitarian food assistance compound these challenges.³⁰⁹

Access to healthcare

- Targeted attacks by armed groups against hospitals and healthcare workers,³¹⁰ alongside generalized insecurity and an increasingly indiscriminate security response,³¹¹ continue to impact hospital operations and force closures.³¹² According to the Pan-American Health Organization (**PAHO**), just 12% of health facilities across the country with inpatient capacity are operating normally.³¹³ Several major hospitals that were forced to close in 2024 and 2025 due to armed group attacks – including the State University Hospital, the Bernard Mevs Hospital, and the University Hospital of Mirebalais – remain closed.³¹⁴ Médecins Sans Frontières (**MSF**) permanently closed its emergency hospital center in Turgeau in October 2025³¹⁵ and suspended its operations in the Bel Air neighborhood of Port-au-Prince in January 2026³¹⁶ due to increased insecurity affecting patient and staff safety. St. Damien Pediatric and St. Luke Hospitals closed for a month in August 2025 to protest the kidnapping of eight people from their sister orphanage, further straining access to healthcare.³¹⁷ As insecurity forces

^{IV} Emergency-level food insecurity refers to households either living with very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality or only able to meet their food needs by resorting to emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. IPC, *IPC Overview and Classification System*, <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/ipc-overview-andclassification-system/en/> (last visited Mar. 11, 2026).

^V Famine- or catastrophic-level food insecurity refers to a situation where at least 20% of households have an extreme lack of food and other basic needs and at least 30% are acutely malnourished, leading to higher mortality rates and the complete collapse of people’s livelihood assets and strategies. IPC, *IPC Overview and Classification System*, <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/ipc-overview-andclassification-system/en/> (last visited Mar. 11, 2026).

hospital closures, it also increases demand, leaving remaining healthcare facilities overwhelmed and patients at risk.³¹⁸

- Even where hospitals are operational, insecurity impedes physical access for patients and healthcare workers,³¹⁹ and generates acute shortages of medicine and critical supplies.³²⁰ The closing of large, public hospitals – on top of the general dearth of public healthcare institutions – has made reaching hospitals or paying for healthcare increasingly impossible for Haitians impacted by the economic crisis or living in rural areas.³²¹ Persistent staffing shortages compound these challenges.³²² The acute challenges to healthcare access from armed group violence are built upon a foundation of chronic, long-term under-resourcing of Haiti’s healthcare sector. Haiti has for years had one of the lowest per capita public health budgets in Latin America and is highly dependent on foreign health assistance.³²³
- The constant exposure to violence, surging displacement, and the desperate humanitarian situation have created a mental health crisis in Haiti.³²⁴ Children³²⁵ and victims of sexual violence³²⁶ are particularly impacted. Chronic government failures to provide minimal mental health services³²⁷ exacerbate the barriers to accessing healthcare, including psychological care, described above.³²⁸ This lack of access leaves Haitians at further risk of violence and suicide.³²⁹
- The number of cholera cases sharply increased in 2025, with around 4,000 suspected cases, 256 confirmed cases, and 71 deaths.³³⁰ The spread of cholera – recklessly introduced to Haiti by UN peacekeepers in 2010 before reemerging in October 2022³³¹ – is driven by longstanding failures in water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure.³³² Flooding caused by Hurricane Melissa³³³ and increased displacement in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions³³⁴ contributed to the acute surge of cases in 2025. Insecurity and under-resourcing, exacerbated by continued cuts to foreign aid, impede prevention and treatment.³³⁵

Access to education

- Continued armed group attacks on schools³³⁶ and the increasing use of schools as informal displacement sites³³⁷ are restricting access to education. More than 1,600 schools remain closed in the West, Artibonite, and Center Departments due to insecurity, depriving over 243,000 children of formal teaching.³³⁸ Overall, over 1.5 million children lack regular access to school.³³⁹ Children in displacement sites are particularly impacted, with many losing entire years of their education.³⁴⁰
- Even when schools remain open, attending is often not safe for many.³⁴¹ Most children in Haiti walk to school, or take public buses or pick-up trucks, which increasingly requires traveling through armed-group territory. In some areas, public transportation and school buses have stopped operating due to a combination of insecurity, inflation, and fuel shortages, forcing parents to send children with unregulated, expensive, and dangerous motorcycle taxis.³⁴² In others, public transportation is still running, but children are forced to pay a “tax” to pass through areas controlled by armed groups.³⁴³ The closure or forced relocation of many schools due to insecurity has resulted in severe overcrowding in those that remain open, affecting the quality of education in those few working institutions.³⁴⁴ These challenges contribute to lower exam pass rates³⁴⁵ and increase the risk of recruitment by armed groups.³⁴⁶
- The government response to these acute challenges remains inadequate and is rooted in chronic under-resourcing of and general dysfunction within the school system.³⁴⁷ Without government support, growing economic hardship and the increased cost of sending children to school due to insecurity are making access for poor children – who have always faced disproportionate barriers to education due to the dearth of public institutions³⁴⁸ – even more difficult.³⁴⁹

VII. Emigration pressures

The number of pathways available for Haitians seeking to flee the country’s increasingly desperate circumstances continues to dwindle. Even as foreign governments publicly emphasize Haiti’s worsening insecurity and humanitarian crisis,³⁵⁰ many are implementing ever more restrictive measures aimed at preventing migration and refuge while escalating removals of Haitians from their territories.³⁵¹ The Dominican Republic, in particular, is responsible for severe human rights abuses as it continues to target Haitians for removal. The U.S. government has cut off virtually all legal pathways to protection in the United States for Haitians. These policies are rooted in anti-Black racism and targeted anti-Haitian discrimination,³⁵² and are consistently criticized as being inhumane, hypocritical, and, in many cases, illegal.³⁵³

- The Dominican Republic remains responsible for over 98% of all removals of Haitians.³⁵⁴ According to the IOM, Dominican authorities expelled over 265,000 Haitians in 2025;³⁵⁵ the Dominican government's own numbers are even higher, reporting nearly 380,000 expulsions in 2025.³⁵⁶ Dominican authorities continue to target individuals for removal without respect to their immigration status and solely based on the color of their skin.³⁵⁷ Those targeted have no legal recourse.³⁵⁸ The Dominican Republic's deportation operations have led to a myriad of human rights abuses, including as a result of inhumane detention and deportation conditions, violence by authorities, and family separation.³⁵⁹ These violations have resulted in at least 54 deaths since 2021.³⁶⁰ Dominican authorities continue to deport Haitians seeking healthcare, particularly pregnant women, with severe consequences for perinatal health.³⁶¹ Haitians' vulnerability in the face of the Dominican government's migration policies leaves them at risk of extortion by corrupt officials.³⁶²
- The U.S. government continues to restrict access to protections for Haitians and to unlawfully deport them,³⁶³ even as it evacuated staff from its embassy in Port-au-Prince and urged its own citizens not to travel to Haiti.³⁶⁴ Haitians targeted for removal are subject to detention in for-profit facilities in the United States that lack adequate access to medical care, among other violations, resulting in three deaths in 2025.³⁶⁵ Haitians are also sometimes detained at the migrant detention facility at Guantánamo Bay prior to deportation, exposing them to inhumane conditions and additional rights violations.³⁶⁶ The Trump administration has suspended all immigration applications for Haitians, including asylum;³⁶⁷ ended critical humanitarian parole and family reunification programs;³⁶⁸ and significantly reduced quotas for refugee resettlement to the United States.³⁶⁹ A full visa ban for Haitian nationals, first implemented in June 2025, remains in effect.³⁷⁰ These policies disproportionately impact poor Haitians and have the effect of excluding the most vulnerable from protection.³⁷¹ As of writing, the current designation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians – which offers protection for over 350,000 Haitians already in the United States prior to June 3, 2024³⁷² – remains in effect, despite continued efforts by the Trump administration to terminate it.³⁷³
- Haitian migrants who are returned to Haiti (**returnees**) are extremely vulnerable to Haiti's intersecting crises.³⁷⁴ According to the IOM, over half of those returned in 2025 have been deported multiple times,³⁷⁵ exacerbating their vulnerability. Returnees are at increased risk of kidnapping because they are perceived to have wealthy relatives abroad.³⁷⁶ In reality, an IOM study on the reintegration of returnees found that they have fewer resources and employment opportunities and are less likely to have a social safety net than non-returnees.³⁷⁷ Assistance to returnees remains limited and insufficient to meet needs, including because of continued foreign funding cuts.³⁷⁸ The current manner of returns has been compounding these challenges: U.S. and Dominican governments almost exclusively return Haitians to Cap-Haïtien (a city in the North Department) and towns along the Haitian-Dominican border, respectively, regardless of their cities of origin, forcing many to travel long distances along dangerous routes controlled by armed groups if they want to be reunited with their communities.³⁷⁹ In Cap-Haïtien and Belladère, the influx of returnees has intensified the pressure on local resources and infrastructure already felt from internal displacement.³⁸⁰ The situation for returnees is so desperate that many attempt to flee again, resorting to increasingly desperate measures that leave them vulnerable to violence, human trafficking, and exploitation by smugglers.³⁸¹ In a particularly brutal example, at least four women who were reportedly deported from Puerto Rico were found beheaded near the Haitian-Dominican border in January, and are believed to be victims of trafficking networks.³⁸² Dominican officials sometimes act as both deporters and smugglers, taking bribes to allow recently deported Haitians back into the country and furthering a vicious cycle of abuse.³⁸³

VIII. Failures of the international community to respect the rights of Haitians

This reporting period has offered a stark illustration of the longstanding patterns of foreign engagement in Haiti that prioritize short-term security responses while ignoring Haitian sovereignty and human rights. These patterns – both old and new – influenced the collapse of Haiti's transitional government. The international community's focus on bolstering what has been an ineffective and increasingly militarized response at the expense of humanitarian assistance and support for good governance likewise continues to undermine prospects for peace and constitutional order.³⁸⁴ Persistent foreign pressure to hold elections, even as the security situation deteriorates further and despite the lack of government credibility to hold them, threaten to further destabilize the governance crisis.³⁸⁵

- After two years of dysfunctional governance that was the predictable consequence of foreign interference in Haiti's transitional process in 2024,³⁸⁶ Haiti's international partners, particularly the

United States, are once again interfering in Haiti's internal politics in ways that undermine institutional legitimacy and enable government dysfunction.³⁸⁷ As the end of the TPC's mandate approached on February 7, the transitional government remained plagued by infighting and corruption, and had failed to meet any of the established benchmarks for a smooth transition of power.³⁸⁸ In the jockeying for power as the mandate expired, the U.S. government and its allies insisted that Prime Minister Fils-Aimé stay in power despite substantial Haitian civil society organizing to present an alternative government that would prevent such an extreme consolidation of power,³⁸⁹ going as far as issuing threats against those who would oppose Fils-Aimé's continued rule.³⁹⁰ This support for Fils-Aimé came despite his lack of a constitutional mandate to remain in office beyond February 7 and notwithstanding concerns about what consolidating power in one person would mean for good government in Haiti.³⁹¹ The U.S. government subsequently imposed visa restrictions against five TPC members, apparently as punishment for attempting to oust Fils-Aimé.³⁹² In the days before February 7, the United States deployed a warship and two U.S. Coast Guard vessels to the Bay of Port-au-Prince, stating that it was a reflection of its "unwavering commitment to Haiti's security, stability and brighter future,"³⁹³ but perceived as a threat to use force if its preferred transition outcome was not accepted.³⁹⁴

- International actors have converted the MSS – which, as predicted by Haitian civil society, failed to materially improve the security situation and drained resources³⁹⁵ – into a more militarized and independent "Gang Suppression Force"³⁹⁶ that many experts say still lacks the resources, credibility, and strategy necessary to sustainably reduce violence in Haiti.³⁹⁷ The GSF does not appear to materially solve the fundamental flaws that contributed to MSS failure.³⁹⁸ Funding for the force is split between voluntary contributions and UN assessed contributions,³⁹⁹ but still falls far short of what is needed,⁴⁰⁰ especially given that the GSF is planned to deploy at five times the size of the MSS.⁴⁰¹ Countries appear reluctant to contribute funding.⁴⁰² Although GSF officials state they are confident the majority of the proposed 5,500 personnel will be deployed by summer 2026,⁴⁰³ as of the end of January 2026 – four months into the GSF's one year (renewable) mandate – fewer than 1,000 officers have been deployed, most of whom were already in Haiti as part of the MSS.⁴⁰⁴ The GSF marks a shift away from supporting Haitian institutions, and notably is authorized to work independently of the PNH.⁴⁰⁵ While U.S. officials claim this will give the force greater freedom to go after armed groups,⁴⁰⁶ experts wonder how GSF troops – who do not speak French or Haitian Creole – will be able to operate on the ground without the police.⁴⁰⁷ There are also significant concerns about the GSF's intended strategy and the lack of transparency around the mission's command structure and engagement protocols.⁴⁰⁸ The GSF faces the same challenges as the MSS in terms of compliance and accountability,⁴⁰⁹ and, as of writing, has no operational structure for ensuring these objectives – but has more opportunities for abuse given its more robust mandate.⁴¹⁰ The lack of sufficient gender considerations in its mandate relative to that of the MSS raises additional concerns about inability to protect and serve or even abuses against women and girls.⁴¹¹
- High-volume arms trafficking from outside Haiti, which produces no weapons or ammunitions of its own and has been subject to an arms embargo since 2023,⁴¹² remains a significant driver of insecurity.⁴¹³ Most weapons continue to come from the United States.⁴¹⁴ U.S. authorities have undertaken some measures to stem the flow of weapons and prosecute traffickers,⁴¹⁵ but these remain insufficient. Insecurity, capacity constraints, and widespread corruption⁴¹⁶ continue to impede efforts by Haitian authorities to intercept arms shipments and prosecute perpetrators.⁴¹⁷
- International actors have continued to sanction Haitian individuals accused of corruption or collusion with armed groups,⁴¹⁸ several of which remain under U.S. terrorism designations.⁴¹⁹ Haitian and foreign governments have generally failed to prosecute sanctioned individuals, which has limited the sanctions' impact on armed groups.⁴²⁰ Even when foreign governments do prosecute sanctioned individuals, it is not always impactful. For example, armed group leader Jimmy Chérizier, who has been under U.S. sanctions since 2020 and was indicted by the U.S. government in August 2025,⁴²¹ remains free and continues to perpetrate abuses in Haiti.⁴²² Some international actors also remain reluctant to sanction many of the key political figures ultimately responsible for Haiti's current crisis, instead imposing visa restrictions and asset freezes on armed group members who do not travel or have bank accounts.⁴²³ In addition to having limited positive impact, these sanctions risk further destabilizing Haiti's economy, disrupting deliveries of essential goods, and impeding foreign assistance by creating risks for foreign engagement with Haiti.⁴²⁴ Recent politicized U.S. sanctions are also contributing to Haiti's protracted governance crisis.⁴²⁵
- This reporting period has seen a further sharp decline in already-inadequate humanitarian assistance to Haiti, even as needs continue to surge.⁴²⁶ The 2025 humanitarian aid basket for Haiti was just 26.2%

funded,⁴²⁷ representing a significant decrease from previous years.⁴²⁸ This is largely due to continuing massive cuts to U.S. foreign aid, which previously funded about two-thirds of Haiti's humanitarian basket.⁴²⁹ New expansions to the U.S. Global Gag Rule further restrict assistance to organizations that provide abortion care or operate on gender-affirming and diversity, equity, and inclusion frameworks, with potentially devastating impacts on women's health and well-being, as well as that of others with marginalized identities.⁴³⁰ The dramatic decline in foreign assistance has already disrupted aid operations in Haiti,⁴³¹ with food assistance especially affected.⁴³² These disruptions have disastrous humanitarian, security, and economic consequences⁴³³ and are damaging the population's trust in humanitarian actors.⁴³⁴ The rising insecurity continues to complicate aid delivery and endanger staff, and has forced some aid organizations to entirely cease operations in certain areas.⁴³⁵ Diversion by armed groups of cash assistance intended for populations under their control is also a common occurrence, particularly in the insecure areas where humanitarian assistance is most needed.⁴³⁶ These acute challenges are happening in the broader context of longstanding harmful aid practices that continue to impede Haiti's development, even as they purport to help.⁴³⁷

- BINUH's mandate was renewed on January 29, 2026⁴³⁸ with significant changes that strip away focus on and commitment to human rights. The United States, which dominated the mandate negotiation process, pushed through "a reduced mandate" over the objection of other UN Security Council members.⁴³⁹ The new mandate removes all uses of the word "gender" and replaces references to "gender-based violence" with "sexual violence against women, men, and children."⁴⁴⁰ The United States similarly overruled efforts to keep language emphasizing inclusivity and the participation of women and youth as core principles for any political process,⁴⁴¹ as well as the usual qualifiers "free and fair" in relation to elections in Haiti.⁴⁴² More generally, the new mandate no longer specifies gender considerations and child protection as cross-cutting issues requiring distinct expertise in the form of gender and child protection advisors.⁴⁴³ These changes exclude consideration of broader gendered harms beyond sexual violence, including discrimination,⁴⁴⁴ and more generally represent a fundamental shift away from supporting inclusive national dialogue and addressing GBV.⁴⁴⁵

Notes

¹ The underlying dynamics are discussed in previous IJDH Updates. See IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, note 17 and associated text, p. 13 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – December 2024*, p. 13 (Dec. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/December-2024-Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – June 2024*, pp. 2, 13-14 (Jun. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments-December-2023-through-May-2024.pdf>.

² IJDH previously documented the pressure exerted by foreign actors, primarily by the U.S. government and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), to shape the April 2024 Accord and resulting government and to impose a foreign military intervention. See IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, p. 13, notes 17, 459 and associated text (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – June 2024*, note 545-552 and associated text (Jun. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments-December-2023-through-May-2024.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – December 2023*, note 453 and associated text (Dec. 2023), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/IJDH-HRU-Dec.-2023-12.11-FINAL.pdf>; Mario Joseph, Brian Concannon & Kristina Fried, *Resisting U.S. Imperialism in Haiti: CARICOM's Role*, *Stabroek News* (Jan. 27, 2025), https://www.stabroeknews.com/2025/01/27/features/in-the-diaspora/resisting-u-s-imperialism-in-haiti-caricom-role/#google_vignette.

³ See, e.g., Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti's New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti>; Jacqueline Charles, *Decrees in Haiti make it difficult to prosecute corrupt officials, erode press freedom*, *Miami Herald* (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314766071.html> (“It was a period of significant corruption and depletion of the public coffers, with little action to help the population in general and women and girls in particular.”) (*internal quotations omitted*).

⁴ The crisis is rooted in a long-standing pattern of foreign policies on Haiti - from the Independence Ransom that France extorted in 1825 to current migration policies seeking to quarantine all Haitians inside the crisis - that prioritize short-term solutions serving foreign agendas while destabilizing Haiti and impoverishing Haitians. For a detailed overview of some of these patterns, see Sandra Wisner & Brian Concannon, *Debt and Dependence: Foreign Interference in Haiti and the Importance of Non-State Actor Accountability*, *Northwestern Human Rights Journal* (2023), <https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol21/iss3/1/>; Brian Concannon Jr., Kristina Fried & Sasha Filippova, *Restitution for Haiti, Reparations for All: Haiti's Place in the Global Reparations Movement*, *University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* (2023), <https://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol55/iss1/6/>; Willie Mack, *Haitians at the Border: The Nativist State and Anti-Blackness*, *Harvard Carr Center* (Mar. 19, 2025), <https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr-ryan/our-work/carr-ryan-commentary/haitians-border-nativist-state-and-anti-blackness>.

⁵ Under the April 2024 Accord, the transitional government was obligated to create (i) an independent electoral council chosen by a broad spectrum of Haitian society; (ii) a national security council responsible for defining and supervising any international security assistance; (iii) a Truth, Justice, and Reparations Commission; and (iv) an oversight body. It accomplished just one of those obligations – the formation of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) – which was criticized for lack of transparency and has not succeeded in holding elections on a timeline envisioned by the Accord. Similarly, joint security operations by the MSS and Haitian state security forces did not materially improve the security situation, including as demonstrated by the revision of the electoral timeline (see note 15). See IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf> (Jul. 2025), note 10; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – December 2024*, (Dec. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/December-2024-Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments.pdf> (Dec. 2024), pp. 2, 13; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf> (Jul. 2025), note 9 and associated text, p. 13.

⁶ See notes 386-394; Colette Lespinasse, *Haiti: Le Premier Ministre Alix D. Fils-Aimé Assume Désormais Tous les Pouvoirs*, *Coordination Europe Haiti* (Feb. 19, 2026), <https://www.coeht.eu/fr/haiti-le-premier-ministre-alix-d-fils-aime-assume-desormais-tous-les-pouvoirs-sans-aucun-partage/> (reporting on observers describing the dynamic as a “soft coup”); see also Jake Johnston, *Private Sector Assumes Control of Haitian State*, *CEPR* (Aug. 18, 2025), <https://cepr.net/publications/private-sector-assumes-control-of-haitian-state/> (discussing Fils-Aimé’s ties to Washington and DC-based lobbyists).

⁷ Fils-Aimé was appointed Prime Minister on November 11, 2025 by the now-defunct TPC pursuant to authorities derived from the April 2024 Agreement. As such, he had no separate authority to remain in office beyond February 7, when the transitional government’s mandate expired. Francklyn B. Geffrard, *Pacte National de Stabilisation: Nécessaire ou Institutionnalisation d'une Transition sans Fin?*, *Rhinews* (Feb. 22, 2026), <https://www.rhinews.com/opinion/pacte-national-stabilisation-necessaire-ou-institutionnalisation-dune-transition-sans-fin/>; COEH, *Haiti: Le Premier Ministre Alix D. Fils-Aimé Assume Désormais Tous les Pouvoirs*, <https://www.coeht.eu/fr/haiti-le-premier-ministre-alix-d-fils-aime-assume-desormais-tous-les-pouvoirs-sans-aucun-partage/> (“According to statements from diplomatic representatives who share the same views as the Americans, Mr. Fils-Aimé represents a guarantee for the continuation of efforts to achieve security in Haiti. But they forget that Mr. Fils-Aimé has already been in power for a year, and his record is just as negative as that of the CPT, which resigned. Indeed, during his time as prime minister, numerous communities fell into the hands of gangs, several massacres were perpetrated, and the number of children recruited into gangs, violence against women and girls, forced displacements, and so on, has significantly increased.”).

⁸ A broad coalition operating under the banner of the “*Consensus Politique pour le Redressement National de la Transition*” formally rejected the Pact. The coalition was joined by the Montana Accord and *Petit Dessalines* groups, both of which held seats on the TPC. The Montana Accord notably emerged as a political consensus movement in 2021 with broad support from civil society and political groups and put forward its own mechanism for government transition and addressing structural injustices; it ultimately joined the TPC in 2024, after being reportedly sidelined in U.S.-backed transition efforts. Vant Bèf Info, *Haiti : une*

coalition politique rejette le “Pacte national” et appelle à une transition refondatrice (Mar. 3, 2026), <https://vantbefinfo.com/haiti-une-coalition-politique-rejette-le-pacte-national-et-appelle-a-une-transition-refondatrice/>; Rhinews, *Des organisations haïtiennes dénoncent un « Pacte pour la stabilité et les élections » qu’elles jugent illégal et téléguédé de l’étranger...* (Feb. 26, 2026), <https://www.rhinews.com/politique/des-organisations-haitiennes-denoncent-un-pacte-pour-la-stabilite-et-les-elections-queles-jugent-illegal-et-teleguede-de-letranger/>; John Fritz Moreau, *Crise politique : plusieurs forces nationales rejettent le Pacte et contestent la gouvernance actuelle*, Juno7 (Mar. 3, 2026), <https://www.juno7.ht/crise-politique-rejet-pacte-national-haiti/>; Juhakenson Blaise, *Haitian political actors sign pact for stability and elections, approve Fils-Aimé’s leadership*, Haitian Times (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/02/24/haitian-political-actors-signed-a-pact/> (Pitit Dessalines called the pact “a blatant fraud that legalizes illegality”); see also Alterpresse, *The Montana Accord’s leadership criticize TPC and PM Fils-Aimé, advocate for “a real alternative” to save Haiti*, The Canada-Haiti Information Project (Dec. 5, 2024), <https://canada-haiti.ca/content/montana-accords-leadership-criticize-tpc-and-pm-fils-aime-advocate-real-alternative-save> (in November 2024, the Montana Accord condemned the Fils-Aimé government as protested “tainted by the same illegitimacy, the same opacity, the same flaws and the same conflicts of particular interest, in opposition to the national interest”); IJDH, *Human Rights Update – June 2022*, pp. 1-2 (Jun. 2022), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/IJDH-Human-Rights-Update-June-2022.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – December 2022*, p. 1 (Dec. 2022), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/HRU-December-2022-FINAL.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – June 2023*, p. 12 (Jun. 2023), https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/HRU-June-2023-FINAL_updated-8.14.pdf; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – December 2023*, p. 12 (Dec. 2023), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/IJDH-HRU-Dec.-2023-12.11-FINAL.pdf>.

⁹ *Pacte National Pour La Stabilité et l’Organisation des Elections*, available at <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yYCxTM7jYeMYcTT6KRD6d8b41ZNvxU6c/view>.

¹⁰ Critics say the 2026 Pact – the fourth transitional agreement since the assassination of President Moïse in 2021 – is yet another iteration of the three that preceded it. “It speaks of stability. It invokes the separation of powers. But in its substance, it concentrates the executive branch, frames the constitutional reform outside the usual procedures, and organizes the transition under the aegis of the same actors. An endless cycle. Successive agreements, weakened institutions, circumvented norms, worsened poverty.” Rezo Nodwes, *Texte complet du 4ème accord post-mardi gras 2026, même scénario, nouveau nom* (Feb. 22, 2026), <https://reznodwes.com/2026/02/texte-complet-du-4e-accord-post-mardi-gras-2026-meme-scenario-nouveau-nom/> (describing the TPC as having been “paralyzed by its internal contradictions,” resulting in “persistent instability, institutional fragmentation, and a lack of coherent authority”). The 2026 Pact directly contradicts Haiti’s Constitution, which provides for a dual executive, by putting executive power solely in the hands of Fils-Aimé and his Council of Ministers. It gives this unitary executive an open-ended mandate, on a timeline terminated only by the holding of elections (art. 3). It envisions a Consultative Committee, charged with supporting the implementation of the transitional government’s mandate pursuant to the Pact and replacing the head of state if this becomes necessary (arts. 20-21, 26). Its membership is to be limited to Pact signatories (art. 22), meaning civil society voices who had rejected the agreement (see note 8) will be excluded from shaping Haiti’s future. As with the previous transitional governments – whose members were screened based on their acquiescence to the deployment of the MSS, which had been strongly opposed by most of Haitian civil society (see IJDH, *Human Rights Update – June 2024*, note 550 and associated text (Jun. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments-December-2023-through-May-2024.pdf>) implicit acceptance of an international military intervention is written into the 2026 Pact (art. 9 stipulates that “[t]he Government shall define the protocol for cooperation between the national security forces and the Gang Suppression Force”). See also Francklyn B. Geffard, *Pacte National de Stabilisation: Nécessaire ou Institutionnalisation d’une Transition sans Fin?*, Rhinews (Feb. 22, 2026), <https://www.rhinews.com/opinion/pacte-national-stabilisation-necessaire-ou-institutionnalisation-dune-transition-sans-fin/>; Vant Bèf Info, *Haïti : une coalition politique rejette le “Pacte national” et appelle à une transition refondatrice*, (Mar. 3, 2026), <https://vantbefinfo.com/haiti-une-coalition-politique-rejette-le-pacte-national-et-appelle-a-une-transition-refondatrice/> (the *Consensus Politique pour le Redressement National de la Transition* coalition says the Pact is “based neither on a genuine inclusive national consensus nor on a solid legal foundation and cannot guarantee political stability or the organization of credible elections”); John Fritz Moreau, *Crise politique : plusieurs forces nationales rejettent le Pacte et contestent la gouvernance actuelle*, Juno7 (Mar. 3, 2026), <https://www.juno7.ht/crise-politique-rejet-pacte-national-haiti/> (critics characterized the National Pact as a “circumstantial arrangement concluded between weakened political actors” which, “in the absence of an inclusive national consensus and a consolidated institutional framework, cannot guarantee the organization of free, credible, and transparent elections”).

¹¹ Jake Johnston, *Private Sector Assumes Control of Haitian State*, CEPR (Aug. 18, 2025), <https://cepr.net/publications/private-sector-assumes-control-of-haitian-state/> (Aug. 18, 2025); Haitiwire, *Who Is Alix Didier Fils-Aimé? Haiti’s New Interim Prime Minister*, <https://haitiwire.com/who-is-alix-didier-fils-aime-haitis-new-interim-prime-minister/> (last visited Mar. 11, 2026); BelPolitik, *Little Known Fact: Alix Didier Fils-Aimé was Considered for Prime Minister of Haiti on Multiple Occasions*, <https://www.belpolitik.com/blog/alix-didier-fils-aime-prime-minister-journey.html> (last visited Mar. 11, 2026). Civil society and political organizations have also raised concerns about two contracts signed by the new transitional government: one is a new border and maritime security contract worth over US\$500 million with a company called Evergreen Trading System Limited, and the other is a US\$6 billion contract with a company called Metric Correctional Facility S.A. for the rental of three prisons to be built in Haiti (the Haitian government will bear the cost of construction for the prisons). Both contracts lack a legitimate institutional basis and violate principles of national sovereignty. Vant Bèf Info, *Haïti : une coalition politique rejette le “Pacte national” et appelle à une transition refondatrice* (Mar. 3, 2026), <https://vantbefinfo.com/haiti-une-coalition-politique-rejette-le-pacte-national-et-appelle-a-une-transition-refondatrice/>; Fondasyon Je Klere (FJKL), *Liquidation de la souveraineté nationale via des contrats léonins : La Fondasyon Je Klere (FJKL) crie au scandale* (Mar. 2026), <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fyau3xLmrs-xd6QpCX3Lpr31N6FYmgJLFTGKy0KLRrKE/edit?tab=t.0> (noting that “the sovereign functions of the state [which include internal security and public order, external security, taxation and currency] cannot be delegated by the public authorities to the private sector”).

¹² See, e.g., Jacqueline Charles, *Decrees in Haiti make it difficult to prosecute corrupt officials, erode press freedom*, Miami Herald (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314766071.html> (reporting that Fils-Aimé has not “revoke[ed] a controversial decree [that according to anti-corruption and human rights advocates] makes it nearly impossible to prosecute former senior government officials, including members of the country’s recently disbanded Transitional Presidential Council.”); notes 151, 176-177. Also being kept in place at the time of writing, and against advocacy by Haitian civil society, is “a decree authorizing prison terms for journalists convicted of criminal defamation.” Jacqueline Charles, *Decrees in Haiti make it difficult to prosecute corrupt officials, erode press freedom*, Miami Herald (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314766071.html>; note 151.

¹³ See notes 127, 176-177.

¹⁴ The underlying dynamics are discussed in previous IJDH Updates. See IJDH, *Human Rights Update – June 2024*, p. 2 (Jun. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments-December-2023-through-May-2024.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, p. 2 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>. For a short recent summation, see @ceprdc, X (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://x.com/ceprdc/status/2016890114526363936?s=20>; Cylindr Magazine, *Hope in Haiti* (Feb. 13, 2026), <https://cylindrmag.substack.com/p/hope-in-haiti>.

¹⁵ On November 14, 2025, the CEP submitted to the executive a complete electoral calendar along with a draft electoral decree, formally proposing August 30, 2026 as the target date for the first round of general elections. The TPC then published the new Electoral Decree in *Le Moniteur* on December 1, formally setting August 30, 2026 as Election Day for the first round, with final first-round results scheduled for October 3, 2026. The second round of elections is scheduled for December 5, 2026. Juhakenson Blaise, *Haiti elections ‘impossible’ by 2026 government turnover deadline | Breaking News*, The Haitian Times (Nov. 04, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/04/haiti-elections-impossible-for-2026-turnover/>; Jovani Davis, *Haiti Publishes Revised Electoral Calendar, Sets August 2026 Election Dates*, Caribbean National Weekly (Dec. 26, 2025), <https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/news/haiti-publishes-revised-electoral-calendar-sets-august-2026-election-dates/>. On February 27, the CEP announced a registration period for political parties for March 2-12. AlterPresse, *Haiti – Elections: Période d’Inscription des Partis Politiques du 2 au 12 Mars 2026* (Mar. 2, 2026), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Elections-Periode-d-inscription-des-partis-politiques-du-2-au-12-mars-2026-sur-fond-d-operations-policieres>; Rezo Nodwes, *Texte complet du 4ème accord post-mardi gras 2026, même scénario, nouveau nom* (Feb. 22, 2026), <https://reznodwes.com/2026/02/texte-complet-du-4e-accord-post-mardi-gras-2026-meme-scenario-nouveau-nom/>. The short timeline for registration raises concerns that it unfairly advantages political parties that had already been meeting together and coordinating around Pact negotiations for the preceding two weeks, over those who were excluded from or boycotted those negotiations. See note 8.

¹⁶ The timeline for holding elections was moved to August 2026 after the CEP said it would be “materially impossible” to hold elections prior to February 7, 2026. Juhakenson Blaise, *Haiti elections ‘impossible’ by 2026 government turnover deadline | Breaking News*, The Haitian Times (Nov. 04, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/04/haiti-elections-impossible-for-2026-turnover/>; Jovani Davis, *Haiti Publishes Revised Electoral Calendar, Sets August 2026 Election Dates*, Caribbean National Weekly (Dec. 26, 2025), <https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/news/haiti-publishes-revised-electoral-calendar-sets-august-2026-election-dates/>.

¹⁷ In particular, observers have noted the security forces’ inability to liberate main roads from armed group control and concerns about the new transitional government’s capacity to maintain “institutional neutrality and strict adherence to fundamental norms.” Rezo Nodwes, *Texte complet du 4ème accord post-mardi gras 2026, même scénario, nouveau nom* (Feb. 22, 2026), <https://reznodwes.com/2026/02/texte-complet-du-4e-accord-post-mardi-gras-2026-meme-scenario-nouveau-nom/>; AlterPresse, *Haiti – Elections: Période d’Inscription des Partis Politiques du 2 au 12 Mars 2026* (Mar. 2, 2026), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Elections-Periode-d-inscription-des-partis-politiques-du-2-au-12-mars-2026-sur-fond-d-operations-policiere>. Compounding these concerns, the United States has continued to put pressure on the transitional government to hold elections even as it orchestrated the removal of “free and fair” language from provisions on electoral support in BINUH’s new mandate; and there are no bars on running in elections for individuals subject to foreign sanctions for their financing of armed groups. Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance*, p. 36 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf>; see also notes 438-445.

¹⁸ The previous transitional government suspended the constitutional review process in October 2025, following “growing criticism over the plan’s illegality and illegitimacy, financial waste, corruption, political distractions and the lack of progress on the country’s most urgent priorities — security, humanitarian relief, healthcare and elections.” Juhakenson Blaise, *Haiti leaders abandon costly effort to replace 1987 Constitution*, The Haitian Times (Oct. 13, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/10/13/haiti-constitutional-referendum/>; see also IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, note 8 and associated text (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>.

¹⁹ The 2026 Pact allows a non-elected transitional executive to initiate, “during this exceptional period, a limited number of” constitutional changes, which would then be submitted for popular ratification during the first round of elections (arts. 13-16). This “entrusts the initiative for constitutional reforms to an unelected interim government. . . [and] merges the electoral process and constitutional consultation, blurring the lines between electing representatives and approving a new institutional framework.” Francklyn B. Geffrard, *Pacte National de Stabilisation: Nécessaire ou Institutionnalisation d’une Transition sans Fin?*, Rhinews (Feb. 22, 2026), <https://www.rhinews.com/opinion/pacte-national-stabilisation-necessaire-ou-institutionnalisation-dune-transition-sans-fin/> (publishing analysis by journalist Francklyn Geffrard); see also Rezo Nodwes, *Texte complet du 4ème accord post-mardi gras 2026, même scénario, nouveau nom* (Feb. 22, 2026), <https://reznodwes.com/2026/02/texte-complet-du-4e-accord-post-mardi-gras-2026-meme-scenario-nouveau-nom/>.

²⁰ IJDH documented the dynamics that led to Haiti’s crisis, including state capture, the deliberate dismantling of democratic institutions, and systemic impunity, in its previous Updates. See IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, pp. 2, 14 (Jul. 2025),

<https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – December 2023*, pp. 1, 11-12 (Dec. 2023), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/IJDH-HRU-Dec.-2023-12.11-FINAL.pdf>.

²¹ See, e.g., Francklyn B. Geffard, *Pacte National de Stabilisation: Nécessaire ou Institutionnalisation d'une Transition sans Fin?*, Rhinews (Feb. 22, 2026), <https://www.rhinews.com/opinion/pacte-national-stabilisation-necessaire-ou-institutionnalisation-dune-transition-sans-fin/>.

²² For example, in an opinion denying the Trump administration's motion to dismiss a lawsuit challenging the administration's termination of Temporary Protected Status for Haitians, U.S. federal judge Ana C. Reyes said "there is no evidence or reason to believe that the GSF will succeed anytime soon given the failed prior interventions." U.S. District Court, *Court Filing*, p. 57, <https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2025cv02471/283214/124/0.pdf?ts=1770116031>.

²³ See notes 395-411.

²⁴ For an overview of the ways in which the GSF-established UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) and BINUH mandates are complementary, see YouTube, *YouTube Video*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JwDgOv31Dk>.

²⁵ Most notably, the GSF is now authorized to operate independently of the Haitian National Police (PNH), which increases the risk for abuses even as the GSF faces the same compliance and oversight challenges as the MSS, and its mandate has no mention of "gender" or inclusivity. See notes 405-407.

²⁶ See 226-227, 430.

²⁷ See notes 412-417.

²⁸ "[T]he use of drones appears to be less of a strategic asset and more of an escalation of the militarization of public security policies – once again, without the necessary coordination between the various police units." GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, p. 20 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf>; see also notes 106-124.

²⁹ See notes 112-115, 137-138.

³⁰ See, e.g., UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶ 30 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32>; see also notes 120-121.

³¹ See, e.g., BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 3 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (62% of people killed between October and December 2025 were killed during security-force operations against armed groups); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)* (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20%20E%20%80%93%20September%202025%29.pdf> (61% of people killed between July and September 2025 were killed during security-force operations against armed groups); see also note 83.

³² According to the UNODC, "[t]ogether, the expansion of private security companies and the mutation of vigilante groups risk deepening fragmentation within the Haitian security environment, multiplying the number of actors with coercive power and eroding the State's monopoly on the use of force." See, e.g., UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶ 30 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32>. IJDH has documented this dynamic in its previous Updates. See IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, pp. 2-3, 5, 6 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – December 2024*, pp. 4, 5 (Dec. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/December-2024-Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments.pdf>.

³³ For good overviews, see GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis* (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/from-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-addressing-haitis-escalating-crisis/>; GI-TOC, *The Weaponization of Displacement by Gangs in Haiti* (Jul. 16, 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/the-weaponization-of-displacement-by-gangs-in-haiti/> (noting "homicide rates placing Haiti among the most violent nations in Latin America and the Caribbean."); see also IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025* (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>.

³⁴ The *Viv Ansanm* coalition was first formed in September 2023, then rebranded in February 2024 to launch coordinated attacks against the government and other targets, which precipitated the resignation of *de facto* Prime Minister Ariel Henry. The coalition is made up of armed groups that continue to operate separately but come together at points for coordinated attacks. According to reporting by GI-TOC, *Viv Ansanm* has grown more cohesive over the past year, and recent tensions among factions have underscored the coalition's "capacity to manage disputes through structured coordination and negotiated restraint." GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, pp. 12, 14 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf>; see also UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶¶ 5-7, 9-10 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32> (discussing the evolution of armed group alliances, specific group alliances, and dynamics within the *Viv Ansanm* coalition); Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance*, (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf>; UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶¶ 31, 57 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597>; UNODC, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti* (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer-organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs> (noting the transformation more generally of

armed groups in Haiti from “fragmented, neighborhood vigilantes who committed sporadic violent acts” to “larger criminal coalitions that control a considerable part of the country”).

³⁵ GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, p. 12 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (“The [*Viv Asnanm*] coalition currently maintains uninterrupted control over more than 100 cumulative kilometres – from Gressier, through Port-au-Prince, to Ganthier in the west and Arcahaie in the north.”).

³⁶ See notes 246, 305.

³⁷ See ACLED, *Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti's Security Landscape* (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape> (discussing the “marriage police-population” between police and “defense” groups); AlterPresse, *Haiti – Sécurité: Drones Kamikazes, Saisies d'Armes, Fuite et Retour Fragile* (Jan. 14, 2026), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Securite-Drones-kamikazes-saisies-d-armes-fuite-et-retour-fragile-dans/> (“[R]esidents, facing chronic insecurity, prolonged absence of the state and constant fear of reprisals, are allegedly forced to coexist with members of armed gangs. In this context of survival, seemingly unarmed civilians would collaborate with criminals, providing information, logistical support or various services, contributing unwittingly or knowingly to the consolidation of territorial control of armed gangs and further blurring the line between populations taken hostage and dynamics of criminal domination.”); GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, pp. 5, 17, 19 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (discussing the “the transformation of the concept of the ‘enemy’ in Haiti. . . . [where] residing in or originating from an area controlled by a gang or a brigade is enough to be labelled a suspect or affiliate of one side, justifying reprisals. . . . and foster[ing] a climate where violence against civilians is normalized”); Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti police raids trigger deadly gang clashes, cutting off medical care in Port-au-Prince*, Miami Herald (Jan. 9, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314253147.html>.

³⁸ ACLED, *Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti's Security Landscape* (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape> (“[S]elf-defense activity continues to take place outside of a legal framework that weak institutions have failed to provide, raising concerns as some of these groups have started to drift into patterns of abuse, politicization, or semi-criminal behavior, which could deepen insecurity rather than resolve it. . . . The current security landscape remains highly critical and fragmented, further complicating any path toward long-lasting peace.”); Americas Quarterly, *Haiti's Political Crisis Deepens Amid a Slide into Criminal Governance* (Feb. 2, 2026), <https://americasquarterly.org/article/haitis-political-crisis-deepens-amid-a-slide-into-criminal-governance/> (“Human rights experts warn that the expansion of private security in fragile settings can blur chains of command, weaken accountability, and erode the state’s already thin monopoly on force.”); UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶¶ 29-30 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32> (“[T]he scale and fragmentation of these actors exceed the State’s capacity to effectively regulate, monitor or respond to their activities.”); Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti's New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti> (UN Independent Expert on Human Rights in Haiti: “You have this whole mosaic of violent people using lethal force: the Haitian National Police, this new force, the gangs, the self-defence groups, and then the private military and their drones and snipers. That makes it even more volatile, it's not predictable at all.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, pp. 2, 5 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (“While brigades are seen as indispensable, growing state dependence on them risks normalizing outsourcing to armed civilians, with the added danger that some brigades may evolve into criminal groups. . . . Haiti is increasingly trapped in cycles of revenge and inter-communal violence targeting civilians. This phenomenon is both a symptom and a consequence of escalating clashes between gangs, police and self-defence brigades.”); see also Jason Motlagh, *The Last Man Standing in Haiti*, Rolling Stone (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/haiti-jean-ernest-muscadin-1235475798/> (“The deployment of private military companies is . . . destined to be ill-fated because ‘they are in it for the money — they are not coming to die,’ [retired Haitian army officer Himmler] Rebu asserts. . . . ‘They will play cat and mouse as long as they can because the longer the problem lasts, the longer they can stay and profit. It’s a commercial and political transaction they’ve made, but it will not produce results.’”).

³⁹ Within the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, communes and neighborhoods including Kenscoff, Cité Soleil, Cabaret, Croix-des-Bouquets, Bel Air, Delmas, and Pacot have been particularly impacted. Beyond Port-au-Prince, armed groups have expanded into the commune of Arcahaie and the towns of Bercy and Malpasse (near the border with the Dominican Republic). See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 8-9 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf; AP, *Gangs Force Doctors Without Borders Clinic Closure in Haiti* (Jan. 8, 2026), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gangs-doctors-without-borders-clinic-msf-52eb140ee9185c983eb4a03eb2bf9f>; AlterPresse, *Haiti – Plusieurs Personnes Assassinées et Blessées par Balles* (Dec. 29, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Plusieurs-personnes-assassinees-et-blessees-par-balles-dans-de-nouvelles>; Jacqueline Charles, *Special representative named for U.S. backed-Gang Suppression Force in Haiti*, Miami Herald (Dec. 2, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313313420.html?giftCode=8a3dadca960f20562c76b300557c0bed596366da81c2b23241b9be2a5689d3f3>; Jean Daniel Senat, *Bercy Faces Ongoing Armed Assaults for the Third Consecutive Week*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 1, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262165/bercy-faces-ongoing-armed-assaults-for-the-third-consecutive-week>; AP, *Haitian Police Use Armored Vehicle to Battle Gangs in Kenscoff* (Sep. 15, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gangs-armored-vehicle-kenscoff-labodri-cda2b7718453d9d0ec05e7a4de4cff2a>; Juhakenson Blaise, *Kenya-led security mission officials*

hopeful for a UN-funded mission in Haiti by October, *The Haitian Times* (25 Aug. 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/25/haiti-mission-new-fully-funded-force-october/>; Juhakenson Blaise, *US Embassy in Haiti resumes service after closure due to nearby violence*, *The Haitian Times* (6 Aug. 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/06/us-embassy-in-haiti-resumes-service-after-closure-due-to-nearby-violence/>; UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶ 6-7 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420>; see also *The Guardian, Haiti: Armed Gangs Attack Artibonite Region* (Dec. 1, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/01/haiti-armed-gangs-attack-artibonite> (a representative of one of Haiti's police unions, SPNH-17, said that “[l]osing the country's 2 largest departments – West and Artibonite – is the greatest security failure in modern Haitian history”) (*internal quotations omitted*).

⁴⁰ Armed group expansion into the Artibonite Department has been an escalating dynamic for at least five years, with Haitian police estimating that armed groups now control about half of the Artibonite region. During this reporting period, armed groups – primarily *Gran Grif*, *Kokorat San Ras*, *Taliban*, and *Délugé* – carried out repeated attacks in the communes of Dessalines, Gros-Morne, La Chapelle, L'Estère, Liancourt, Montrouis, Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, Saint-Marc, and Verrette, and the town of Pont-Sondé. See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 10 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf; BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 16 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf>; Fenel Péliissier et al., *Pourquoi la police n'arrive-t-elle pas à stopper les gangs dans l'Artibonite*, *AyiboPost* (Dec. 6, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pourquoi-la-police-narrive-t-elle-pas-a-stopper-les-gangs-dans-lartibonite/>; *The Guardian, Hundreds flee central Haiti after gangs launch large-scale attacks and burn homes* (Dec. 1, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/01/haiti-armed-gangs-attack-artibonite>; Louis Chadrac, *Savien Gang Launches New Assault on Pont-Sondé*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 1, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262129/savien-gang-launches-new-assault-on-pont-sonde>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 9 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20%20-%20September%202025%29.pdf>; Jérôme Wendy Norestyl & Wethzer Piercin, *Artibonite: Rice Farmers Lose Everything as Gnags Toch Rice Plantations*, *AyiboPost* (Nov. 1, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/gangs-set-fire-to-grain-depots-and-agricultural-plantations-in-artibonite/>; UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, S/2025/641, ¶ 13 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641>; UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶¶ 31, 51-57 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597>; *Le Nouvelliste, Le Nouvelliste Article*, (Sep. 22, 2025), https://lenouvelliste.com/article/260101/nouvelle-attaque-du-gang-kokorat-sans-ras-non-loin-de-lestere#google_vignette (Sep. 22, 2025); (*Le Nouvelliste, Le Nouvelliste Article*, (25 Aug. 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/259259/six-people-killed-in-latest-gros-morne-gang-assault>, (25 Aug. 2025); see also IOM, *Haiti: Report on the Internal Displacement Situation – Round 12 (December 2025)*, (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true> (noting a 77% increase in the Artibonite Department over the last year); GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (Sep. 2025), p. 9 (noting significant expansion into the Artibonite and Center Departments between march and August 2025).

⁴¹ The communes of Mirebalais (which has been occupied by armed groups since they attacked in March 2025), Belladère, Saut-d'Eau, and La Chapelle are especially impacted. BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 10 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20%20-%20September%202025%29.pdf>; UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, S/2025/641, ¶ 17 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641>; UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶¶ 31, 51-57 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597>; Juhakenson Blaise, *Kenya-led security mission officials hopeful for a UN-funded mission in Haiti by October*, *The Haitian Times* (Aug. 25, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/25/haiti-mission-new-fully-funded-force-october/>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 10 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf; UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶ 33 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420>; see also IOM, *Haiti: Report on the Internal Displacement Situation – Round 12 (December 2025)* (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true> (noting a 140% increase in displacement in the Center Department over the last year).

⁴² Armed group members have expanded to the North, Northwest, and South Departments. Amid a surge in violence by armed groups on rural communities, the UN Panel of Experts on Haiti raised concerns that *Viv Ansann* “might join forces with the various criminal groups operating in northern Haiti – currently specialized in land dispossession, murders and robberies – to carry out attacks, thereby gaining control over larger portions of the country.” See UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶¶ 32, 56-57 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597>; IOM, *Haiti: Report on the Internal Displacement Situation – Round 12 (December 2025)* (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true> (noting a 98% increase in displacement in the Great North over the last year); Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak>; UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, S/2025/641, ¶ 17 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641>; Jacqueline Charles & Ychmuth Corneille, *Residents in rural Haiti town staying away amid calls to return after gang attack*, *Miami Herald* (Sep. 21, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312199453.html>; Jacqueline Charles, *Gangs tighten grip outside Haitis capital as questions over new suppression force grow*, *Miami Herald* (Sep. 18, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation->

[world/world/americas/haiti/article312150767.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/fronpage/2026/January/explainer_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs) (reporting on attacks “outside the capital in once peaceful communities,” including Liancourt and other cities connecting the Lower Artibonite to parts of the Central Plateau); BINUH & OHCHR, *Intensification of Criminal Violence in Lower Artibonite, the Centre Department, and Regions Located East of the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince*, p. 25 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-july-artibonite-and-mirebalais-EN.pdf> (reporting on attacks in “Chambrum, Desvarieux, and Sarrazines (Lascahobas), located about twenty kilometres from the Dominican border and until then spared from gang violence”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶¶ 6-7 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420> (“Southern Haiti, traditionally more insulated from gang violence, has also experienced a surge in gang-related incidents.”).

⁴³ UNODC, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti*, (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/fronpage/2026/January/explainer_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs (Jan. 21, 2026) (80-90%); Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak> (90%); UN News, *UN News Report*, (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166325> (Nov. 11, 2025) (90%); Miami Herald, *Miami Herald Article*, (Sep. 6, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311989488.html#storylink=cpy> (Sep. 6, 2025) (“nearly 90 percent”); GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis*, (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf>, (Sep. 2025; pg. 1), (90%); UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶ 32 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (85%); AyiboPost, *AyiboPost Article*, (2 Aug. 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/fritz-alphonse-jean-denies-allegations-in-u-s-state-department-statement/>, (2 Aug. 2025), (90%); *see also* BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 5 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (reporting that 71% of killings – by armed groups, during security operations, and by “defense” groups – between October and December 2025 were documented in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area).

⁴⁴ According to UN reporting in January 2026, armed groups “exercise effective control over all access routes to Port-au-Prince, including maritime approaches to the main ports, internal road networks linking the capital to the north and south of the country, and the principal land routes connecting Port-au-Prince to the border with the Dominican Republic.” UNODC, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti*, (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/fronpage/2026/January/explainer_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs; *see also* Wesker Sylvain, *Haitian Traders Face Gang “Toll Booths” at Sea*, *Ayibopost* (Feb. 23, 2026), <https://ayibopost.com/haitian-traders-face-gang-toll-booths-at-sea/>; Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance*, pp. 12-13 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf> (discussing the increase in “maritime theft and kidnapping”); Daniel Dickinson, *Record cocaine seizure in Haitian waters underlines country’s ‘pivotal’ trafficking role*, *UN News* (Nov. 30, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166460>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 9 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20-%20E2%80%93%20September%202025%29.pdf> (reporting on an attack by armed groups in early August on strategic telecommunications infrastructure serving Port-au-Prince and the National Civil Aviation Office); Le Nouvelliste, *\$54 millions: revenus mensuels du cabotage entre l’Ouest et le grand Sud, selon Jacques Anderson Desroches* (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/260406/54-millions-revenus-mensuels-du-cabotage-entre-louest-et-le-grand-sud-selon-jacques-anderson-desroches>; note 103. Most international airlines have suspended service to the Port-au-Prince International Airport since it shut down in November 2024 due to armed group attacks on multiple airplanes, although extremely limited international flights are departing from Port-au-Prince International Airport. Armed groups continue to occupy the area around the airport. Jean Daniel Senat, *Two aircraft hit by gunfire prompt suspension of Haiti-Brazil connection*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Jan. 26, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/263675/two-aircraft-hit-by-gunfire-prompt-suspension-of-haiti-brazil-connection> (ZED Airlines indefinitely suspended flights after two aircrafts were struck by gunfire on January 25, 2026); Jacqueline Charles, *FAA extends ban on U.S. commercial aircraft landing in parts of Haiti*, *Miami Herald* (Sep. 6, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311989488.html#storylink=cpy> (the Federal Aviation Administration extended its ban on U.S. commercial carriers landing in Port-au-Prince, first imposed in November 2024, through March 7, 2026; American Airlines shut down its operations in Haiti completely in 2025); Juhakenson Blaise, *US authorizes direct flights from Les Cayes airport to Florida*, *The Haitian Times* (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/12/04/haiti-antoine-simon-airport-certified-lpd-us/> (noting that international flights are operating out of Les Cayes, in the South Department); *see also* notes 367-370 (significant visa restrictions on Haitians – including for transit – imposed by the Dominican Republic and the United States have made traveling out of Haiti lawfully impossible for most Haitians). Domestic flights have also been impacted – locally-owned Sunrise Airways temporarily suspended domestic flights to and from Port-au-Prince in November 2025 after armed group members shot at an aircraft. Jacqueline Charles, *U.S. revokes visa of top Haiti official for alleged gang support, fanning instability*, *Miami Herald* (Nov. 30, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313118626.html>.

⁴⁵ Haitians are forced to take increasingly dangerous and expensive routes to try and avoid armed groups or submit to extortion and violence. Marie Alexandra Michel, *In Haiti, as gangs turn life into survival, every day feels like the last | Opinion*, *The Haitian Times* (Feb. 1, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/02/01/haitian-doctor-living-under-gang-violence/> (“People take perilous mountain roads, overcrowded boats or pay armed groups to pass. Travel that once took a few hours now takes an entire day — or more — at triple the cost. Some never arrive.”); Jason Motlagh, *The Last Man Standing in Haiti*, *Rolling Stone* (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/haiti-jean-ernest-muscadin-1235475798/> (“The only practical way to reach the capital is an unreliable charter flight to the northern city of Cap-Haïtien. From there, U.N. humanitarian helicopters

shuttle passengers to Pétion-Ville.”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶ 65 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641>; see also Wesker Sylvain, *Haitian Traders Face Gang “Toll Booths” at Sea*, Ayibopost (Feb. 23, 2026), <https://ayibopost.com/haitian-traders-face-gang-toll-booths-at-sea/> (discussing increased armed group attacks on and extortion of vessels along sea routes, which “serve as lifelines in a context where armed gangs control the land routes linking Port-au-Prince to other cities across the country”); Jacqueline Charles, *Gangs tighten grip outside Haitis capital as questions over new suppression force grow*, Miami Herald (Sep. 18, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312150767.html> (describing how armed groups “are all currently in cities connecting the Lower Artibonite to parts of the Central Plateau,” leaving communities “sandwiched between gang strongholds”) (*internal quotations omitted*); Jacqueline Charles, *FAA extends ban on U.S. commercial aircraft landing in parts of Haiti*, Miami Herald (Sep. 6, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311989488.html#storylink=cpy> (as a result of the ban on U.S., Canadian, and French commercial and cargo flights, “Haitians have found themselves virtually isolated”); @Radio_Metronome, *Post on X*, (Feb. 18, 2026), https://x.com/Radio_Metronome/status/2024131400228597866?s=20 (“The Director General of the Haitian National Police (PNH) was forced to take a helicopter to Port-de-Paix instead of traveling by road.”).

⁴⁶ Control of key transportation routes allows armed groups to regulate movement in and out of Port-au-Prince, generate substantial revenue through extortion of commercial traffic, and ensure geographic continuity between territories under their control in Port-au-Prince and other departments, thereby strengthening their criminal governance. UNODC, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti* (Jan. 21, 2026), [https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer-organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer-organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs;); Daniel Dickinson, *Record cocaine seizure in Haitian waters underlines country’s ‘pivotal’ trafficking role*, UN News (Nov. 30, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166460>; Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti gangs have slowed attacks in the capital, but they have intensified elsewhere*, Miami Herald (Nov. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312880614.html> (describing attacks in the Artibonite and Center Departments as in “largely indiscriminate, aimed at seizing control of localities located along strategic roadways leading to the northern and eastern parts of the country”) (*internal quotations omitted*); GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis*, pp. 5, 11 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf>; see also UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶ 8 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32>.

⁴⁷ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 14 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf> (“Overall, more than 8,100 killings were documented nationwide between January and November 2025.”); see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 1, 4 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (reporting a much lower number of people killed in 2025 – “at least 5,915”); GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis*, p. 4 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (“Between January and May 2025, Haiti recorded 4 026 homicides – a 24% increase compared to the same period in 2024 – reflecting a sharp deterioration in national security.”).

⁴⁸ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 14 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf>; see also, e.g., Dania Coto, *Haitian Police Kill Powerful Gang Leader Kempes*, AP News (Dec. 9, 2025), https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gangs-killed-kempes-viv-ansanm-belair-b557bac153603539fa894c03463c1697?utm_source=copy&utm_medium=share (explaining that the number of people killed during clashes in Port-au-Prince in December “is expected to rise since the clashes are ongoing and no authorities or human rights groups have been able to access the area”).

⁴⁹ See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 5 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (reporting major armed group attacks in Pont Sondé on November 29 (27 people killed); Morne Casse, Ondo, and Tiena on December 5 (25 people killed); Haut Bel Air on December 8-9 (23 people killed); and Bois Bélanger Chandelle on December 15 (4 people killed)); Fenel Pélissier et al., *Pourquoi la police n’arrive-t-elle pas à stopper les gangs dans l’Artibonite*, AyiboPost (Dec. 6, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pourquoi-la-police-narrive-t-elle-pas-a-stopper-les-gangs-dans-lartibonite/> (at the end of November, armed groups attacked Pont-Sondé, a town in the Artibonite Department, killing at least twenty people, raping women and girls, and displacing over 4,000 people); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 6 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20%20E2%80%93%20september%202025%29.pdf> (reporting major armed group attacks in Léogâne on July 8 (2 people killed); Obléon on July 11 (14 people killed); and Bercy and Labodrie on September 7 and 11 (42 people killed)); Jacqueline Charles, *Gangs tighten grip outside Haitis capital as questions over new suppression force grow*, Miami Herald (Sep. 18, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312150767.html> (in September, members of the *Viv Ansanm* armed group coalition attacked Labodrie, a village 20 miles north of Port-au-Prince, killing 40 people and displacing over 2,900); see also Louis Chadrac, *Savien Gang Launches New Assault on Pont-Sondé*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 1, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262129/savien-gang-launches-new-assault-on-pont-sonde> (residents forced to flee the November attack in Pont-Sondé said that what happened “is more tragic than the massacre of October 3, 2024, considering that the criminals were more numerous and stayed longer to kill and burn”).

⁵⁰ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 8 (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026->

[01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf](#) (local sources attributed limited violence in Croix-des-Bouquet to “the total control these gangs exert over the population and the fear they instill in this commune under their control”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 8 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20%E2%80%93%20September%202025%29.pdf>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 8 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (“400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs have established a criminal governance system that is now deeply rooted in these neighborhoods, to the point that they no longer need to resort to physical and widespread violence to subjugate the population”); see also notes 62-68.

⁵¹ UNODC, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti* (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer_-_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs.

⁵² See OHCHR & BINUH, *Children Trafficked by Gangs in Haiti: Rethinking the Responses*, p. 19 (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs-rethinking-responses-en.pdf> (reporting that gangs force children recruits to commit targeted killings of “a family member” or “enemies”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 7, 8 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf.

⁵³ See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 8 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (the bodies of people killed by armed groups for supposedly collaborating with police “were often mutilated or burned with gasoline”).

⁵⁴ See, e.g., BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 8 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (describing armed groups beating with sticks people suspected of collaborating with the police); Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti gangs have slowed attacks in the capital, but they have intensified elsewhere*, Miami Herald (Nov. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312880614.html> (in two separate incidents in September, armed group members beat three children as young as ten after altercations at football matches; in another incident, armed group members beat a woman to death and demanded a ransom from her family to recover the body; they also beat her daughter and burned her feet before releasing her).

⁵⁵ See Section V.

⁵⁶ See, e.g., BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 8 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf; Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak> (a woman living in a displacement camp described how armed group members “kidnapped a young man from my neighbourhood and a policeman and they burned them [to death]”); Louis Chadrac, *Savien Gang Launches New Assault on Pont-Sondé*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 1, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262129/savien-gang-launches-new-assault-on-pont-sonde> (during an attack on Pont-Sondé at the end of November, “the attackers . . . set fire everywhere without giving inhabitants time to escape their homes”) (*internal quotations omitted*); see also Jacqueline Charles, *Dispute over kidnappings triggers deadly war among Haiti’s gang coalition*, Miami Herald (Dec. 9, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313559561.html?giftCode=59a8570a8204727d94d798ea9cc6666de41d0092f99edee9c041982b77507e22> (reporting that videos shared online after clashes between armed group factions “showed the slaughtered bodies of gang members, some of whom had been set on fire”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 8 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (armed group members collectively raped and killed two women, then set their bodies on fire).

⁵⁷ See Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti police raids trigger deadly gang clashes, cutting off medical care in Port-au-Prince*, Miami Herald (Jan. 9, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314253147.html>; see also Sandra Pellegrini & María Fernanda Arocha, *Last line of defense? How vigilante groups are transforming Haiti’s security landscape*, ACLED (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape#:~:text=A%20Haiti%20expert%20interviewed%20for,timely%20response%20to%20gang%20incursions.&text=Over%20all%20C%20self%20defense%20groups%27.and%20Anadolu%20via%20Getty%20Images> (reporting that armed groups allowed residents to return to Solino “in a move likely intended to use civilians as shields in response to anti-gang operations and drone strikes conducted by the prime minister’s task force”).

⁵⁸ See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 6, 8, 10 (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026->

[01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf](https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Plusieurs-personnes-assassinees-et-blessees-par-balles-dans-de-nouvelles) (“[I]n the Artibonite 75 per cent of those killed and injured were victims of indiscriminate attacks.”); AlterPresse, *Haiti – Plusieurs Personnes Assassinées et Blessées par Balles* (Dec. 29, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Plusieurs-personnes-assassinees-et-blessees-par-balles-dans-de-nouvelles>; Jean Daniel Senat, *Bercy Faces Ongoing Armed Assaults for the Third Consecutive Week*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 1, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262165/bercy-faces-ongoing-armed-assaults-for-the-third-consecutive-week>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 7 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf.

⁵⁹ See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 16 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (from October to December 2025, “[a]t least 230 residences and other buildings, including at least two schools located in Turgeau (Port-au-Prince), were ransacked, set on fire, or destroyed by gangs,” 80% of those in the Artibonite Department); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 14 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20%E2%80%93%20september%202025%29.pdf> (from July to September 2025, “[a]t least 300 homes and other buildings . . . were ransacked, burned or destroyed by gangs,” including “the Oloffson Hotel in Port-au-Prince, a 19th-century building and an emblematic part of Haiti’s cultural heritage”); AlterPresse, *Haiti – Plusieurs Personnes Assassinées et Blessées par Balles* (Dec. 29, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Plusieurs-personnes-assassinees-et-blessees-par-balles-dans-de-nouvelles>; Jacqueline Charles, *Special representative named for U.S. backed-Gang Suppression Force in Haiti*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 2, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313313420.html?giftCode=8a3dadca960f20562c76b300557c0bed596366da81c2b23241b9be2a5689d3f3>; The Guardian, *Hundreds flee central Haiti after gangs launch large-scale attacks and burn homes* (Dec. 1, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/01/haiti-armed-gangs-attack-artibonite>; Louis Chadrac, *Savien Gang Launches New Assault on Pont-Sondé*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 1, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262129/savien-gang-launches-new-assault-on-pont-sonde>; Jacqueline Charles & Ychmuth Corneille, *Residents in rural Haiti town staying away amid calls to return after gang attack*, *Miami Herald* (Sep. 21, 2025), [miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312199453.html](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312199453.html).

⁶⁰ Roberson Alphonse, *Wave of Kidnappings in Delmas: Where are the Police?*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 2, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262188/wave-of-kidnappings-in-delmas-where-are-the-police> (armed groups appear to be carrying out targeted kidnappings as well as abducting people at random in the Port-au-Prince communes of Delmas and Pétion-Ville; the director of the Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace confirmed that the number of kidnappings has increased, but “made a point of clarifying that kidnapping never really disappeared”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 6, 14 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (reporting 647 people kidnapped for ransom in 2025, but noting that the real figure is likely even higher because “[i]n many cases, victims’ relatives do not report the kidnappings to the police or to service providers and instead choose to negotiate directly with gang members, believing that this approach allows for a faster release and helps avoid possible reprisals”); AlterPresse, *Haiti – Deux Nouveaux Présûmés Kidnappeurs Tués à Delmas* (Feb. 23, 2026), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Deux-nouveaux-presumes-kidnappeurs-tues-a-Delmas> (reporting that two kidnapers were “dressed in PNH uniforms” and “travelling in a Nissan Patrol vehicle belonging to the state service”); @Radio_Metronome, *Post on X* (Feb. 18, 2026), https://x.com/Radio_Metronome/status/2024131400228597866?s=20; Jean Daniel Senat, *Port-au-Prince Faces Rising Wave of Ransom Abductions*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Feb. 13, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/264334/port-au-prince-faces-rising-wave-of-ransom-abductions> (“For several weeks, kidnapers have resumed operations in Port-au-Prince. Several victims have been abducted. . . . A priest, a lawyer, and a magistrate are among the hostages. . . . the kidnapers are demanding large sums of money in exchange for their release.”); Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance*, p. 12 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf> (“The Gran Ravine gang kidnapped six UNICEF staff members in July; the next month, eight people, including an Irish nun, were seized from an orphanage in the Kenscoff area by the gang led by alias Izo 2.”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶ 15 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641> (“From 1 June to 31 August [2025], gangs abducted 334 people, including 69 women, 10 girls and 14 boys, compared with 328 kidnappings recorded in the previous three months.”). Notably, in December clashes among factions of the *Viv Ansanm* coalition allegedly triggered by disagreements over kidnappings led to the deaths of at least 85 people, including 23 civilians. BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 7-8 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf; Danica Coto, *Haitian Police Kill Powerful Gang Leader Kempes*, *AP News* (Dec. 9, 2025), https://apnews.com/article/haiti-gangs-killed-kempes-viv-ansanm-belair-b557bac153603539fa894c03463c1697?utm_source=copy&utm_medium=share; Jacqueline Charles, *Dispute over kidnappings triggers deadly war among Haiti’s gang coalition*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 9, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313559561.html?giftCode=59a8570a8204727d94d798ea9cc6666de41d0092f99edee9c041982b77507e22>.

⁶¹ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 14 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (“In some circumstances, heavily armed gang members displayed extreme violence during kidnappings, killing individuals who resisted. . . . Similarly, victims whose families were unable to pay the demanded ransoms were often killed. For example, on 14 October, the Canaan gang executed a woman who had been

kidnapped the previous day in downtown Mirebalais (Centre department) because her family was unable to pay a ransom of 20,000 gourdes (USD 150). Gang members made a video call to her relatives during which they shot the woman. The victim's body was subsequently burned with gasoline.”); Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak> (a woman living in a displacement camp described how armed group members “kidnapped a young man from my neighbourhood and a policeman and they burned them [to death]”).

⁶² Robert Muggah, *Haiti's Political Crisis Deepens Amid a Slide into Criminal Governance*, Americas Quarterly (Feb. 2, 2026), <https://americasquarterly.org/article/haitis-political-crisis-deepens-amid-a-slide-into-criminal-governance/> (“These [criminal] networks do not just terrorize; they govern. They tax residents, settle disputes, control access to markets, and decide who may work, trade, or leave.”); UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶ 33 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (“[G]angs continue to exercise criminal parallel governance in areas under their control, imposing informal rulemaking and extortion and providing basic services in the absence of the State.”); GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, p. 15 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf>; Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, *Ending Haiti's Criminal Governance Crisis*, Americas Quarterly (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://americasquarterly.org/article/ending-haitis-criminal-governance-crisis/> (“Gangs are not just predators; they act as de facto sovereigns that grant—and deny—permission to live and work.”); BINUH & OHCHR, *Intensification of Criminal Violence in Lower Artibonite, the Centre Department, and Regions Located East of the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince*, p. 23 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-july-artibonite-and-mirebalais-EN.pdf> (“Following a modus operandi already observed in areas of Port-au-Prince under their control, the gangs began providing ‘services’ to residents, exploiting the absence of public service representatives.”). The UN has characterized the current system of parallel governance as a recent shift that “highlight[s] the growing influence of criminal networks in local governance” (UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶ 11 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420>), but it is worth noting that, historically, in poor neighborhoods governance and development was largely organized by street gangs known as *baz*. For an explanation of the evolution of these groups, see Chelsey Kivland, *Semantics of the Gang*, Society for Cultural Anthropology (May 3, 2022), <https://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/semantics-of-the-gang>.

⁶³ See Jacqueline Charles, *Dispute over kidnappings triggers deadly war among Haiti's gang coalition*, Miami Herald (Dec. 9, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313559561.html?giftCode=59a8570a8204727d94d798ea9cc6666de41d0092f99edee9c041982b77507e22> (in a video shared in December 2025, armed group leader and *Viv Ansanm* coalition spokesperson Jimmy Chérizier claimed to be working on behalf of former hostages “liberated by the coalition,” and said that *Viv Ansanm* is “fighting for the country”) (*internal quotations omitted*); Jacqueline Charles, *Haitian gangs' call for mobilization prompts high alert from foreign embassies, police*, Miami Herald (Nov. 17, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312939933.html?giftCode=4b92560347af8018bc3dc07d8fd7e180066502497b0548d841efcc8b12215478> (in another video, an armed group leader known as Krisla called on Haitians nationwide “to rise up en masse” and “fight against the corrupted system;” Chérizier warned publicly that the armed group would be taking to the streets and “advised the public to stay indoors to avoid becoming victims”) (*internal quotations omitted*); see also Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance*, pp. 16-18 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf>.

⁶⁴ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 6-8 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (“[G]ang members . . . [who] were suspected of having committed theft or other minor offences against members of the population. . . . were subjected to so-called ‘trials,’ at the end of which some were ‘sentenced’ to captivity and the payment of ‘fines,’ while others were ‘sentenced’ to death and executed.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, pp. 5-7 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20-%20September%202025%29.pdf> (“According to some sources, these ‘punishments’ . . . form part of a gang strategy aimed at consolidating support among the population and preventing residents from fleeing, while providing them with a form of ‘protection’ in a context of intensified security forces operations.”).

⁶⁵ GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, p. 15 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (“For a growing number of residents and business operators, extortion fees are no longer exceptional – they have become a regular cost of living, doing business or moving across the country.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 6 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20-%20September%202025%29.pdf> (reporting that armed groups forced residents living under their control who had allegedly committed crimes or were suspected of collaborating with police “to pay ‘fines’ to secure their release, with amounts ranging from . . . approximately 40 to 400 US dollars”); see also notes 274-275.

⁶⁶ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 6-8, 10 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf; BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on*

the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025), p. 5 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20%E2%80%93%20september%202025%29.pdf>; Jacqueline Charles, *Gangs tighten grip outside Haitis capital as questions over new suppression force grow*, Miami Herald (Sep. 18, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312150767.html> (according to RNDDH, armed groups carried out a massacre in the town of Labodrie in retaliation in part because they suspected residents of acting as informants for police officers); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 7 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (the majority of those killed by the *Grand Ravine* and *Village-de-Dieu* armed groups in the second quarter of 2025 were “accused of challenging their authority or were suspected of collaborating with the police or self-defense groups”).

⁶⁷ See, e.g., BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 6-7, 16 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 6 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20%E2%80%93%20september%202025%29.pdf>; see also notes 274-275.

⁶⁸ Wesker Sylvain, *Haitian Traders Face Gang “Toll Booths” at Sea*, Ayibopost (Feb. 23, 2026), <https://ayibopost.com/haitian-traders-face-gang-toll-booths-at-sea/> (a sailor reported “that his vessel was hijacked eight times by gangs despite paying the 75,000 gourdes demanded by them”).

⁶⁹ GI-TOC describes how armed groups first depopulate strategic areas through violence, creating a “buffer” zone between territory they already control and territory under the control of security forces; then selectively repopulate those areas; and finally use the return of the original population “to reinforce territorial governance, impose extra-legal systems of taxation, and assert control over humanitarian access, justice and basic service provision.” GI-TOC, *The Weaponization of Displacement by Gangs in Haiti* (Jul. 16, 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/the-weaponization-of-displacement-by-gangs-in-haiti/>; See, e.g., Fredner Cayemitte, *Solino residents begin triumphant return home after months of displacement by G9 gang*, Haitian Times (Sep. 11, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/11/solino-residents-return-home/> (armed groups depopulated, then destroyed, the neighborhood of Solino in Port-au-Prince before telling residents in September that they could return); see also UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶¶ 61-62 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (noting that armed groups use displacement as a “deliberate tactic” to facilitate extortion along commercial routes); note 276.

⁷⁰ IOM, *Haiti: Report on the Internal Displacement Situation – Round 12 (December 2025)* (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true> (reporting 1,450,254 people displaced); IOM, *Haiti: Displacement Situation – Round 11 (September 2025)*, p. 1 (Sep. 2025), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-information-sheet-displacement-situation-haiti-round-11-september-2025?close=true> (reporting 1,412,199 as of September 2025); Human Rights Watch, *Haiti: Cholera Resurgence Threatens Vulnerable Communities* (Nov. 5, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/11/05/haiti-cholera-resurgence-threatens-vulnerable-communities> (noting that the number of people displaced is the highest ever recorded in Haiti); see also RNDDH, *Hurricane Melissa: RNDDH Denounces Inadequacy of Measures Adopted by State Authorities* (Nov. 6, 2025), <https://web.rnddh.org/hurricane-melissa-rnddh-denounces-the-inadequacy-of-measures-adopted-by-state-authorities/?lang=en> (Hurricane Melissa displaced an additional nearly 2,000 people, all from the Greater South); Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak> (the director of the NGO Fondasyon Je Klere, Marie Yolène Gilles, says that “most of the people [in Port-au-Prince] are displaced” but in many cases “they aren’t registered by national or international organisations because they are staying with relatives”).

⁷¹ IOM, *Haiti: Report on the Internal Displacement Situation – Round 12 (December 2025)* (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true>; IOM, *Haiti: Displacement Situation – Round 11 (September 2025)*, p. 2 (Sep. 2025), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-information-sheet-displacement-situation-haiti-round-11-september-2025?close=true> (noting that, unlike in previous years, “the majority of armed attacks resulting in mass displacements [also] took place in the provinces”); see also @Unknown, *Post on X* (19 Aug. 2025), <https://x.com/MakyavelStudios/status/1957902892989354111> (“Although 45% of displaced persons listed throughout Haiti’s provinces originate from the capital, most of those left in the city can not flee, as main roads are under gang control & the international airport has been shut down since Nov. 2024.”).

⁷² IOM, *Haiti: Report on the Internal Displacement Situation – Round 12 (December 2025)* (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true>.

⁷³ 197,440 of the 217,444 IDPs living in displacement sites are hosted in just 95 sites in the capital. IOM, *Haiti: Report on the Internal Displacement Situation – Round 12 (December 2025)* (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true>; IOM, *Haiti: Displacement Situation – Round 11 (September 2025)*, p. 2 (Sep. 2025), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-information-sheet-displacement-situation-haiti-round-11-september-2025?close=true> (noting that “[t]he capital remains the only area where the majority of IDPs are in sites (66% vs 34% outside sites)”).

⁷⁴ IOM, *Haiti: Report on the Internal Displacement Situation – Round 12 (December 2025)* (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true>; IOM, *Haiti: Update on the Displacement Situation at Spontaneous Sites (November 2025)* (Nov. 2025), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-update-displacement-situation-spontaneous-sites-november-2025?close=true> (the number of sites decreased from 238 in September to 219 in November as armed group attacks have caused some to close and other to open); RNDDH, *Sites for Internally Displaced*

Persons: The RNDDH Urges the Haitian State to Act, ¶ 4 (Jan. 12, 2026), <https://web.rnddh.org/sites-for-internally-displaced-persons-the-rnddh-urges-the-haitian-state-to-put-an-end-to-this-situation/?lang=en> (“According to combined information from the Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC) – Ouest, the Direction de la Protection Civile – Centre, and the National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH), the country has at least two hundred seventeen (217) sites for internally displaced persons.”); see also BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 64 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf> (“[T]he number of displacement sites nationwide rose from 117 in 2024 to 238 by September 2025”).

⁷⁵ IOM, *Haiti: Update on the Displacement Situation at Spontaneous Sites (November 2025)*, p. 3 (Nov. 2025), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-update-displacement-situation-spontaneous-sites-november-2025?close=true> (reporting nearly 83,000 IDPs housed in 80 schools, over 37,000 in 49 churches or temples, and the remainder in other public spaces); Emmanuel Marino Bruno, *Crise: La Pòdh exige de meilleurs accompagnements pour les familles déplacées en Haïti*, *Alterpresse* (Jul. 22, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31981> (“Unsuitable for prolonged use, schools, public administration offices, abandoned land, and other institutions serving as shelters for displaced persons are overcrowded and unsanitary, according to a coalition of Haitian human rights organizations.”).

⁷⁶ IOM, *Haiti: Résultats Clés des Analyses Comparatives des Besoins Multisectoriels des Populations*, p. 5 (Feb. 12, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/reports/haiti-resultats-cles-des-analyses-comparatives-des-besoins-multisectoriels-des-populations?close=true>; *AlterPresse, Haiti – Violences des Gangs: La Réponse Humanitaire Entravée à Montrouis et Saint-Marc* (Jan. 7, 2026), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Violences-des-gangs-La-reponse-humanitaire-entree-a-Montrouis-et-Saint->

Lucrise Duquereste, *Exodus to Cap-Haïtien: rent, food, services...everything is going up*, *Ayibopost* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/exodus-to-cap-haitien-rent-food-services-everything-is-going-up/> (“Internal migration [to Cap-Haïtien], mainly from Port-au-Prince and Artibonite, is causing all prices to skyrocket. . . . For a simple apartment in Cap-Haïtien . . . you sometimes have to pay more than a million gourdes — nearly 8,000 US dollars. . . . Increasingly described as a ‘refuge city’, Cap-Haïtien is under constant demographic pressure, according to Patrick Almonor, the city’s deputy mayor.”); Victor Raison, *Guns, gangs and drought: how crime and the climate crisis are reshaping Haiti*, *The Guardian* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/13/haiti-violence-climate-disaster-drought-haitians-gang-warfare> (cities overwhelmed by people displaced by insecurity “struggle to manage waste collection, water, sanitation and housing”). A network of healthcare organizations working in Haiti reported that health clinics in the Central and Southeast Departments are seeing a big increase in patient loads due to displacement. See also Section VI.

⁷⁷ IOM, *Haiti: Résultats Clés des Analyses Comparatives des Besoins Multisectoriels des Populations*, pp. 6, 7 (Feb. 12, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/reports/haiti-resultats-cles-des-analyses-comparatives-des-besoins-multisectoriels-des-populations?close=true> (a survey of IDPs revealed significant overcrowding and food shortages, with nearly half of households surveyed resorting to begging for food and one in ten surveyed resorting to “illegal or dangerous activities to access food”); National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH), *Sites for internally displaced persons: The RNDDH calls on the Haitian government to put an end to this situation* (Jan. 12, 2026) (“Only 20% of the sites monitored in this report have latrines that are reasonably clean. In 57.5% of the sites, the latrines are unsanitary, blocked, and not emptied. And 22.5% of sites have no latrines at all. To relieve themselves, displaced persons defecate on the ground, or in bags and buckets that they fill and throw on piles of rubbish or into adjacent rivers. When they can afford it, they pay to use the toilets in neighboring houses.”); RNDDH, *Sites for Internally Displaced Persons: The RNDDH Urges the Haitian State to Act*, ¶¶ 9-10, 12, 18-29 (Jan. 12, 2026), <https://web.rnddh.org/sites-for-internally-displaced-persons-the-rnddh-urges-the-haitian-state-to-put-an-end-to-this-situation/?lang=en> (describing severe overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, insect and rodent infestations, and exposure to the elements in 80% of sites surveyed; as well as unsanitary latrines – or none at all – and non-existent waste management services in the majority of sites); European Commission, *Cholera Strikes Haiti Once Again* (Dec. 11, 2025), https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/stories/cholera-strikes-haiti-once-again_en; Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak> (women in displacement camps describe sleeping on the floor where they are exposed to flooding; cockroaches, bedbugs, and rats; overflowing toilets; piles of rubbish; and water that gives them scabies); Esther Kimberly Bazile, *The Many Faces of Suffering: The Dual Struggle of Displaced Women*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262371/the-many-faces-of-suffering-the-dual-struggle-of-displaced-women>; CPD Haiti, *Situation des Personnes Déplacées Internes dans la Zone Métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://cpdhaiti.org/situation-des-personnes-deplacées-internes-dans-la-zone-metropolitaine-de-port-au-prince-rapport-de-monitoring-novembre-2025/> (“Food distribution is becoming scarce. People are complaining a lot about malnutrition . . . Eight sites still lack functioning latrines, and access to clean water remains irregular. . . . These conditions foster the spread of waterborne diseases and a loss of dignity, especially among women.”); BAI report (Nov. 2025) (discussing conditions of displacement at two camps in Port-au-Prince); Human Rights Watch, *Haiti: Cholera Resurgence Threatens Vulnerable Communities* (Nov. 5, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/11/05/haiti-cholera-resurgence-threatens-vulnerable-communities> (describing the “little or no access to clean water or sanitation” as particularly concerning given the resurgence in cholera cases); Emmanuel Marino Bruno, *Crise: La Pòdh exige de meilleurs accompagnements pour les familles déplacées en Haïti*, *AlterPresse* (Jul. 22, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31981>.

⁷⁸ CPD Haiti, *Situation des Personnes Déplacées Internes dans la Zone Métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://cpdhaiti.org/situation-des-personnes-deplacées-internes-dans-la-zone-metropolitaine-de-port-au-prince-rapport-de-monitoring-novembre-2025/> (numerous cases of skin diseases and acute diarrhea – especially in children – were reported following the hurricane, which also destroyed makeshift shelters); see also RNDDH, *Sites for Internally Displaced Persons: The RNDDH Urges the Haitian State to Act*, ¶¶ 13-17 (Jan. 12, 2026), <https://web.rnddh.org/sites-for-internally-displaced-persons-the-rnddh-urges-the-haitian-state-to-put-an-end-to-this-situation/?lang=en> (“[R]ainfall generally represents a serious and distressing ordeal for internally displaced persons.”).

⁷⁹ CPD Haiti, *Situation des Personnes Déplacées Internes dans la Zone Métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://cpdhaiti.org/situation-des-personnes-deplacées-internes-dans-la-zone-metropolitaine-de-port-au-prince-rapport-de->

[monitoring-novembre-2025/](#) (the majority of security incidents reported to observers were “thefts and fights between internally displaced persons,” although “[k]idnappings were reported near some camps in Delmas”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶ 59 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641>; Emmanuel Marino Bruno, *Crise: La Pòdh exige de meilleurs accompagnements pour les familles déplacées en Haïti*, *AlterPresse* (Jul. 22, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31981> (“The security situation remains unstable in some camps for displaced persons, several of which are located in areas still considered high-risk, exposed to possible armed attacks or reprisals.”).

⁸⁰ Women make up 27% and children make up 52% of the population. Women and girls together make up 54%. IOM, *Haiti: Report on the Internal Displacement Situation – Round 12 (December 2025)* (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true>.

⁸¹ RNDDH, *Sites for Internally Displaced Persons: The RNDDH Urges the Haitian State to Act*, ¶¶ 31-34 (Jan. 12, 2026), <https://web.rnddh.org/sites-for-internally-displaced-persons-the-rnddh-urges-the-haitian-state-to-put-an-end-to-this-situation/?lang=en> (despite efforts to include women and girls in site management committees and provide limited dedicated assistance, “women and girls do not benefit from any specific protection measures that take their vulnerability into account” and they “many site managers reported that cases of sexual violence, gender-based violence, harassment, as well as physical violence against women and girls are regularly recorded”); Jacqueline Charles, *‘Unimaginable’: The toll on Haiti’s women and girls raped by violent gangs*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316158.html> (“The sexual targeting of women and girls isn’t isolated to armed gangs. Assaults are becoming commonplace inside the soiled makeshift displacement camps where shacks have no doors. . . . Men in positions of power, whether they are community leaders, husbands or warlords, are coercing girls and women into sex in exchange for protection or money.”); Esther Kimberly Bazile, *The Many Faces of Suffering: The Dual Struggle of Displaced Women*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262371/the-many-faces-of-suffering-the-dual-struggle-of-displaced-women> (“[G]roping, threats, sexual assaults, and rapes have surged, fueled by the lack of privacy, overcrowding, and absence of supervision.”); CPD Haiti, *Situation des Personnes Déplacées Internes dans la Zone Métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://cpdhaiti.org/situation-des-personnes-deplacees-interne-dans-la-zone-metropolitaine-de-port-au-prince-rapport-de-monitoring-novembre-2025/> (observing “an increase in prostitution activity around the camps, with “many young women . . . prostituting themselves to obtain food and other necessities,” and noting the lack of any safe space for children in camps increases the risk of abuse); BAI report, p. 3 (Nov. 2025), (“[S]tray bullets pose a constant danger to internally displaced persons (IDPs), as they frequently land on the site, endangering the lives of many people who are already in vulnerable situations.”); see also notes 218-224.

⁸² GI-TOC, *The Weaponization of Displacement by Gangs in Haiti* (Jul. 16, 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/the-weaponization-of-displacement-by-gangs-in-haiti/> (“Despite their public statements, the Haitian Transitional Presidential Council, the interim body that exercises the functions of the presidential office until a new president is elected, and the government of Prime Minister Fils-Aimé have yet to implement an effective strategy to address the situation of internally displaced persons.”); see also OHCHR, *Children Trafficked by Gangs: Rethinking Responses*, p. 38 (Feb. 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs-rethinking-responses-en.pdf> (initiatives and programs implemented by “national authorities, local organizations, the United Nations, and international partners” to address the recruitment of children by armed groups, which is a particularly acute risk in displacement sites, “remain too limited in scale, fragmented, and heavily affected by insecurity, as well as vulnerable to chronic underfunding”). State efforts to safely relocate IDPs have been flawed and largely unsuccessful. UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶ 59 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641> (“A government relocation programme led to only a modest 2.4 per cent reduction in internally displaced persons.”); Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak> (a displaced person laments the shortcomings of the relocation plan: “The people displaced in camps still don’t have a stable situation. They don’t have anywhere to go, and the relocation subsidy they receive is very low. Renting a house currently costs about \$2,000 to \$3,000 a year. If you are given 100,000 gourdes [the equivalent of about \$760], you can’t rent a house.”); Jean Junior Celestin, *Authorities Seek to Relocate IDPs While Ensuring Human Rights*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Jul. 22, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/258294/authorities-seek-to-relocate-idps-while-ensuring-human-rights> (the government’s resettlement plan promised to deliver 99,000 gourdes to over 3,600 IDPs – out of a total of over 211,000 living in displacement sites – “to support their voluntary departure from overcrowded emergency shelters and transition to more stable living conditions,” but did not specify what or where those conditions might be).

⁸³ RNDDH, *Sites for Internally Displaced Persons: The RNDDH Urges the Haitian State to Act*, ¶ 48 (Jan. 12, 2026), <https://web.rnddh.org/sites-for-internally-displaced-persons-the-rnddh-urges-the-haitian-state-to-put-an-end-to-this-situation/?lang=en>.

⁸⁴ IOM, *Haiti: Résultats Clés des Analyses Comparatives des Besoins Multisectoriels des Populations*, p. 5 (Feb. 12, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/reports/haiti-resultats-cles-des-analyses-comparatives-des-besoins-multisectoriels-des-populations?close=true> (IDPs in displacement sites “deplored the inadequacy and inappropriateness of aid,” and said they “were not consulted about the aid they received, . . . which may go a long way towards explaining the dissatisfaction rates and the feeling of inadequacy to real needs”); Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak> (displaced persons recall the lack of consistent support: “Since I arrived at the camp, the only help I received, in 2024, came from the World Food Programme, which used to bring food and give us money. UNICEF also gave us cash. But now, we don’t receive anything – only water. . . . [The International Organization for Migration] used to help us. But in November [2023], they did an assessment here, and then we stopped receiving anything. In January [2024], they did another assessment, and then in March [2024] again. But nothing. The first time we received food again was in December [2024], when other actors came. We asked them to distribute it. They made a first gesture, but it was not much,

and it was neither hygienic nor correct. The [National Directorate for Drinking Water and Sanitation] provides us with water, Fadhris [a local organisation that offers educational and economic opportunities to women] comes with a mobile clinic, and Mojed [Youth Movement for Development in Haiti] teaches children. But there isn't enough medical assistance.”); CPD Haiti, *Situation des Personnes Déplacées Internes dans la Zone Métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://cpdhaiti.org/situation-des-personnes-deplacees-interne-dans-la-zone-metropolitaine-de-port-au-prince-rapport-de-monitoring-novembre-2025/> (“Site managers report a continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation. . . . [T]he presence and intervention of humanitarian organizations have significantly decreased, increasing the vulnerability of IDPs in several key areas: shelter, food, security, health, and education.” In the Bérée Site in Delmas 33, observers noted a “[l]ack of follow-up from NGOs that previously supported the children’s schooling.”); BAI report, pp. 4, 6 (Nov. 2025), (IDPs at a camp in Port-au-Prince “survive mainly thanks to solidarity among displaced persons or occasional donations from people of goodwill;” in another camp, IDPs reported receiving no food aid for nearly a year); WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, pp. 18, 20 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (the WFP reported in September 2025 that the provision of hot meals to IDPs in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area had been suspended since the end of April due to funding gaps, despite a reported increase in needs; this “not only leaves newly displaced populations without food or shelter but also undermines trust in humanitarian actors”); see also Section VIII.

⁸⁵ IOM, *Haiti: Résultats Clés des Analyses Comparatives des Besoins Multisectoriels des Populations*, p. 6 (Feb. 12, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/reports/haiti-resultats-cles-des-analyses-comparatives-des-besoins-multisectoriels-des-populations?close=true> (a survey of IDPs found that 19% of respondents in displacement sites expressed dissatisfaction with humanitarian actors, “mainly citing breaches of integrity (fraud, corruption) or respect,” and 22% cited abuse and exploitation; further, 69% of IDPs and 75% of host communities surveyed expressed a strong reluctance to report misbehavior by humanitarian actors); BAI Report, p. 3 (Nov. 2025), (in one camp in Port-au-Prince, there has been a decline in NGO presence over time, which “can be explained in particular by the fact that some NGOs have reportedly been refused cooperation due to suspicions of corruption involving certain site agents in their relations with the committee chair”).

⁸⁶ See note 127; see also CPJ, *CPJ Calls on Haitian Authorities to Ensure Media Leaders Protection after Threats* (Sep. 11, 2025), <https://cpj.org/2025/09/cpj-calls-on-haitian-authorities-to-ensure-media-leaders-protection-after-threats/> (the CPJ condemned Haitian authorities’ harassment of Guy Delva, the leader of Haitian press freedom group SOS Journalistes, who “has been threatened at least two times in the street by unidentified men, and . . . believes the police intend to arrest him after he was told that the Haitian government complained about his advocacy work on behalf of independent radio stations Radio Caraïbes and Radio Mega”).

⁸⁷ See CPJ, *Haitian Gang Leader Calls for Radio/TV Caraïbes Journalists’ Assassination* (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://cpj.org/2025/12/haitian-gang-leader-calls-for-radio-tv-caraibes-journalists-assassination/> (the CPJ expressed concern “with the lack of security protections in Haiti for journalists and the country more broadly,” and emphasized that “[t]hreatening to attack journalists sends a chilling message to all people in Haiti that no one is safe if they challenge the lawless authority of the country’s gangs”); CPJ, *Latest Attack on an Independent Haitian Radio Station Marks 5th in 6 Months* (Nov. 10, 2025), <https://cpj.org/2025/11/latest-attack-on-an-independent-haitian-radio-station-marks-5th-in-6-months/> (“Journalists play a vital role in ensuring that the public is informed about what is happening in their community, and the destruction of radio stations points to a desire to stoke fear and control information in Haiti.”); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶ 36 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en (in its concluding observations on Haiti’s long-postponed review before the UN Human Rights Committee regarding its implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Committee expressed concern “about the lack of effective protection measures [for journalists], [and] the continuing impunity surrounding the execution of journalists and human rights defenders by armed gangs”); see also Juno7, *Le Collectif des Professionnels de la Presse Alerte* (Nov. 30, 2025), <https://www.juno7.ht/le-collectif-des-professionnels-de-la-presse-alerte-s/> (the Collective of Press Professionals “issued an urgent appeal to state authorities, including the Presidency, the Government, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, and the General Directorate of the Haitian National Police. . . . to take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and effective protection of journalists in a climate where practicing journalism is becoming increasingly perilous.”).

⁸⁸ Juno7, *Le Collectif des Professionnels de la Presse Alerte* (Nov. 30, 2025), <https://www.juno7.ht/le-collectif-des-professionnels-de-la-presse-alerte-s/> (“The safety of journalists in Haiti is deteriorating at an alarming rate.”); U.S. State Dept, *Haiti 2024 Human Rights Report*, p. 6 (Aug. 12, 2025), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/624521_HAITI-2024-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf.

⁸⁹ CPJ, *Latest Attack on an Independent Haitian Radio Station Marks 5th in 6 Months* (Nov. 10, 2025), <https://cpj.org/2025/11/latest-attack-on-an-independent-haitian-radio-station-marks-5th-in-6-months/> (the November attack was against independent radio station Radio Émancipation, which had received threats before for its criticism of armed group activities); see also CPJ, *Haitian Gang Leader Calls for Radio/TV Caraïbes Journalists’ Assassination* (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://cpj.org/2025/12/haitian-gang-leader-calls-for-radio-tv-caraibes-journalists-assassination/> (“In a widely disseminated social media video reviewed by CPJ, Cherizier — leader of the “Viv Ansam” gang coalition that has laid siege to Haiti’s capital city, Port-au-Prince — appeared to offer a \$50,000 reward for [Radio TV Caraïbes (RCTV) news host Ronald] Desormes’ life as he expressed general frustrations over the independent outlet’s coverage. . . . RTVC is the oldest independent radio station in Haiti and was forced to abandon its offices earlier this year after gang attacks which have continued against other radio stations.”).

⁹⁰ Jacqueline Charles, *Drones, heavy guns and fragile gains: Inside Haiti’s latest push against gangs*, Miami Herald (Jan. 27, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314466392.html>; UNODC, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti* (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer_-_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military%20Drugs (armed groups’ “access to sophisticated, military-grade weaponry . . . outmatches that of the Haitian National Police”); UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶ 31 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32>; Fenel Pélissier et al., *Pourquoi la police n’arrive-t-elle pas à stopper les gangs dans l’Artibonite*, AyiboPost (Dec. 6, 2025),

<https://ayibopost.com/pourquoi-la-police-narrive-t-elle-pas-a-stopper-les-gangs-dans-lartibonite/> (according to the government commissioner for the Saint-Marc district, the Central Directorate of Administrative Police said the police did not have the heavy equipment needed to fill holes dug by armed groups; one police officer said the police are “overwhelmed” and that “[t]he forces deployed are insufficient”); UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶ 25 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597>; Jacqueline Charles, *FAA extends ban on U.S. commercial aircraft landing in parts of Haiti*, Miami Herald (Sep. 6, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311989488.html#storylink=cpy>; Al Jazeera, *Haiti Declares Three-Month State of Emergency as Gang Violence Spikes* (Aug. 9, 2025), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/9/haiti-declares-three-month-state-of-emergency-as-gang-violence-spikes> (former police chief Normil Rameau “had repeatedly warned about the police force’s severe underfunding”).

⁹¹ See Roberson Alphonse, *10 Véhicules blindés reçus du Canada, d’autres attendus à Port-au-Prince*, Le Nouvelliste (Feb. 16, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/264351/10-vehicules-blindes-recus-du-canada-dautres-attendus-a-port-au-prince>; BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 19 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf>; Fenel Pélissier et al., *Pourquoi la police n’arrive-t-elle pas à stopper les gangs dans l’Artibonite*, AyiboPost (Dec. 6, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pourquoi-la-police-narrive-t-elle-pas-a-stopper-les-gangs-dans-lartibonite/>; Jean Daniel Senat, *OAS and EU Pledge Support to Bolster Haiti’s Police and Anti-Gang Force*, Le Nouvelliste (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/261402/oas-and-eu-pledge-support-to-bolster-haitis-police-and-anti-gang-force>; UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶ 21 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641>; AlterPresse, *Haiti-Security: 29 Haitian soldiers in military training in Martinique*, ¶ 4 (Jul. 22, 2025) <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31980>; see also UN Geneva, *Dialogue with Haiti: Human Rights Committee Welcome Efforts* (Jul. 4, 2025), <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/meeting-summary/2025/07/dialogue-haiti-experts-human-rights-committee-welcome-efforts> (reporting on efforts currently “underway to strengthen the capacities of the Haitian National Police and the Armed Forces of Haiti, which had a budget increase of 11 per cent in 2024-2025”).

⁹² See Carnegie Endowment, *Haiti Crisis: State Capacity, Gangs, Weapons, and Drugs* (Dec. 17, 2025), <https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/12/haiti-crisis-state-capacity-gangs-weapons-drugs?lang=en>; Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance*, p. 24 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf> (“[T]he army now regularly supports the police in offensives against the gangs. But the army remains ill equipped and poorly trained, and its 900 troops are focused on static tasks, such as securing key sites and protecting areas retaken by the Haitian police and the multinational mission. High-ranking army officers say the force is composed mostly of engineers, doctors and agronomists, many of them ill-suited for warfare.”); *But see* BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 19 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf> (“[T]he Government allocated 7 of 17 armoured personnel carriers to the Armed Forces of Haiti to support anti-gang operations.”); Haiti Libre, *Colombia Will Train 1,000 FAD’H Soldiers*, ¶ 3 (Jul. 20, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45371-haiti-flash-colombia-will-train-1-000-fad-h-soldiers.html> (“Colombia . . . has committed to training 1,000 recruits for the Haitian Armed Forces (FAD’H) in the coming months (pending the official signing of an agreement).”).

⁹³ U.S. Senate, *Testimony of Henry Wooster Before the Senate Appropriations Committee* (Feb. 10, 2026), https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/the_honorable_henry_wooster_testimony.pdf (in testimony before Congress in February 2026, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires to Haiti Henry Wooster estimated there are 6,000 officers); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 18 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf> (reporting 13,414 officers as of November 30, 2025); Carnegie Endowment, *Haiti Crisis: State Capacity, Gangs, Weapons, and Drugs* (Dec. 17, 2025), <https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/12/haiti-crisis-state-capacity-gangs-weapons-drugs?lang=en> (estimating 9,000 officers in total); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶ 20 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641> (reporting 13,501 officers as of August 31, 2025); Jacqueline Charles, *Drones, heavy guns and fragile gains: Inside Haiti’s latest push against gangs*, Miami Herald (Jan. 27, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314466392.html> (“Haiti has fewer than one police officer per 1,000 residents,” and faces a “severe personnel shortage”).

⁹⁴ Known as P4000, the program aims to train 4,000 new police officers between 2026 and early 2027. The first cohort of 877 officers graduated on January 23. Juhakenson Blaise, *Nearly 900 graduate in Haitian police’s fight against gangs*, The Haitian Times (Jan. 24, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/01/24/nearly-900-graduate-in-haitian-polices-fight-against-gangs/>; ICI Haïti, *P4000+ Program: Recruitment Process for 37th PNH Promotion Continues* (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.ichaiti.com/en/news-46738-ichaiti-p4000+-program-the-recruitment-process-for-the-37th-promotion-of-the-pnh-continues.html>.

⁹⁵ According to information shared with the authors.

⁹⁶ U.S. Senate, *Testimony of Henry Wooster Before the Senate Appropriations Committee* (Feb. 10, 2026), https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/the_honorable_henry_wooster_testimony.pdf.

⁹⁷ See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 3 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (reporting three officers killed between October and December 2025); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 18 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf> (reporting 14 officers killed between September and November 2025, 9 of whom were on duty); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 3 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20-%20E2%80%93%20sep>

[tember%202025%29.pdf](#) (reporting 8 security force personnel killed during security operations between July and September 2025); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶ 20 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641> (reporting 13 officers killed by gunfire between June and August 2025).

⁹⁸ UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶¶ 61-62 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597>; BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 19 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf> (as of December 31, 2025, armed groups had destroyed 25 PNH armored vehicles and stolen a further 2); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 14 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20%2E2%80%93%20september%202025%29.pdf> (between July and September 2025, armed groups “ransacked, burned, or destroyed” four police stations, one in Kenscoff and three in the Artibonite Department); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶¶ 16, 17 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641>; Jacqueline Charles, *Gangs tighten grip outside Haitis capital as questions over new suppression force grow*, Miami Herald (Sep. 18, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312150767.html>; Juhakenson Blaise, *Haitian police lose three officers in 72 hours amid gang violence wave*, Haitian Times (15 Aug. 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/15/three-haitian-police-officers-killed-in-72-hours/>; AlterPresse, *Haiti-Kenscoff: The NHP hit by persistent gang violence* (13 Aug. 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article32099>.

⁹⁹ UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶ 20 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641>; But see Jean Daniel Senat, *Réouverture du sous-commissariat de Carrefour aéroport*, Le Nouvelliste (Feb. 9, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/264120/reouverture-du-sous-commissariat-de-carrefour-aeroport> (reporting the reopening of the Carrefour de l'Aéroport police station on Saturday, February 7).

¹⁰⁰ Secretary of State for Public Security Mario Andrésol, who oversees the PNH, acknowledged that “misunderstandings” with the previous Director General of the PNH, Normil Rameau, were behind some of the coordination issues across Haiti’s security forces. Rameau was replaced in August 2025 with André Jonas Vladimir Paraison. The decision was controversial – Paraison was the head of security at the National Palace when President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated in July 2021 and was indicted (although never charged) in 2018 in relation to an arms trafficking scheme. According to a police report, Paraison’s service revolver was found in the possession of Sanel Jean, who had connections with several armed groups, when Jean was arrested in 2024 (RhineNews, *Révélation Accablantes: DCPJ Rapport Dévoile le Rôle Clé des Membres du Gang Ti Bwa* (Sep. 4, 2024), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/revelations-accablantes-un-rapport-denquete-de-la-dcpj-devoile-le-role-cle-des-membres-du-gang-ti-bwa-et-de-leurs-allies-policiers-dans-une-serie-de-crimes-violents/>). Local authorities and police officers have emphasized the lack of coordination and communication between PNH leadership and the primature, as well as between central and departmental police authorities, as a serious impediment to restoring security. See Jean Junior Celestin, *Mario Andrésol Pledges to Reopen Routes to the South and North Before February 7*, Le Nouvelliste (Jan. 7, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/263077/mario-andresol-pledges-to-reopen-routes-to-the-south-and-north-before-february-7/>; Fenel Péliissier et al., *Pourquoi la police n’arrive-t-elle pas à stopper les gangs dans l’Artibonite*, AyiboPost (Dec. 6, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pourquoi-la-police-narrive-t-elle-pas-a-stopper-les-gangs-dans-lartibonite/>; RNDDH, *Monthly Report: Simon Pelé (October 22, 2025)* (Oct. 22, 2025), <https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/9-RapM-Simon-Pele-22Oct2025.ENG.pdf>; UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶ 29 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597>; GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis*, pp. 2, 20 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (“The absence of a central chain of command prevents implementation of a unified response to security challenges. As a result, the lack of coordinated leadership has entrenched dysfunction within state security mechanisms, ultimately benefiting armed groups that continue to expand territorial control.”); Juhakenson Blaise, *Head of presidential security Paraison replaces Normil Rameau as Haiti police chief*, Haitian Times (Aug. 9, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/09/paraison-replaces-rameau-pnh-chief/>; see also AlterPresse, *Haiti-Crime: The SPNH-17 police union revolted after the assassination of two agents and two brigadiers in Liancourt*, ¶ 4 (Jul. 23, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31984> (“The [police union] SPNH-17 denounces the indifference of the Transitional Presidential Council (Cpt), the Superior Council of the National Police (Cspn), and the government toward the police force.”); Jean Junior Celestin, *Mario Andrésol Says Political Crisis and Coup Rumors Have Hampered Law Enforcement Progress*, Le Nouvelliste (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/263968/mario-andresol-says-political-crisis-and-coup-rumors-have-hampered-law-enforcement-progress> (reporting that “[p]olitical tensions at the highest level of the State” and rumours of a coup d’état forced Paraison to prioritize “reinforcing strategic sites and the immediate surroundings of certain key areas of the capital with armored vehicles and the human resources involved in the operations, . . . [which] compromised law enforcement plans to restore security”) (internal quotations omitted).

¹⁰¹ See Evens Sanon and Danica Coto, *Glimmers of life appear after Haiti retakes control of a key area from powerful gangs*, AP News (Feb. 25, 2026), https://apnews.com/article/haiti-control-gangs-carrefour-aeroport-9e248bf212c16bf5f35bceb7770667b4?utm_source=copy&utm_medium=share (“The retaking of Carrefour Aéroport [by police] is “probably one of the very first tangible messages sent by the authorities that, ‘yes, we can take back the territory of . . . no man’s land,’” said Romain Le Cour, head of the Haiti Observatory at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. . . . Gaspar Caséus, 49, said he remains frustrated because gangs still control the main highway leading to southern Haiti. He called on authorities to retake control of other major intersections.”); Juhakenson Blaise, *Haitian Police kill 16 alleged gang members in Kenscoff operation*, The Haitian Times (Feb. 22, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/02/22/haitian-police-anti-gang-operation/>; Jean Junior Celestin, *Mario Andrésol Says Political Crisis and Coup Rumors Have Hampered Law Enforcement Progress*, Le Nouvelliste (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/263968/mario-andresol-says-political-crisis-and-coup-rumors-have-hampered-law-enforcement-progress> (“The Secretary of State for Public Security . . . announced that law enforcement forces have resumed operations in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. . . . but not yet at full capacity. The progress recorded this weekend in Tabarre and Croix-des-Bouquets is of little significance compared to what law enforcement can actually

do and what is planned in terms of restoring security.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); Robert Muggah, *Haiti's Political Crisis Deepens Amid a Slide into Criminal Governance*, *Americas Quarterly* (Feb. 2, 2026), <https://americasquarterly.org/article/haitis-political-crisis-deepens-amid-a-slide-into-criminal-governance/> (“Haitian police, backed by a U.S.-approved task force, have notched some symbolic but real gains.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 9 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (local sources attribute the low level of armed group activity in Pétion-Ville and Tabarre to “the significant number of security force operations that have weakened the gangs’ operational and financial capacities, particularly that of the Kraze Baryè gang”); Jacqueline Charles, *Drones, heavy guns and fragile gains: Inside Haiti’s latest push against gangs*, *Miami Herald* (Jan. 27, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314466392.html> (“U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres acknowledged that the intensified anti-gang operations in Port-au-Prince and parts of the neighboring Artibonite region have resulted in the reopening of several key roads. But he also noted that gangs’ expansion beyond metropolitan Port-au-Prince continue to undermine government authority, disrupting humanitarian and commercial routes in the region. . . . For now, success remains modest — and uncertain.”); Jean Daniel Senat, *Security Operations in Bercy Drive Out Criminals, War Weapons Seized*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Jan. 5, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/263026/security-operations-in-bercy-drive-out-criminals-war-weapons-seized> (a police operation in Bercy “resulted in the complete destruction of a toll post erected by armed bandits. . . . to extort the population and hinder the free movement of citizens”) (*internal quotations omitted*); AlterPresse, *Haiti – Plusieurs Personnes Assassinées et Blessées par Balles* (Dec. 29, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Plusieurs-personnes-assassinees-et-blessees-par-balles-dans-de-nouvelles> (“Several bandits were killed and two hostages freed during an operation conducted by specialized units of the Haitian National Police (PNH), the Armed Forces of Haiti (Fad’H) and the Gang Repression Force (FRG) against armed gangs in Kenscoff on Saturday, November 22, 2025.”).

¹⁰² See Jacqueline Charles, *Amid political turmoil in Haiti, U.S. warship arrives off coast of Port-au-Prince*, *Miami Herald* (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314559715.html>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 9 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (despite sustained security operations in Kenscoff, armed groups have taken control of several areas in the commune); AlterPresse, *Haiti – Sécurité: Drones Kamikazes, Saisies d’Armes, Fuite et Retour Fragile dans* (Jan. 14, 2026), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Securite-Drones-kamikazes-saisies-d-armes-fuite-et-retour-fragile-dans> (“Despite these [police] operations [in December and January in several areas of the city center, including Bel Air, La Saline, Bas de Delmas, Saint-Michel and Fort National], some gangs continue to exert their control over the city centre, extorting the population during the day and taking refuge at night in Carrefour, on the southern outskirts, considered a ‘liberated territory’ entirely controlled by the gangs.”); Fenel Péliissier et al., *Pourquoi la police n’arrive-t-elle pas à stopper les gangs dans l’Artibonite*, *AyiboPost* (Dec. 6, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pourquoi-la-police-narrive-t-elle-pas-a-stopper-les-gangs-dans-lartibonite/> (in the Artibonite Department, “[t]he presence of the police sometimes forces the gangs to retreat in certain areas, but this does not prevent them from attacking others with complete impunity”) (*internal quotations omitted*); Jacqueline Charles, *Special representative named for U.S. backed-Gang Suppression Force in Haiti*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 2, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313313420.html?giftCode=8a3dadca960f20562c76b300557c0bed596366da81c2b23241b9be2a5689d3f3>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, pp. 5, 8-9 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20-%20E%20%80%93%20september%202025%29.pdf> (“Continuing the trend seen in the second quarter, gangs were unable to make further gains in the capital and were even pushed back from a number of neighbourhoods – including Delmas 19 and Route de l’Aéroport (Delmas) and downtown Port-au-Prince and Turgeau (Portau-Prince) following operations by the security forces and self-defense groups. However, the authorities have yet to fully regain control of these areas, where gangs continue to launch quick, sporadic attacks. . . . Despite reinforced operations by the security forces to dislodge them, . . . [the *Grand Ravine* and *Village de Dieu* armed groups] succeeded in establishing cells in several areas [in Kenscoff].”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶ 17 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641> (attacks in the Artibonite and Center Departments “underscore the capacity of gangs to consolidate control across a corridor from the Centre to the Artibonite amid limited law enforcement presence and logistical constraints”); UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶¶ 25, 30, 45-46, 48 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (“[T]he failure to consolidate the gains achieved by security operations has enabled gang members to regain control of territory.”); Jacqueline Charles, *FAA extends ban on U.S. commercial aircraft landing in parts of Haiti*, *Miami Herald* (Sep. 6, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311989488.html#storylink=cpy> (the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration said that “Haitian and international security forces’ . . . uncoordinated actions against FTOs [foreign terrorist organization – i.e. armed groups] . . . reduce their operational effectiveness”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶¶ 6-7 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420> (“Localized successes [against armed groups] . . . are overshadowed by broader territorial losses to gangs in other parts of the country.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 7 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (while the intensification of security operations and the use of drones against armed groups in Delmas, Grand Ravine, Martissant, and Village-de-Dieu “prevented them from expanding their territorial hold, their members nevertheless continued to commit abuses against residents living in neighborhoods already under their control”); see also Wesker Sylvain, *Haitian Traders Face Gang “Toll Booths” at Sea*, *AyiboPost* (Feb. 23, 2026), <https://ayibopost.com/haitian-traders-face-gang-toll-booths-at-sea/> (the president of Haiti’s Coast Guard acknowledged that the Coast Guard “do[es] not have the resources to ensure a permanent presence at sea,” leaving vessels vulnerable to extortion by armed groups); Jason Motlagh, *The Last Man Standing in Haiti*, *Rolling Stone* (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/haiti-jean-ernest-muscadin-1235475798/> (discussing the high number of civilian deaths due to drone attacks, retired Haitian army officer Himmler Rebu said, “[i]f you

disorganize the enemy and don't have ground troops to exploit that action, then you just kill people, plain and simple") (*internal quotations omitted*).

¹⁰³ @Radio_Metronome, *Post on X* (Feb. 18, 2026), https://x.com/Radio_Metronome/status/2024131400228597866?s=20 ("The Secretary of State for Public Security, Mario Andrésol, had announced that some roads would be cleared before February 7th, but nothing has been done. The Director General of the Haitian National Police (PNH) was forced to take a helicopter to Port-de-Paix instead of traveling by road."); see also Jean Junior Celestin, *Mario Andrésol Pledges to Reopen Routes to the South and North Before February 7*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Jan. 7, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/263077/mario-andresol-pledges-to-reopen-routes-to-the-south-and-north-before-february-7>; Jean Junior Celestin, *PNH Operations Aim to Reopen Traffic Between Tabarre and Carrefour Marassa*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Feb. 2, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/263879/pnh-operations-aim-to-reopen-traffic-between-tabarre-and-carrefour-marassa> (reporting that "law enforcement forces are continuing operations aimed at restoring road traffic and strengthening security in strategic zones controlled by bandits").

¹⁰⁴ See, e.g., Fenel Péliissier et al., *Pourquoi la police n'arrive-t-elle pas à stopper les gangs dans l'Artibonite*, *AyiboPost* (Dec. 6, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pourquoi-la-police-narrive-t-elle-pas-a-stopper-les-gangs-dans-lartibonite/> (the *Gran Grif* armed group announced that it would attack Pont-Sondé on social media a few days before the attack on November 29, but authorities did not take measures to prevent the attack); *The Guardian*, *Hundreds flee central Haiti after gangs launch large-scale attacks and burn homes* (Dec. 1, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/01/haiti-armed-gangs-attack-artibonite>.

¹⁰⁵ See Fenel Péliissier et al., *Pourquoi la police n'arrive-t-elle pas à stopper les gangs dans l'Artibonite*, *AyiboPost* (Dec. 6, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pourquoi-la-police-narrive-t-elle-pas-a-stopper-les-gangs-dans-lartibonite/> (the government commissioner of Saint-Marc "criticizes the behavior of some police officers deployed in the field who refuse to participate in operations" and notes that "it sometimes happens that police officers, when there are injuries, retreat and find themselves forced to abandon"); Jacqueline Charles, *Special representative named for U.S. backed-Gang Suppression Force in Haiti*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 2, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313313420.html?giftCode=8a3dadca960f20562c76b300557c0bed596366da81c2b23241b9be2a5689d3f3> (community leaders in Pont-Sondé "say they've pleaded for drones and other reinforcements to no avail[,], leaving them vulnerable to the Gran Grif gang's continued attacks"); *The Guardian*, *Hundreds flee central Haiti after gangs launch large-scale attacks and burn homes* (Dec. 1, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/01/haiti-armed-gangs-attack-artibonite> (a Pont-Sondé official said that two days after armed groups attacked Pont-Sondé, "no additional police had arrived"); Jacqueline Charles & Ychmuth Corneille, *Residents in rural Haiti town staying away amid calls to return after gang attack*, *Miami Herald* (Sep. 21, 2025), [miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312199453.html](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312199453.html) (speaking about an armed group attack in Bassin-Bleu, "the Catholic Bishop for the Northwest Diocese, Monsignor Charles Peters Barthelus, said the gunmen entered without encountering any resistance from the police"); Jacqueline Charles, *Gangs tighten grip outside Haitis capital as questions over new suppression force grow*, *Miami Herald* (Sep. 18, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312150767.html> (in the Artibonite Department, "[t]he gangs are advancing, while the authorities seem to be retreating") (*internal quotations omitted*); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 10 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (attributing armed groups' expansion into the Center Department in the second quarter of 2025 to "the flight or absence of state services"); see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 12 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (from October to December 2025, 85% of police operations took place in the West Department, while just 10 and 5% took place in the Artibonite and Center Departments, respectively).

¹⁰⁶ Robert Muggah, *Haiti's Political Crisis Deepens Amid a Slide into Criminal Governance*, *Americas Quarterly* (Feb. 2, 2026), <https://americasquarterly.org/article/haitis-political-crisis-deepens-amid-a-slide-into-criminal-governance/> ("[T]hese private initiatives . . . highlight the growing tendency toward outsourcing security functions when the state is weak and multilateral missions struggle to scale."); UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶¶ 26-29 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> ("Resorting to private military companies currently constitutes a key pillar of the Government's security strategy."); see also Sandra Pellegrini & Maria Fernanda Arocha, *Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti's Security Landscape*, *ACLEDDATA* (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape> ("Haiti's security landscape has evolved in recent years, with security progressively shifting beyond formal state institutions. New tactics have emerged, including security forces' use of explosive-laden drones, while non-traditional actors such as private military contractors and self-defense brigades have gained prominence as security operators."); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶ 18 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420> (discussing the significant expansion of private security companies in Haiti, including the "the use of private security guards – primarily Haitian nationals – employed by local businesses to protect commercial facilities and staff[;] . . . national and international security firms contracted by foreign embassies, international missions and some larger businesses and NGOs[;] . . . [and] private military companies contracted directly by Haitian authorities or international partners to support law enforcement and protect critical assets").

¹⁰⁷ Erik Prince's former private security firm Blackwater has a long record of human rights abuses. Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti's New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti>.

¹⁰⁸ The task force operates under the authority of the Prime Minister and is "[c]omprised of personnel coming from the Prime Minister's security unit and the [General Security Unit of the National Palace]," with support from private security contractors. It "was created without formal publication of its mandate, chain of command or institutional oversight." GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, p. 19 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (since the task force was established, "drone attacks have become a near-

daily occurrence in Port-au-Prince”); UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶ 28 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597>; Haiti Libre, *Haiti – Security: Kamikaze Drones in Haiti Are Essential*, ¶ 5 (Jul. 21, 2025) <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45380-haiti-security-kamikaze-drones-in-haiti-are-essential.html> (then-President of the TPC Fritz Alphonse Jean confirmed that “[t]he kamikaze drone program is led by a task force composed of Haitians and foreign private contractors, under the direction of the Prime Minister”).

¹⁰⁹ GI-TOC, *Haiti: Military Companies, Organized Crime, and Gangs* (Sep. 8, 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/haiti-military-companies-organized-crime-gangs/> (a one-year contract apparently includes “serving directly in combat operations, and deploying helicopters and vessels,” alongside participating in drone operations, while a ten-year contract, “which has not been confirmed by the Haitian government, is . . . focused on restructuring and modernizing customs and immigration services, including infrastructure development”); Danica Coto, *Haiti Considers Hiring Contractors Connected to Erik Prince to Fight Gangs*, AP News (Aug. 14, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-erik-prince-contractors-gang-violence-police-8b354f3e085b927b30b6877b5b98e7a5> (“Vectus Global also will assume a long-term role in advising Haiti’s government on how to restore revenue collection capabilities once the violence subsides.”).

¹¹⁰ Prince confirmed in August 2025 that his firm Vectus Global was contracted both to assist with drone attacks and for the two new contracts, but the transitional government has denied that claim. Other reporting indicates the new contracts may be held by two separate companies: Evergreen Trading System Limited and Alex Stewart International. Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti’s New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti> (“Haitian Prime Minister Alix Didier Filis-Aimé and other Transitional Presidential Council members have been secretive about the exact role that Vectus Global is playing.”); Haiti Libre, *Fritz Alphonse Jean Denies Any Connection to Erik Prince’s Vectus Global Contract* (Aug. 18, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45575-haiti-flash-fritz-alphonse-jean-denies-any-connection-to-erik-prince-s-vectus-global-contract.html>; Danica Coto, *Haiti Considers Hiring Contractors Connected to Erik Prince to Fight Gangs*, AP News (Aug. 14, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/haiti-erik-prince-contractors-gang-violence-police-8b354f3e085b927b30b6877b5b98e7a5>; Roberson Alphonse, *\$500 Million Border Security Contract Receives Court of Auditors’ Approval*, Le Nouvelliste (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/264541/500-million-border-security-contract-receives-court-of-auditors-approval> (reporting that the Haitian government has contracted with private security companies Evergreen Trading System Limited and Alex Stewart International “to strengthen national security at the borders, optimize tax and customs revenues, and increase the State’s capacity to effectively combat transnational crime, tax fraud, and smuggling”); see also UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶ 28 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (“[T]he engagement of private security contractors in ground operations has [also] been reported.”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶ 18 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420> (“In late May 2025, some of these companies emerged as supporting Haitian police by deploying surveillance equipment and providing tactical support, including loitering munitions. Reports have also suggested that such companies sent a ‘large cache of weapons’ to Haiti in April 2025.”); GI-TOC, *Haiti: Military Companies, Organized Crime, and Gangs* (Sep. 8, 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/haiti-military-companies-organized-crime-gangs/> (noting that “the opacity of [these] contractual arrangements should not be viewed merely as a negative externality, but as an intrinsic feature that enhances their perceived value”). The government has also sought to incorporate into its national security forces the Brigade for the Security of Protected Areas – a government agency-turned-paramilitary group that, since at least January 2024, has been operating largely outside the law – but its role remains unclear. UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶ 27 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (“The Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées comprises multiple units operating across the country, mostly outside of State control. . . . Its activities have continued to underscore the ambiguity between its role as an informal local security provider and the criminal activities in which many agents of the Brigade are involved. The manner in which the authorities intend to implement the 3 April 2025 decree calling for the Brigade to join with national security forces in the fight against gangs remains unclear.”).

¹¹¹ See GI-TOC, *Haiti: Military Companies, Organized Crime, and Gangs* (Sep. 8, 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/haiti-military-companies-organized-crime-gangs/> (“One of the biggest issues with deploying PMCs is accountability. The oversight mechanisms controlling Vectus Global are shrouded in secrecy. . . . Although there are international guidelines to regulate the use of private security companies, such as the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, the former is non-binding and the latter has no enforcement mechanism. Furthermore, contractors are not subject to military law, and there are grey areas about their rights and accountability under international and national laws.”); UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶ 29 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32> (“The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates that there are approximately 100 private security companies collectively employing between 75,000 and 90,000 personnel in Haiti. The expansion of such companies has created parallel armed structures operating with uneven accountability, notwithstanding their role in protecting key infrastructure.”); Robert Muggah, *Haiti’s Political Crisis Deepens Amid a Slide into Criminal Governance*, Americas Quarterly (Feb. 2, 2026), <https://americasquarterly.org/article/haitis-political-crisis-deepens-amid-a-slide-into-criminal-governance/>.

¹¹² OHCHR, *High Commissioner Türk Updates Human Rights Council on Haiti* (Oct. 2, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/10/high-commissioner-turk-updates-human-rights-council-haiti-we-can>.

¹¹³ See notes 137-138.

¹¹⁴ See Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance*, pp. 23-24 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf> (drone strikes “instilled fear among the gangs, [but] authorities remained unable to regain territorial control, partly because of a lack of coordination between the task force and the police”); RNDDH, *Monthly Report: Simon Pelé (October 22, 2025)*, ¶¶ 6, 29 (Oct. 22, 2025), https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/9-RapM-Simon-Pele-22Oct2025.ENG_.pdf (“Despite these repeated operations, notorious gang leaders continue to circulate freely, openly mocking state authorities in videos and attacking civilians by organizing massacres and armed assaults in the Artibonite, Central, and Western Departments.”); GI-TOC, *Haiti: Military*

Companies, Organized Crime, and Gangs (Sep. 8, 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/haiti-military-companies-organized-crime-gangs/> (since the drone strikes started, “[g]angs have not lost any significant territory in the capital . . . and have dramatically expanded their influence in the provinces”); Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti's New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti> (“The use of drones, [founding member and former executive director of Lakou Lapè, Louis Henry] Mars suggested, could further intensify the violence, especially as they are typically deployed in lower-income areas. ‘The victims are always in the poor neighbourhoods, where gangs are embedded in the community. So when you attack them, you also attack the community. . . . At some point, resentment will explode, not only against those who killed children and families, but also against those who are perceived as being spared and being the ones who sent the force to kill them.’”); GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, pp. 2, 19 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (“While militarized responses – such as drone strikes – may contain certain manifestations of armed violence, they remain insufficient to address the broader political economy that sustains gang operations. . . . The lack of accountability mechanisms and coordination with the actual police structure reflects deep mistrust within the state and its law enforcement agencies.”).

¹¹⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Haiti: Drone Strikes Put Residents at Risk* (Mar. 10, 2026), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/10/haiti-drone-strikes-put-residents-at-risk>; Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti's New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti> (“While notorious gang leaders remain completely unaffected by these kamikaze drone strikes, their footsoldiers, mostly minors and young adults, are being killed in large numbers.”); see also Sarah Morland, *Hundreds of People Killed in Haiti Police Drone Strikes*, *Canberra Times* (Mar. 10, 2026), <https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/9194891/hundreds-of-people-killed-in-haiti-police-drone-strikes/> (“security forces have yet to capture a major gang leader”).

¹¹⁶ See Sandra Pellegrini & Maria Fernanda Arocha, *Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti's Security Landscape*, ACLED (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape> (analyzing the increased formalization of civilian “defense” groups, which have “become an integral part of Haiti's security response. . . . serving as an informal extension of the state's response capacity”); Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance*, p. 28 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf>; GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, pp. 2, 16 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (“Civilian brigades provide operational support to security forces, compensating for the inability of Haitian and international police to sustain a presence on the ground.”); see also *The Guardian*, *Hundreds flee central Haiti after gangs launch large-scale attacks and burn homes* (Dec. 1, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/01/haiti-armed-gangs-attack-artibonite>; Victor Raison, *Guns, gangs and drought: how crime and the climate crisis are reshaping Haiti*, *The Guardian* (Nov. 13, 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/13/haiti-violence-climate-disaster-drought-haitians-gang-warfare?utm_term=.6916cfec641e9c7793bdfe10e27bd1fe&utm_campaign=FirstEdition&utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&CMP=firstedition_email; UN Geneva, *Dialogue with Haiti: Human Rights Committee Welcome Efforts* (Jul. 4, 2025), <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/meeting-summary/2025/07/dialogue-haiti-experts-human-rights-committee-welcome-efforts> (in its second periodic report to the Human Rights Committee on its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Haitian government acknowledged that “despite the Government's efforts, some citizens, driven by anger at the atrocities committed by criminal groups, resorted to extreme methods, including the lynching of captured gang members, instead of handing them over to the authorities”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶ 24 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420>.

¹¹⁷ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 11 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (“In some communes of the Artibonite and Centre departments, self-defense groups have become the only security structures still present, providing a certain level of protection against gang attacks.”); Fenel Pélissier et al., *Pourquoi la police n'arrive-t-elle pas à stopper les gangs dans l'Artibonite*, *AyiboPost* (Dec. 6, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pourquoi-la-police-narrive-t-elle-pas-a-stopper-les-gangs-dans-lartibonite/> (in some areas, “defense” groups are “a significant bulwark against the advance of gangs”). Paradoxically, killings often provoke harsh retaliation from armed groups, furthering the cycle of violence. Sandra Pellegrini & Maria Fernanda Arocha, *Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti's Security Landscape*, ACLED (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape> (“The embedded nature of self-defense members within their own communities makes residents — including individuals not participating in self-defense activity — particularly vulnerable to reprisals. In fact, self-defense activity in communities has often prompted gangs to adopt more predatory and indiscriminate forms of violence against the population.”); see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 9 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20-%20E2%80%93September%202025%29.pdf> (attacks by armed groups in the Artibonite Department, “often supported by gangs based in the capital . . . in turn triggered a response from local self-defence groups, contributing to a highly lethal cycle of violence”).

¹¹⁸ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 11 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf; see also Sandra Pellegrini & Maria Fernanda Arocha, *Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti's Security Landscape*, ACLED (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape> (“[L]ynchings and

coordinated actions to push back gangs involving organized and semi-organized citizen groups have remained frequent, and now represent a significant share of overall violence.”).

¹¹⁹ Sandra Pellegrini & Maria Fernanda Arocha, *Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti's Security Landscape*, ACLED (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape> (“For example, vigilante actors have at times treated clothing style or living in marginalized neighborhoods as sufficient grounds for gang affiliation, and individuals have deliberately destroyed their documents to prevent being associated with neighborhoods under gang control. This dynamic has fueled social discrimination but also resulted in extrajudicial killings.”); Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance*, p. 28 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf> (“People who do not carry identification or who are suspected of being gang members based on their physical appearance, such as dreadlocks or tattoos, have found themselves in the crosshairs.”); see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 11-12 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (“Beyond interventions aimed at repelling gang attacks, self-defense groups and members of the population acting within the framework of the ‘popular justice’ movement known as ‘Bwa Kalé’ also committed killings of individuals suspected of belonging to gangs or collaborating with them, even though those individuals were neither armed nor involved in acts of violence at the time they were killed.”); Victor Raison, *Guns, gangs and drought: how crime and the climate crisis are reshaping Haiti*, *The Guardian* (Nov. 13, 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/13/haiti-violence-climate-disaster-drought-haitians-gang-warfare?utm_term=6916cfec641e9c7793bdfe10e27bd1fe&utm_campaign=FirstEdition&utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&CMP=firstedition_email (“Vigilante lynchings by the *Bwa Kalé* movement, in which victims are sometimes burned alive, can await those unable to justify their presence outside curfew hours.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 10 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20%20-%20September%202025%29.pdf>.

¹²⁰ Sandra Pellegrini & Maria Fernanda Arocha, *Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti's Security Landscape*, ACLED (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape> (“The line between voluntary community support and coerced contributions to support the operations of the brigade and provide security is often blurred, which heightens the risk of groups sliding from collective defense into control and extortion — especially when trying to secure resources and sustain their operations.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 11 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20%20-%20September%202025%29.pdf> (“[I]n some areas, self-defence groups have begun adopting criminal behaviours similar to those of gangs. For example, in the commune of Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite, the Jean Denis self-defence group set up checkpoints on certain roads in order to extort local residents to acquire weapons and ammunition. Vehicles that refused to pay were shot.”); see also Fenel Pélessier et al., *Pourquoi la police n’arrive-t-elle pas à stopper les gangs dans l’Artibonite*, *AyiboPost* (Dec. 6, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pourquoi-la-police-narrive-t-elle-pas-a-stopper-les-gangs-dans-lartibonite/> (a “defense” brigade in the Artibonite Department “is regularly accused of committing atrocities against the civilian population”); UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶ 33 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (reporting that the increase in “defense” groups is “fuelling a rise in arbitrary violence and acts of banditry”).

¹²¹ UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶ 30 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32> (“Field reporting from Artibonite and Malpasse indicates instances in which the leaders of vigilante or so-called self-defence groups have aligned themselves with established gangs or financed themselves through extortion, illustrating how community-led resistance groups can evolve into armed actors combining elements of local protection, criminal activity and the opportunistic building of alliances.”).

¹²² Sandra Pellegrini & Maria Fernanda Arocha, *Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti's Security Landscape*, ACLED (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape> (“[S]tate forces themselves have normalized extrajudicial violence. . . . [fostering] a climate of permissiveness toward extrajudicial executions, including in the framework of self-defence activity.”); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶ 24 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en (the UN Human Rights Committee “notes with concern that some of these killings [by “defense” groups] are said to have been encouraged, supported or facilitated by members of the National Police and that the State Party has not provided details of any related investigations, prosecutions or penalties”); see also notes 134-143, 168.

¹²³ UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶ 100 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597>; Sandra Pellegrini & Maria Fernanda Arocha, *Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti's Security Landscape*, ACLED (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape>.

¹²⁴ Sandra Pellegrini & Maria Fernanda Arocha, *Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti's Security Landscape*, ACLED (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape> (“Police and government officials have appealed to residents for support in the fight against gangs, promoting the idea of what they call ‘marriage police-population.’ . . . Police forces have notably facilitated the issuance of permits to carry weapons, which citizens have a constitutionally protected right to use for self-defense on their property. . . . The links between vigilante groups and police forces are also facilitated by the fact that many police officers live in the neighborhoods where these groups operate. Current and former police officers frequently participate in the defense of the neighborhood where they live and have contributed to the organization of local self-defense groups by facilitating their access to equipment and tactical know-how.”); Victor Raison, *Guns, gangs and drought: how crime and the climate crisis are reshaping Haiti*, *The Guardian* (Nov. 13,

2025), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/13/haiti-violence-climate-disaster-drought-haitians-gang-warfare?utm_term=.6916cfec641e9c7793bdfe10e27bd1fe&utm_campaign=FirstEdition&utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&CMP=firstedition_email; GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, p. 2 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (“The line between law enforcement and vigilante groups is becoming increasingly blurred, while the category of ‘civilian’ (i.e. non-combatant) is following the same path of confusion, reinforcing the polarization of Haitian society.”).

¹²⁵ See Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance* (Dec. 15, 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf>.

¹²⁶ See Section IV.

¹²⁷ On December 30, 2025, the transitional government adopted a “Decree Regulating the Exercise of Freedom of Expression and Providing for the Prevention and Punishment of Defamation and Press Offenses.” CPJ, *Projet de Décret sur la Presse* (Dec. 30, 2025), https://cpj.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/projet_decret.pdf. The decree imposes restrictions on freedom of expression that “could unduly restrict freedom of expression and criminalize criticism of public officials,” according to the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Jacqueline Charles, *Decrees in Haiti make it difficult to prosecute corrupt officials, erode press freedom*, Miami Herald (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/americas/haiti/article314766071.html> (“The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights warned that the decree could unduly restrict freedom of expression and criminalize criticism of public officials.”); see also Juhakenson Balise, *CPT sets jail time and stiff fines for Haitian journalists, digital distributors – raising alarm*, The Haitian Times (Jan. 22, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/01/22/haiti-media-decree-repressive-press-freedom/> (“Advocates for an open press and freedom of expression warn the directive opens the door to expanded state control over speech — all without public debate and ahead critical elections. . . . ‘This text undermines one of the most important gains since the end of the dictatorship: freedom of expression,’ said Richard Widmaier, president of ANMH [National Association of Haitian Media].”); CPJ, *Haiti's Presidential Council Expands Defamation Laws as End of Political Immunity Looms* (Jan. 16, 2026), <https://cpj.org/2026/01/haitis-presidential-council-expands-defamation-laws-as-end-of-political-immunity-loom/>. A separate decree establishing the organization and function of the High Court of Justice was likewise “passed with the same purpose in mind: [t]o shut everyone up,” according to Haitian lawyer Rosy Auguste Ducéna. Jacqueline Charles, *Decrees in Haiti make it difficult to prosecute corrupt officials, erode press freedom*, Miami Herald (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314766071.html>; see also notes 176-177.

¹²⁸ UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶ 25 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32>; see also Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak> (A displaced person laments that “[i]t was previous governments that created the gangs; they formed and financed the gangs. They made them grow and guided them. In fact, the gangs are just doing their job.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); Victor Raison, *Guns, gangs and drought: how crime and the climate crisis are reshaping Haiti*, The Guardian (Nov. 13, 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/13/haiti-violence-climate-disaster-drought-haitians-gang-warfare?utm_term=.6916cfec641e9c7793bdfe10e27bd1fe&utm_campaign=FirstEdition&utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&CMP=firstedition_email (the spokesperson of the Villambetta displaced persons camp: “Our leaders have had dealings with the gangs. If they created the problem, they can’t be the solution.”) (*internal quotations omitted*). For extensive documentation of those in position of public authority colluding with armed groups from previous reporting periods, see IJDH, *IJDH Publications*, <https://www.ijdh.org/news-and-resources/publications/>.

¹²⁹ In May 2025, a coalition of civil society organizations filed a formal complaint against the members of the TPC, accusing them of complicity with armed groups. There have also been separate allegations of collusion with armed groups leveled against TPC member Louis Gérald Gilles, his party the December 21 Agreement, and the political party *Pitit Desalin* (which also has a representative on the Council). In June 2025, a senior government source accused transitional Prime Minister Fils-Aimé of deliberately obstructing police operations against armed group leaders and legal actions against individuals suspected of providing support to criminal groups. See IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, notes 157-158 and associated text (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>.

¹³⁰ UNODC, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti* (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs; UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶¶ 25-32 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 16 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20%28%20%28september%202025%29.pdf> (a report by the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police (DCPJ) in August 2025 highlighted the connections between a former Director-General of the Metropolitan Solid Waste Collection Service “and several individuals supporting gangs operating in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶ 27 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641> (reporting on the arrest of former senator Nènel Cassy due to his ties with armed groups); UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc S/2025/597, ¶¶ 49, 78-80, 83 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (noting armed groups’ use of “scorched-earth” tactics “to confiscate land for the benefit of politicians and businesspeople. . . . reportedly instigated by politicians willing to expose the police’s inability to protect one of the capital’s most residential areas;” and highlighting “the crucial role played by intermediaries [including a former political appointee] in enabling the relationship between gangs and political, security and economic actors”); Juhakenson Blaise, *US Embassy in Haiti resumes service after closure due to nearby violence*, The Haitian Times (6 Aug. 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/06/us-embassy-in-haiti-resumes-service-after-closure-due-to-nearby-violence/> (three political figures and former lawmakers - Nènel Cassy, Prophane Victor, and Alfredo

Antoine – are “suspected of providing logistical support to gangs”); Press Lakay, *Justice | Magalie Habitant interviewed a second time by judge Benjamin Felisme* (6 Aug. 2025), <https://presslakay.net/?p=62424>; BINUH & OHCHR, *Intensification of Criminal Violence in Lower Artibonite, the Centre Department, and Regions Located East of the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince*, p. 31 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-july-artibonite-and-mirebalais-EN.pdf>; UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶ 22 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420>; see also Widlore Merancourt and Wethzer Piercin, *Fritz Alphonse Jean Denies Allegations in U.S. State Department Statement*, AyiboPost (2 Aug. 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/fritz-alfonse-jean-denies-allegations-in-u-s-state-department-statement/> (“According to the economist and author of *Haiti: An Economy of Violence*, members of the private sector are involved in arms trafficking and money laundering. And when the private sector controls both branches of the executive, . . . it raises legitimate concerns.”) (*internal quotations omitted*). For an extensive discussion of the ways in which relationships between armed groups and political and economic elites have evolved, see Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance*, pp. 10-11 (Dec. 15, 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf>; Jake Johnston, *Private Sector Assumes Control of Haitian State as DC Lobbying Picks up Pace*, CEPR (Aug. 18, 2025), <https://cepr.net/publications/private-sector-assumes-control-of-haitian-state/>.

¹³¹ UN Security Council, *Kempes Sanon – Security Council Profile* (Oct. 17, 2025), <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/kempes-sanon> (sanctioning Kempes Sanon, leader of the armed group *Les Argentins*, which is part of the *Viv Ansanm* alliance and “has been involved in systematic human rights violations, including extortion, kidnappings, and illicit taxation”; under Sanon’s leadership, *Les Argentins* “has conducted repeated assaults on neighborhoods like Solino, resulting in numerous casualties and the displacement of thousands of residents”).

¹³² UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶¶ 22-23 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420> (“The lack of regulatory oversight over private security companies has facilitated the diversion of weapons to criminal groups, including gangs. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights observed that firearms trafficked into Haiti are also trafficked and sold by private security companies.”); see also notes 106-115.

¹³³ For example, the UN reported that police intentionally impeded security operations in Kenscoff to allow politician-backed armed groups to carry out attacks. UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶¶ 49, 100 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597>.

¹³⁴ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 12 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf.

¹³⁵ See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 2 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (reporting 13% between October and December 2025); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 22 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf> (reporting 19% between October and December 2025, with children accounting for nearly 3% of casualties); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, pp. 11-12 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20-%20September%202025%29.pdf> (reporting 17% between July and September 2025); UN, *UN Digital Library Document* (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4090959?ln=en&v=pdf> (reporting 22% between June and September); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 3 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (reporting 15% between April and June 2025); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (January – March 2025)* (Apr. 30, 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_jan_-_march_2025.pdf (reporting 18% between January and March 2025); see also Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti police raids trigger deadly gang clashes, cutting off medical care in Port-au-Prince*, Miami Herald (Jan. 9, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314253147.html> (the head of the Organization for Peace and Development said at least 40% of those killed during security operations in December 2025 “were collateral damage involving innocent residents who live in the areas being targeted because they have no other choice, are attached to their neighborhood, or used as human shields by gang members”) (*internal quotations omitted*).

¹³⁶ OHCHR, *High Commissioner Türk Updates Human Rights Council on Haiti* (Oct. 2, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/10/high-commissioner-turk-updates-human-rights-council-haiti-we-can> (the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern “that State law enforcement have used unnecessary and disproportionate lethal force in their operations against the gangs”); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶ 24 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en (the UN Human Rights Committee expresses concern “about reports of excessive or disproportionate use of lethal force by the National Police and of extrajudicial executions by certain authorities”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 13 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (finding “a disproportionate use of lethal force and a lack of precautionary measures to protect the population by certain specialized police units, such as those deployed in Carrefour Drouillard, Carrefour Vincent, and Sarthe (Cité Soleil),” which sometimes “fired indiscriminately from inside their armored vehicles”); see also U.S. State Dept, *Haiti 2024 Human Rights Report*, pp. 13-14 (Aug. 12, 2025), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/624521_HAITI-2024-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf (“Although the constitution prohibited such practices, credible reports from NGOs suggested members of the HNP

occasionally beat or abused detainees and suspects. . . . Civil society representatives alleged widespread misconduct among police officers, driven largely by poor training and a lack of professionalism.”).

¹³⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Haiti: Drone Strikes Put Residents at Risk* (Mar. 10, 2026), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/10/haiti-drone-strikes-put-residents-at-risk> (videos uploaded to social media or shared with Human Rights Watch “show the repeated use of drones equipped with explosives to attack vehicles and people, some of them armed, but none who appear to be engaged in violent acts or pose any imminent threat to life. . . . bolster[ing] the impression that many of the drone attacks are attempts to target and extrajudicially kill people, rather than a law enforcement response that might justify the deliberate, lethal use of force”); AlterPresse, *Haiti – Sécurité: Drones Kamikazes, Saisies d'Armes, Fuite et Retour Fragile dans plusieurs quartiers de la capitale* (Jan. 14, 2026), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Securite-Drones-kamikazes-saisies-d-armes-fuite-et-retour-fragile-dans> (“As police intensify operations against gangs terrorizing several neighborhoods in downtown Port-au-Prince, the repeated use of drones and heavy weapons has reportedly caused hundreds of residents to flee, homes to be destroyed, and civilians, including women, children, and the elderly, to lose their lives. . . . Communities are calling on authorities to recognize the lack of truly safe spaces and to take concrete steps to protect the civilian population, especially children and the elderly.”); Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti police raids trigger deadly gang clashes, cutting off medical care in Port-au-Prince*, Miami Herald (Jan. 9, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314253147.html>; Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti's New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti>; RNDDH, *Monthly Report: Simon Pelé (October 22, 2025)* (Oct. 22, 2025), https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/9-RapM-Simon-Pele-22Oct2025.ENG_.pdf (discussing concerns around abuses in the context of a drone attack on September 20, 2025, during the birthday celebration of an armed group leader that resulted in numerous civilian casualties, including children, and noting in particular that “[s]ince the funds allocated to the intelligence service have been squandered by state authorities, the mechanism created to gather reliable information on the location of armed gang bases and to minimize the killing of innocent people and the destruction of property unrelated to criminal activities has been severely limited”); GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti's Escalating Crisis*, p. 19 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (“According to an RNDDH report, the deployment of attack drones has resulted in the deaths of at least 300 gang members and injuries to more than 400 others. However, no official report makes mention of potential civilian casualties. This omission effectively amounts to considering that anyone residing in a gang-controlled area is a legitimate target – a particularly worrying development given the potential human rights violations related to drone strikes.”); UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶ 73 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597>; UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶ 9 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420> (“The lack of a clear legal framework governing drone operations and military-style engagements in civilian settings adds urgency to the need for comprehensive legislative oversight.”); see also Jacqueline Charles, *Drones, heavy guns and fragile gains: Inside Haiti's latest push against gangs*, Miami Herald (Jan. 27, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314466392.html> (a drone task force operative said they “would encourage civilians to not be in those prepared gang defensive positions if they don’t want to get killed,” and claimed that “the collateral damage has been extremely, extremely minimal”).

¹³⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Haiti: Drone Strikes Put Residents at Risk* (Mar. 10, 2026), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/10/haiti-drone-strikes-put-residents-at-risk>; see also BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 17 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf> (reporting 39 civilians killed, including 16 children, in 2025); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 3 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (reporting at least 32 civilians, including 2 children, killed or injured by drone strikes between October and December 2025); Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti gangs have slowed attacks in the capital, but they have intensified elsewhere*, Miami Herald (Nov. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312880614.html> (reporting at least 39 deaths, including 20 children).

¹³⁹ See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 3, 13 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (police carried out 58 extrajudicial executions between October and December 2025); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, pp. 3, 12 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20%2E2%80%93%20september%202025%29.pdf> (79 extrajudicial executions were carried out by police (78) and Public Prosecutor of Miragoâne Jean Ernest Muscadin (1) between July and September 2025); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 3 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (73 extrajudicial executions were carried out by police (46) and Muscadin (27) between April and June 2025”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (January – March 2025)*, p. 2 (Apr. 30, 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_jan_-_march_2025.pdf (65 extrajudicial executions were carried out by police (50) and Muscadin (15) between January and March 2025); see also Sandra Pellegrini & Maria Fernanda Arocha, *Last Line of Defense: How Vigilante Groups Are Transforming Haiti's Security Landscape*, ACLED (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://acleddata.com/report/last-line-defense-how-vigilante-groups-are-transforming-haitis-security-landscape> (discussing the state’s normalization of extrajudicial killings, and noting in particular the involvement of Muscadin and another commissioner in the Northwest Department in such killings); see also generally Jason Motlagh, *The Last Man Standing in Haiti*, Rolling Stone (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/haiti-jean-ernest->

[muscadin-1235475798/](#) (Muscadin operates with impunity in the Nippes Department, where he has retained his role as government commissioner despite publicly committing extrajudicial killings for years).

¹⁴⁰ Daniel Dickinson, *Trapped behind bars: Reforming Haiti's broken detention system*, UN News (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166325> (“Police will often arrest people en masse. Literally, they will come to a scene of an alleged crime, and arrest everybody they find. People get caught up in this kind of dragnet and spend a lot of time in prison even though they have nothing to do with the crime.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 13 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (most victims of extrajudicial killings by police “were arrested during patrols or at police checkpoints, questioned in the street, and then executed on the spot”); *see also* note 185.

¹⁴¹ In February 2026, the PNH reportedly arrested three police officers accused of involvement in kidnapping cases.

YouTube, *YouTube Video* (Feb. 26, 2026), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFc6tg8-tYk>; Haiti 24, *Kidnapping en Haïti: La Police Face à ses Propres Démons* (Feb. 27, 2026), <https://haiti24.net/kidnapping-en-haiti-la-police-face-a-ses-propres-demons/>.

¹⁴² Wesker Sylvain, *Haitian Traders Face Gang “Toll Booths” at Sea*, AyiboPost (Feb. 23, 2026), <https://ayibopost.com/haitian-traders-face-gang-toll-booths-at-sea/> (a sailor and a spokesperson for the spokesperson for the *Syndicat des Marins et Amateurs de la Gonâve* (Union of Sailors and Enthusiasts of Gônave – SYMAG) said the Haitian Coast Guard charges sailors about 100,000 gourdes to protect their vessels from armed groups, and sometimes asks them to cover the fuel costs of doing so).

¹⁴³ *See* BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 12, 20 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (“To date, the [BINUH Human Rights Service] HRS has received no information indicating that the authorities have opened investigations to establish the circumstances and responsibilities relating to deaths and injuries caused during operations by the security forces and the private military company, including cases in which children were affected. . . . Of the 222 alleged cases of extrajudicial executions and attempted extrajudicial executions transmitted to the IGPNH in 2025, none had been completed and forwarded to the justice system. However, 174 of these 222 cases are the subject of ongoing investigations.”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶ 23 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641> (“Through a dedicated mechanism, BINUH and OHCHR transmitted details on 100 documented cases of extrajudicial and attempted extrajudicial killings . . . to the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police. No investigations were completed and handed to the Director General of Police.”); U.S. State Dept, *Haiti 2024 Human Rights Report*, p. 14 (Aug. 12, 2025), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/624521_HAITI-2024-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 14 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf.

¹⁴⁴ UNODC, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti* (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer_-_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs (“Corruption and economic crimes, such as money laundering, together with limited financial oversight, are enabling trafficking and organized crime in Haiti.”); UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶¶ 23, 119-121, 133-135 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (discussing how corruption, mismanagement, and diversion of public funds have undermined the effectiveness of the transitional authorities and “exacerbated the fragility of the economic system . . . thereby rendering the country more susceptible to instability”); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶ 12 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en.

¹⁴⁵ Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index 2025* (Feb. 10, 2026), <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2025>.

¹⁴⁶ Michelson Cesaire, *ULCC Calls for Legal Action Over Irregular Subsidies Issued by the FNE*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 9, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262373/ulcc-calls-for-legal-action-over-irregular-subsidies-issued-by-the-fne> (the former Director General of the National Education Fund (FNE) and six others are variously accused of, *inter alia*, “embezzlement of public funds, a complete absence of oversight, granting subsidies to nonexistent associations or to groups unrelated to the institution’s educational mission, and obstructing the proper functioning of justice”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 16 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20-%20September%202025%29.pdf> (noting investigations into the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Civic Action; the Office for Work, Sickness and Maternity Insurance; the Office for the Protection of Citizens; the National Federation of Haitian Mayors; the General Directorate of Customs; the Social Assistance Fund (CAS); the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications; as well as a former mayor); Lakay Info 509, *Affaire Nené Cassy: Perquisitions Révèlent un Vaste Système de Détournement de Fonds Publics* (7 Aug. 2025), <https://lakayinfo509.com/affaire-nene-cassy-des-perquisitions-ciblees-revelent-un-vaste-systeme-de-detournement-presume-de-fonds-publics/>; UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶¶ 44-45 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420> (the Directorate of Immigration and Emigration was also implicated in “serious misconduct and widespread corruption”); *see also* UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶ 41 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32>.

¹⁴⁷ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 19 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf.

[%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf](#) (on December 8, the ULCC submitted “eight reports implicating several high-ranking public officials, including a former President of the Republic, and calling for the initiation of judicial proceedings”); UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶ 42 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32>; Jean Junior Celestin, *Michel Martelly Targeted by ULCC Over Alleged Misrepresentation of Assets*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262365/michel-martelly-targeted-by-ulcc-over-alleged-misrepresentation-of-assets> (the ULCC “reveals serious irregularities in the asset declarations of former Haitian president Michel Joseph Martelly,” accusing him “of false declarations, omissions, and blatant inconsistencies” and recommending public action be initiated against him); Lakay Info 509, *Affaire Nene Cassy: Perquisitions Révèlent un Vaste Système de Détournement de Fonds Publics* (7 Aug. 2025), <https://lakayinfo509.com/affaire-nene-cassy-des-perquisitions-ciblees-revelent-un-vaste-systeme-de-detournement-presume-de-fonds-publics/> (former senator Nene Cassy is implicated in the CAS corruption scandal).

¹⁴⁸ see also UNODC, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti* (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs (“Over the past three to four years, the Anti-Corruption Unit of Haiti (ULCC) has produced 55 investigation reports - more than in the previous 17 years combined - and referred priority cases for prosecution. At the same time, compliance with asset declaration obligations among senior officials (Presidential Transitional Council – CPT, Ministers and state secretaries of the current government) reached 100 per cent.”); UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶ 32 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32> (describing increased efforts by Haiti’s Central Financial Intelligence Unit to screen transaction reports for evidence of financial crimes); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 18 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20%E2%80%93%20September%202025%29.pdf> (the Haitian Ministry of Justice and Public Security “adopted a protocol for handling cases of Haitian nationals deported or extradited for financial crimes or complicity in criminal group activities,” under which “these individuals will be transferred, upon arrival, to the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police (DCPJ) so that their cases can be processed by the Government Commissioner with the support of financial oversight institutions;” two cases have so far been transferred in this way).

¹⁴⁹ UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶¶ 133-134 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (“In the past 20 years, only two high profile [financial crimes] cases have been successfully prosecuted in Haiti, the latest being that of an inspector at the Directorate General of Taxes, who in November 2024 was sentenced by the Criminal Court of Hinche (Centre department) to four years in prison for embezzlement of public funds. . . . Despite the consistency of the anti-corruption unit in its investigations, several cases remain unprosecuted involving large amounts of money and implicating very influential figures from the business and economic elite.”); UNODC, *10th Quarterly Report*, UN Doc. S/2026/32, ¶ 40 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32> (“Notwithstanding an improved conversion rate from suspicious transaction reports to Central Financial Intelligence Unit dissemination reports, only a small number of cases were transmitted to prosecutors during the period, and no cases have yet resulted in money-laundering convictions or significant asset-recovery outcomes.”); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶ 12 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en (the UN Human Rights Committee notes “that the implementation of institutional and strategic frameworks to combat corruption remains weak, with very few prosecutions leading to the effective holding of alleged perpetrators of corruption, embezzlement or money-laundering to account”); see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 17 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (“[P]ersistent constraints in terms of resources, capacity, and institutional functioning remained an obstacle to combating corruption and to accountability efforts.”); notes 176-177.

¹⁵⁰ TPC members awarded themselves massive, unjustified personal “allowances” totaling over US\$8 million per year, some of which was allegedly siphoned from funds intended for state intelligence services. Three TPC members were separately accused of abuse of office, bribery, and corruption in a 2024 report by Haiti’s Anti-Corruption Unit. See IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, p. 6 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>.

¹⁵¹ See notes 176-177; see also Jacqueline Charles, *Decrees in Haiti make it difficult to prosecute corrupt officials, erode press freedom*, Miami Herald (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314766071.html> (among those who signed the decree are “individuals who have been cited by government anti-corruption bodies for alleged money laundering, arms trafficking and other crimes,” and “the three council members who were indicted after being accused of attempting to extort the director of a state-owned bank;” Haitian lawyer Rosy Auguste Ducéna explains that, with the new decree, the investigative judge assigned to prosecute the latter can no longer do so: “[i]t’s a decree that was created to protect people who steal the state’s money”).

¹⁵² Jacqueline Charles, *Decrees in Haiti make it difficult to prosecute corrupt officials, erode press freedom*, Miami Herald (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314766071.html>; UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶ 12 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en.

¹⁵³ See generally BAI et al., *Justice Sector Challenges in Haiti*, IJDH (Dec. 2021), https://ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Updated-Justice-Sector-Challenges-in-Haiti_UPR-Submission_EN-1.pdf.

¹⁵⁴ See Jacqueline Charles, *Decrees in Haiti make it difficult to prosecute corrupt officials, erode press freedom*, Miami Herald (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314766071.html> (co-founder of

Haitian feminist organization Nègès Mawon says “[o]ne of the biggest obstacles we face is impunity — the lack of accountability, the weakness of the judiciary, the weaponization of institutions”) (*internal quotations omitted*).

¹⁵⁵ See also 139-140 (discussing extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests by government actors).

¹⁵⁶ For an explanation of its unconstitutionality, see IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, note 5 and associated text (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>; Michael Chalupovitsch, *Haiti: New Criminal Code Comes Into Force*, Library of Congress (Jul. 28, 2022), <https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2022-07-28/haiti-new-criminal-code-comes-into-force/>.

¹⁵⁷ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 17 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (noting that transitional authorities postponed the implementation of the code to avoid “legal uncertainty”); Le Quotidien 509, *Postponement of Penal Codes: When the State Hesitates Before Its Own Reform* (Dec. 26, 2025), <https://lequotidien509.com/en/haiti-penal-code-reform-postponement-2025/>. Haitian lawyer Rosy Auguste Ducéna noted that although the new penal code and accompanying penal procedure code were officially published in Le Moniteur in 2025, the government has not provided the training, dissemination, and awareness-raising activities it was required to undertake, and neither code is in effect.

¹⁵⁸ See Daniel Dickinson, *Trapped Behind Bars: Reforming Haiti’s broken detention system*, UN News (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166325> (“Violence in the Haitian capital . . . has led to the shuttering of numerous courts further slowing down the justice system.”); OHCHR, *Intensification of Criminal Violence in Lower Artibonite and Surrounding Regions*, p. 30 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-july-artibonite-and-mirebalais-EN.pdf>; UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶ 34 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en, (the UN Human Rights Committee “regrets the lack of financial and human resources to ensure the proper functioning of the justice system and the lack of clarity regarding the budgetary resources of the National Council, in particular for the establishment of legal aid offices”).

¹⁵⁹ See OHCHR, *Intensification of Criminal Violence in Lower Artibonite and Surrounding Regions*, p. 30 (Jul. 2025) <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-july-artibonite-and-mirebalais-EN.pdf> (discussing the impact in the Lower Artibonite, where “judicial system is virtually at a standstill”).

¹⁶⁰ OHCHR, *Intensification of Criminal Violence in Lower Artibonite and Surrounding Regions*, p. 30 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-july-artibonite-and-mirebalais-EN.pdf>.

¹⁶¹ Rezonodwes, *Rezonodwes Article* (Feb. 18, 2026), <https://rezonodwes.com/?p=373113>; BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 18 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf> (“On 17 November, the *Collectif des magistrats debout d’Haïti* launched a strike by public prosecutors from 18 jurisdictions, calling for improved working conditions and salary parity with judges.”).

¹⁶² Rezo Nodwes, *Rapport: appareil judiciaire dysfonctionnel, 6 mille détenus son ten attente de jugement, selon le RNDDH*, Rezo Nodwes (Feb. 18, 2026), <https://rezonodwes.com/?p=373113> (according to RNDDH, just 243 people were tried in the 2024-2025 judicial year, while over 6,000 people are incarcerated awaiting trial). Limited criminal hearings have taken place in some jurisdictions, including the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance, which had been unable to hold hearings for several years due to insecurity and neglect. See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 15 (Jan. 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20-%20E2%80%93%20September%202025%29.pdf> (27 cases were tried in the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance in July and September 2025); Charilien Jeanvil, *Haïti-Justice: Reprise des assises criminelles sans assistance de jury au tribunal civil des Cayes, après sept ans d’interruption*, Alterpresse (Jul. 28, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article32008> (“[t]he civil court of Les Cayes has resumed criminal trials without jury assistance as of July 7, 2025, ending a seven-year hiatus since 2018,” although the trials covered only about 20 cases); see also IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, notes 191-192 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>.

¹⁶³ UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶¶ 12, 34 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en (the UN Human Rights Committee expresses concern “about the role of the President of the Republic in appointing members of the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation, as this undermines the separation of powers, and about the lack of transparency in the criteria for certifying judges”); see also U.S. State Dept, *Haiti 2024 Human Rights Report*, p. 12 (Aug. 12, 2025), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/624521_HAITI-2024-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf (attributing the problem of “illegal and prolonged pretrial detention . . . to the arbitrary application of court rules, arbitrary judicial discretion, corruption, and poor recordkeeping”); note 185.

¹⁶⁴ The ongoing judicial proceedings against former Deputy of Petite-Rivière in the Artibonite Prophane Victor, who was arrested in January 2025 for his involvement in transactions with armed groups, are a rare exception in a context where those with political or armed group connections often evade accountability. BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 18 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf.

¹⁶⁵ The vast majority of Haitian individuals sanctioned by foreign states and the UN for corruption or collusion with armed groups have not been arrested. Prominent examples include armed group leader Jimmy Chérizier and former government officials Fednel Monchery and Joseph Pierre Richard Duplan, all of whom remain free despite having been sanctioned by the U.S. and U.K. governments and charged in Haiti for their involvement in the 2018 La Saline massacre. See notes 173, 420-422; see also RNDDH, *Correspondance Adressée à l'Inspecteur Général en Chef de la PNH* (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://web.rnddh.org/correspondance-adressee-a-linspecteur-general-en-chef-de-la-police-nationale-dhaiti-sur-le-fonctionnement-preoccupant-de-la-direction-centrale-de-la-police-judiciaire-dcpj/?lang=en> (reporting a live broadcast by Belizaire, Chérizier, and other members of *Viv Ansanm* on the premises of the DCPJ). Even when action is taken toward arresting an individual with political or armed group connections, it is sometimes perceived as lip service. RNDDH, *Avis de Recherche Émis par la DCPJ: Le RNDDH Exige le Respect de la Loi et des Garanties Judiciaires* (Feb. 7, 2026), <https://web.rnddh.org/avis-de-recherche-emis-par-la-dcpj-le-rnddh-exige-le-respect-de-la-loi-et-des-garanties-judiciaires/?lang=en> (RNDDH called the DCPJ's wanted notice against Arnel Belizaire for financing armed groups “a farce,” citing his close relationship with the current DCPJ director).

¹⁶⁶ See, e.g., UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶ 83 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (law enforcement arrested a senior customs official for his involvement in a weapons trafficking scheme in April 2024, but “[d]espite compelling evidence of his role in the trafficking network, the individual was released without trial in July 2025, reportedly due to pressure from some powerful figures”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, S/2025/641, ¶ 27 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641> (“Former senator Nènel Cassy, accused of alleged links with gangs, was arrested on 2 August by the national police and released on 19 August by the Port-au-Prince Prosecutor.”); Widlore Merancourt and Rolph Louis-Jeune, *The damning investigation << dossier >> against Nènel Cassy*, Ayibopost (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/the-damning-investigation-file-against-nenel-cassy/> (noting Cassy’s “high-level connections within the current government;” the magistrate who released him was placed on leave for “serious administrative misconduct”); But see BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 18 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (the Public Prosecutor of Port-au-Prince announced that he was reconstructing Cassy’s judicial file after the original had disappeared).

¹⁶⁷ RNDDH, *Avis de Recherche Émis par la DCPJ: Le RNDDH Exige le Respect de la Loi et des Garanties Judiciaires* (Feb. 7, 2026), <https://web.rnddh.org/avis-de-recherche-emis-par-la-dcpj-le-rnddh-exige-le-respect-de-la-loi-et-des-garanties-judiciaires/?lang=en>; RNDDH, *Correspondance Adressée à l'Inspecteur Général en Chef de la PNH* (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://web.rnddh.org/correspondance-adressee-a-linspecteur-general-en-chef-de-la-police-nationale-dhaiti-sur-le-fonctionnement-preoccupant-de-la-direction-centrale-de-la-police-judiciaire-dcpj/?lang=en>.

¹⁶⁸ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 15 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20-%20E2%80%93%20september%202025%29.pdf> (“Investigations into emblematic cases of serious human rights violations showed no significant progress.”); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶ 8 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en (the UN Human Rights Committee expresses concern about the lack of funding for the Office for the Protection of Citizens – Haiti’s human rights ombudsman – and “the lack of information concerning the State Party’s intention to allow the Office to investigate human rights violations resulting from acts and omissions of private entities”); see also OAS, *OAS Report on Haiti, Towards a Haitian-led Roadmap for Stability and Peace with Regional and International Support*, p. 6 (Oct. 2025) (discussing the impact of impunity on the situation of vulnerable populations); Section V.

¹⁶⁹ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 18 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (“[T]he Port-au-Prince Court of Appeal annulled the decision of 25 January 2024 issued by investigating judge Walther Wesser Voltaire, which had dismissed the case in favor of 51 individuals implicated in the proceedings. The Court reportedly identified serious procedural irregularities and shortcomings in the assessment of evidence, considering that the investigation had failed to exhaust all relevant lines of inquiry. Consequently, it ordered the appointment of a new judge to resume the investigation, which will have to be entirely restarted from the beginning.”). For a detailed explanation of the problems with the investigation under Judge Voltaire, see IJDH, *Human Rights Update – June 2024*, p. 6 (Jun. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments-December-2023-through-May-2024.pdf>.

¹⁷⁰ Dorval was shot and killed outside his home hours after he had publicly denounced the PHTK government’s management of the country. BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 18 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (noting that “the four judges previously designated had recused themselves,” and “[t]he Chief Judge of the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance will now have to appoint a new investigating judge to ensure the continuity of the investigation”); Roberson Alphonse, *Murder of Me Monferrier Dorval: a new judge steps aside*, The Canada-Haiti Information Project (Dec. 5, 2023), <https://canada-haiti.ca/content/murder-me-monferrier-dorval-new-judge-steps-aside>.

¹⁷¹ Unidentified individuals shot and killed Charles and Duclair on June 29, 2021. Jeudy, the president of the LGBTQI+ advocacy organization Kouraj, was found dead in his home on November 25, 2019. Years later, there has been no movement in

their cases. Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2025: Haiti* (2025), <https://freedomhouse.org/country/haiti/freedom-world/2025>.

¹⁷² Jacqueline Charles, *Decrees in Haiti make it difficult to prosecute corrupt officials, erode press freedom*, Miami Herald (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314766071.html>.

¹⁷³ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 18 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (despite some minimal progress in the investigation into the 2024 Wharf Jérémie massacre, no arrests have been made; “no progress was made in the cases related to the Grand Ravine (2017), La Saline (2018), and Bel Air (2019) massacres” or the 2024 Pont-Sondé massacre); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2025/641*, ¶ 28 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641>; UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶ 14 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en.

¹⁷⁴ IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, note 211 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>. It is also not clear whether recruitment for the units risks disrupting staffing for the already under-staffed and under-resourced judiciary system as a whole.

¹⁷⁵ Rezo Nodwes, *Rapport: appareil judiciaire dysfonctionnel, 6 mille détenus son ten attente de jugement, selon le RNDDH*, Rezo Nodwes (Feb. 18, 2026), <https://rezonodwes.com/?p=373113>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 18 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (“By the end of December, ten public prosecutors had been selected, while the appointment of judges and certain logistical arrangements, notably the allocation of a building to house the judicial units, were still ongoing.”); HRW, Human Rights Watch, *Sexual Violence Escalating in Haiti*, November 25, 2025 (noting that the two units “still need an official decree from the transitional government, so they can be fully operational”); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update*, (Sep. 2025) (reporting that the units were supposed to be operational in the last quarter of 2025); Haiti Libre, *Haiti – Justice: Towards the Establishment of Specialized Judicial Centers* (Jul. 20, 2025), <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-45376-haiti-justice-towards-the-establishment-of-specialized-judicial-centers.html> (reporting that the units were supposed to be operational on October 6, 2025); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 16 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf.

¹⁷⁶ Assemblée Nationale de la Jeunesse, *Décret Portant Organisation et Fonctionnement de la Haute Cour de Justice* (Dec. 17, 2025), <https://www.assembleenationaledelajeunesse.com/repertoire-des-lois-de-la-republique-d-haiti/2898046-decret-portant-organisation-et-fonctionnement-de-la-haute-cour-de-justice>. Notably, the decree complies with the May 6, 2008, Inter-American Court of Human Rights order requiring Haiti “to adopt, as soon as possible, the legislative or other measures needed to regulate the procedures relating to the High Court of Justice.” Inter-American Court of Human Rights, *Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti*, Judgment of May 6, 2008 (2008), Inter-American Court of Human Rights, *Case of the Sawhoyamaya Indigenous Community v. Paraguay*, ¶ 179, https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_180_ing.pdf.

¹⁷⁷ Article 11 of the decree requires that (1) a two-thirds majority vote in the lower house of Parliament is required in order to indict or impeach an official referred to the court, and (2) in order for a case to proceed to Parliament in the first place, all related investigative reports must first be validated by the Council of Ministers and the Board of Directors of the entity or organization that produced the report. Article 13 removes all crimes involving current or former high-level officials from the jurisdiction of all other judicial or administrative bodies (presumably, including the envisioned judicial units). These provisions appear to offer government officials enormous scope to block investigations into official misconduct. The continued non-functionality of Haiti’s Parliament (Frances Robles, David C. Adams, and André Paultre, *Haiti Reaches ‘Full Crisis’ as Transition Government Expires*, The New York Times (Feb. 6, 2026), <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/06/world/americas/haiti-crisis-leadership-gangs.html>) is an additional barrier to the court’s function. See also RNDDH, *POHDH and RNDDH Reject the Decree of December 1, 2025 on the High Court of Justice* (Jan. 19, 2026), <https://web.rnddh.org/neges-mawon-nou-pap-domi-pohdh-et-rnddh-contestent-et-rejettent-le-decret-du-1er-decembre-2025-sur-la-haute-cour-de-justice/?lang=en> (Nègès Mawon, Nou Pap Dòm, the Plateforme des Organisations Haïtiennes de Droits Humains (POHDH) and the Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH) say that these provisions reflect an “obvious aim of guaranteeing impunity for senior state officials”); Jacqueline Charles, *Decrees in Haiti make it difficult to prosecute corrupt officials, erode press freedom*, Miami Herald (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314766071.html> (the two-third majority requirement is “a threshold, the groups say, that’s ‘practically impossible’ to achieve in a country where political parties exercise little control over members and lawmakers are notorious for selling their . . . votes to the highest bidders.”); see also Section III.

¹⁷⁸ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 28 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf> Daniel Dickinson, *Trapped behind bars: Reforming Haiti’s broken detention system*, UN News (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166325> (the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights in Haiti called them “[u]nbelievably crowded and hot”).

¹⁷⁹ Daniel Dickinson, *Trapped behind bars: Reforming Haiti’s broken detention system*, UN News (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166325>; UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2025/641*, ¶ 34 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641> (“Between September 2022 and March 2025, four major prison breaches, including the women’s facility, reduced national correctional capacity by about 44 per cent, leaving the only remaining functional site in Port-au-Prince, built for 90 juveniles, overcrowded with more than 600 inmates of all categories. Without plans to reopen the breached facilities due to gang control and resource constraints, the Minister of Justice and Public Security endorsed a BINUH proposal to create a task force, involving national and international partners, to improve

detention conditions, develop sustainable infrastructure and manage high-security inmates.”); John Smith Justin, *FJKL Raises Alarm Over Overcrowding in Haiti’s Remaining Prisons*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Aug. 22, 2025),

<https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/259206/fjkl-raises-alarm-over-overcrowding-in-haitis-remaining-prisons> (“Only 14 prison facilities out of 24 are currently operational. . . . Some prisons, serving as buffers for those that are inoperative, have become overcrowded. This is the case of Delmas, which used to incarcerate minor boys. Today, it serves as an alternative to the Croix-des-Bouquets civil prison, the National Penitentiary, and other dysfunctional prisons. The same is true for Petit-Goâve prison, which serves as a buffer for Carrefour, reported Marie Yolène Gilles, stressing that these prisons were not built to hold so many people.”). The Haitian government’s contract with Metric Correctional Facility S.A. to build and rent three new prisons will, if fulfilled, increase prison capacity. See note 11; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 18 (Jun. 2025),

https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf.

Michelle Karshan, Executive Director of Alternative Chance, a program that works with criminal deportees in Haiti, notes it is critical that these prisons be built in consultation with appropriate organizations that have long time experience providing services to people incarcerated in Haiti’s prisons. She emphasizes that the prison design should address sanitation and healthcare issues, including by providing a separate isolation area for those with infectious diseases while they are being treated; a special dorm for the care and protection of those with mental health concerns; appropriate spaces for radiography and offices for doctors and health administrators; and an appropriate holding area for new admissions so that a full medical history, exam and x-rays may be taken. It should also ensure that cell block locations for men and women are built adequately far apart to protect women from sexual assault in the event of a riot or prison break, as has happened before; that children are not housed together with adults; and that the new prisons have spaces for educational, vocational, and training workshops for incarcerated persons and prison staff.

¹⁸⁰ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 28 (Jan. 15, 2026),

<https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf> (on average, Haiti’s prisons are at 306% capacity, with just 0.34 square meters of cell space per person); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2025/641*, ¶ 34 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641> (the Jacmel prison was built to hold 139 people, but holds 779, with just 0.14 square meters per person).

¹⁸¹ John Smith Justin, *FJKL Raises Alarm Over Overcrowding in Haiti’s Remaining Prisons*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Aug. 22, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/259206/fjkl-raises-alarm-over-overcrowding-in-haitis-remaining-prisons>.

¹⁸² Rezo Nodwes, *Rapport: appareil judiciaire dysfonctionnel, 6 mille détenus son ten attente de jugement, selon le RNDDH*, Rezo Nodwes (Feb. 18, 2026), <https://rezonodwes.com/?p=373113> (“Since 2024, CERMICOL has been converted into a veritable prison complex where women, girls, boys and men are crammed together in promiscuity, unsanitary conditions and with a lack of respect for the dignity due to them.”); Daniel Dickinson, *Trapped behind bars: Reforming Haiti’s broken detention system*, UN News (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166325> (“Convicted criminals are often held alongside detainees waiting for trial and children are frequently being detained alongside adults in contravention of international standards, including the Nelson Mandela Rules, the universally acknowledged blueprint for prison management in the 21st century.”); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶ 28 (Jul. 29, 2025),

https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en; see also Jacqueline Charles, *As gang rapes surge in Haiti, aid groups strain under demand for services*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313038946.html> (several women in the Jacmel jail were raped while in custody).

¹⁸³ UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2025/641*, ¶ 32 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641>.

¹⁸⁴ André Jean Baptiste, *Le Gouvernement lance une Caravane nationale contre la Détention Préventive Prolongée*, *Gazette Universitaire* (Jan. 20, 2026), <https://www.gazetteuniv.com/gouvernement-caravane-nationale-detention-preventive-prolongee-janvier/> (as part of a newly-launched government initiative to reduce pretrial detention, 20 cases were heard in the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance; authorities plan to extend the initiative to other areas); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 21 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (describing efforts by Haitian authorities to take up cases of children held in pretrial detention; 32 were or are currently under review, resulting in the release of 15 children detained at the Centre for Education and Social Reintegration of Minors in Conflict with the Law (CERMICOL)); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, pp. 17-18 (Nov. 11, 2025),

<https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20%E2%80%93%20september%202025%29.pdf> (in Cap-Haïtien, authorities “signed a joint resolution aimed at reconstructing lost case files in order to speed up case processing and relieve congestion in the prison;” in Les Cayes, authorities processed 27 cases, resulting in the release of 25 people held in pretrial detention); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶ 28 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en (the UN Human Rights Committee notes “the fact that measures to encourage alternatives to detention do not appear to have had any effect on prison overcrowding or excessive use of pretrial detention”).

¹⁸⁵ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 20 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf; BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 28 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf> (the number reflects

“persistent judicial delays”); Daniel Dickinson, *Trapped behind bars: Reforming Haiti’s broken detention system*, UN News (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166325> (“This chronic overcrowding is a direct result of the practice of incarcerating people ahead of a trial. . . . One prisoner told William O’Neill that he had been waiting for a trial date for two years; his alleged crime? The theft of two pairs of shoes. ‘There’s a backlog because the court system doesn’t function,’ said [UN Independent Expert on Human Rights in Haiti] Mr O’Neill. ‘There are not enough trials and they keep on arresting people.’”); U.S. State Dept, *Haiti 2024 Human Rights Report*, p. 12 (Aug. 12, 2025), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/624521_HAITI-2024-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf (“In some cases, detainees spent years in detention without appearing before a judge.”).

¹⁸⁶ BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2026/31, ¶ 28 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/SGR%20Jan%202026%20EN.pdf>; Daniel Dickinson, *Trapped behind bars: Reforming Haiti’s broken detention system*, UN News (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166325> (the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights in Haiti called conditions in Haiti’s prisons “subhuman,” with incarcerated persons “kept in cells for many, hours in a day with very little air or light, or access to water, toilets and showers”); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶ 28 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 18 (Jun. 2025), [https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly report on the human rights situation in haiti april - june 2025.pdf](https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly%20report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20haiti%20april%20-%20june%202025.pdf)

¹⁸⁷ Daniel Dickinson, *Trapped behind bars: Reforming Haiti’s broken detention system*, UN News (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166325>.

¹⁸⁸ John Smith Justin, *FJKL Raises Alarm Over Overcrowding in Haiti’s Remaining Prisons*, Le Nouvelliste (Aug. 22, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/259206/fjkl-raises-alarm-over-overcrowding-in-haitis-remaining-prisons> (some facilities outside Port-au-Prince have nurses, but not all).

¹⁸⁹ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 20 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf; see also Daniel Dickinson, *Trapped behind bars: Reforming Haiti’s broken detention system*, UN News (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166325> (“Fifty-two people have died in detention in the last three months in Haitian prisons many of diseases that should not kill them, said [UN Independent Expert on Human Rights in Haiti] Mr. O’Neill, adding that they are so weakened by the conditions and the lack of adequate nutrition and access to enough water, it’s a deadly combination.”) (*internal quotations omitted*).

¹⁹⁰ Rezo Nodwes, *Rapport: appareil judiciaire dysfonctionnel, 6 mille détenus son ten attente de jugement, selon le RNDDH*, Rezo Nodwes (Feb. 18, 2026), <https://rezonodwes.com/?p=373113> (reporting “questions about compliance with the rules governing the awarding of a contract for the construction of three prisons. . . . in areas completely under the control of armed bandits”); John Smith Justin, *FJKL Raises Alarm Over Overcrowding in Haiti’s Remaining Prisons*, Le Nouvelliste (Aug. 22, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/259206/fjkl-raises-alarm-over-overcrowding-in-haitis-remaining-prisons> (“[T]he Prison Administration Directorate has not received a single additional officer [since January 2025]. . . . [T]he prison system faces a shortage of staff, with only 700 qualified officers available for the prison population.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); UN Geneva, *In Dialogue with Haiti: Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome Efforts to Establish a New Constitution, Raise Questions on Measures to Combat Gang-Related Gender-Based Violence and Lynchings* (Jul. 4, 2025), <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/meeting-summary/2025/07/dialogue-haiti-experts-human-rights-committee-welcome-efforts> (due to insecurity and the destruction of several prisons by armed groups, “[t]he Government had been forced to relocate several jurisdictions to allow the resumption of judicial activities in minimum security conditions and the normal application of appropriate sentences and sanctions”).

¹⁹¹ John Smith Justin, *FJKL Raises Alarm Over Overcrowding in Haiti’s Remaining Prisons*, Le Nouvelliste (Aug. 22, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/259206/fjkl-raises-alarm-over-overcrowding-in-haitis-remaining-prisons> (noting that “[a]ccording to prison administration regulations, one officer should supervise four detainees”).

¹⁹² John Smith Justin, *FJKL Raises Alarm Over Overcrowding in Haiti’s Remaining Prisons*, Le Nouvelliste (Aug. 22, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/259206/fjkl-raises-alarm-over-overcrowding-in-haitis-remaining-prisons> (FJKL warns this is “a dangerous situation”) (*internal quotations omitted*); U.S. State Dept, *Haiti 2024 Human Rights Report*, p. 13 (Aug. 12, 2025), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/624521_HAITI-2024-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf (“[C]redible reports from NGOs suggested members of the HNP occasionally beat or abused detainees and suspects.”).

¹⁹³ Nawal Al-Maghafi and Jasmin Dyer, *In a Haitian city ruled by gangs, young rape survivor raises baby she was told to abort*, BBC News (Jul. 23, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c07d3m3xk32o>. During the reporting period, several human rights bodies and experts issued stark statements of condemnation and urgent demands for action to secure women’s rights. See, e.g., OHCHR, *Haiti: Women’s exclusion undermines path to peace and security, UN experts warn* (Nov. 3, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/haiti-womens-exclusion-undermines-path-peace-and-security-un-experts-warn> (“The UN Working Group on discrimination against women and girls [(WGDAWG)] today sounded the alarm over the deteriorating crisis in Haiti, warning that the systematic exclusion of women from leadership and decision-making and the widespread use of sexual violence are deepening insecurity and obstructing pathways to peace.”); IACHR, *Haiti: IACHR Expresses Concern over Persistent Sexual Violence against Women, Girls, and Adolescents* (Dec. 19, 2025), <https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/newsroom/2025/12/haiti-sexual-violence>, *Haiti: IACHR expresses concern over persistent sexual violence against women, girls, and adolescents*, (expressing the Commission’s “extreme concern about the persistence and worsening of sexual violence against women, girls, and adolescents in Haiti”; calling on the government of Haiti to strengthen its capacity to ensure the protection of survivors and prevent further rights violations” “[w]ith the support of international actors”; and cataloguing ongoing harms); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Haiti (CCPR/C/HTI/CO/2)*, ¶¶ 16-17, 20-23 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F%2FHITI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en

[g=en](#) (expressing concerns regarding gender equality; violence against women, related impunity, and lack of adequate services for survivors; and barriers to voluntary termination of pregnancy and respect for sexual and reproductive rights; in addition to providing corresponding recommendations); see also CCPR, *Haiti's long-delayed review before the Committee: Reflections on symbolism, silence, and structural fragility* (Jul. 28, 2025), <https://ccprcentre.org/ccprpages/haitis-long-delayed-review-before-the-human-rights-committee-reflections-on-symbolism-silence-and-structural-fragility> (reporting that the UN Human Rights Committee “expressed deep concern over the systematic and widespread violence against women and girls, especially in areas under gang control” along with other violations, and “criticized the government’s response as insufficient and weakly implemented” in reviewing the Haitian government’s implementation of its human rights obligations under the ICCPR)). Members of both chambers of the U.S. Congress also introduced resolutions H. Res. 1018 and S.Res.599 (with identical text) expressing their sense “that protecting and advancing the rights of women and girls in the Republic of Haiti is critical to the success of Haiti’s transition from crisis and its future stability, condemning the failure to center women’s leadership and distinct needs to date, and calling for urgent measures to secure all human rights of women and girls in Haiti.” See U.S. Congress, *H. Res. 1018 – Supporting Haitian Women and Girls*, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-resolution/1018/text>; U.S. Congress, *S. Res. 599 – Supporting Haitian Women and Girls*, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-resolution/599/all-actions>; see also IJDH, *Human Rights Groups Welcome Congressional Resolution Supporting Haitian Women and Girls*, https://www.ijdh.org/press_release/human-rights-groups-welcome-congressional-resolution-supporting-haitian-women-and-girls/.

¹⁹⁴ See, e.g., Dominique Guillaume et al., “*Li pa gen la vwa o chapit*”: *Gender-Based Violence and Sexual and Reproductive Health Consequences Experienced by Migrants and Asylum-Seekers Amid the Haitian Humanitarian Crisis*, *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, pp. 2, 8-18 (Aug. 16, 2025), <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10778012251362209> (offering overview of dynamics based on original study and literature review); MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (“Haiti’s humanitarian crisis disproportionately affects women and girls.”); UNFPA, *UNFPA Regional Situation Report: Hurricane Melissa: 31 October - 7 November, 2025* (Nov. 2025) https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/UNFPA%20Regional%20SitRep_Hurricane%20Melissa.pdf (“Hurricane Melissa . . . has exacerbated existing humanitarian needs, with women and girls disproportionately affected. They are in urgent need of [sexual and reproductive health (SRH)] services and are at increased risk of GBV.”); UNFPA, *UNFPA Regional Situation Report No. 3: Hurricane Melissa: 19-30 November 2025* (Dec. 2025) https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/Regional%20SitRep%203_Hurricane%20Melissa.pdf; World Food Programme, WFP, *The Impacts of Cash for Work on Food Security and Gender Equality in Haiti* (Dec. 18, 2025), https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000171035/download/?_ga=2.199620071.853343683.1766071794-1279933891.1766071794 (“Women in Haiti face significant challenges across multiple dimensions, including access to education, health care, and economic opportunities. Gender-based violence and discrimination remain widespread, with limited legal protection and high rates of abuse. Only 16 percent of women are formally employed, while 48 percent work in the informal sector, earning on average 30 percent less than men. Early marriage is also prevalent, with 14.9 percent of women aged 20–24 married or in a union before age 18. These inequalities contribute to heightened vulnerability, particularly in the context of food insecurity, where women and girls are disproportionately affected.”); SOFA, *Biannual Report on Gender-Based Violence – January-June 2025*, pp. 11-14 (July 2025), <https://sofahaiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Rapport-25-semester-1-SOFA.pdf> (“[GBV] undermines mental health, erodes dignity, and serves as a foundation for all other forms of aggression. In this silent war, every act of violence is a strategy of control. And every institutional silence is complicity. . . . Economic violence, reported in 78% of cases, is inseparable from the logic of economic domination. Women who depend on their spouses or humanitarian aid, who live in the informal sector or on community support, are particularly targeted by violence that deprives them of income, housing, and dignity. Control over money, property, or decision-making power is a central weapon of patriarchy, and poor, displaced, or isolated women are most vulnerable to this form of blackmail.”); *id.* at 20 (“How can a survivor escape an abuser when she has no home, no income, and no alternatives? Economic independence is not simply a choice; it is essential for escaping violence for good.”); UN Women, *Media Factsheet Haiti: Impact of Ongoing Violence on Women and Girls* (May. 5, 2025), <https://lac.unwomen.org/en/stories/noticia/2025/05/ficha-informativa-sobre-haiti-mas-de-la-mitad-de-las-personas-desplazadas-son-mujeres-ninas-y-ninos> (“Women’s access to health services is hampered and their unpaid care work has significantly increased, with several healthcare facilities and over 900 schools shut down due to insecurity.”); Direct Relief, *In Haiti, Pregnant Women Flee Melissa’s Devastation Through Gang-Controlled Roads*, (Nov. 6, 2025), <https://www.directrelief.org/2025/11/in-haiti-pregnant-women-flee-melissas-devastation-through-gang-controlled-roads/> (describing impacts of insecurity, Hurricane Melissa, related displacement, malnutrition, and stress on women and girls, especially with respect to maternal health). For an extended discussion of historic patterns of GBV and underlying inequality, see IJDH UPR on GBV, IJDH, *Gender-Based Violence in Haiti (UPR Submission)*, https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Gender-Based-Violence-in-Haiti_UPR-Submission_EN-1.pdf. Intersectional vulnerabilities like poverty serve as compounding factors. SOFA, *Biannual Report on Gender-Based Violence – January-June 2025*, p. 14 (July 2025), <https://sofahaiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Rapport-25-semester-1-SOFA.pdf>.

¹⁹⁵ See, e.g., Dominique Guillaume et al., “*Li pa gen la vwa o chapit*”: *Gender-Based Violence and Sexual and Reproductive Health Consequences Experienced by Migrants and Asylum-Seekers Amid the Haitian Humanitarian Crisis*, *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, pp. 2, 10-14 (Aug. 16, 2025), <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10778012251362209> (“Over the past several decades, political tensions, environmental and humanitarian disasters, and societal transformations in Haiti have intensified the vulnerability of women and other marginalized gender groups. More recently, amidst a complex sociopolitical landscape and evolving humanitarian crisis, the escalation of GBV has become an urgent concern in Haiti. . . . Traditional gender norms and societal expectations which disempower women are exacerbated by the humanitarian crisis. The decimation of Haiti’s already fragile economy due to the current crisis has led to heightened rates of poverty and socioeconomic instability particularly for women. These factors have resulted in heightened vulnerability amongst women, in which some have had to engage in survival sex—at times with gang members—and being placed in highly unsafe situations due to having to find a means to obtain their basic needs. Psychological factors such as stigmatization and fear, coupled with lack of institutional support from the health system and government entities, contributed to women not reporting victimization, and being unable to access support in the

<https://fokyola.ht/livreblanc2026/> (documenting barriers to women’s political inclusion and reporting on related perspectives from participants in townhall consultations with women in the Grand Sud); Monique Clesca, *Elles ne cèdent pas*, Le Nouvelliste (Feb. 24, 2026) <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/264562/elles-ne-cedent-pas> (describing the dynamics and history of political exclusion of women in Haiti).

¹⁹⁹ As further discussed below, notes 411, 439-445, neither of the UN Security Council Resolutions regarding Haiti from the reporting period – 2793 (authorizing the conversion of the MSS to the GSF) nor 2814 (changing the BINUH) – include the word “gender,” in a complete departure from prior Haiti resolutions. The BINUH resolution (2814) also deliberately removes prior emphasis on “ensuring the full, equal, meaningful, and safe participation of women,” makes a point of changing language acknowledging that “sexual violence [] disproportionately impacts women and girls,” which had been present even in Resolution 2793 just four months earlier, *see* p. 1 and para 1(c), to “violence against all women, girls, men and boys” in every instance discussing GBV; *see also* Security Council Report, *Haiti: Vote on BINUH Mandate Renewal* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/01/haiti-vote-on-binuh-mandate-renewal-4.php> (reporting on the drafting process for the resolution showing that these were choices deliberately made over objections). The UN WGDAWG wrote to “emphasize[] that the international community’s response, including through the recently adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2793, has failed to adequately address . . . gendered harms and women’s exclusion. OHCHR, *Haiti: Women’s exclusion undermines path to peace and security, UN experts warn* (Nov. 3, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/haiti-womens-exclusion-undermines-path-peace-and-security-un-experts-warn> (noting that the Resolution “does not include concrete measures to ensure their leadership or to integrate gender perspectives across the security and governance agenda”).

²⁰⁰ *See* OHCHR, *Haiti: Women’s exclusion undermines path to peace and security, UN experts warn* (Nov. 3, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/haiti-womens-exclusion-undermines-path-peace-and-security-un-experts-warn> (underscoring that the discriminatory patterns described above “undermine the prospect of sustainable peace,” calling their exclusion “not only unjust – [but] a strategic failure,” and observing that “Haiti’s crisis cannot be addressed without confronting the gendered dynamics of violence and governance”); *See also* H. Res. 1018 U.S. Congress, *H. Res. 1018 – Supporting Haitian Women and Girls*, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-resolution/1018/text> / S.Res.599 U.S. Congress, *S. Res. 599 – Supporting Haitian Women and Girls*, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-resolution/599/all-actions> (“[T]he failure to center women’s leadership and women-specific needs and protections in Haiti’s transition threatens the effectiveness of the transition and the long-term security, democracy, and socioeconomic development of Haiti.”). “The[UN WGDAWG] called on Haitian authorities and international partners, especially States participating in the Standing Group of Partners for the Gang Suppression Forces, to take immediate steps to uphold the rights of Haitian women and girls. This must include ensuring women’s equal participation in all political, security, transitional justice and recovery processes. ‘As the global community marks 25 years since the adoption of landmark Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, Haiti is a painful reminder of what happens when its core principles are ignored,’ the experts said. ‘Women’s inclusion is not a symbolic act; It is a cornerstone of any credible path out of crisis.’” OHCHR, *Haiti: Women’s exclusion undermines path to peace and security, UN experts warn* (Nov. 3, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/haiti-womens-exclusion-undermines-path-peace-and-security-un-experts-warn>.

²⁰¹ OHCHR, *Children Trafficked by Gangs: Rethinking Responses*, p. V (Feb. 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs-rethinking-responses-en.pdf> (providing an overview and concluding that [i]n the absence of urgent measures to protect children . . . Haiti’s very future is at risk”); UNICEF, *UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell remarks at the Security Council Open Debate on Haiti* (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-executive-director-catherine-russell-remarks-security-council-open-debate> (“We estimate that children currently account for a staggering 50 percent of the members of the armed groups active today.”). *See further* notes 246, 305 (and associated text) below.

²⁰² *See, e.g.*, BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 5 (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (for latest available incidence data, of 301 reported victims of sexual violence, 280 were women, 20 girls, and one a boy); UN, *Letter from the Panel of Experts to the UN Security Council*, ¶ 65 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091504?v=pdf> (documenting that 92% of reported GBV survivors were women (78%) and girls (14%)); UNFPA & the Ministry on the Status and Rights of Women, OCHA, *Haiti: Snapshot sur les Incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre (VBG)* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-basees-sur-la-genre-vbg-de-janvier-septembre-2025> (90% of survivors in reported cases were women (76%) and girls (14%)); UN Women, *Media Factsheet Haiti: Impact of Ongoing Violence on Women and Girls* (May. 5, 2025), <https://lac.unwomen.org/en/stories/noticia/2025/05/ficha-informativa-sobre-haiti-mas-de-la-mitad-de-las-personas-desplazadas-son-mujeres-ninas-y-ninos> (“Women are most targeted group of sexual violence”); Plan International, *Every Haitian Girl Deserves to Be Free: Forced Marriage and Violence*, p. 1 (Oct. 11, 2025) <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/every-haitian-girl-deserves-be-free-forced-marriage-and-violence> (“Sexual and gender-based violence remains alarmingly high yet underreported, with 6,450 incidents primarily targeting women and girls reported from January to the end of August 2025”); IACHR, *Haiti: IACHR Expresses Concern over Persistent Sexual Violence against Women, Girls, and Adolescents* (Dec. 19, 2025), https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2025/277.asp&utm_content=country-hiti&utm_term=class-mon (“This violence specifically targets women and girls as an expression of gender discrimination and as a means of exercising territorial and population control.”).

²⁰³ OCHA, *Today’s top news: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Cuba, Sudan, Haiti, Madagascar, Syria, Ukraine* (Feb. 9, 2026), <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-occupied-palestinian-territory-cuba-sudan-haiti-madagascar-syria-ukraine> (reporting 8,000 GBV cases in 2025, a 25% increase from 2024, and likely “only a fraction” of real incidence).

²⁰⁴ UNFPA & the Ministry on the Status and Rights of Women, OCHA, *Haiti: Snapshot sur les Incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre (VBG)* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-basees-sur-la-genre-vbg-de-janvier-septembre-2025> (“From January to September 2025 in Haiti, more than 7,472 cases of GBV were reported,

or 27 new cases every day, of which nearly 56% were sexual violence”); OCHA & Humanitarian Action, *Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan* (Jan. 1, 2026), <https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1503> (“27 Daily average for reported cases of gender-based violence”); OCHA, *Today’s top news: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Cuba, Sudan, Haiti, Madagascar, Syria, Ukraine* (Nov. 20, 2025) <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-sudan-occupied-palestinian-territory-democratic-republic-congo-haiti> (“Between January and September, over 7,400 cases of gender-based violence were reported in Haiti – an average of about 27 per day ... Sexual violence made up just over half of the cases.”); see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)* (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (“In 2025, 1,753 cases of gang-related sexual violence were documented”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2025/641*, ¶ 47 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/united-nations-integrated-office-haiti-report-secretary-general-s2025641-enarruzh> (reporting 2,646 GBV incidents, of which 56% were rape or sexual assault from June to August 2025); International Rescue Committee, IRC, *2026 Emergency Watchlist: New World Disorder*, pp. 44-45 (Dec. 16, 2025), <https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/Watchlist%202026.pdf> (“Violence towards women and girls is drastically escalating, with at least 6,000 cases of gender-based violence recorded in the first half of 2025 compared to 4,000 in 2024.”); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)*, p. 8 (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (documenting 6,450 new incidents between January and August 2025 that, while below the real incidence due to under-reporting, represent “an increase of 34% compared to the same period in 2024,” with “[n]early half of all reported cases involve[ing] rape”); HRW, *Sexual Violence Escalating in Haiti* (Nov. 25, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/the-day-in-human-rights/2024/11/25> (reporting 4,000 reports of sexual violence “just a fraction of the real number of cases between January and October 2025 due to underreporting”); MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (reporting that cases at one of its clinics have tripled since 2022, with 2,300 survivors seen just between January and September of 2025); SOFA, *Biannual Report on Gender-Based Violence – January-June 2025*, p. 10 (July 2025), <https://sofahaiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Rapport-25-semester-1-SOFA.pdf> (reporting a 153% overall increase in sexual violence reported across ten centers in multiple cities in the first half of 2025 relative to the same time period in 2024). Methodologies and definitions vary across reports, obscuring the true number of attacks and victims: for example some reports document incidents with multiple victims and it is not clear whether increasingly prevalent incidents of rape by multiple perpetrators are counted as a single or multiple assaults. See, e.g., UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2025/641*, ¶ 46 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/united-nations-integrated-office-haiti-report-secretary-general-s2025641-enarruzh> (recording “582 incidents of sexual violence involving 635 victims, predominantly women and girls” between May and August 2025 while noting limited reporting by survivors); UN SRSG-SVC, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti – Q3 2025* (Nov. 2025), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/report/quarterly-report-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-haiti/3Q-2025-Quarterly-report_EN_.pdf (documenting “341 incidents of sexual violence involving 400 survivors” between July and September 2025 while noting limited reporting by survivors).

²⁰⁵ See, e.g., BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)* (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (acknowledging “only a limited number of victims report these incidents” “due to persistent reporting constraints, including fear of reprisals, social stigma, and low trust in police and judicial institutions”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti – Q3 2025* (Nov. 2025), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/report/quarterly-report-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-haiti/3Q-2025-Quarterly-report_EN_.pdf; SOFA, *Biannual Report on Gender-Based Violence – January-June 2025*, pp. 5, 21-23, 26 (July 2025) <https://sofahaiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Rapport-25-semester-1-SOFA.pdf> (describing reported figures as a “tiny part of a much larger, more painful, and more invisible reality,” because they exclude cases that “were not reported, not recorded, or remained invisible due to the isolation of survivors, fear of reprisals, social stigma, or the collapse of services in certain areas,” and noting difficulties in accessing justice for survivors); UNODC, *Haitian Capital ‘Paralysed and Isolated’ by Gang Violence, Security Council Hears* (Jul. 2, 2025) <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2025/July/haitian-capital-paralysed-and-isolated-by-gang-violence--security-council-hears.html> (“Despite persistent under-reporting of sexual violence due to fear of reprisals, social stigma and lack of trust in institutions, BINUH reported an increase in sexual violence committed by gangs in the past three month”); Jérôme Wendy Norestyl, *Pedophiles infect children with HIV in camps in Port-au-Prince*, Ayibopost (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pedophiles-infect-children-with-hiv-in-camps-in-port-au-prince/> (“Survivors are reluctant to file complaints. A[n] official from the Central Committee of the Solino Humanitarian Corridor suggests that the low number of rapes recorded is linked to the fact that parents are afraid to speak out and prevent children from reporting them as well. . . . Survivors also face the risk of violence when they point the finger at their attackers[:] the majority of women who seek services, despite knowing their attackers, refuse to file a complaint for fear of reprisals.”) (internal quotations omitted); notes 232-234.

²⁰⁶ See, e.g., UNFPA & the Ministry on the Status and Rights of Women, *Haiti: Snapshot sur les Incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre (VBG)* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-bases-sur-la-genre-vbg-de-janvier-septembre-2025> (documenting that 75% of almost 7,500 cases of GBV reported in the first nine months of 2025 were attributable to members of armed groups); MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (reporting that 57% of survivors receiving care since 2022 were attacked by members of armed groups); SOFA, *Biannual Report on Gender-Based Violence – January-June 2025*, p. 10 (July 2025), <https://sofahaiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Rapport-25-semester-1-SOFA.pdf> (“In metropolitan areas, more than 60% of reported cases are related to gang violence.”); see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)* (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (“In 2025, 1,753 cases of gang-related sexual violence were documented”); HRW, *World Report 2026: Haiti* (Feb. 2026), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/haiti> (“Between January and September, 1,270 cases of sexual violence, mostly attributed to criminal groups, were reported,” albeit “likely just a fraction of the real number of cases”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2025/641*, ¶ 46 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/united-nations-integrated-office>

[haiti-report-secretary-general-s2025641-enarruzh](#) (“From May to August, the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements implemented by BINUH to track sexual violence by armed individuals recorded 582 incidents of sexual violence involving 635 victims, predominantly women and girls”). Women also continue to face GBV from intimate partners, family, and community members, including in the form of domestic violence, forced or coerced prostitution, sexual exploitation and abuse, and refusal to use condoms. See, e.g., Dominique Guillaume et al., “*Li pa gen la vwa o chapit*”: *Gender-Based Violence and Sexual and Reproductive Health Consequences Experienced by Migrants and Asylum-Seekers Amid the Haitian Humanitarian Crisis*, *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, pp. 10-12 (Aug. 16, 2025), <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10778012251362209> (describing women’s experience of “GBV perpetrated by intimate partners or through the need to engage in survival sex” in addition to GBV perpetrated by armed groups); SOFA, *Biannual Report on Gender-Based Violence – January-June 2025*, pp. 10, 20 (July 2025), <https://sofahaiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Rapport-25-semestre-1-SOFA.pdf> (“This mapping of violence highlights two simultaneous patriarchal regimes: On the one hand, there is intimate, structural violence, rooted in homes and family ties, which is perpetuated in silence, on a daily basis, and with impunity. On the other, delegitimized state violence, carried out by gangs, tolerated or even exploited by failing public authorities, which imposes control over bodies, lives, and territories by force.”).

²⁰⁷ See, e.g., UNODC ¶ 14 (“Violence has acquired political and gender-targeted dimensions, including the use of sexual violence as a tool of terror and control.”); MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (“[Sexual and gender-based violence] in Haiti is being systematically and increasingly used as a weapon to assert control and destabilize communities, which deliberately targets women and girls. This violence serves multiple strategic purposes, including punishing acts of resistance, enforcing submission, spreading terror, and coercing payment or compliance. It is deployed during kidnappings, territorial takeovers, to control humanitarian aid in displacement sites, and when individuals cross front lines”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)* (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (“Sexual violence is also used for purposes of exploitation or punishment against women and girls.”); IRC, *2026 Emergency Watchlist: New World Disorder* (Dec. 16, 2025), <https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/Watchlist%202026.pdf> (“Women and children face rising sexual violence and forced recruitment. Gangs are increasingly using sexual violence to systematically consolidate control and strike fear in communities”); HRW, *Sexual Violence Escalating in Haiti* (Nov. 25, 2024) <https://www.hrw.org/the-day-in-human-rights/2024/11/25> (“The criminal groups that control large parts of Haiti have been intensifying their attacks against the population in recent weeks. This has included subjecting girls and women to horrific sexual abuse[. . .] which they often use] to instill fear in rival territories, but sometimes, as one aid worker told us, they simply do it because they can: ‘They rape because they have the power. Sometimes they do it for days or weeks.’”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti – Q3 2025* (Nov. 2025), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/report/quarterly-report-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-haiti/3Q-2025-Quarterly-report_EN.pdf (“Sexual violence and child trafficking (including recruitment and exploitation) continue to be used by gangs to subjugate residents living in areas under their control Sexual violence is often used for purposes of exploitation or punishment.”); UN, *Letter from the Panel of Experts to the UN Security Council*, ¶ 66 (Sep. 25, 2025) <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091504?v=pdf> (reporting that 25 women and girls – all under the age of 25 – were “raped, beaten and/or killed by members of the Simon Pelé gang in Cité Soleil” “for having refused to join the gang or having disobeyed orders, such as to enter rival territory”).

²⁰⁸ See, e.g., Nawal Al-Maghafi and Jasmin Dyer, *In a Haitian city ruled by gangs, young rape survivor raises baby she was told to abort*, *BBC News* (Jul. 23, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c07d3m3xk32o> (reporting that according to MSF head of mission in Haiti, “[s]urvivors talk about two or four or seven, or up to 20 aggressors” at a time) (internal quotations omitted); Esther Kimberly Bazile, *The Many Faces of Suffering: The Dual Struggle of Displaced Women*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262371/the-many-faces-of-suffering-the-dual-struggle-of-displaced-women> (reporting on “the case of a young girl who was held captive and repeatedly raped by about twenty men”); MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (documenting over 100 survivors treated by an MSF clinic reporting being raped by ten or more perpetrators at a time).

²⁰⁹ See, e.g., UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2025/641*, ¶ 46 (Oct. 14, 2025) <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/united-nations-integrated-office-haiti-report-secretary-general-s2025641-enarruzh> (“Collective rape accounted for 85 per cent of [sexual violence] cases” reported from May to August 2025); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti – Q3 2025*, (Nov. 2025), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/report/quarterly-report-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-haiti/3Q-2025-Quarterly-report_EN.pdf (“Sexual violence documented in areas under gang control has mainly taken the form of gang rape”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 15 (Aug. 1, 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (“Gangs have systematically resorted to gang rape, which is now the predominant form of sexual violence (85% of reported incidents)”); UNFPA & the Ministry on the Status and Rights of Women, OCHA, *Haiti: Snapshot sur les Incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre (VBG)* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-basees-sur-la-genre-vbg-de-janvier-septembre-2025> (“Of the total number of cases reported under the heading “rape,” 65% stated that it was a gang rape and 35% that it was a rape committed by a single person.”); MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (“Among the survivors who received care at Pran Men’m since 2022, 57% were attacked by members of armed groups, often through group assault committed by multiple perpetrators.”).

²¹⁰ See, e.g., OHCHR, *In Dialogue with Haiti, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Experts Welcome Efforts to Establish a New Constitution, Raise Questions on Measures to Combat Gang-Related Gender-Based Violence and Lynchings* (Jul. 2, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/meeting-summaries/2025/07/dialogue-haiti-experts-human-rights-committee-welcome-efforts-establish> (“The scale of violence against women and girls was reportedly considerable, with sexual violence, including rape of children as young as five years old, gang rape, and forced prostitution, used as a weapon of control by gangs.”); OHCHR,

Intensification of Criminal Violence in Lower Artibonite and Surrounding Regions, p. 15 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-july-artibonite-and-mirebalais-EN.pdf> (reporting on kidnappings and sexual violence during armed group attacks); UN, *Letter from the Panel of Experts to the UN Security Council*, ¶ 66 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091504?v=pdf> (documenting women and girls raped, beaten, killed, and forced to become the “girlfriends” of armed group members); UN Women, *Media Factsheet Haiti: Impact of Ongoing Violence on Women and Girls* (May 5, 2025), <https://lac.unwomen.org/en/stories/noticia/2025/05/ficha-informativa-sobre-haiti-mas-de-la-mitad-de-las-personas-desplazadas-son-mujeres-ninas-y-ninos> (“Women are most targeted group of sexual violence (including rape, gang rape, and rape with kidnapping and killing)”); Jacqueline Charles, ‘Unimaginable’: *The toll on Haiti’s women and girls raped by violent gangs*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316158.html> (“In some cases, survivors are subjected to prolonged captivity, repeated rape and forced ‘relationships.’ The perpetrators, armed with assault rifles, often attack in packs, leaving survivors with profound psychological scars.”); MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (documenting survivor reports that “acts of sexual violence increasingly involve firearms and occur during broader attacks against entire families and communities”); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)*, p. 8 (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“Gangs use rape, often collective, and other forms of sexual violence, including sexual slavery, to assert their power and control over the population, including minors.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 15 (Aug. 1 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (“Victims were also subjected to sexual slavery”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)* (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (“Sexual violence, documented in areas under gang control, was characterized mainly by collective rape, often perpetrated by armed individuals during home intrusions or while victims were moving about in the streets”); Nawal Al-Maghafi and Jasmin Dyer, *In a Haitian city ruled by gangs, young rape survivor raises baby she was told to abort*, *BBC News* (Jul. 23, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c07d3m3xk32o> (reporting on abduction, collective rape, attempts at forced abortion, and growing survivor testimonies that “they have been threatened with weapons or knocked unconscious”); GARR, *Four Haitian women beheaded on the Haitian-Dominican border; GARR condemns these heinous crimes and demands thorough investigations* (Feb. 03, 2026), <https://garrhaiti.org/2026/02/03/quatre-femmes-haitiennes-violees-puis-decapitees-a-la-frontiere-haitiano-dominicaine-le-garr-denonce-ces-crimes-crapuleux-et-exige-des-enquetes-appfondies/> (reporting on gruesome killing and dismemberment of Haitian women believed to be victims of trafficking); SOFA, *Biannual Report on Gender-Based Violence – January-June 2025*, p. 10 (July 2025), <https://sofahaiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Rapport-25-semester-1-SOFA.pdf> (reporting data from ten centers in different cities that “reveals an explosion of psychological and economic violence, still too often ignored by public policies”); *See also* Esther Kimberly Bazile, *The Many Faces of Suffering: The Dual Struggle of Displaced Women*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262371/the-many-faces-of-suffering-the-dual-struggle-of-displaced-women> (offering narrative experiences of GBV); Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti’s Lost Generation series*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 12, 2025) <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316158.html> (reporting on individual stories that illustrate the experiences of GBV survivors, including deep physical and psychological trauma, suicidal ideation, unwanted pregnancies and children, impoverishment, and profound stigma).

²¹¹ *See, e.g.*, Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)*, p. 8 (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (reporting “[a]larming” levels of GBV, “particularly in areas most affected by violence and displacement, as well as in more remote communities”); Jacqueline Charles, ‘Unimaginable’: *The toll on Haiti’s women and girls raped by violent gangs*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316158.html> (“[A]ssaults are happening with alarming frequency during travel along gang-controlled roads on public transportation, in squalid displacement camps scattered throughout the capital and in neighborhoods run by gangs.”); *see also* notes 218-224. Reports make clear that nowhere is truly safe, and assaults happen in private homes and private transportation as well. *See, e.g.*, BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti – Q3 2025*, (Nov. 2025), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/report/quarterly-report-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-haiti/3Q-2025-Quarterly-report_EN.pdf (“Sexual violence documented in areas under gang control has mainly taken the form of gang rape, often committed during home invasions.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 15 (Aug. 1, 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (“As in previous periods, victims were often assaulted inside their homes, where gangs forced their way in.”).

²¹² MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (“While it was previously less common to receive survivors aged over 50 to 80, since 2022 these cases have increased sevenfold.”); OHCHR, *In Dialogue with Haiti, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome Efforts to Establish a New Constitution, Raise Questions on Measures to Combat Gang-Related Gender-Based Violence and Lynchings* (Jul. 2, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/meeting-summaries/2025/07/dialogue-haiti-experts-human-rights-committee-welcome-efforts-establish> (reporting “rape of children as young as five years old”); CCPR Centre, *Haiti’s Long-Delayed Review Before the Human Rights Committee: Reflections on symbolism, silence, and structural fragility* (Jul. 28, 2025) <https://ccprcentre.org/ccprpages/haitis-long-delayed-review-before-the-human-rights-committee-reflections-on-symbolism-silence-and-structural-fragility> (documenting “[r]eports of mass rape, survival prostitution, and abuse of minors—including children as young as five”); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)*, (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“Recent accounts from local organizations indicate that girls as young as 12 and 13 have gone missing and are believed to be held in conditions of sexual slavery.”); IACHR, *Haiti: IACHR Expresses Concern over Persistent Sexual Violence against Women, Girls, and Adolescents* (Dec. 19, 2025),

https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2025/277.asp&utm_content=country-haiti&utm_term=class-mon (“Gang rape has become a more widespread phenomenon, with the ages of both perpetrators and victims decreasing.”); See also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (“Between October and November (latest available data), the Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Mechanism (MARA) documented 301 victims (280 women, 20 girls, and one boy - some as young as ten years old) of sexual violence involving gangs.”).

²¹³ There have been warnings of a material resurgence in HIV/AIDS since 2024 linked to the increase in sexual violence, though the closure of screening centers around Port-au-Prince impedes meaningful data collection. Jérôme Wendy Norestyl, *Pedophiles infect children with HIV in camps in port-au-prince*, Ayibopost (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pedophiles-infect-children-with-hiv-in-camps-in-port-au-prince/>.

²¹⁴ See, e.g., Jacqueline Charles, ‘Unimaginable’: *The toll on Haiti’s women and girls raped by violent gangs*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316158.html> (reporting that some survivors of sexual violence are stigmatized, blamed, rejected from their homes, and mocked if they become pregnant from the rapes, describing a phenomenon wherein “many are no longer even identified by their names[, and i]nstead, [] are referred to as Madame Kadejak (Mrs. Rape) — the Haitian Creole word for rape that has become a pejorative term”); Jacqueline Charles, *Rape, pregnancy and a stroke: the scars that sexual violence leaves on Haiti’s victims*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316190.html> (describing “deeply rooted colorism, sexism and classism, which have fueled a culture of silence and a lack of outrage about sexual assaults” along with stigma towards children born of rape); MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (reporting that 68% of survivors surveyed experienced stigma and 23% “face outright rejection”); Esther Kimberly Bazile, *The Many Faces of Suffering: The Dual Struggle of Displaced Women*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262371/the-many-faces-of-suffering-the-dual-struggle-of-displaced-women> (narrating individual experiences of fear and stigma that impede reporting, including a woman who “was threatened with expulsion from a camp in Lalue after rumors falsely claimed she had contracted HIV following a rape”).

²¹⁵ See, e.g., Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)*, (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“Survivors frequently face severe physical, psychological, and social consequences, including sexually transmitted infections, unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions, injuries, shame and guilt, and social rejection. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to psychological and emotional abuse”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (“The psychological, economic, and social consequences for the victims are devastating. Some have also reported cases of unwanted pregnancies and HIV transmission”); HRW, *Sexual Violence Escalating in Haiti* (Nov. 25, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/the-day-in-human-rights/2024/11/25> (“Many survivors suffer from the effects of physical abuse and mistreatment and/or end up pregnant, with no access to medical, psychosocial, or legal services. Sexually transmitted infections affect a large number”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti – Q3 2025*, (Nov. 2025), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/report/quarterly-report-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-haiti/3Q-2025-Quarterly-report_EN_.pdf (“The psychological, economic and social consequences for victims are devastating. Some have also reported cases of unwanted pregnancies and HIV transmission”); Esther Kimberly Bazile, *The Many Faces of Suffering: The Dual Struggle of Displaced Women*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262371/the-many-faces-of-suffering-the-dual-struggle-of-displaced-women> (reporting that suicidal ideation is “common” among survivors); Jacqueline Charles, *Rape, pregnancy and a stroke: the scars that sexual violence leaves on Haiti’s victims*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316190.html> (“Survivors of Haiti’s surging sexual violence are finding themselves repeatedly victimized as they are forced from their homes, infected with sexually transmitted diseases and, in many cases, ending up pregnant from the attacks”); The combination of resulting financial burdens – for any medical costs, for unwanted children without a co-parent, for moving away from the abuser; the additional challenges presented by any chronic health conditions or impairments and social stigma; and the psychological trauma mean that survivors will experience significant barriers to resuming educations, income-generating activities, and sometimes even their family lives.

²¹⁶ See, e.g., Akسیون Sitwayen Angaje, *Rapport d’Enquête d’Opinion sur la Situation Sécuritaire et Politique en Haïti*, ProEco Haiti, p. 45 (Jan. 2026) <https://proecohaiti.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Enquete-Dopinion-Sur-La-Situation-Securitaire-Et-Politique-En-Haiti.pdf> (“[M]arket closures, kidnappings, and forced displacements limit the movement of female traders, leading to a specifically female economic vulnerability. . . . [T]he fear of violence on the roads or in marketplaces reduces the options available to female traders, who must choose between safety and income[. . . with] 37.2% of women hav[ing] no activity, compared to 17.1% of men.”); Jacqueline Charles, ‘Unimaginable’: *The toll on Haiti’s women and girls raped by violent gangs*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316158.html> (“[A]ssaults are happening with alarming frequency during travel along gang-controlled roads on public transportation.”); See also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)* (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (“[O]n 7 and 10 November, four street vendors were raped by several armed members of the Village de Dieu gang in the Portail Léogâne and Fort SaintClair areas (Port-au-Prince), where the gang controls ‘checkpoints.’ As the women crossed these checkpoints, they were intercepted, raped, and robbed of their belongings.”).

²¹⁷ See, e.g., OHCHR & BINUH, *Children Trafficked by Gangs in Haiti: Rethinking the Responses*, p. 21 (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs-rethinking-responses-en.pdf> (reporting on girls being forced or socially pressured into relationships with armed group members, including by their families); Jacqueline Charles, ‘Unimaginable’: *The toll on Haiti’s women and girls raped by violent gangs*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025),

<https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316158.html> (reporting on “[m]en in positions of power, whether they are community leaders, husbands or warlords, . . . coercing girls and women into sex in exchange for protection or money”); MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti*, (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (“[T]he only semblance of protection perceived for women and girls, by themselves and their families, is entering into survival sex and sexual relations with men with arms and power.”); notes 197, 223.

²¹⁸ IOM, *Haiti: Report on the Internal Displacement Situation – Round 12 (December 2025)*, (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true>; see also notes 218-224.

²¹⁹ See, e.g., Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“Overcrowded, unsafe, and undignified living conditions in these sites, combined with a lack of basic services, continue to exacerbate vulnerabilities and increase the risk of exposure to violence and exploitation. The presence of armed actors around or inside displacement sites contributes to pervasive insecurity, with women and girls often avoiding certain areas.”); RNNDH, *Sites for internally displaced persons: The RNDDH Urges the Haitian State to Act*, ¶ 45, (Jan. 12, 2026), <https://web.rnndh.org/sites-for-internally-displaced-persons-the-rnndh-urges-the-haitian-state-to-put-an-end-to-this-situation/?lang=en> (“Women and girls, whose vulnerability is further exacerbated by conditions in the displacement sites, are exposed to physical, sexual, and psychological violence.”); OHCHR, *Haiti: Women’s exclusion undermines path to peace and security, UN experts warn* (Nov. 3, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/haiti-womens-exclusion-undermines-path-peace-and-security-un-experts-warn> (“Displacement sites starkly illustrate the [protection] failures, the [UN WGDWAG] experts noted. Reports of sexual exploitation and abuse in these settings are widespread, while systems for reporting or addressing such abuse remain weak or non-existent.”); UN Women, *Media Factsheet Haiti: Impact of Ongoing Violence on Women and Girls* (May 5, 2025), <https://lac.unwomen.org/en/stories/noticia/2025/05/ficha-informativa-sobre-haiti-mas-de-la-mitad-de-las-personas-desplazadas-sou-mujeres-ninas-y-ninos> (“Sexual and gender-based violence is on the rise, especially in displacement sites where shelter, sanitation, and protection are severely lacking”); IACHR, *Haiti: IACHR Expresses Concern over Persistent Sexual Violence against Women, Girls, and Adolescents* (Dec. 19, 2025), https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2025/277.asp&utm_content=country-hiti&utm_term=class-mon (“Although temporary shelters have been set up, women, girls, and adolescents continue to be exposed to high risks of sexual violence because these spaces are overcrowded and lack services to protect against sexual violence”); Esther Kimberly Bazile, *The Many Faces of Suffering: The Dual Struggle of Displaced Women*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262371/the-many-faces-of-suffering-the-dual-struggle-of-displaced-women> (“In the [displacement] camps, it is the law of the strongest. In addition, groping, threats, sexual assaults, and rapes have surged, fueled by the lack of privacy, overcrowding, and absence of supervision.”); Jacqueline Charles, *As gang rapes surge in Haiti, aid groups strain under demand for services*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313038946.html> (“And after being forced to flee their homes, many have no choice but to live in dehumanizing camps that have no doors, no privacy and poor lighting that offers little protection against sexual assaults”); see also notes 196-200. For narrative reporting on the experience of women at displacement sites, see Esther Kimberly Bazile, *The Many Faces of Suffering: The Dual Struggle of Displaced Women*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262371/the-many-faces-of-suffering-the-dual-struggle-of-displaced-women>.

²²⁰ See, e.g., OCHA, *Today’s top news: Sudan, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti* (Nov. 20, 2025), <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-sudan-occupied-palestinian-territory-democratic-republic-congo-haiti> (“Between January and September, over 7,400 cases of gender-based violence were reported in Haiti . . . Two out of every three victims were displaced people.”); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“Most survivors [of GBV] (69%) are internally displaced persons, spread between host communities and makeshift displacement sites.”); UNFPA & the Ministry on the Status and Rights of Women, *Haiti: Snapshot sur les Incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre (VBG)* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-basees-sur-la-genre-vbg-de-janvier-septembre-2025> (reporting that IDPs are the most affected by GBV); UN, *Letter from the Panel of Experts to the UN Security Council*, ¶ 65 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091504?v=pdf> (“In 63 per cent of reported cases of sexual and gender-based violence, the victims were internally displaced persons, making them the most affected group”); UNFPA, *What Do We Face in a Worsening Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti?* (Aug. 26, 2025), <https://haiti.unfpa.org/en/news/what-do-face-worsening-humanitarian-crisis-haiti> (“Between January and June 2025, 4,852 cases of GBV were reported . . . Of these cases, 61% involved internally displaced persons.”); Jacqueline Charles, *Rape, pregnancy and a stroke: the scars that sexual violence leaves on Haiti’s victims*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316190.html> (“The internally displaced make up almost 70% of all reported rape survivors. . . .”); RNNDH, *Sites for internally displaced persons: The RNDDH Urges the Haitian State to Act*, ¶¶ 31-33 (Jan. 12, 2026), <https://web.rnndh.org/sites-for-internally-displaced-persons-the-rnndh-urges-the-haitian-state-to-put-an-end-to-this-situation/?lang=en> (reporting, based on visits to 40 displacement sites, that in spite of some limited measures undertaken for protection, “women and girls remain exposed to all kinds of violence . . . [and] many site managers have reported that cases of sexual and gender-based violence, harassment, and physical violence against women and girls are regularly recorded”); *id.* ¶ 34 (documenting that rapes were reported at 17.5% of the sites visited by RNDDH); Jacqueline Charles, *As gang rapes surge in Haiti, aid groups strain under demand for services*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313038946.html> (“Of approximately 800 women and girls the feminist aid group Nègès Mawon . . . has assisted this year, more than 60% live in the camps.”); Jérôme Wendy Norestyl, *Pedophiles infect children with HIV in camps in Port-au-Prince*, *Ayibopost* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pedophiles-infect-children-with-hiv-in-camps-in-port-au-prince/> (“We have received several complaints of sexual harassment from young girls, as well as cases of domestic violence. Women do not have access to water or hygiene products.”) (internal quotations omitted).

²²¹ See, e.g., RNNDH, *Sites for internally displaced persons: The RNDDH Urges the Haitian State to Act* (Jan. 12, 2026) (reporting additional challenges for pregnant and breastfeeding women and their babies as a consequence of unsanitary and cramped conditions at displacement sites); ScienceDirect, *Severe Depression Among Haiti's Internally Displaced Populations: Prevalence and Correlates in the Context of Gang Violence* (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165178126000594> (reporting on study findings that clinically significant and severe depression symptoms were higher among displaced women than displaced men).

²²² See, e.g., Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“There are also reports of sexual exploitation, including those involving displaced persons’ committees.”).

²²³ See, e.g., Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (reporting on “cases of women engaging in transactional sex with gang members for basic goods, protection, or social status”); Dominique Guillaume et al., “*Li pa gen la vwa o chapit*”: *Gender-Based Violence and Sexual and Reproductive Health Consequences Experienced by Migrants and Asylum-Seekers Amid the Haitian Humanitarian Crisis*, *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, pp. 10-11 (Aug. 16, 2025), <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10778012251362209>.

²²⁴ See, e.g., RNNDH, *Sites for internally displaced persons: The RNDDH Urges the Haitian State to Act*, ¶ 31 (Jan. 12, 2026), <https://web.rnndh.org/sites-for-internally-displaced-persons-the-rnndh-urges-the-haitian-state-to-put-an-end-to-this-situation/?lang=en> (reporting that it evaluated “sites for internally displaced persons, women and girls do not benefit from any specific protection measures that take their vulnerability into account,” although “some partners register women and girls and provide them with emergency kits” and at one out of the 40 visited sites, the management committee had established a women and girls unit, which “organizes activities with women and girls living at the site, “while one other conducts “awareness-raising activities for women and girls”); OHCHR, *Haiti: Women’s exclusion undermines path to peace and security, UN experts warn* (Nov. 3, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/haiti-womens-exclusion-undermines-path-peace-and-security-un-experts-warn> (“While women and girls make up the majority of the displaced population, their underrepresentation in management committees leaves critical protection gaps and reinforces gender hierarchies.”); IACHR, *Haiti: IACHR Expresses Concern over Persistent Sexual Violence against Women, Girls, and Adolescents* (Dec. 19, 2025), https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2025/277.asp&utm_content=country-hti&utm_term=class-mon (reporting on IACHR concerns that displacement sites “lack services to protect against sexual violence”). Haitian lawyer Rosy Auguste Ducéna, who participated in preparing the RNDDH report, shared that women rarely participate in displacement site management and where they are included, they are often “just marionettes.” However, when women are completely absent from displacement site management, male managers rarely discuss GBV. Conversely, the presence of women on management committees of displacement sites anecdotally correlates with more GBV reporting. See also UNFPA, *UNFPA Regional Situation Report: Hurricane Melissa: 31 October - 7 November, 2025* (Nov. 2025) https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/UNFPA%20Regional%20SitRep_Hurricane%20Melissa.pdf (“GBV prevention and response activities – particularly for women and girls who faced increased risks at shelters due to insecure conditions – is urgently required.”); Alterpresse, *Haiti-Femmes: La Sofa dénonce un cycle de << violence sourde >> à briser*, Alterpresse (May 8, 2025) <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Femmes-La-Sofa-denonce-un-cycle-de-violence-sourde-a-briser> (“Displacement camps ... are now places of impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence, where women are held hostage in a hellish reality, far from any protection or support. Their lives, their rights, and their dreams are erased and crushed by the indifference of those in power.”). Notably, as reported in the previous IJDH Update, civil society efforts to strengthen protections by expanding and extending existing IACHR precautionary measures applicable to women and girls at displacement sites remain unanswered. IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, note 258 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>.

²²⁵ See, e.g., UN Women, *Media Factsheet Haiti: Impact of Ongoing Violence on Women and Girls* (May 2025), <https://lac.unwomen.org/en/stories/noticia/2025/05/ficha-informativa-sobre-haiti-mas-de-la-mitad-de-las-personas-desplazadas-son-mujeres-ninas-y-ninos> (reporting that “47 per cent of women and girls in Haiti will need humanitarian aid in 2025”); UNFPA, *Strengthening Resources and Protection for Women in Haiti*, (Sep. 11, 2025), <https://haiti.unfpa.org/en/news/strengthening-resources-and-protection-women-haiti> (“Due to insecurity (caused) by armed gang attacks, women and girls face increased risks of displacement and service disruptions limiting access to sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services and prevention and holistic response to gender-based violence (GBV)”); HRW, *Human Rights Watch, Sexual Violence Escalating in Haiti* (Nov. 25, 2024), <https://www.hrw.org/the-day-in-human-rights/2024/11/25> (documenting the lack of access to medical, psychological, or legal services, notably for survivors of GBV); Global R2P, *Open Letter Re Imperative to Center Women’s Rights and Leadership in Haiti’s Transition To His Excellency Laurent Saint-Cyr, President of the Presidential Transitional Council* (Aug. 7, 2025) <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/open-letter-re-imperative-to-center-womens-rights-and-leadership-in-haitis-transition-to-his-excellency-laurent-saint-cyr-president-of-the-presidential-transitional-council/> (“They are desperate for medical and psychosocial services, for food, for safe economic opportunities”); UNFPA & the Ministry on the Status and Rights of Women, *Haiti: Snapshot sur les Incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre (VBG)* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-bases-sur-la-genre-vbg-de-janvier-septembre-2025> (“[A]ccess to holistic care, including medical care, livelihood support, and legal assistance, remains limited.”); UNFPA, *UNFPA Regional Situation Report No. 3: Hurricane Melissa: 19-30 November 2025* (Dec. 2025) https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/Regional%20SitRep%203_Hurricane%20Melissa.pdf (“The ongoing violence is also impacting on humanitarian access to the affected areas, preventing humanitarian organizations and agencies from assisting the affected people, compromising access to quality care and the full deployment of services. ... particularly in areas such as Petit-Goâve, the South, and Gonaïves, where women and girls are in urgent need of health and hygiene supplies”); IACHR, *Haiti: IACHR expresses concern over persistent sexual violence against women, girls, and adolescents* (Dec. 19, 2025) https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2025/277.asp&utm_content=country-hti&utm_term=class-mon (“Because of the disruption of security and justice systems, survivors do not have access to institutions

capable of providing comprehensive care services, protection measures, and effective mechanisms for justice and reparation.”); notes 226, 229, 235; see also UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Haiti*, ¶ 21 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F%2FHQ%2F%2F2025%2F229&lang=en (calling for intensified efforts to eliminate violence against women, including accountability and adequate resources for survivors); IACHR, *Haiti: IACHR expresses concern over persistent sexual violence against women, girls, and adolescents* (Dec. 19, 2025) https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2025/277.asp&utm_content=country-hiti&utm_term=class-mon (“The IACHR urges the international community to work urgently with the Haitian State to implement prevention and protection measures and to guarantee access to health services and legal assistance for survivors of sexual violence, especially in areas where temporary camps are located. . . . [and] reiterates its call to the international community to give the appropriate and urgent attention to sexual violence which is restricting the lives of all women and girls in Haiti.”). The government of Haiti is largely absent from providing gender-specific protections and resources. Local organizations are struggling to sustain the enormous burden they are consequently forced to bear, including secondary trauma. See, e.g., Global R2P, *Open Letter Re Imperative to Center Women’s Rights and Leadership in Haiti’s Transition To His Excellency Laurent Saint-Cyr, President of the Presidential Transitional Council* (Aug. 7, 2025) <https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/open-letter-re-imperative-to-center-womens-rights-and-leadership-in-haitis-transition-to-his-excellency-laurent-saint-cyr-president-of-the-presidential-transitional-council/> (“The government is not respecting its obligation to meet these basic rights, to protect from violence, and to offer recourse. For example, most services for displaced women and girls and survivors of sexual violence are provided by civil society with international support, with the government “completely absent” at displacement sites”); Alterpresse, *Haiti-Femmes: La Sofa dénonce un cycle de violence sourde à briser*, Alterpresse (May 8, 2025) <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Femmes-La-Sofa-denonce-un-cycle-de-violence-sourde-a-briser> (“While Haitian women struggle to survive amid increasingly brutal violence, public resources are being diverted away from those who need them most. The authorities remain deaf to their distress, turning a blind eye to the violence that is exploding in the streets and in the camps”); Jacqueline Charles, *As gang rapes surge in Haiti, aid groups strain under demand for services*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313038946.html> (describing burden on local women’s rights organizations and medical providers, including inability of staff to process the daily trauma they observe); Esther Kimberly Bazile, *The Many Faces of Suffering: The Dual Struggle of Displaced Women*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262371/the-many-faces-of-suffering-the-dual-struggle-of-displaced-women> (“The leaders of the different organizations and associations assisting these women struggle to respond to their needs.”).

²²⁶ See, e.g., UNFPA & the Ministry on the Status and Rights of Women, *Haiti: Snapshot sur les Incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre (VBG)* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-basees-sur-la-genre-vbg-de-janvier-septembre-2025> (“Despite this crisis, support remains dramatically insufficient: an 81% funding gap now threatens the few existing services on which 95% of women and girls depend”); OCHA, *Today’s top news: Sudan, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti* (Nov. 20, 2025), <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-sudan-occupied-palestinian-territory-democratic-republic-congo-haiti> (“Between January and September . . . humanitarian partners were able to reach just 7 per cent of the 833,000 people they aim to provide with specialized support to address gender-based violence this year – or just over 54,000 people in total. The response remains critically underfunded, with an overall gap of US\$13.5 million – 70 per cent of the over \$19 million needed for this year. If that funding is not received, nearly 780,000 women and girls – including survivors of gender-based violence and those at risk – will go without critical services, including the clinical management of rape, mental health and psychosocial support, case management, legal assistance, safe spaces for women and girls, and dignity kits”); OCHA, *Today’s top news: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Cuba, Sudan, Haiti, Madagascar, Syria, Ukraine*, (Feb. 9, 2026) <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-occupied-palestinian-territory-cuba-sudan-haiti-madagascar-syria-ukraine> (“Underfunding means survivors can’t access legal assistance, child protection services and safe shelter”); UNFPA, *For a Strengthening of Resources and Protection for Women in Haiti* (Sep. 11, 2025) <https://haiti.unfpa.org/en/news/strengthening-resources-and-protection-women-haiti> (“According to the UNFPA representative, resources must be increased to meet needs that are only funded at 8%”); HRW, *Sexual Violence Escalating in Haiti* (Nov. 25, 2024) <https://www.hrw.org/the-day-in-human-rights/2024/11/25> (“As of September, the UN had only received 17 percent of the required US\$16 million needed to strengthen and expand access to essential services for girls and women”); UNFPA, *Haiti Situation Report (June–July 2025)* (Jul. 31, 2025) <https://haiti.unfpa.org/en/publications/haiti-situation-report-junejuly-2025> (“UNFPA is appealing for US\$28.9 million to strengthen and expand access to life-saving SRH and GBV services in Haiti in 2025. To date, the total amount received by UNFPA for Haiti was only US\$2.6 million, representing only 8% of the required funding”).

²²⁷ See, e.g., HRW, *World Report 2026: Haiti, Events of 2025* (Feb. 2026), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/haiti> (“US funding cuts deprived approximately 750,000 women and girls of access to health care, psychosocial support, and emergency services, further limiting access that was already available to only a small fraction of survivors”); Jacqueline Charles, *‘Unimaginable’: The toll on Haiti’s women and girls raped by violent gangs*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316158.html> (“Compounding the crisis: Aid to local and international organizations trying to respond is being severely slashed as the Trump administration cuts funding to United Nations agencies, limits access to contraceptives for women in low-income countries.”); Jacqueline Charles, *As gang rapes surge in Haiti, aid groups strain under demand for services*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313038946.html> (reporting on challenges aid groups are facing due to U.S. aid cuts and UN budgetary shortfalls); note 430. According to Dr. Florence Jean Louis Vorbe of PROFAMIL, a leading provider of sexual and reproductive health care and education in Haiti, there is “very little data covering the last eight months,” but the impression based on isolated observations is that “the overall situation for women’s health is deteriorating, . . . largely due to a shift where available funding is being directed toward general healthcare, leaving a significant gap in sexual and reproductive health services.” (correspondence on file).

²²⁸ See, e.g., Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (reporting that “[d]espite the scale of the crisis and profound impacts on survivors, timely and comprehensive [sexual and gender-

based violence (JSGBV[]) care remains extremely limited” and documenting details); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“There is only one medical actor providing 24/7 comprehensive SGBV care in Port-au-Prince . . . Additional barriers to care include insecurity, distance, lack of affordable and/or safe transportation, a lack of knowledge and information of why and how to seek care, and stigma and fear of retaliation. Support services, including emergency shelter, financial assistance, and legal aid are similarly inadequate”); UN, Haiti: OHCHR, *Haiti: Women’s Exclusion Undermines Path to Peace and Security, UN Experts Warn* (Nov. 3, 2025), [Women’s exclusion undermines path to peace and security, UN experts warn](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/women%E2%80%99s-exclusion-undermines-path-to-peace-and-security-un-experts-warn) (“Survivors are left without support, resources, or legal recourse”); MSF, *MSF, Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), [Sexual and gender-based violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti](https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-in-port-au-prince-haiti) (“[Challenges getting GBV-related care] are due to multiple factors, including fear, stigma, financial challenges, insecurity, and limited access to information. . . . patients are often required to pay out-of-pocket for medications, tests, and supplies. These financial barriers are compounded by transportation costs, as many healthcare facilities are hours away and expensive to reach. . . . A significant barrier for survivors is a lack of awareness about the free health and support services available. Since 2022, 83% of survivors cared for at Pran Men’m reported that limited access to such information made it more difficult for them to access care. . . . When survivors seek medical care or other support services, they often must enter hostile territory where they risk being attacked again. . . . MSF is often unable to refer survivors to essential nonmedical supports— notably safe shelter, relocation and livelihood assistance—which is a key part of comprehensive care. Referrals to shelters are especially difficult because shelter services are often disrupted due to unstable funding, and because women who have medical conditions or children, or who are pregnant are often not accepted . . . The lack of available services leaves survivors exposed to the same risks that led to their initial trauma. Without safe shelter or relocation options, MSF discharges its patients straight back into the nightmare they came from.”); Esther Kimberly Bazile, *The Many Faces of Suffering: The Dual Struggle of Displaced Women*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262371/the-many-faces-of-suffering-the-dual-struggle-of-displaced-women> (reporting that local service providers struggle to meet survivor needs, “which are mostly economic in nature[, as] to break the cycle of vulnerability, they need means and financial resources”) (internal quotations omitted); Jacqueline Charles, *‘Unimaginable’: The toll on Haiti’s women and girls raped by violent gangs*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316158.html> ([I]n the lack of national outrage, few people turn to the police as they grapple with shame and social stigma while facing limited access to medical care, little mental-health counseling and a severe shortage of emergency shelters.”); Dominique Guillaume et al., *“Li pa gen la vwa o chapit”: Gender-Based Violence and Sexual and Reproductive Health Consequences Experienced by Migrants and Asylum-Seekers Amid the Haitian Humanitarian Crisis*, p. 12 (Aug. 16, 2025) (noting that some women are reluctant to seek healthcare because they had witnessed stigma and discrimination directed by healthcare providers towards those testing positive for HIV); see also notes 226, 229, 235.

²²⁹ See, e.g., OCHA, *Today’s top news: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Cuba, Sudan, Haiti, Madagascar, Syria, Ukraine* (Feb. 9, 2026), <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-occupied-palestinian-territory-cuba-sudan-haiti-madagascar-syria-ukraine> (“Access to emergency care remains extremely limited. Only 30 per cent of survivors were able to receive assistance within 72 hours of an assault, increasing the risk of sexually transmitted infections and unintended pregnancies.”); MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (“Since 2022, only a third of survivors seeking care at Pran Men’m reached the clinic within three days of their attack, and only 41% reached it within five days. As a result, 67% of survivors missed the opportunity to prevent HIV transmission, and 59% missed the chance to prevent an unwanted pregnancy.”); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2025/641*, ¶ 47 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/united-nations-integrated-office-haiti-report-secretary-general-s2025641-enarruzh> (documenting that of the sexual assault incidents reported between June and August 2025, only 25% of survivors reported receiving medical care within the first 72 hours); UNFPA & the Ministry on the Status and Rights of Women, *Haiti: Snapshot sur les Incidents de Violences Basées sur le Genre (VBG)* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-bases-sur-la-genre-vbg-de-janvier-septembre-2025> (reporting that “only 27% of rape survivors [are] able to access medical care within 72 hours”); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“From January to August 2025, among survivors who managed to access care, 25% were able to do so within 72 hours after the incident.”); see also Jacqueline Charles, *Rape, pregnancy and a stroke: the scars that sexual violence leaves on Haiti’s victims*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316190.html> (narrating the experience of women forced to carry unwanted pregnancies resulting from rape because they were trapped in a neighborhood controlled by armed groups). According to Dr. Vorbe of PROFAMIL, they “have noted a marked decrease in access to post-rape kits and contraception in general.”

²³⁰ See HRW, *World Report 2026: Haiti: Events of 2025* (Feb. 2026), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/haiti> (“Haiti previously had a total ban on abortion. The new penal code decriminalized abortion before the eighth week of pregnancy, and at any time in cases of rape or incest, or when the mental or physical health of the pregnant person is in danger. At time of writing, the new penal code had not come into force.”). There is some confusion regarding whether abortion is decriminalized until the eighth or the twelfth week of pregnancy, reflecting a proliferation of drafts of the Penal Code before it was officially published in *Le Moniteur* in 2025 and the lack of requisite transmission and training by the government, note 157. See, e.g., UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Haiti*, ¶ 22 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F2025%2F22&Lang=en (incorrectly noting “the adoption of the new Criminal Code [as decriminalizing] . . . abortion up to the twelfth week of pregnancy and at any time in cases of rape or incest, or when the pregnant woman’s mental or physical health is at risk”).

²³¹ See, e.g., Human Rights Research Center, *When Governance Fails: Child Recruitment, Gendered Violence, and the Rise of Gang Rule in Haiti* (Dec. 11, 2025), <https://www.humanrightsresearch.org/post/when-governance-fails-child-recruitment-gendered-violence-and-the-rise-of-gang-rule-in-haiti> (“[P]regnant people are increasingly unable to access maternity care as hospitals close under fire. Haiti’s total ban on abortion further compounds these dangers, forcing many to attempt unsafe ‘at-home’ procedures. The absence of reproductive autonomy has long been a form of violence that denies agency and compounds

physical trauma with social and psychological harm.”); UNFPA, *Haiti Situation Report (June–July 2025)* (Jul. 31, 2025), <https://haiti.unfpa.org/en/publications/haiti-situation-report-junejuly-2025> (“[Women and girls] have limited access to essential services, including sexual and reproductive health (SRH) and gender-based violence (GBV) services.”); MSF, *MSF supports the reopening of a major maternity hospital* (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/haiti-msf-supports-reopening-major-maternity-hospital> (“In Haiti, maternal and infant mortality rates remain among the highest in the Caribbean and Latin America, and access to health care has become severely limited amid a broader crisis of violence and insecurity. As violence and insecurity increased between February 2022 and April 2025, the proportion of maternal deaths in hospitals rose from 250 to 350 per 100,000 live births, while home deliveries became increasingly common. Currently, nearly 60 percent of births in Port-au-Prince take place without medical care, increasing the risk of complications such as hemorrhage, infections, and hypertension—one of the leading causes of maternal mortality. Far too many women and pregnant adolescents die due to lack of medical care. Because of the growing insecurity, several health facilities have shut down, reducing the availability of sexual and reproductive health care.”) (internal quotations omitted); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Haiti*, ¶¶ 22-23 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F%2FHQ%2F%2F2025/22/2025/22-23 (noting “with concern reports of difficulties in ensuring access to obstetric and gynaecological

care given the insecurity facing the population” and “the insecurity in which midwives work and the lack of medical equipment and medicines available to them,” and calling on the government of Haiti to ensure adequate corresponding care and safety conditions); Jacqueline Charles, *‘Unimaginable’: The toll on Haiti’s women and girls raped by violent gangs*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316158.html> (“To protect themselves, women have started to use birth-control pills, which are increasingly difficult to get, to safeguard themselves against unwanted pregnancies.”).

²³² See, e.g., MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (“Since 2022, the proportion of survivors who received care at Pran Men’m and indicated they would not press charges against their perpetrator(s) has nearly tripled. MSF’s 2025 survey also highlighted this challenge, with one respondent explaining that survivors can face ridicule from police when filing complaints. . . . Access to justice is affected by the medical certificates that SGBV survivors receive from healthcare professionals. These certificates are often critical evidence in criminal proceedings against perpetrators, but both their legal framework and practical application impose obstacles. . . . Given the country’s shortage of doctors, most survivors are cared for by trained nurses and midwives. In practice, if a survivor wants to bring their case before legal authorities, they may need to attend multiple medical appointments to obtain a doctor’s signature”); SOFA, *Biannual Report on Gender-Based Violence – January-June 2025*, pp. 21-23 (July 2025), <https://sofahaiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Rapport-25-semester-1-SOFA.pdf> (reporting that “[a]ccess to justice remains difficult for survivors, hindered by procedural delays, practices of withdrawal under family or community pressure, and gaps in the enforcement of arrest warrants” and providing data on low prosecution rates, “reflect[ing] the many institutional and social barriers that hinder access to justice,” a judicial system that is often slow and ineffective,” and a long and uncertain judicial process” with significant regional disparities); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“As with killings and injuries, SGBV survivors continue to face significant barriers to justice and effective remedies. They often experience a disregard for basic rights when navigating the justice system, including breaches of confidentiality and privacy, lack of informed consent, and lack of respectful and dignified treatment”); OHCHR, *In Dialogue with Haiti, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome Efforts to Establish a New Constitution, Raise Questions on Measures to Combat Gang-Related Gender-Based Violence and Lynchings* (Jul. 2, 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/meeting-summaries/2025/07/dialogue-haiti-experts-human-rights-committee-welcome-efforts-establish> (“According to reports, the judiciary were not sensitive to cases of gender-based violence and victims were hesitant to report cases”); Esther Kimberly Bazile, *The Many Faces of Suffering: The Dual Struggle of Displaced Women*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262371/the-many-faces-of-suffering-the-dual-struggle-of-displaced-women> (“[F]ew raped women file complaints The slowness and dysfunction of the system — such as the malfunctioning of the Legal Aid Office (BAL) at various Courts of First Instance across the country — constitutes a barrier to survivors’ right to justice, as they cannot always afford lawyers. Moreover, in such situations, the victim sometimes becomes a victim twice over, because she is not protected. Some receive death threats or are even persecuted. These accounts, which are not isolated cases, silence the victims. Sometimes the aggressor is a family member or a close relative with whom the victim still shares a roof”) (internal quotations omitted); Jérôme Wendy Norestyl, *Pedophiles infect children with HIV in camps in Port-au-Prince*, Ayibopost (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pedophiles-infect-children-with-hiv-in-camps-in-port-au-prince/> (“[T]he majority of women who seek services, despite knowing their attackers, refuse to file a complaint for fear of reprisals.”) (internal quotations omitted); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)* (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (deducing that the fear of reprisals is especially significant when perpetrators are members of armed groups); see also IACHR, *Haiti: IACHR Expresses Concern over Persistent Sexual Violence against Women, Girls, and Adolescents* (Dec. 19, 2025), https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2025/277.asp&utm_content=country-hti&utm_term=class-mon (“The IACHR urges the State to strengthen mechanisms for safe reporting, which is a first step in conducting diligent investigations to identify and punish those responsible and thus overcome the impunity that characterizes these cases.”); CCPR Centre, *Haiti’s Long-Delayed Review Before the Human Rights Committee: Reflections on Symbolism, silence, and structural fragility* (Jul. 28, 2025) <https://ccprcentre.org/ccprpages/haitis-long-delayed-review-before-the-human-rights-committee-reflections-on-symbolism-silence-and-structural-fragility> (“The Committee also asked why key legislative reforms, including the criminalization of marital rape and femicide, remain blocked due to the absence of a functioning parliament”). One dynamic of impunity for GBV observed by the BAI, which has been representing survivors of sexual violence since 2010, is that a growing number of GBV survivors are unable to identify the perpetrators themselves, and law enforcement consistently fails to mount effective investigations to discover them.

²³³ For example, the UN worked with the HNP to establish more effective GBV reporting pathways that leverage local service providers to connect survivors to legal, medical, and psychosocial assistance, as well as temporary shelter. See CCPR, *Haiti’s*

long-delayed review before the Committee: Reflections on symbolism, silence, and structural fragility (Jul. 28, 2025), <https://ccprcentre.org/ccprpages/haitis-long-delayed-review-before-the-human-rights-committee-reflections-on-symbolism-silence-and-structural-fragility>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 19 (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (“As a result[of establishing GBV “platforms[] involving service providers”], according to the Haitian National Police (HNP), 145 cases of sexual and gender-based violence were reported to the police across the country, 84 percent of which involved incidents against children.”); see also UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Haiti*, ¶ 20 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F2005%2F22&Lang=en (“The Committee welcomes the State Party’s initiatives to combat violence against women and girls, including the development of the third National Plan to Combat Violence against Women for the period 2017–2027, and the establishment of the National Coordination Office for Women’s Affairs and Gender Issues.”) *But see id.* ¶¶ 20-21.

²³⁴ Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)*, p. 11 (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (describing efforts to address protection risks and provide timely responses to GBV as “limited and uneven”); see also, e.g., HRW, *World Report 2026: Haiti, Events of 2025* (Feb. 2026) <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/haiti> (“Accountability for past and ongoing human rights violations, including massacres and sexual violence, remains nearly nonexistent”); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Haiti*, ¶ 20 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F2005%2F22&Lang=en (“[T]he Committee is also concerned about: widespread impunity for sexual violence and the low rate of reporting of such violence, particularly given the risks of reprisals and stigmatization and marginalization of victims; inadequate healthcare, psychosocial services for victims and legal services; and the lack of trust in the judicial system. The Committee is concerned about the non-criminalization of incest.”); CCPR Centre, *Haiti’s long-delayed review before the Committee: Reflections on symbolism, silence, and structural fragility* (Jul. 28, 2025), <https://ccprcentre.org/ccprpages/haitis-long-delayed-review-before-the-human-rights-committee-reflections-on-symbolism-silence-and-structural-fragility> (supplementing the Committee’s Concluding observations based on proceedings to observe that notwithstanding “recent efforts such as the establishment of one-stop service centers providing legal, medical, and psychosocial assistance, as well as plans for a national action plan on Women, Peace and Security,” “questions remained about the geographic reach, effectiveness, and resourcing of these services—particularly for internally displaced women” and that the UN Human Rights Committee questioned “why key legislative reforms, including the criminalization of marital rape and femicide, remain blocked due to the absence of a functioning parliament”); notes 226, 229, 235. Notably, although the specialized judicial unit intended to deal with mass crimes including sexual violence was supposed to start operations in late 2025 and some recruitment has reportedly taken place, there is little indication it will be functional in the foreseeable future. See BINUH, UN SRSG-SVC, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti – Q3 2025* (Nov. 2025), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/report/quarterly-report-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-haiti/3Q-2025-Quarterly-report_EN.pdf (reporting that while ten public prosecutors had been recruited, they still await their appointment and that no judges had been designated or a building acquired); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (reporting expectation that the specialized judicial units were “expected to become operational in the last quarter of 2025); see also Esther Kimberly Bazile, *The Many Faces of Suffering: The Dual Struggle of Displaced Women*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262371/the-many-faces-of-suffering-the-dual-struggle-of-displaced-women> (“In April 2025, the government officially announced the establishment of a judicial unit specialized in prosecuting mass crimes and sexual violence. To date, no progress has been reported.”). Similarly, while a new Criminal Code and a new Code of Criminal Procedure were formally published in Haiti’s paper of record 2025 (notwithstanding Constitutional concerns therewith), and contain provisions that would improve legal protections for GBV, as a practical matter they are not in effect and according to sources, they are not being distributed as required. See also Section IV.

²³⁵ UNICEF, *Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report No. 8*, UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report No. 8 (31 December 2025)* (Jan. 24, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/unicef-haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-no-8-31-december-2025> (“Haiti’s crisis is fundamentally a protection crisis, as children are bearing the brunt of violence, displacement, and facing grave violations of their rights.”); UNICEF, *Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report No. 6 (Mid-Year 2025)*, p. 2 (Jul. 29, 2025) <https://www.unicef.org/documents/haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-no-6-mid-year-2025> (“Children continue to bear the brunt of this multi-faceted crisis”).

²³⁶ See, e.g., Jacqueline Charles, ‘Unimaginable’: The toll on Haiti’s women and girls raped by violent gangs, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316158.html> (“The unimaginable cruelty is often perpetrated by underage gang members — who, like their targets, are getting younger and younger”); IACHR, *Haiti: IACHR Expresses Concern over Persistent Sexual Violence against Women, Girls, and Adolescents*, (Dec. 19, 2025), https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2025/277.asp&utm_content=country-hiti&utm_term=class-mon (noting the decreasing age of rapists); Nawal Al-Maghafi and Jasmin Dyer, *In a Haitian city ruled by gangs, young rape survivor raises baby she was told to abort*, *BBC News* (Jul. 23, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c07d3m3xk32o> (“Women are also reporting more frequently that their assailants are under 18.”); UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Child Alert: The polycrisis for children in Haiti* (Oct. 2025) <https://www.unicef.org/media/174956/file/UNICEF%20Haiti%20Child%20Alert%20EN.pdf.pdf> (reporting on children as young as ten performing dangerous tasks for armed groups); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)* (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (reporting that “children are forced to take part in violent activities, including kidnappings and killings”); see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti – Q3 2025* (Nov. 2025), <https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/report/quarterly-report-on-the-human-rights-situation->

[in-haiti/3Q-2025-Quarterly-report_EN_.pdf](#) (describing a 14-year-old boy member of an armed group being beaten and shot for allegedly raping a nine-year-old girl).

²³⁷ See, e.g., Jacqueline Charles, *As gang rapes surge in Haiti, aid groups strain under demand for services*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313038946.html> (reporting on “a troubling ‘phenomenon’ of abandoned children, some of them born of rape,” and the inadequacies of Haiti’s laws on adoption and child welfare for dealing therewith); Jacqueline Charles, *What happens to a child born of rape? Grandma raises the baby her daughter rejects*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316203.html> (describing the trauma and suicidal ideation of a girl who was raped and after being unable to seek an abortion rejected her baby).

²³⁸ See, e.g., UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Child Alert: The polycrisis for children in Haiti* (Oct. 2025) <https://www.unicef.org/media/174956/file/UNICEF%20Haiti%20Child%20Alert%20EN.pdf.pdf> (“Children in Haiti face increasingly overlapping and compounding threats, including forced recruitment, abduction, sexual violence and the loss of caregivers. Displacement, trauma, and poverty make them more vulnerable than ever, with limited access to safe spaces and social support . . . In areas under the control of armed groups, children and their families live under the constant threat of armed attacks, kidnappings and sexual violence . . . Children as young as 10 are being forced to carry weapons, serve as lookouts or for other dangerous tasks. Girls, in particular, face brutal risks of sexual violence, coercion and exploitation by armed group members.”); MSF, *People and Health System Are Trapped by Escalating Violence in Haiti* (Oct. 3, 2025), <https://www.msf.org/people-and-health-system-are-trapped-escalating-violence-haiti> (reporting that children were 26% of the victims of violence treated by MSF between January and June 2025, 30% of whom had suffered gunshot wounds, with boys two-thirds of the wounded children); Jérôme Wendy Norestyl, *Pedophiles infect children with HIV in camps in Port-au-Prince*, Ayibopost (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pedophiles-infect-children-with-hiv-in-camps-in-port-au-prince/> (“Children are the prime targets of attackers in more than fifty displaced persons camps in Port-au-Prince, where residents live in precarious conditions and in overcrowded conditions.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)* (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025> (reporting that “[t]hroughout 2025, the trafficking of children by gangs for purposes of exploitation and participation in criminal activities was a major concern for the HRS, due to the profound and lasting consequences for the children and their families, as well as for the future of the country,” and noting the likelihood of “severe long-term trauma” as well as “expos[ure of minors recruited into armed groups] to the risk of being killed or seriously injured during clashes with other gangs or in the course of operations conducted by the security forces”); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“Children are also affected by violence, face family separation, and are at risk of trafficking, including recruitment by armed gangs, where they are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.”); BINUH, UN SRSG-SVC, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti – Q3 2025* (Nov. 2025), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/report/quarterly-report-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-haiti/3Q-2025-Quarterly-report_EN_.pdf (“In the Artibonite department, cases of child sexual exploitation were reported, involving the Kokorat San Ras gang and concerning 27 minors aged 13 to 17.”); UN News, *‘The people of Haiti are in a perfect storm of suffering,’ warns UN chief* (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165738> (“Even more concerning, [the head of the UN Children’s Fund] said, was the 700 per cent increase in cases of recruitment and use of children by armed groups, alongside a 54 per cent increase in killing and maiming, according to Ms. Russell. Children now account for a staggering 50 per cent of all active gang members in Haiti.”); Jacqueline Charles, *It’s not just gangs: UN human rights chief alarmed over rise in Haiti’s civilian deaths*, Miami Herald (Oct. 2, 2025) <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312352544.html> (“More children are being subjected to trafficking, exploitation and forced recruitment by gangs. They are used as couriers, lookouts or weapons carriers, and are sometimes coerced into combat roles against rival gangs, security forces and so-called self-defense groups.”); Plan International, EOCHA, *Every Haitian Girl Deserves to Be Free: Forced Marriage and Violence* (Oct. 11, 2025) <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/every-haitian-girl-deserves-be-free-forced-marriage-and-violence> (“Children are also affected by violence, face family separation, and are at risk of trafficking in person, including recruitment by armed groups, where they are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.”); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“Children associated with armed gangs, some as young as 10 years old, are exploited in a range of roles, including domestic tasks such as cleaning and cooking, surveillance of police movements, transporting ammunition, delivering extortion payment letters to businesses, as well as participating in clashes with other gangs. Girls face heightened vulnerability to sexual exploitation and are often forced into sexual relationships with gang members. Once recruited, many children are unable to leave freely due to threats and fear of retaliation.”); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Haiti*, ¶ 31 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F%2FHTI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en (“The Committee is concerned about the problem of child labour, children employed as domestic workers and trafficking in persons, including the recruitment, exploitation and abduction of children by armed gangs, despite the efforts made by the State Party in this regard, such as the establishment of a presidential commission to support the establishment of a national network of reception centres and rehabilitation homes and the implementation of the National Plan of Action to Combat Child Labour adopted in 2019. The Committee remains concerned about the lack of information to establish the precise extent of these human rights violations. The Committee is also concerned about reports of insufficient human and financial resources to ensure adequate protection and assistance for victims.”).

²³⁹ See, e.g., UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Child Alert: The polycrisis for children in Haiti* (Oct. 2025) <https://www.unicef.org/media/174956/file/UNICEF%20Haiti%20Child%20Alert%20EN.pdf.pdf> (“Many [children] have witnessed killings or been forced to flee in the middle of the night . . . [and for] countless children, trauma is a daily reality.”); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)*, p. 8 (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (documenting instances of rapes taking place in front of the victims’ children); OHCHR, *Children Trafficked by Gangs:*

Rethinking Responses, p. 29 (Feb. 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs-rethinking-responses-en.pdf> (“Children who are victims of trafficking and gang exploitation suffer deep and lasting psychological and emotional harm. Many of them experience post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, and other mental health disorders resulting from these experiences.”).

²⁴⁰ See, e.g., Jérôme Wendy Norestyl, *Pedophiles infect children with HIV in camps in Port-au-Prince*, Ayibopost (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pedophiles-infect-children-with-hiv-in-camps-in-port-au-prince/> (reporting that children are the “prime targets” for rape at displacement sites); Jacqueline Charles, *Rape, pregnancy and a stroke: the scars that sexual violence leaves on Haiti’s victims*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316190.html> (reporting that “children account for 15% of the reported sexual-assault cases” and describing one seven-year-old girl who died as a result, though “there are no exact statistics on how many children have died as a result of sexual attacks”); UN, *Letter from the Panel of Experts to the UN Security Council*, ¶ 67 (Sep. 25, 2025) <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4091504?v=pdf> (“On 3 May 2025, a six-year-old girl died from injuries after a sexual assault in an internally displaced persons site in Cité Soleil”).

²⁴¹ See, e.g., Jérôme Wendy Norestyl, *Pedophiles infect children with HIV in camps in Port-au-Prince*, Ayibopost (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pedophiles-infect-children-with-hiv-in-camps-in-port-au-prince/>; Jacqueline Charles, *What happens to a child born of rape? Grandma raises the baby her daughter rejects*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025) <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316203.html>; Jacqueline Charles, *‘Unimaginable’: The toll on Haiti’s women and girls raped by violent gangs*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025) <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316158.html> (“What do we say to a 13-year-old girl who was gang-raped, became pregnant and was too young to understand what was happening to her own body?”) (internal quotations omitted).

²⁴² See, e.g., OHCHR, *Children Trafficked by Gangs: Rethinking Responses* (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs-rethinking-responses-en.pdf> (“[B]oth structural and contextual factors contribute to creating an environment in which children are increasingly exposed to the risk of trafficking by gangs. This risk is particularly acute for children from extremely poor and marginalized families, as well as for those living on the streets or in displacement sites.”); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“The socio-economic situation of households plays a critical driver, as children from low-income and/or single-headed households face heightened risks. Some join armed gangs as a coping mechanism to address food insecurity and unmet basic needs, while others had already dropped out of school before joining gangs, often due to the inability to afford school fees, supplies, or uniforms.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 15 (Aug. 1, 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (describing “two minors, aged 14 and 16, . . . forced to have non-consensual sex with gang members for several days,” and noting that “[v]ictims of this type of sexual exploitation, often from vulnerable families, are targeted by these armed individuals, who use power, intimidation, and fear to establish control over the minors”).

²⁴³ See IOM, *Haiti: Report on the Internal Displacement Situation – Round 12 (December 2025)* (Feb. 24, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true>; see also Jacqueline Charles, *Rape, pregnancy and a stroke: the scars that sexual violence leaves on Haiti’s victims*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312316190.html> (“[W]ith one in eight children displaced from their homes, they are increasingly exposed to exploitation and abuse.”); UNICEF, *Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report No. 8*, pp. 1-2 (Jan. 24, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/unicef-haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-no-8-31-december-2025> (reporting that the number of displaced children rose by 34% between December 2024 and September 2025, from 551,000 to 748,000); notes 69-85.

²⁴⁴ See, e.g., UNICEF, *Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report No. 8*, p. 1 (Jan. 24, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/unicef-haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-no-8-31-december-2025> (reporting that “nearly 130,000 children under five now suffer from acute malnutrition” as “the most vulnerable” to Haiti’s acute food crisis); UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Child Alert: The polycrisis for children in Haiti* (Oct. 2025) <https://www.unicef.org/media/174956/file/UNICEF%20Haiti%20Child%20Alert%20EN.pdf.pdf> (reporting increases of acute malnutrition in children); Section VI; see also Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, The New Humanitarian (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions> (describing how “food is the weapon used by gangs to recruit children”).

²⁴⁵ UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Child Alert: The polycrisis for children in Haiti* (Oct. 2025) <https://www.unicef.org/media/174956/file/UNICEF%20Haiti%20Child%20Alert%20EN.pdf.pdf>; Section VI.

²⁴⁶ See, e.g., UN News, *UN News Report* (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166954> (“Poverty is worsening for the most vulnerable families, and children are increasingly susceptible to gang recruitment, in order to earn money Many children are pushed by hunger, lack of schooling and economic desperation to join gangs. Others are forcibly recruited or threatened.”); Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, The New Humanitarian (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions> (describing how hunger drives children towards recruitment or exploitation by armed groups); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti – Q3 2025*, (Nov. 2025), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/report/quarterly-report-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-haiti/3Q-2025-Quarterly-report_EN_.pdf (“The recruitment and exploitation of children by gangs are fuelled by poverty, social exclusion and the criminal governance exercised in neighbourhoods under their control. In these areas, threats, violence and promises of “protection” or income encourage children – often from low-income or single-parent households and already out of school – to become involved in gang activities.”); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September*

2025), p. 6 (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“Children who lose one or both parents to violence face even greater risks...these children become highly vulnerable to human rights abuses, including trafficking and recruitment by armed groups or other criminal networks.”); UNICEF, *UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell remarks at the Security Council Open Debate on Haiti* (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unicef-executive-director-catherine-russell-remarks-security-council-open-debate> (estimating children are 50% of armed group members).

²⁴⁷ See, e.g., UN News, *UN News Report*, (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166954> (“Services to protect children are overstretched or absent, leaving minors at risk in neighborhoods where gangs exert control.”); OHCHR, *Children Trafficked by Gangs: Rethinking Responses*, p. 29 (Feb. 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs-rethinking-responses-en.pdf> (describing scarcity of providers offering mental health services for children involved with armed groups and the need for more resources and specialized training given the complex traumas the children experience); UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Child Alert: The polycrisis for children in Haiti* (Oct. 2025) <https://www.unicef.org/media/174956/file/UNICEF%20Haiti%20Child%20Alert%20EN.pdf.pdf> (noting “limited access to safe spaces and social support” for children); Plan International, *Haiti's Security Deployment Must Take Into Account Child Protection* (Oct. 1, 2025), <https://plan-international.org/news/2025/10/01/haitis-security-deployment-must-take-into-account-child-protection/> (“Funding for essential services for children, such as education and protection from harm, remains alarmingly low. According to the UN’s Financial Tracking Service for the 2025 Haiti Humanitarian Response Plan, only 13% of the required funding has been secured for education and child protection efforts, leaving thousands of children without the safety, support, and opportunities they desperately need.”); UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report No. 8 (31 December 2025)*, (Jan. 24, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/unicef-haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-no-8-31-december-2025> (“[S]evere sectoral gaps persist, with Child Protection again one of the most underfunded areas, facing funding gaps nearing 90 per cent.”); see also UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Child Alert: The polycrisis for children in Haiti* (Oct. 2025) <https://www.unicef.org/media/174956/file/UNICEF%20Haiti%20Child%20Alert%20EN.pdf.pdf> (“[U]nless protection services are urgently restored, an entire generation risks growing up not only in fear but also under relentless exposure to violence and exploitation.”).

²⁴⁸ See, e.g., OHCHR, *Children Trafficked by Gangs: Rethinking Responses*, p. 11 (Feb. 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs-rethinking-responses-en.pdf> (reporting that children are being killed and injured in “security operations against gangs, including summary executions (25 per cent [of 806 total reported victims]), and acts of “popular justice” perpetrated by so-called self-defence groups, as well as by members of the population (three per cent),” and noting that in some cases their bodies are mutilated or burned by police to avoid identification); *id.*, p. 31 (reporting that a number of PNH officers “consider children involved in gangs as ‘combatants’ who can be targeted at any time and in any place,” in spite of training in child protection, and that at least 36 children, “some as young as 10, were executed by members of specialized police units or killed by self-defense groups and mobs after being accused of gang association,” where some of the underlying “suspicions were based solely on their refusal to cooperate during police searches”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations Security Council*, ¶¶ 23-24 (Oct. 14, 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on_the_situation_in_haiti_14_october_2025.pdf (reporting on instances of children killed in government operations); Al Jazeera, *Deadly Haiti drone attack kills eight children in capital Port-au-Prince* (Sept. 23, 2025), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/23/deadly-haiti-drone-attack-kills-eight-children-in-capital-port-au-prince> (reporting on government drone attack that killed 11 children among other civilians); UN Geneva, *Trapped behind bars: Reforming Haiti's broken detention system* (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/11/112740/trapped-behind-bars-reforming-haitis-broken-detention-system> (describing children detained in inhumane conditions and alongside adults).

²⁴⁹ The government of Haiti signed a Protocol on the Transfer, Reception, and Care of Children Associated with Armed Gangs Encountered during Security Operations on National Territory with the UN in October 2023 that remains in effect. The Protocol recognizes that children associated with gangs must be considered victims and establishes procedures to address the specific needs of minors, “emphasizing a victim-centered approach that prioritizes protection, rehabilitation, and reintegration,” and seeks to avoid or minimize detention. See OHCHR, *Children Trafficked by Gangs: Rethinking Responses*, pp. 32-34 (Feb. 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs-rethinking-responses-en.pdf>. But see *id.* p.34 (calling into question whether police and judicial actors understand or use the Protocol). Other efforts include the Prejeunes program intended to protect children from violence, support the reintegration of children released from armed groups, and identify sustainable alternatives that prevent them from reverting back to violence, see UNICEF, *Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report No. 8 (31 December 2025)* (Jan. 24, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/unicef-haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-no-8-31-december-2025> (emphasizing the importance of sustaining and scaling up related funding and ensuring that it helps to strengthen social the welfare and juvenile justice systems in Haiti). Further, the revised BINUH mandate requires it to “assist in the design of a Haitian-led disarmament, dismantlement, and reintegration program in line with Haiti’s national strategy, including, as appropriate, support for safe exit, voluntary disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration pathways for individuals, particularly children, formerly associated with gangs, and the implementation of the handover protocol to ensure clear referral pathways to safely transfer children to child protection services.” BINUH, S/RES/2814 (2026), ¶¶ 1(d), 5, 18 (Jan. 29, 2026). The GSF’s mandate includes provisions authorizing it to “contribute to the creation of . . . security conditions conducive to supporting Haiti and other actors’ complementary efforts to facilitate the safe exit of those willing to voluntarily leave gangs which should have a particular emphasis on disengagement and referral of children to rehabilitation and reintegration programs” and setting out that its conduct must be “in full compliance with international law; including international human rights law, as applicable, taking steps to ensure, where appropriate and feasible, that children apprehended in such operations are referred to child protection actors and not detained with adults,” with Member States requested to provide child protection expertise, including through child protection advisers. UN Security Council, S/RES/2793(2025), (Sept. 30, 2025).

²⁵⁰ See, e.g., OHCHR, *Children Trafficked by Gangs: Rethinking Responses*, p. 34 (Feb. 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs-rethinking-responses-en.pdf> (noting insufficient knowledge among police officers about applicable standards and practices by police and judicial actors that bypass Protocol requirements like avoidance of detention); *id.* at 36 (“Reintegration and rehabilitation programs for children who are victims of trafficking are essential to break cycles of violence and help them build a future outside gang-related criminal networks. However, according to information collected by the HRS, only a few of these programs exist, and their impact on the rehabilitation and reintegration of children released from CERMICOL remains very limited.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20-%20september%202025%29.pdf> (“During the quarter, the HRS also supported judicial actors in the handling and prioritisation of hearings relating to criminal cases involving minors in conflict with the law, detained at the Centre for the Reintegration of Minors in Conflict with the Law (CERMICOL). This support enabled the reconstruction of case files, the drafting of indictments, and their submission to the competent judicial authorities. As of 30 September, 25 minors’ cases (20 boys and five girls) had been processed, but no criminal or correctional sessions had yet been held to try them. In addition, 28 further cases (20 boys and eight girls) had been identified as of 11 September for file reconstruction, but no action had been taken by the deputies of the Public Prosecutor as of 30 October.”); see also Chatham House, *A Roadmap for Security and Governance Reform in Haiti* (Jan. 22, 2026), <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/roadmap-security-and-governance-reform-haiti/policy-recommendations-sequenced-roadmap> (“Haitian authorities should issue a clear and public commitment that children associated with gangs will be treated first and foremost as victims entitled to protection, in line with international juvenile-justice and child-rights standards. In practice, that implies an immediate halt to practices that treat children in gangs as indistinguishable from adults. It implies a need to design basic screening procedures at the point of arrest or separation to identify minors, assess their exposure and direct them into appropriate child-protection channels.”).

²⁵¹ Disaggregated data is scarce.

²⁵² See MSF, *MSF Condemns Sweeping Expansion of Global Gag Rule* (Jan. 27, 2026), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/msf-condemns-sweeping-expansion-global-gag-rule> (stating that the U.S. government’s expanded “global gag” rule “applies extensive restrictions to activities it claims promote so-called ‘gender ideology’ and ‘discriminatory equity ideology,’ defining the terms “so broadly that it is likely to result in barring or limiting access to essential health services for LGBTQIA+ individuals, women and girls, racial and ethnic minorities, and other marginalized groups”); note 430.

²⁵³ UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Haiti*, ¶¶ 18-19 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F%2FHRTI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en (expressing further concern regarding the lack of information about measures to combat discrimination and a 2017 draft law that would criminalize homosexuality, and calling responsive measures); Erasing 76 Crimes, *LGBTQ+ Haitians mourn the loss of Hotel Oloffson, an inclusive refuge* (Jul. 18, 2025), <https://76crimes.com/2025/07/18/lgbtq-haitians-mourn-the-loss-of-hotel-oloffson-an-inclusive-refuge/> (“LGBTQ+ individuals often face stigma, exclusion and violence [in Haiti].”).

²⁵⁴ See Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)*, p. 11 (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“Funding remains insufficient, with recent cuts from international partners further reducing support, including for LGBTIQ+ organizations that provide free sexual and reproductive health care, psychosocial support, and safe temporary shelter for marginalized communities. Despite a CERF-supported scale-up in 2023, protection risks may be deprioritized in upcoming response plans, including the Humanitarian Programme Cycle, raising concerns about the sustainability of services and the capacity to address growing vulnerabilities.”); UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Haiti*, ¶¶ 18-19 (Jul. 29, 2025), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2F%2FHRTI%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en (“The Committee is also concerned about the lack of measures that enable organizations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons to hold public events and to protect them while organizing

such activities (arts. 2 and 26).”); MSF, *MSF Condemns Sweeping Expansion of Global Gag Rule* (Jan. 27, 2026), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/msf-condemns-sweeping-expansion-global-gag-rule>; see also Erasing 76 Crimes, *LGBTQ+ Haitians Mourn the Loss of Hotel Oloffson, an Inclusive Refuge* (Jul. 18, 2025), <https://76crimes.com/2025/07/18/lgbtq-haitians-mourn-the-loss-of-hotel-oloffson-an-inclusive-refuge/> (reporting that the July destruction of the Oloffson Hotel, “a gay refuge and historic landmark in Port-au-Prince,” deprives queer Haitians of a safe place for meeting and socializing); Erasing 76 Crimes, *Haiti: Another Setback for LGBT Rights* (Jul. 10, 2025), <https://76crimes.com/2025/07/10/haiti-another-setback-for-lgbt-rights/> (reporting that expected changes to Haiti’s penal code that would have provided protections against discrimination to LGBTIQ+ individuals had been clawed back from the version adopted, a betrayal of LGBTIQ+ activist Carlot Jeudy who had been assassinated in 2019). See note 171 (there is still no accountability for Jeudy’s assassination).

²⁵⁵ Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)*, p. 7 (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (reporting that “LGBTQ+ individuals [kidnapped by armed groups] are subjected to degrading and punitive treatment, including forced sexual acts framed as ‘correction’”).

²⁵⁶ See BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti – Q3 2025*, (Nov. 2025), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/report/quarterly-report-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-haiti/3Q-2025-Quarterly-report_EN_.pdf (reporting that in the Communes of Delmas and Port-au-Prince, armed groups killed, beat, and burned individuals accused of “mystical” practices and witchcraft).

²⁵⁷ See Linnea Fehrm, *In Depth: Gang Violence Breeds Hunger as Haitians Seek Homegrown Solutions*, The New Humanitarian (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger->

[haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions](#) (reporting that “[f]armers [were] attacked by armed groups, who st[ole] their harvest” and “everything of value,” set the houses on fire “and destroy[ed] their agricultural infrastructure”).

²⁵⁸ See Amy Bracken, *How Trump-Era Funding Cuts Endanger Efforts to Empower Haiti's Farmers*, Al Jazeera (Nov. 12, 2025), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2025/11/12/how-trump-era-funding-cuts-endanger-efforts-to-empower-haitis-farmers> (warning that U.S. funding cuts for the WFP resulted in a “financial shortfall of \$44m in Haiti alone over the next six months,” which could disempower Haitian farmers who had just begun benefiting from local sourcing for food programs).

²⁵⁹ See Daniella Saint-Louis, *Is Haiti's massive Darbonne sugar factory about to be revived?*, Haitian Times (Sep. 9, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/09/darbonne-sugar-factory-revival-plan/> (“[I]nsecurity, land grabs and lack of state support continue to push farmers out of production.”).

²⁶⁰ See HRW, *World Report 2026: Haiti, Events of 2025* (Feb. 2026), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/haiti> (“According to the UN, approximately 16 percent of Haiti’s population has a disability, though no census has been conducted since 2003. Haitian people with disabilities face significant barriers to accessing essential services and experience pervasive discrimination and stigma.”); Aksyon Sitwayen Angaje, *Rapport d’Enquête d’Opinion sur la Situation Sécuritaire et Politique en Haïti*, ProEco Haiti (Jan. 2026), <https://proecohaiti.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Enquete-Dopinion-Sur-La-Situation-Securitaire-Et-Politique-En-Haiti.pdf> (reporting 2025 survey findings indicating that individuals with disabilities have reduced ability to participate in leisure activities due to lack of accessible spaces, are more economically vulnerable, attain less education, have less access to formal employment, and are less likely to be registered to vote); RNDDH, *Sites for internally displaced persons: The RNDDH Urges the Haitian State to Act*, ¶¶ 35-36, 46 (Jan. 12, 2026), <https://web.rnddh.org/sites-for-internally-displaced-persons-the-rnddh-urges-the-haitian-state-to-put-an-end-to-this-situation/?lang=en> (reporting that individuals with physical, sensory, or cognitive disabilities were identified at 90% of the 40 displacement sites examined by RNDDH, and that while some sites offer occasional therapy sessions, food, and hygiene kits to persons with disabilities, most displaced individuals with disabilities “live in conditions of indignity and in total denial of their most basic rights,” with “no access to health care, education, or adequate food,” or crutches, wheelchairs, and other specialized equipment suited to their specialized needs, are “neglected by State authorities and further marginalized by their situation [and] suffer greatly”; and, because most lack family and appropriate equipment, are dependent on humanitarian interventions, site management committees, and “the goodwill of their neighbors”); Global Protection Cluster, *Haiti: Protection Analysis Update (September 2025)* (Sep. 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-09/pau25_20_protection_analysis_update_haiti_sept2025_final.pdf (“The physical environment [in displacement sites] is especially hazardous for children, older persons, and persons living with disabilities.”); HRW, *World Report 2026: Haiti, Events of 2025* (Feb. 2026) <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/haiti> (“Haiti acceded to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2009, yet its legal framework still contains discriminatory provisions.”); see also Direct Relief, *In Haiti, Pregnant Women Flee Melissa's Devastation through Gang-Controlled Roads* (Nov. 6, 2025), <https://www.directrelief.org/2025/11/in-haiti-pregnant-women-flee-melissas-devastation-through-gang-controlled-roads/> (documenting an instance when a mentally and physically disabled woman was raped in an IDP camp and became pregnant without being able to understand what was happening to her).

²⁶¹ GI-TOC, *The Weaponization of Displacement by Gangs in Haiti* (Jul. 16, 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/the-weaponization-of-displacement-by-gangs-in-haiti/> (“For the third consecutive year, conditions in Haiti continue to deteriorate. Humanitarian indicators now resemble those of countries engaged in active conflict.”).

²⁶² See RNDDH, *Hurricane Melissa: RNDDH Denounces Inadequacy of Measures Adopted by State Authorities* (Nov. 6, 2025), <https://web.rnddh.org/hurricane-melissa-rnddh-denounces-the-inadequacy-of-measures-adopted-by-state-authorities/?lang=en> (discussing the inadequacy of the government’s response to Hurricane Melissa, which resulted in the deaths of 43 people and severe flooding across the Greater South, destroying thousands of homes and displacing nearly 2,000 people; all victims interviewed “complained that they had received no assistance from the State”); OCHA, *Haiti Food Security Outlook (October 2025 – May 2026)* (Nov. 17, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-food-security-outlook-october-2025-may-2026-persistent-insecurity-and-effects-hurricane-melissa-maintain-crisis-ipc-phase-3-and-emergency-ipc-phase-4-food-insecurity>; WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, pp. 6, 18 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (“The country remains highly exposed to hurricanes and earthquakes, but lacks the preparedness capacity to respond. For the first time since 2016, it is without a full in-country contingency food stock in case of a sudden onset crisis.”). The lack of safety infrastructure more generally “exacerbates the consequences of every disaster.” Valéry Félix, *Fort-Liberté: Plusieurs maisons détruites, et plus de 15 blessés dans un incendie causé par le stockage clandestin de carburant*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/262339/fort-liberte-maisons-detruit-es-plus-de-15-blesses-dans-un-incendie-cause-par-le-stockage-clandestin-de-carburant>.

²⁶³ Victor Raison, *Guns, gangs, and drought: how crime and the climate crisis are reshaping Haiti*, The Guardian (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/13/haiti-violence-climate-disaster-drought-haitians-gang-warfare>.

²⁶⁴ In particular, restitution for the debt extorted by France in 1825 in exchange for Haiti’s independence, which has played a significant role in Haiti’s under-development. Victor Raison, *Guns, gangs, and drought: how crime and the climate crisis are reshaping Haiti*, The Guardian (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/13/haiti-violence-climate-disaster-drought-haitians-gang-warfare> (the ransom “has left a legacy of environmental degradation, violent upheavals and weak governance”); IJDH, *Joint Open Letter to Demand Restitution for Haiti's Independence Ransom from France* (Jul. 11, 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/2025/07/projects/joint-open-letter-to-demand-restitution-for-haitis-independence-ransom-from-france/>; Brian Concannon Jr., Kristina Fried & Sasha Filippova, *Restitution for Haiti, Reparations for All: Haiti's Place in the Global Reparations Movement*, University of Miami Inter-American Law Review (Dec. 13, 2023), <https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2673&context=umialr>.

²⁶⁵ Gérard Junior Jeanty, *Le CPT et son gouvernement: un bilan économique mitigé*, Le Nouvelliste (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/263982/le-cpt-et-son-gouvernement-un-bilan-economique-mitige> (“During the 2024-2025 fiscal year, the Haitian economy experienced a negative growth rate of -2.7%. As a result, Haiti has now experienced its seventh

consecutive year of contraction.”); see also WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, p. 11 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (“Haiti’s economy has contracted for six consecutive years, shrinking over 4 percent in 2024 – a loss exceeding USD 1 billion in a USD 25 billion GDP.”).

²⁶⁶ See World Bank, *Haiti Macro Poverty Outlook*, p. 2 (Oct. 2025), <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/e408a7e21ba62d843bdd90dc37e61b57-0500032021/related/mpo-hti.pdf> (48.3% live below the international poverty line of US\$3 per day); WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, p. 11 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (putting the number of Haitians living below the poverty line at over 65%); see also AP News, *Haiti pledges quick response as report finds almost 6M Haitians face hunger crisis, deportations to Haiti worsen situation*, *The Haitian Times* (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/10/14/haiti-hunger-response-report/>, (reporting “some 6 million Haitians living on less than \$2.41 a day”).

²⁶⁷ Gérard Junior Jeanty, *Le CPT et son gouvernement: un bilan économique mitigé*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/263982/le-cpt-et-son-gouvernement-un-bilan-economique-mitige>.

²⁶⁸ Institut Haïtien de Statistique d’Informatique, IHSI, *Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Informatique*, <https://ihsi.gouv.ht/>. It has stayed at 25% or above since March 2024. Trading Economics, *Haiti Inflation CPI*, <https://tradingeconomics.com/haiti/inflation-cpi>.

²⁶⁹ *Juno7, Haiti: Inflation Slows to 25% but Living Costs Remain High* (Feb. 21, 2026), <https://www.juno7.ht/haiti-inflation-slows-to-25-but-living-costs-remain-high/> (“Housing, water, electricity, and gas costs rose by 40.5% annually — one of the steepest increases recorded.”).

²⁷⁰ See, e.g., Neale Mahoney and Adam Shaw, *The Global Affordability Crisis Isn’t Going Away*, *TIME Magazine* (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://time.com/collections/davos-2026/7339214/global-affordability-crisis-cost-of-living-inflation-politics/>, (noting that “food prices have doubled” in Haiti since 2020); Myriam Lafontant, André Jean Baptiste and Rodeline Celestin, *La Banque mondiale projette une croissance de 2% en 2026 pour Haïti conditionnée à la stabilité sécuritaire*, *Gazette Universitaire* (Jan. 13, 2026), <https://www.gazetteuniv.com/banque-mondiale-projette-croissance-2-pourcent-haiti-2026-conditionnelle/> (“The prices of basic food products remain exceptionally high. . . . The cost of the minimum number of kilocalories making up the food basket for poor and very poor households in the metropolitan area is between 12,000 and 14,000 gourdes per month (between 14,000 and 16,000 nationwide) from May to November 2025, a very high level compared to the five-year average.”); OCHA, *Haiti Food Security Outlook (October 2025 – May 2026)* (Nov. 17, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-food-security-outlook-october-2025-may-2026-persistent-insecurity-and-effects-hurricane-melissa-maintain-crisis-ipc-phase-3-and-emergency-ipc-phase-4-food-insecurity> (“The general price level [of food] remains high, reaching an average of nearly 32 percent year-on-year, with food inflation exceeding 35 percent in September 2025.”); AP News, *Haiti pledges quick response as report finds almost 6M Haitians face hunger crisis, deportations to Haiti worsen situation*, *The Haitian Times* (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/10/14/haiti-hunger-response-report/> (“[T]he cost of food increased by 33% in July [2025] compared with the same month last year.”); see also WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, p. 11 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (“WFP’s monitoring shows prices are very volatile, with trends differing across regions and products.”).

²⁷¹ *Juno7, Haiti: Inflation Slows to 25% but Living Costs Remain High* (Feb. 21, 2026), <https://www.juno7.ht/haiti-inflation-slows-to-25-but-living-costs-remain-high/>; Rhinews, *La Cour des Comptes Alerte sur une Exécution Budgétaire Insuffisante* (Dec. 7, 2025), <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/la-cour-des-comptes-alerte-sur-une-execution-budgetaire-insuffisante-et-un-manque-de-conformite-du-rapport-soumis-par-le-mef-selon-son-rapport-dexecution-du-budget-2024-2025/> (Haiti’s Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes warned that inflation is resulting in an “accelerated erosion of household purchasing power”) (*internal quotations omitted*); OCHA, *Haiti Food Security Outlook (October 2025 – May 2026)* (Nov. 17, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-food-security-outlook-october-2025-may-2026-persistent-insecurity-and-effects-hurricane-melissa-maintain-crisis-ipc-phase-3-and-emergency-ipc-phase-4-food-insecurity>; WFP, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point; Haiti Country Report*, p. 11 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (“Food inflation . . . disproportionately affects food affordability among poor households and informal workers, who account for 86 percent of the workforce. . . . WFP data for 2024 indicates 64 percent of households cannot cover the minimum food basket and can only afford half of their basic food needs on average.”); see also LivingCost, *Cost of Living in Haiti* (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://livingcost.org/cost/haiti> (“The average salary after taxes in Haiti is \$173, which is enough to cover living expenses for 0.3 months.”).

²⁷² See OCHA, *Haiti Key Message Update: Security Gains Remain Limited, No Improvement in Acute Food Insecurity* (Feb. 6, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-key-message-update-security-gains-remain-limited-no-improvement-acute-food-insecurity-january-may-2026> (“Poor households are increasingly resorting to negative coping strategies, including reducing the number of meals, borrowing, begging, selling productive assets, and internal migration.”); Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, *The New Humanitarian* (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions>, (“Families sell land [for cash] just to keep their children in school.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, p. 22 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (IDPs have resorted to “selling productive assets” to afford food); FEWS NET, *Haiti Key Message Update (August 2025)* (Aug. 2025), <https://fewsn.net/latin-america-and-caribbean/haiti/key-message-update/august-2025> (“IDPs have lost essential livelihood assets and are increasingly exposed to physical and financial risks in maintaining income-generating activities and accessing food due to gang extortion and high prices of basic food items.”).

²⁷³ Persistent foreign interference created an over-reliance on foreign imports, which has in turn made the Haitian gourde extremely vulnerable to fluctuations on the global market, significantly impacting the economy and further limiting many Haitians’ ability to purchase food. See generally Sandra Wisner & Brian Concannon, *Debt and Dependence: Foreign Interference in Haiti and the Importance of Non-State Actor Accountability*, *Northwestern Law Journal of Human Rights* (2023), <https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1252&context=njihr>; Sandra C. Wisner, *Starved for*

Justice: International Complicity in Systemic Violations of the Right to Food in Haiti, Columbia Human Rights Law Review Online (May 10, 2022), <https://hrlr.law.columbia.edu/hrlr-online/starved-for-justice-international-complicity-in-systemic-violations-of-the-right-to-food-in-haiti/>; WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, p. 11 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/>; see also Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti ushers in last phase of transitional government amid color, class tensions*, Miami Herald (Aug. 7, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311554409.html> (TPM member Fritz Alphonse Jean raise concerns about “the council’s support of a contract that gives elements of the private sector 24 years of control of 70% of all the cargo-container traffic coming into Port-au-Prince, after questioning its legitimacy in Haiti’s economy, which relies heavily on imports and exports”); notes 109–110. Long-standing government failures to improve safety and infrastructure, combined with most Haitians’ reliance on informal employment, is a compounding factor in the country’s economic decline. See Onz Chéry, *Fire ravages Cap-Haïtien’s Cluny Market, vendors reeling in despair*, The Haitian Times (Jan. 25, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/01/25/haitian-merchants-products-fire/>; Juhakenson Blaise, *Dumornay market fire leaves merchants demanding aid and threatening roadblocks*, The Haitian Times (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/12/12/vendors-threaten-roadblock-after-dumornay-market-fire/>, (“Fires routinely devastate major public markets across Haiti — from Croix-des-Bossales to Pétion-Ville, La Saline, Croix-des-Bouquets, Tabarre and Pont-Sondé, and from Jérémie to Gonaïves and Cap-Haïtien — wiping out the capital base of small traders who depend entirely on informal commerce to support their families. Many rely on informal rotating savings systems or high-interest bank loans to buy goods, leaving them unable to recover after each loss.”).

²⁷⁴ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 6, 16 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (“For instance, in some gang-controlled areas, pastors have been forced to pay approximately 10,000 gourdes (around USD 80) for each religious service.”); GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis*, pp. 14–15 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (“Residents of Kenscoff, for example, reported to the GI-TOC that shortly after the first wave of attacks in January 2025, gang-affiliated ‘tax collectors’ began going door to door to businesses and homes demanding payment. Similar patterns have been documented in the Artibonite region, where Gran Grif extorts farmers and traders, sometimes seizing crops, land or livestock as payment in kind. The financial scale of this extortion-based model – which has been in place in areas of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area for years – is reaching unprecedented levels. Along RN1, in and around the capital, gangs are estimated to extort a total of US\$6 000 to US\$8 000 per day from transporters, and up to US\$20 000 per day from businesses operating along the corridor; at the Port-au-Prince fuel terminal, extortion fees reportedly doubled in May from 25 000 to 50 000 gourdes per truck (approximately US\$160–US\$350, depending on exchange rates); Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance*, pp. 11–12 (Dec. 15, 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf>; see also notes 62–65.

²⁷⁵ Wesker Sylvain, *Haitian Traders Face Gang “Toll Booths” at Sea*, Ayibopost (Feb. 23, 2026), <https://ayibopost.com/haitian-traders-face-gang-toll-booths-at-sea/> (armed groups have set up “informal tolls targeting vessels connecting Port-au-Prince, La Gonâve and Arcahaie,” with sailors forced to pay up 75,000 gourdes to pass, sometimes to multiple armed groups during one journey); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 16 (Jan. 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (“For example, at ‘checkpoints’ set up by the 400 Mawozo gang in Croix-des-Bouquets, minibus drivers are forced to pay 5,000 gourdes (approximately USD 30) to cross the area, while pickup trucks must pay 1,000 gourdes (approximately USD 7). Some transport companies pay gangs on a weekly basis to avoid having their trucks stop and pay at each checkpoint.”); UNODC, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti* (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs (“Gangs dominate supply chains and extort commerce and humanitarian transport routes, giving them huge power to siphon off Haiti’s resources and destabilize its economy.”); Myriam Lafontant, André Jean Baptiste and Rodeline Celestin, *La Banque mondiale projette une croissance de 2% en 2026 pour Haiti conditionnée à la stabilité sécuritaire*, Gazette Universitaire (Jan. 13, 2026), <https://www.gazetteuniv.com/banque-mondiale-projette-croissance-2-pourcent-haiti-2026-conditionnelle/>; Le Nouvelliste, *\$ 54 millions : revenus mensuels du cabotage entre l’Ouest et le grand Sud, selon Jacques Anderson Desroches* (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/260406/54-millions-revenus-mensuels-du-cabotage-entre-louest-et-le-grand-sud-selon-jacques-anderson-desroches> (armed group extortion along national highways brings in approximately US\$54 million every month); Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, *Ending Haiti’s Criminal Governance Crisis*, Americas Quarterly (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://americasquarterly.org/article/ending-haitis-criminal-governance-crisis/> (“By mid-year, gangs were earning between \$60 million and \$75 million annually from extorting container transports alone, according to the Haitian Ministry of Economy.”); GI-TOC, *From Criminal Governance to Community Fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s Escalating Crisis*, p. 15 (Sep. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/From-criminal-governance-to-community-fragmentation-Addressing-Haitis-escalating-crisis-GI-TOC-September-2025.pdf> (“According to interviews conducted by the GI-TOC, extortion charges imposed on the transport of goods on the routes between Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien now reportedly range between US\$4 500–US\$6 000 per round trip.”); see also Jason Motlagh, *The Last Man Standing in Haiti*, Rolling Stone (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/haiti-jean-ernest-muscadin-1235475798/> (“Uncontested authority over much of the capital and critical roadways lets [armed groups] . . . extract revenue from all economic activity in the areas they control, . . . enabling them to grow their ranks and arsenals, and maintain tight control over their strongholds and any new territory they seize.”) (*internal quotations omitted*).

²⁷⁶ Reginald Surin, *Haiti: Gangs Create One of the World’s First Displacement Economies*, Le Nouvelliste (Sep. 26, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/260307/haiti-gangs-create-one-of-the-worlds-first-displacement-economies> (“The IOM reveals that a large proportion of the displaced come from urban households, including middle-class families owning property and small businesses. Forced exodus creates a massive rotation of assets: houses sold at derisory prices, businesses abandoned,

land occupied by gang-linked networks.”); see also Lucnise Duquereste, *Exode vers le Cap-Haïtien : loyers, nourriture, services... tout augmente*, Ayibopost (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/exode-vers-le-cap-haitien-loyers-nourriture-services-tout-augmente/> (many people have had to leave their jobs after being displaced by armed group violence).

²⁷⁷ See OCHA, *Haiti Key Message Update: Security Gains Remain Limited, No Improvement in Acute Food Insecurity* (Feb. 6, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-key-message-update-security-gains-remain-limited-no-improvement-acute-food-insecurity-january-may-2026>; Gérard Junior Jeanty, *Le CPT et son gouvernement: un bilan économique mitigé*, Le Nouvelliste (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/263982/le-cpt-et-son-gouvernement-un-bilan-economique-mitige>; Marie Alexandra Michel, *In Haiti, as gangs turn life into survival, every day feels like the last* | Opinion, The Haitian Times (Feb. 1, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/02/01/haitian-doctor-living-under-gang-violence/> (travel from Port-au-Prince to Hinche now costs approximately six times as much as it used to because people are forced to take circuitous routes to try to avoid armed groups); Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, The New Humanitarian (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions>, (“Haitian logistics and agriculture entrepreneur Geoffrey Handal said that transporting containers to and from the ports now requires armored vehicles, raising costs by as much as 50%.”); Onz Chéry, *Royal Caribbean’s Haiti cruise suspension leaves hundreds in Labadie jobless*, The Haitian Times (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/01/21/haiti-labadee-cruises-extension-royal-caribbean/> (the Royal Caribbean Group’s suspension of cruises to Haiti due to security concerns “cuts off a major source of income for hundreds of residents in the northern coastal community near Cap-Haïtien, despite the region remaining largely untouched by gang violence common in other parts of the country”); Myriam Lafontant, André Jean Baptiste and Rodeline Celestin, *La Banque mondiale projette une croissance de 2% en 2026 pour Haïti conditionnée à la stabilité sécuritaire*, Gazette Universitaire (Jan. 13, 2026), <https://www.gazetteuniv.com/banque-mondiale-projette-croissance-2-pourcent-haiti-2026-conditionnelle/>; Chadrac Louis, *La route nationale numéro 1 bloquée entre Saint-Marc et l’Estère depuis trois jours* (Dec. 27, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/262871/la-route-nationale-numero-1-bloquee-entre-saint-marc-et-lestere-depuis-trois-jours>; Jason Motlagh, *The Last Man Standing in Haiti*, Rolling Stone (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/haiti-jean-ernest-muscadin-1235475798/> (“Because the highway connecting the southern peninsula to the capital is now blocked by police, businesspeople pay upward of \$3,000 per container to ship cargo by boat a mere 20 miles from Port-au-Prince to Léogâne in the south, a hefty toll that gets passed on to consumers. A bag of cement that sells for \$8 elsewhere in the country might go for double the price, and staples like rice and wheat flour have risen by as much as 30 percent.”); Juhakenson Blaise, *Parents demand promised Haitian government funds to help enroll children in school*, The Haitian Times (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/30/parents-demand-haiti-supports-schools/>; Le Nouvelliste, *\$54 millions: revenus mensuels du cabotage entre l’Ouest et le grand Sud, selon Jacques Anderson Desroches* (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/260406/54-millions-revenus-mensuels-du-cabotage-entre-louest-et-le-grand-sud-selon-jacques-anderson-desroches>; WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, pp. 9, 11 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/>; Kervenson Martial, *Road transport resumes in Haiti’s northwest as gangs ‘tax’ drivers to reach Port-au-Prince*, The Haitian Times (Aug. 2, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/02/road-transport-resumes-in-haitis-northwest-as-gangs-tax-drivers-to-reach-port-au-prince/> (“Business owners report tripling transport costs and are forced to raise prices for everything, including food, fuel and essentials, to cover losses and extortion from gangs.”); IPC, *Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity (September 2025 – June 2026) – Snapshot* (Oct. 10, 2025), https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_AcuteFoodInsec_Sept2025_June2026_Snapshot_English.pdf (“Insecurity . . . is suffocating the Haitian economy. In areas occupied by armed groups, farmers who have managed to carry out their agricultural activities are forced not only to negotiate access to plots of land but also to share their produce. Households that relied on small businesses have been forced to abandon their sources of income and many people have lost their jobs due to the closure of certain businesses located in areas occupied by armed groups.”).

²⁷⁸ The fuel shortage is particularly impactful due to Haiti’s unreliable electric grid, which makes Haitians dependent on fuel for many basic life needs. Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, The New Humanitarian (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions>, (“Gangs controlling roads have caused fuel prices to surge. In some areas, gasoline now costs three times what it once did. . . . We need fuel not just for transport but also for watering our cabbage and cassava. Farming tools and pesticides have doubled in price too.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); Daniella Saint-Louis, *Schoolchildren in Léogâne face daily danger as motorcycle transport fills public transit void*, The Haitian Times (Dec. 31, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/12/31/haiti-leogane-schoolchildren-transportation-risk/> (“As fuel shortages, unreliable infrastructure, insecurity and economic decline push drivers out of business, motorcycle taxis—cheap, fast and widely available—have multiplied, often without licenses, insurance or safety equipment.”); Edxon Francisque, *Fuel blast in Haiti’s Fort-Liberté injures residents, destroys homes amid improper storage and lack of emergency response*, The Haitian Times (Dec. 9, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/12/09/fuel-explosion-fort-liberte-11-injured-homes-destroyed/> (describing how “Haiti’s fuel crisis has reshaped daily life” and turned gasoline “from a commodity into a form of currency,” with the informal fuel market functioning “as a parallel economy;” the result is exorbitant prices and dangerous and illegal fuel storage); UN, *Panel of Experts Report to the UN Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2025/597, ¶ 142 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (“Since March 2025, most trucking companies ferrying commodities between Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien either ceased operations or opted to use the sea route to gain access to the North and neighbouring departments. Notably, petroleum trucking companies transporting fuel to Cap-Haïtien became a major target and were left with only two options: pay heavy extortion fees to gangs in Mirebalais, or pay heavy costs to ferry fuel by sea. In either case, those costs cascaded to the consumer, resulting in higher fuel costs.”); see also Roberson Alphonse, *Seven Months On, Péligré’s Return to Operation Still Not a Leadership Priority*, Le Nouvelliste (Jan. 6, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/263009/seven-months-on-peligres-return-to-operation-still-not-a-leadership-priority> (the continued closure of Haiti’s main hydroelectric plant, which was shut down in May 2025 by civilians protesting the government’s failure to restore security, is forcing businesses and homes that depend on electricity from the plant to either exist in darkness or spend “significant amounts” on fuel).

²⁷⁹ UNICEF, *Humanitarian Action for Children: Haiti* (2025), [https://www.unicef.org/media/165671/file/2025-HAC-Haiti\(1\).pdf](https://www.unicef.org/media/165671/file/2025-HAC-Haiti(1).pdf) (“[A]round 35 per cent of the Haitian population continues to lack access to safe drinking water.”); HRW, *Haiti: Cholera*

Resurgence Threatens Vulnerable Communities (Nov. 5, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/11/05/haiti-cholera-resurgence-threatens-vulnerable-communities> (“In Haiti, only 25 per cent of households have access to adequate handwashing facilities with soap, and 70 percent of people do not have access to an improved sanitation system.”).

²⁸⁰ Public Health Nursing, *Academic Article on Public Health in Haiti* (Feb. 18, 2026), <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phn.70078> (“[W]hile 85% of urban residents had access to improved water sources, only 43% of rural inhabitants benefited from such access.”); see also, e.g., Onz Chéry, *Haiti’s Labadie to hold crucial election for coordination committee president on Dec. 14*, *The Haitian Times* (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/12/10/labadie-important-elections-misery/> (in the town of Labadie, water that is supposed to be potable “remains unsafe”); Fritznel D. Octave, *Thirteen days in Haiti: Quadruplets and collections, shacks and mansions | Part 2*, *The Haitian Times* (Nov. 29, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/29/fritznel-octave-haiti-travel-diary-reporters-notebook-2/> (in Bombardopolis, a commune in the Northwest Department, “[c]lean drinking water remains a daily battle”).

²⁸¹ See BAI report, pp. 4, 5 (Nov. 2025), (the lack of proper water storage facilities in one site “makes the supply irregular and unsustainable, exposing the population to serious health risks related to the lack of drinking water;” in another, water “supplied by the National Directorate for Drinking Water and Sanitation . . . causes abdominal pain”); UNICEF, *Launch of the UNICEF Child Alert on Haiti highlights the growing concern of malnutrition in children* (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/launch-unicef-child-alert-haiti-highlights-growing-concern-malnutrition-children>; UNICEF, *Access to Water Under Threat from Violence in Haiti* (Jul. 6, 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/stories/access-water-under-threat-violence-haiti>.

²⁸² Esther Kimberly Bazile, *Contaminated Drinking Water Now a Daily Reality in Port-au-Prince*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Feb. 2, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/263898/contaminated-drinking-water-now-a-daily-reality-in-port-au-prince> (“Conducted between August 2025 and January 2026, the study focuses on treated and packaged water intended for human consumption. . . . [T]he analyses reveal the presence of the four main indicators of fecal contamination, namely total coliforms, fecal coliforms, fecal streptococci, and *Escherichia coli*. In many cases, several of these bacteria were detected simultaneously in the same sample, thereby increasing the level of health risk for consumers.”).

²⁸³ UNICEF, *Haiti’s Children Confront Polycrisis*, (Oct. 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/child-alert/haitis-children-confront-polycrisis>.

²⁸⁴ HRW, *Haiti: Cholera Resurgence Threatens Vulnerable Communities* (Nov. 5, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/11/05/haiti-cholera-resurgence-threatens-vulnerable-communities>; see also notes 77-79, 330-335.

²⁸⁵ UN News, *UN’s Ban apologizes to people of Haiti, outlines new plan to fight cholera epidemic and help communities* (Dec. 1, 2016), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/12/546732>; IJDH, *Broken UN Promises Lead to Haiti Cholera Resurgence* (Oct. 11, 2022), https://www.ijdh.org/press_release/brokenun-promises-lead-to-haiti-cholera-resurgence/.

²⁸⁶ ASB Haiti, *ASB Haiti Report* (Jan. 26, 2026), <https://asb-haiti.org/en/2026/01/29/3016/>.

²⁸⁷ HaitiClimat, *Accès à l’Eau Potable en Haïti: Défis et Solutions Durables*, <https://haiticlimat.org/acces-a-leau-potable-en-haiti-defis-et-solutions-durables-face-aux-enjeux-climatiques-et-environnementaux/> (noting “poor natural resource management practices” as a primary cause of the lack of adequate access to drinking water); HRW, *Haiti: Cholera Resurgence Threatens Vulnerable Communities* (Nov. 5, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/11/05/haiti-cholera-resurgence-threatens-vulnerable-communities> (noting that “Haiti’s transitional government, with support from international partners, should urgently repair the national water and sewage network”); Cf. Gérard Maxineau, *Blaze at Clugny Market Causes Major Material Losses*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Jan. 26, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/263635/blaze-at-clugny-market-causes-major-material-losses> (after a fire at Clugny market, “[t]ons of waste—mixed with stagnant water and charred debris—are strewn across several sections of this major public market in Cap-Haïtien,” raising public health concerns); Roobens Isma, *Persistent Waste Challenges the Authorities in Pétiion-Ville*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Nov. 5, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/261397/persistent-waste-challenges-the-authorities-in-petion-ville> (“The heaps of garbage [in Pétiion-Ville] are so large that they completely block visibility from both directions. The area perfectly illustrates a broader problem: the inability of local authorities to meet the sanitation needs of an overpopulated town.”).

²⁸⁸ ASB Haiti, *ASB Haiti Report* (Jan. 26, 2026), <https://asb-haiti.org/en/2026/01/29/3016/>; WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, p. 10 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (discussing the lack of safe water as a result of natural disasters and weather extremes); see also UN, *Security Council Press Release SC/16213* (Nov. 6, 2025), <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16213.doc.htm> (“[E]nvironmental damage caused by conflicts continues to push people into hunger, disease and displacement. . . . While climate-conflict pathways are complex, climate change is not infrequently one of the peels of the onion.”) (*internal quotations omitted*).

²⁸⁹ UNICEF, *Haiti’s Children Confront Polycrisis* (Oct. 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/child-alert/haitis-children-confront-polycrisis> (“Water and sanitation infrastructure has collapsed in many displacement sites and areas under the control of armed groups.”); UN, *Security Council Press Release SC/16213* (Nov. 6, 2025), <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16213.doc.htm> (“[I]n Haiti conflict has worsened soil and water contamination in lowland slums.”); see also *The Guardian*, *Haiti: Violence, Climate Disaster, Drought — Haitians Face Converging Crises* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/13/haiti-violence-climate-disaster-drought-haitians-gang-warfare> (cities overwhelmed by people displaced by insecurity “struggle to manage waste collection, water, sanitation and housing”); GI-TOC, *The Weaponization of Displacement by Gangs in Haiti* (Jul. 16, 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/the-weaponization-of-displacement-by-gangs-in-haiti/> (discussing armed groups’ intentional displacement in strategic areas, such as those with water sources).

²⁹⁰ Juhakenson Blaise, *Cholera fears rise in Haiti after Hurricane Melissa flooding*, *The Haitian Times* (Nov. 6, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/06/cholera-outbreak-haiti-hurricane-melissa/> (“[O]fficials say flooding from Hurricane Melissa contaminated water sources and sharply increased the risk of a wider [cholera] outbreak — particularly in areas like Pétiion-Ville, where more than 130 suspected cases, including 20 confirmed and five deaths, were recorded in a single week last month.”);

WHO, *WHO Health Emergency Appeal for Haiti 2026* (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-who-health-emergency-appeal-2026>; PAHO, *PAHO Situation Report No. 5: Regional Response to Hurricane Melissa (December 4, 2025)*, p. 1 (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.paho.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/ops-sitrep5-regional-melissa-4dec.pdf>; AP, *Hurricane Melissa Strikes Haiti and Jamaica* (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/melissa-haiti-jamaica-hurricane-storm-caribbean-bbc009020e6a2a8150ccec5b6370833>.

²⁹¹ PAHO, *PAHO Situation Report No. 5: Regional Response to Hurricane Melissa (December 4, 2025)*, p. 15 (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.paho.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/ops-sitrep5-regional-melissa-4dec.pdf>; PAHO, *PAHO Health Cluster Situation Report No. 25* (Sep. 6, 2025), <https://www.paho.org/en/documents/paho-health-cluster-situation-report-no25-humanitarian-situation-haiti-6-september-2025>; UNICEF, *Access to Water Under Threat from Violence in Haiti* (Jul. 6, 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/stories/access-water-under-threat-violence-haiti>.

²⁹² WFP, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point; Haiti Country Report*, p. 5 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/>.

²⁹³ Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, *The New Humanitarian* (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions>; Gérard Junior Jeanty, *Le CPT et son gouvernement: un bilan économique mitigé*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/263982/le-cpt-et-son-gouvernement-un-bilan-economique-mitige>; WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, p. 9 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (“[Haiti’s] food security crisis is protracted, and food insecurity numbers have risen every year since 2018.”).

²⁹⁴ OCHA, *Haiti: Crisis Numbers (16 February 2026)* (Feb. 16, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-crisis-numbers-16-february-2026>; IPC, *Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity (September 2025 – June 2026) – Snapshot* (Oct. 10, 2025), https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_AcuteFoodInsec_Sept2025_June2026_Snapshot_English.pdf.

²⁹⁵ IPC, *Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity (September 2025 – June 2026) – Snapshot* (Oct. 10, 2025), https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_AcuteFoodInsec_Sept2025_June2026_Snapshot_English.pdf (the number of people experiencing emergency levels of food insecurity is also projected to rise again, to 2 million).

²⁹⁶ Compare IPC, *Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity (September 2025 – June 2026) – Snapshot* (Oct. 10, 2025), https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_AcuteFoodInsec_Sept2025_June2026_Snapshot_English.pdf (reporting 1.9 million people facing emergency-level food insecurity and zero people facing famine as of writing) with IPC, *Haiti: Acute Food Insecurity (March – June 2025)* (Apr. 14, 2025), https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Haiti_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Mar_Jun2025_Report_French.pdf (reporting 2.1 million people facing emergency-level food insecurity and 8,400 people experiencing famine as of June 2025).

²⁹⁷ IOM, *Haiti: Résultats Clés des Analyses Comparatives des Besoins Multisectoriels des Populations*, p. 7 (Feb. 12, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/reports/haiti-resultats-cles-des-analyses-comparatives-des-besoins-multisectoriels-des-populations?close=true> (“The majority of households suffer from hunger, but the displaced in sites are the most severely affected: they are more likely to face a lack of food, to go to bed without eating and to spend entire days fasting. . . . Nearly half of households in sites . . . resorted to begging, exposing women and girls to critical protection risks. More than one in ten households in sites . . . reported engaging in illegal or dangerous activities to access food. Withdrawing children from school to direct spending towards food is also more common in sites.”); Oritro Karim, *UNICEF Calls for Global Support to Protect Displaced and Starving Children in Haiti*, UNICEF (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://www.globalissues.org/news/2025/10/14/41322>; AP News, *Haiti pledges quick response as report finds almost 6M Haitians face hunger crisis, deportations to Haiti worsen situation*, *The Haitian Times* (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/10/14/haiti-hunger-response-report/> (“Among the areas most affected by hunger are makeshift shelters, impoverished communities in Port-au-Prince and Haiti’s northwest and central regions.”); WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, pp. 9, 11, 21-22 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (“In the MA-PAP, IDPs face significantly higher levels of acute food insecurity than resident households with nearly half (49 percent) having poor food consumption . . . and 57 percent suffering from severe hunger. . . . Among residents, the prevalence is still high at 32 percent with poor FCS [Food Consumption Score] and 39 percent suffering from severe hunger, but lower than among IDPs;” WFP further reported that funding cuts have limited the organizations ability to “reduce the share of beneficiaries resorting to emergency coping strategies,” which include “pulling children out of school . . . selling productive assets or engaging in high -risk work.”); see also WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, p. 23 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (“The suspension of hot meals [in displacement sites] has removed a key stabilizing factor, with community leaders warning of increased violence, theft and exploitation.”).

²⁹⁸ Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, *The New Humanitarian* (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions>, (“The youngest are among the hardest hit. More than 1.2 million children under five live in areas gripped by severe hunger. Women and displaced families bear a disproportionate burden. . . . Some children require physiotherapy to rebuild muscle lost to hunger. Others must learn how to chew.”); see also Section V.

²⁹⁹ WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, p. 9 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (noting that this is the case particularly “low-access areas of the capita”); see also Oritro Karim, *UNICEF Calls for Global Support to Protect Displaced and Starving Children in Haiti*, UNICEF (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://www.globalissues.org/news/2025/10/14/41322>, (“This year, an estimated 288,544 children under the age of five are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition.”).

³⁰⁰ Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, *The New Humanitarian* (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions> (Wilfred Nkwambi, the WFP’s head of programmes in Haiti: “There are many interconnected factors: high inflation, repeated natural disasters. But the most significant is insecurity linked to armed conflict.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); Oritro Karim, *UNICEF Calls for Global Support to Protect Displaced and Starving Children in*

Haiti, UNICEF (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://www.globalissues.org/news/2025/10/14/41322> (“The worsening hunger crisis is largely driven by soaring staple food prices, which have made basic items unaffordable for most families, forcing many to skip meals or rely on nutrient-poor diets.”); WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, p. 9 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (“The primary driver of acute food insecurity is widespread violence, which has led to the closure of markets, caused mass displacement, severely disrupted livelihoods, limited movement of people and essential goods, prevented access to fields for cultivation, and destroyed crops and cattle.”); see also note 270.

³⁰¹ OCHA, *Haiti Key Message Update: Security Gains Remain Limited, No Improvement in Acute Food Insecurity* (Feb. 6, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-key-message-update-security-gains-remain-limited-no-improvement-acute-food-insecurity-january-may-2026> (“In several areas including Lower Artibonite, Lower Plateau, and the West (particularly Montrouis, Arcahaie, and ZMPP), lack of regular access to farmland, inputs, and markets due to insecurity has reduced area planted for the winter season, limiting production potential.”); Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, *The New Humanitarian* (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions> (noting the impact of attacks in the Center and Artibonite Departments – the latter of which produces up to 80% of Haiti’s rice – and the commune of Kenscoff – Port-au-Prince’s “breadbasket” – on agricultural production); Roobens Isma, *Gangs Methodically Devastate Agriculture in L’Estère*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Nov. 5, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/261441/gangs-methodically-devastate-agriculture-in-lestere> (in L’Estère, “bandits have been systematically destroying the commune’s agricultural infrastructure and harvests”); Jérôme Wendy Norestyl & Wethzer Piercin, *Artibonite: Rice Farmers Lose Everything as Gangs Torch Rice Plantations*, *Ayibopost* (Nov. 1, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/gangs-set-fire-to-grain-depots-and-agricultural-plantations-in-artibonite/> (a journalist and agricultural technician describing multiple attacks in Liancourt since November 2024 that have forced farmers to “abandon[] their plantations, grain depots, and homes” said that “[g]angs destroyed plantations, looted or burned several depots” and “used sacks of rice and corn to build barricades in the streets”) (*internal quotations omitted*); Juhakenson Blaise, *We’ve seen this movie before: Turgeau residents warn authorities as gangs surge into central Port-au-Prince*, *The Haitian Times* (Oct. 23, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/10/23/haiti-turgeau-gang-advance> (“Videos circulating on social media show gangs from Savien setting plantations ablaze [in Liancourt, Bélanger and Verrettes] — a devastating blow to farmers in Haiti’s main rice-producing region.”); WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, pp. 9, 10 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (insecurity in the Artibonite Department “had led to the abandonment of around 2 200 hectares, i.e., 7.4 percent of the department’s cropland,” and in the Center Department “600 hectares have been lost, representing 5.5 percent of all cropland area in the department”); see also WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, p. 11 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (“Agriculture – once key to livelihoods – has declined steadily, worsening the availability of local food and eroding households’ incomes.”).

³⁰² Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, *The New Humanitarian* (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions> (“Our farmers’ produce is stuck and rotting,” said Sélanie Apparézon of KOSIAH, a citizens’ organisation working with farming communities in Hinche – a commune in central Haiti – that once relied on sales in the capital. “Port-au-Prince was our lifeline. . . . But for three years, we haven’t been able to reach it.”); AP News, *Haiti pledges quick response as report finds almost 6M Haitians face hunger crisis, deportations to Haiti worsen situation*, *The Haitian Times* (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/10/14/haiti-hunger-response-report/> (“[W]hile the harvest of corn, bean, rice and tubers is estimated to be close to normal this year, few of those goods reach Port-au-Prince because gangs control the main roads going in and out of the capital.”).

³⁰³ See, e.g., OCHA, *Haiti Key Message Update: Security Gains Remain Limited, No Improvement in Acute Food Insecurity* (Feb. 6, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-key-message-update-security-gains-remain-limited-no-improvement-acute-food-insecurity-january-may-2026>; BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, pp. 6-7 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28July%20%E2%80%93%20September%202025%29.pdf> (describing an attack on a boat carrying Madan Sara traders that killed 2 people and injured 13); Blaise, *At Nègès Mawon’s 8th festival, women question their absence in Haiti’s power structure | PHOTOS*, *The Haitian Times* (Jul. 19, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/07/19/womens-impact-in-haiti-politics-neges-mawon-8th-festival/> (“Madan Sara can no longer safely come to the capital to sell. Many are raped, robbed, or killed by gangs.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶ 12 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420> (Madan Sara sometimes have to buy up to 20% of the value of their goods at armed group checkpoints in order to reach the market).

³⁰⁴ WFP, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point; Haiti Country Report*, p. 11 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/>.

³⁰⁵ Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, *The New Humanitarian* (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions>, (“At Petit Cœur de Jésus School in the Port-au-Prince neighbourhood of Solino, principal François Onel explained how food is the weapon used by gangs to recruit children. . . . It is the children themselves, some as young as seven, who go looking for it. . . . Their parents leave early to find work in the city: carrying bags, selling small items, taking whatever odd jobs they can. The children go the whole day without eating, [some girls] sell their bodies to survive. Just down the road, at a gang base near the school, three dozen young armed men sit in shifts, day and night. Cooks deliver large buckets of food: big breakfasts, lunches, dinners. Barefoot children linger near the base, sitting or lying on the ground. The armed men are their neighbours. . . . Will they eat without giving something to the children? Of course not. When the armed men finish eating, they pass on the leftovers. . . . The children eat. In exchange, they run errands. Hold a gun. Fetch drinks. After a while . . . they are no longer just hanging around – they are gang members.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); see also notes 235-250.

³⁰⁶ World Bank Group, *Transforming Haiti’s Landscapes into Engines of Food Security* (Oct. 22, 2025), <https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2025/10/22/transforming-haiti-s-landscapes-into-engines-of-food-security>, (explaining

how “chronic under-investment and poor resource management degraded the productive base” for agriculture, while “unsustainable farming, driven by land pressure, low education, and economic hardship, combined with natural disasters’ shocks, severely degraded watersheds and accelerated [*sic*] deforestation”).

³⁰⁷ WFP, *Haiti Seasonal Monitoring (November–December 2025)* (Jan. 26, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-seasonal-monitoring-wfp-haiti-november-december-2025> (moderate to severe droughts in the southern and western departments in November and December 2025 resulting in deteriorated crop conditions); AP, *Hurricane Melissa Kills Dozens in Haiti* (Nov. 16, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/hurricane-melissa-haiti-petit-goave-killed-funeral-586600389b1491108efe3d670b58f36f> (“Petit-Goâve used to be a farming community with a bustling commercial center that saw 90% of its fields washed away in the [Hurricane Melissa] storm.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); The Guardian, *Haiti: Violence, Climate Disaster, Drought — Haitians Face Converging Crises* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/13/haiti-violence-climate-disaster-drought-haitians-gang-warfare> (“Haiti ranks among the most climate-vulnerable countries, with longer droughts, violent floods, erratic seasons and devastating hurricanes. The Artibonite plain and Central plateau in the middle of the country crack under the heat. Three consecutive failed harvests have emptied the granaries.”); World Bank Group, *Transforming Haiti’s Landscapes into Engines of Food Security* (Oct. 22, 2025), <https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2025/10/22/transforming-haiti-s-landscapes-into-engines-of-food-security>; FSIN, *Global Report on Food Crises* (Oct. 2025), <https://www.fightfoodcrises.net/sites/default/files/resource/file/CD7310EN.pdf> (“Dry conditions between May and July reduced yields of the main season maize and paddy crops. . . . The acute food security situation is projected to be further exacerbated by heavy rains and floods caused by Hurricane Melissa.”); WFP, *Haiti: Country Brief*, p. 10 (Sep. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/>.

³⁰⁸ Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, The New Humanitarian (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions>, (discussing the long-term impact of cheap U.S. rice imports and harmful foreign aid on Haiti’s food sovereignty). For an extensive overview of related dynamics, see Columbia Human Rights Law Review, *Starved for Justice: International Complicity in Systematic Violations of the Right to Food in Haiti* (May 10, 2022), <https://hrlr.law.columbia.edu/hrlr-online/starved-for-justice-international-complicity-in-systematic-violations-of-the-right-to-food-in-haiti/>.

³⁰⁹ IRC, *Haiti’s gang violence crisis: What to know and how to help* (Jan. 12, 2026), <https://www.rescue.org/article/haitis-gang-violence-crisis-what-know-and-how-help> (“By the end of 2025, only 24% of the necessary funding [for Haiti’s 2025 humanitarian response plan] had been secured, meaning that 1.7 million could be left without critical humanitarian services, including food aid, health care and protection services.”); The Haitian Times, *Haiti among six countries hit hardest as UN says donor cuts severely limit food aid* (Oct. 15, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/10/15/haiti-un-wfp-donor-cuts-hunger-crisis/> (“Nearly 14 million people could face emergency levels of hunger as the [WFP] agency’s funding drops 40% from last year, with Haiti among the countries at greatest risk.”); see also Section VIII.

³¹⁰ Juhakenson Blaise, *Nonprofits NPH and St. Luke Foundation shut down hospitals over staff kidnapping in Kenscoff*, The Haitian Times (Aug. 5, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/05/kenscoff-hospital-shutdown-gang-kidnapping/> (“Medical professionals and patients have increasingly become targets in Haiti’s escalating conflict, which continues to force closures of humanitarian and social services.”); Jacqueline Charles & Ychmuth Corneille, *Residents in rural Haiti town staying away amid calls to return after gang attack*, Miami Herald (Sep. 21, 2025), [miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312199453.html](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312199453.html) (during an attack in the town of Bassin-Bleu in the Northwest Department, “gunmen stormed the hospital”); see also Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, *Haiti* (Nov. 14, 2025), <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/haiti/>, (“[T]argeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, including . . . medical facilities . . . has increased.”).

³¹¹ See Daniela Mohor, *Haiti in-depth: The new Gang Suppression Force and what it means for Haitians*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti>, (according to the head of MSF in Haiti, the security forces’ increased use of drones in civilian areas “makes us fear that there are no rules anymore, that the minimal respect for civilians, be it citizens, humanitarian workers, or hospitals [no longer exists]”) (*internal quotations omitted*); see also notes 137-138.

³¹² Catiana Dorilien and Clara Aleida Prada Sanabria, *The healthcare system in Haiti*, *Frontiers in Public Health* (Dec. 16, 2025), <https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/public-health/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2025.1603076/full>; MSF, *Port-au-Prince: Over 100 patients admitted in just two weeks as violence escalates* (Jan. 22, 2026), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/port-au-prince-over-100-patients-admitted-just-two-weeks-violence-escalates> (“Many medical facilities in the capital are closed or only partially functional, and some have been attacked or looted by armed groups.”); Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti police raids trigger deadly gang clashes, cutting off medical care in Port-au-Prince*, Miami Herald (Jan. 9, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314253147.html>; Juhakenson Blaise, *Cholera fears rise in Haiti after Hurricane Melissa flooding*, The Haitian Times (Nov. 6, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/06/cholera-outbreak-haiti-hurricane-melissa/> (“More than 30 healthcare facilities have stopped operating due to vandalism, fires, or gang attacks.”); Juhakenson Blaise, *Doctors Without Borders forced to shut another hospital, after months of attacks*, The Haitian Times (Oct. 16, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/10/16/doctors-without-borders-closes-turgeon-center-haiti/>; see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 15 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20%20E2%80%93%20september%202025%29.pdf> (“The population, particularly those living in the neighbourhoods most affected by violence, continues to face numerous obstacles in accessing healthcare and other essential services. . . . Violence and attacks on infrastructure, combined with the lack of safe transport, high medical costs and the limited capacity of the health system, represent major barriers preventing people from accessing basic services.”).

³¹³ OCHA, *Haiti: Crisis Numbers* (Feb. 16, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-crisis-numbers-16-february-2026>; see also OHCHR, *Children Trafficked by Gangs: Rethinking Responses*, p. 11 (Feb. 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/children-trafficked-by-gangs-rethinking-responses-en.pdf> (“[O]nly 5 per cent of the 93 health facilities assessed in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince were fully operational.”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 15 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20-%28july%20-%20september%202025%29.pdf> (“Fewer than one third of health facilities with inpatient capacity remain fully operational.”); UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Child Alert: The polycrisis for children in Haiti* (Oct. 2025) <https://www.unicef.org/media/174956/file/UNICEF%20Haiti%20Child%20Alert%20EN.pdf.pdf> (“Only 41 per cent of health facilities in the Metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince remain fully functional.”).

³¹⁴ The State University Hospital, Haiti’s largest public hospital, closed in March 2024 due to repeated attacks and looting, and remains closed after armed groups attacked the hospital’s planned reopening in December 2024. The Bernard Mevs Hospital, Haiti’s only neurological trauma center, has been closed since armed groups set the hospital on fire and destroyed equipment worth millions of dollars in December 2024. The University Hospital of Mirebalais closed in April 2025 after an armed group attack that forced patients and staff to evacuate. Juhakenson Blaise, *Doctors Without Borders forced to shut another hospital, after months of attacks*, *The Haitian Times* (Oct. 16, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/10/16/doctors-without-borders-closes-turgeonau-center-haiti/>; see also IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, p. 11 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>.

³¹⁵ MSF, *MSF announces permanent closure of our Turgeau emergency centre in Port-au-Prince* (Oct. 15, 2025), <https://www.msf.org/msf-announces-permanent-closure-our-turgeonau-emergency-centre-port-au-prince>; Juhakenson Blaise, *Doctors Without Borders forced to shut another hospital, after months of attacks*, *The Haitian Times* (Oct. 16, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/10/16/doctors-without-borders-closes-turgeonau-center-haiti/> (calling the closure “another blow to Haiti’s collapsing healthcare system”); see also IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, p. 11 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf> (MSF had suspended operations at its Turgeau facility following an incident in March 2025 when police reportedly deliberately targeted MSF vehicles evacuating staff from the facility).

³¹⁶ MSF, *Civilians Must Be Protected: Violence Forces Suspension of Activities in Bel Air, Haiti* (Jan. 8, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/civilians-must-be-protected-violence-forces-suspension-activities-bel-air-haiti> (“On Tuesday 6 January, the former school building used for MSF’s medical activities became a battlefield, amid intense fighting between an armed group and the PNH. Seven community volunteers were trapped there for several hours before managing to escape.”).

³¹⁷ Juhakenson Blaise, *Nonprofits resume Haiti’s hospital services after 8 people kidnapped by gangs freed*, *The Haitian Times* (Sep. 4, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/04/st-damien-st-luke-hospitals-reopen-after-hostages-freed/> (the hospitals reopened on August 29 after the hostages were released); Juhakenson Blaise, *Nonprofits NPH and St. Luke Foundation shut down hospitals over staff kidnapping in Kenscoff*, *The Haitian Times* (Aug. 5, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/05/kenscoff-hospital-shutdown-gang-kidnapping/>.

³¹⁸ MSF, *Port-au-Prince: Over 100 patients admitted in just two weeks as violence escalates* (Jan. 22, 2026), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/port-au-prince-over-100-patients-admitted-just-two-weeks-violence-escalates>, (“Despite the severe constraints people face while trying to access care, MSF has recorded a marked increase in violence-related admissions at our Drouillard Hospital.”); Fenel Pélissier et al., *Pourquoi la police n’arrive-t-elle pas à stopper les gangs dans l’Artibonite*, *Ayibopost* (Dec. 6, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pourquoi-la-police-narrive-t-elle-pas-a-stopper-les-gangs-dans-lartibonite/> (“[S]ince the forced closure of the Mirebalais University Hospital in April 2025, Saint-Nicolas Hospital — the only facility serving the population of Lower Artibonite, the Central Plateau, Archaie and Cabaret — is suffering even more from the pressure caused by the escalation of armed violence.”); Juhakenson Blaise, *Nonprofits resume Haiti’s hospital services after 8 people kidnapped by gangs freed*, *The Haitian Times* (Sep. 04, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/04/st-damien-st-luke-hospitals-reopen-after-hostages-freed/> (the temporary closure of St. Damien Pediatric and St. Luke Hospitals “added strain to a healthcare system where more than 20 facilities are already shut down or vandalized due to gang violence”); see also PAHO, *WHO Health Emergency Appeal for Haiti 2025*, <https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/documents/emergencies/2025-appeals/2025-hea-haiti.pdf> (“According to the UN, two in five Haitians urgently need medical care.”).

³¹⁹ See Marie Alexandra Michel, *In Haiti, as gangs turn life into survival, every day feels like the last | Opinion*, *The Haitian Times* (Feb. 1, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/02/01/haitian-doctor-living-under-gang-violence/> (“Patients are dying not because their illnesses are untreatable, but because they cannot reach a hospital.”); MSF, *Port-au-Prince: Over 100 patients admitted in just two weeks as violence escalates* (Jan. 22, 2026), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/port-au-prince-over-100-patients-admitted-just-two-weeks-violence-escalates> (“Surviving violence is only the first step for injured patients in Port-au-Prince, who must also cross long barricades, navigate blocked roads, and pass through neighborhoods under fire to reach one of the few hospitals still operational.”); see also MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti*, p. 16 (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (survivors of sexual violence seeking medical care “often must enter hostile territory where they risk being attacked again” or pass by civilian or police barricades, where having an ID that shows they live in an area controlled by armed groups may put them at risk of violence).

³²⁰ Jacqueline Charles, *‘Explosion of violence’: Medical charity calls for action as Haiti’s rape crisis soars*, *Miami Herald* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314483437.html>; PAHO, *WHO Health Emergency Appeal for Haiti 2025*, <https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/documents/emergencies/2025-appeals/2025-hea-haiti.pdf>; UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Child Alert: The polycrisis for children in Haiti* (Oct. 2025) <https://www.unicef.org/media/174956/file/UNICEF%20Haiti%20Child%20Alert%20EN.pdf.pdf>; see also Direct Relief, *Despite Challenges in Haiti, Local Groups Work Together to Keep Health Services Going* (Oct. 6, 2025), <https://www.directrelief.org/2025/10/despite-challenges-in-haiti-local-groups-work-together-to-keep-health-services-going/> (“Barbara Campbell, executive director of the Dalton Foundation, said that the ability to purchase medication in Haiti has

drastically reduced since the start of the conflict and has only gotten worse over time. The foundation has imported donated medications, but there is a high tax on imports. Campbell said that the ambiguity of customs charges has made it more difficult to import medications, especially those that need to be used quickly or require cold chain storage.”); notes 228-231.

³²¹ MSF, *Port-au-Prince: Over 100 patients admitted in just two weeks as violence escalates* (Jan. 22, 2026), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/port-au-prince-over-100-patients-admitted-just-two-weeks-violence-escalates>, (“Only one public hospital with surgical capacity remains open, while most others are private and largely inaccessible to the most vulnerable people in the city.”); Catiana Dorilien and Clara Aleida Prada Sanabria, *The healthcare system in Haiti*, *Frontiers in Public Health* (Dec. 16, 2025), <https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/public-health/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2025.1603076/full> (“The predominance of the private sector, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in the healthcare system further exacerbates inequalities, particularly in access to services. . . . This not only limits access for low-income populations but also leaves those living in rural areas without access to basic healthcare services.”).

³²² Jacqueline Charles, ‘*Explosion of violence*’: *Medical charity calls for action as Haiti’s rape crisis soars*, *Miami Herald* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314483437.html> (reporting “critical shortages of . . . staff” in hospitals across Port-au-Prince); UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Child Alert: The polycrisis for children in Haiti* (Oct. 2025), <https://www.unicef.org/media/174956/file/UNICEF%20Haiti%20Child%20Alert%20EN.pdf.pdf> (“In many parts of Port-au-Prince, women give birth without trained personnel.”); Direct Relief, *Despite Challenges in Haiti, Local Groups Work Together to Keep Health Services Going* (Oct. 6, 2025), <https://www.directrelief.org/2025/10/despite-challenges-in-haiti-local-groups-work-together-to-keep-health-services-going/> (“[M]ore than 60% of medical staff in Port-au-Prince have fled the country, resulting in diminished access to care and medication for residents.”); see also Jacqueline Charles, *Haiti healthcare system braces for bad news as money dries up, cholera cases rise*, *Miami Herald* (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312312475.html> (“Thousands of workers in Haiti’s public healthcare system are at risk of losing their jobs as international funding dries up and gang violence escalates.”).

³²³ Catiana Dorilien and Clara Aleida Prada Sanabria, *The healthcare system in Haiti*, *Frontiers in Public Health* (Dec. 16, 2025), <https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/public-health/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2025.1603076/full> (“The Haitian healthcare system is characterized by numerous challenges, including a strong dependence on external aid, inequalities in access to primary care, insufficient infrastructure, and limited public funding, which undermine the goal of universal health coverage in the country. . . . Only 19.28% of the population has access to Primary Health Care, highlighting limited basic services, especially in remote areas.”); UNFPA, *“A Point of No Return”: Urgent Call to Support Women and Girls in Haiti* (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://www.unfpa.org/news/%E2%80%9Cpoint-no-return%E2%80%9D-urgent-call-support-women-and-girls-haiti> (“The health system is all but depleted after years of crisis, conflict, looting and financial collapse, and as severe hunger rises to catastrophic levels, the UN has warned the crisis risks ‘reaching a point of no return.’”); see also David C. Adams and Frances Robles, *After \$30 Million in U.S. Aid, Haiti’s Biggest Hospital Goes up in Smoke*, *The New York Times* (Mar. 15, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/15/us/haiti-hospital-fire-usaid.html?unlocked_article_code=1.4U4.6Jv.08j11WIj9iQ&smid=url-share. The dependence on foreign assistance makes Haiti’s healthcare sector vulnerable to foreign funding cuts. See Section VIII.

³²⁴ Juhakenson Blaise, *Seminarian’s suicide troubles Haiti’s Catholic Church, exposes toll of overlapping crises*, *The Haitian Times* (Aug. 13, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/13/seminarian-suicide-shocks-haiti-church/>; IOM, *Haiti: Résultats Clés des Analyses Comparatives des Besoins Multisectoriels des Populations*, p. 6 (Feb. 12, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/reports/haiti-resultats-cles-des-analyses-comparatives-des-besoins-multisectoriels-des-populations?close=true> (finding particularly high levels of fear and anxiety related to the experience of being displaced); RNDDH, *Sites for Internally Displaced Persons: The RNDDH Urges the Haitian State to Act*, ¶ 49 (Jan. 12, 2026), <https://web.rnddh.org/sites-for-internally-displaced-persons-the-rnddh-urges-the-haitian-state-to-put-an-end-to-this-situation/?lang=en> (reporting that many IDPs “experience depression and exhibit suicidal behavior”).

³²⁵ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 15 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (children who are exploited and recruited by armed groups “are forced to take part in violent activities, including kidnappings and killings, which, while directly involving them in criminal acts, expose them from a very young age to repeated violence likely to result in severe long-term trauma”); Chatham House, *The UN’s New Force Won’t Save Haiti from the Gangs* (Dec. 15, 2025), <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2025-12/uns-new-force-wont-save-haiti-gangs>; see also notes 235-250.

³²⁶ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 15 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf; Jacqueline Charles, ‘*Explosion of violence*’: *Medical charity calls for action as Haiti’s rape crisis soars*, *Miami Herald* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314483437.html> (“Survivors grapple with shame and social stigma while facing limited access to medical care, scarce mental-health counseling and a severe shortage of emergency shelters.”); see also Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, *The New Humanitarian* (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions> (increasingly, “mothers need trauma therapy to take care of their children;” according to one nurse, roughly one-third of the women in her ward were “traumatized to attend to their children’s needs,” and “[m]ost are believed to have survived sexual violence”); Section V.

³²⁷ See Edxon Francisque, *Young man kills father in Haiti’s northeast amid deepening mental health crisis*, *The Haitian Times* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/13/haiti-mental-health-challenges/> (“The case illustrates Haiti’s critical shortage of mental health services. According to the World Health Organization, just a handful of psychiatrists serve the

country's population of more than 11 million. With care often inaccessible or unaffordable, families frequently turn to religious or spiritual explanations.”)

³²⁸ Juhakenson Blaise, *Seminarian's suicide troubles Haiti's Catholic Church, exposes toll of overlapping crises*, The Haitian Times (Aug. 13, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/13/seminarian-suicide-shocks-haiti-church/> (“The nation’s mental health system is nearly collapsed. The Mars and Kline Psychiatry Center — the last remaining mental health hospital after Beudet’s closure — ceased operations last year.”); MSF, *Report: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-port-au-prince> (describing the lack of access to mental health support for survivors of sexual violence).

³²⁹ See, e.g., RNDDH, *Sites for Internally Displaced Persons: The RNDDH Urges the Haitian State to Act*, ¶ 49 (Jan. 12, 2026), <https://web.rnddh.org/sites-for-internally-displaced-persons-the-rnddh-urges-the-haitian-state-to-put-an-end-to-this-situation/?lang=en> (“For example, during the year 2025, at least three (3) suicides and seven (7) suicide attempts were recorded at the site of the former premises of the General Directorate of the Haitian National Police.”); Edxon Francisque, *Young man kills father in Haiti's northeast amid deepening mental health crisis*, The Haitian Times (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/13/haiti-mental-health-challenges/>; Juhakenson Blaise, *Seminarian's suicide troubles Haiti's Catholic Church, exposes toll of overlapping crises*, The Haitian Times (Aug. 13, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/13/seminarian-suicide-shocks-haiti-church/>.

³³⁰ UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Humanitarian Situation Report No. 8 (31 December 2025)* (Jan. 23, 2026), https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/unicef-haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-no-8-31-december-2025?_gl=1*1g7yucv*_ga*NTE1Nzg0OTE3LjE3NzE2OTQ5MDc.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*_czE3NzIzMTU5MzkkbzYkZzEkdDE3NzIzMTY0MTQkajYwJGwwJGgw (reporting 3,664 suspected cases in 2025); OCHA, *Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan: Executive Summary*, p. 3 (Dec. 19, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-2026-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-executive-summary-december-2025> (reporting 4,309 suspected cases in 2025); see also WHO, *WHO Health Emergency Appeal for Haiti 2026*, p. 1 (Feb. 4, 2026), https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-who-health-emergency-appeal-2026?_gl=1*19npj7q*_ga*NTE1Nzg0OTE3LjE3NzE2OTQ5MDc.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*_czE3NzIzMTU5MzkkbzYkZzEkdDE3NzIzMTYzODkajE5JGwwJGgw (reporting “nearly 4000 suspected cases as of November 8” and noting that “without sustained funding, there is risk of resurgence in 2026”); OCHA, *Today's top news: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti* (Oct. 20, 2025), <https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-occupied-palestinian-territory-sudan-democratic-republic-congo-haiti-0> (OCHA warned of a resurgence in October 2025).

³³¹ HRW, *Haiti: Cholera Resurgence Threatens Vulnerable Communities* (Nov. 5, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/11/05/haiti-cholera-resurgence-threatens-vulnerable-communities>; IJDH, *Press Release on Cholera* (Oct. 11, 2022), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Cholera-Press-Release-2022-EN.pdf>.

³³² HRW, *Haiti: Cholera Resurgence Threatens Vulnerable Communities* (Nov. 5, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/11/05/haiti-cholera-resurgence-threatens-vulnerable-communities>; see also OCHA, *Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan: Executive Summary*, p. 3 (Dec. 19, 2025), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-2026-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-executive-summary-december-2025> (noting that the increase in cases in 2025 “heightened public health risks, particularly in areas with limited access to safe water and sanitation”).

³³³ See Juhakenson Blaise, *Cholera fears rise in Haiti after Hurricane Melissa flooding*, The Haitian Times (Nov. 6, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/06/cholera-outbreak-haiti-hurricane-melissa/> (“[O]fficials say flooding from Hurricane Melissa contaminated water sources and sharply increased the risk of a wider outbreak — particularly in areas like Pétion-Ville, where more than 130 suspected cases, including 20 confirmed and five deaths, were recorded in a single week last month.”); AP, *Hurricane Melissa Kills Dozens in Haiti* (Nov. 16, 2025), <https://apnews.com/article/hurricane-melissa-haiti-petit-goave-killed-funeral-586600389b1491108efe3d670b58f36> (“More than 30 suspected cholera cases and six deaths have been reported in Petit-Goâve alone.”); Haitian Government, *Communiqué: Recrudescence du Choléra et les Risques d'Épidémies Post-Ouragan* (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://communication.gouv.ht/communiqués/le-gouvernement-fait-le-point-sur-la-recrudescence-du-cholera-et-les-risques-depidemies-post-ouragan/>.

³³⁴ WHO, *WHO Health Emergency Appeal for Haiti 2026*, p. 1 (Feb. 4, 2026), https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-who-health-emergency-appeal-2026?_gl=1*19npj7q*_ga*NTE1Nzg0OTE3LjE3NzE2OTQ5MDc.*_ga_E60ZNX2F68*_czE3NzIzMTU5MzkkbzYkZzEkdDE3NzIzMTYzODkajE5JGwwJGgw (the majority of suspected cases in 2025 were in the West Department and IDP sites).

³³⁵ PAHO, *Regional Situation Report - Hurricane Season 2025*, p. 15 (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.paho.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/ops-sitrep5-regional-melissa-4dec.pdf>; see also Juhakenson Blaise, *Cholera fears rise in Haiti after Hurricane Melissa flooding*, The Haitian Times (Nov. 6, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/06/cholera-outbreak-haiti-hurricane-melissa/> (many of the hospitals that were forced to close due to insecurity “previously provided critical medical support for monitoring and treating epidemics”).

³³⁶ Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, *Haiti* (Nov. 14, 2025), <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/haiti/> (“[T]argeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, including schools . . . has increased.”); see also, e.g., BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 16 (Jan. 30, 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (“at least two schools located in Turgeau (Port-au-Prince), were ransacked, set on fire, or destroyed by gangs” between October and December 2025).

³³⁷ The number of schools being used as displacement sites has risen to 80 as of November 2025. Compare IOM, *Haiti: Update on the Displacement Situation at Spontaneous Sites (November 2025)*, p. 3 (Nov. 2025), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-update-displacement-situation-spontaneous-sites-november-2025?close=true> with IOM, *Haiti: Displacement Situation – Round 10 (June 2025)*, p. 18 (Jun. 2025), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-displacement-situation-haiti-round-10-june-2025> (reporting 75 in

June 2025); see also Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, The New Humanitarian (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions>; UN Security Council 9988th Meeting, *Amid Relentless Armed Violence, Collapsing Schools, Hospitals, Haiti Facing 'Perfect Storm of Suffering', Secretary-General Warns Security Council* (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16158.doc.htm> (“Schools, once sanctuaries, have become minefields, . . . with classrooms destroyed or turned into shelters for displaced families.”) (*internal quotations omitted*).

³³⁸ Gallardo Honoré, ‘Do not give up on children’: Displaced by violence, a Haitian girl finds hope at school, UN News (Jan. 3, 2026), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166695> (also noting that “dozens [are] occupied by armed groups”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 14 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20%E2%80%93%20september%202025%29.pdf>; Juhakenson Blaise, *Parents demand promised Haitian government funds to help enroll children in school*, The Haitian Times (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/30/parents-demand-haiti-supports-schools/> (the schools, “burned, abandoned, or deserted due to gang threats,” have been closed since April).

³³⁹ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (July – September 2025)*, p. 14 (Nov. 11, 2025), <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20%E2%80%93%20september%202025%29.pdf>; UN Security Council 9988th Meeting, *Amid Relentless Armed Violence, Collapsing Schools, Hospitals, Haiti Facing 'Perfect Storm of Suffering', Secretary-General Warns Security Council* (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16158.doc.htm>; see also UNICEF, *UNICEF Haiti Snapshot 2025*, https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/media/68111/file/2025_UNICEFHaiti_Snapshot_En.pdf (one in four children “is currently out of school”).

³⁴⁰ IOM, *Haiti: Résultats Clés des Analyses Comparatives des Besoins Multisectoriels des Populations*, pp. 6-7 (Feb. 12, 2026), <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/reports/haiti-resultats-cles-des-analyses-comparatives-des-besoins-multisectoriels-des-populations?close=true> (economic barriers prevent school attendance for many, and “[w]ithdrawing children from school to direct spending towards food is also more common in sites”); Milo Milfort, *As New UN Force set to tackle gangs, Haitians Speak of Exhaustion and Hopelessness*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak> (“Gabriel Tcharly, a merchant and driver, president of the Argentine Bellegarde school internally displaced camp [said]. . . [s]ome children and young people spend two or three years here without going to school. If a child was four years old when they arrived, they are now eight and still at the same level of schooling.”); CPD Haiti, *Situation des Personnes Déplacées Internes dans la Zone Métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://cpdhaiti.org/situation-des-personnes-deplacees-interne-dans-la-zone-metropolitaine-de-port-au-prince-rapport-de-monitoring-novembre-2025/>; see also Gallardo Honoré, ‘Do not give up on children’: Displaced by violence, a Haitian girl finds hope at school, UN News (Jan. 3, 2026), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166695>, (“In overcrowded shelters and displacement sites, children lack access to textbooks, learning materials as well as qualified teachers.”).

³⁴¹ See, e.g., Juhakenson Blaise, *Parents demand promised Haitian government funds to help enroll children in school*, The Haitian Times (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/30/parents-demand-haiti-supports-schools/> (the director of Lycée Daniel Fignolé said that “[e]nrollments have dropped because many students used to come from Lower Delmas, Solino, and the neighborhoods of Cité Soleil to attend the school, but insecurity now prevents them from traveling.”) (*internal quotations omitted*).

³⁴² Daniella Saint-Louis, *Schoolchildren in Léogâne face daily danger as motorcycle transport fills public transit void*, The Haitian Times (Dec. 31, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/12/31/haiti-leogane-schoolchildren-transportation-risk/> (in Léogâne, “traditional public transport has virtually disappeared,” leaving in its place a “motorcycle monopoly, with scenes that have become disturbingly routine: preschoolers seated in front of drivers, multiple students clinging to the back, none wearing helmets, including drivers themselves”).

³⁴³ See Juhakenson Blaise, *How Haitian gangs extort up to \$75 million a year*, The Haitian Times (Dec. 17, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/12/17/haiti-gangs-extort-millions-annually-cargo-illegal-tolls/>; International Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance* (Dec. 15, 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/110-undoing-haitis-deadly-gang-alliance>; The Guardian, *Haiti: Violence, Climate Disaster, Drought — Haitians Face Converging Crises* (Nov. 13, 2025), <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/13/haiti-violence-climate-disaster-drought-haitians-gang-warfare>.

³⁴⁴ See, e.g., Juhakenson Blaise, *Parents demand promised Haitian government funds to help enroll children in school*, The Haitian Times (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/30/parents-demand-haiti-supports-schools/> (“A single institution, such as Lycée Horatius Laventure, now accommodates up to four schools, while Collège Théophile Pierre d’Haïti hosts three, including Lycée Daniel Fignolé. School principals say this situation falls far short of acceptable standards for quality education.”).

³⁴⁵ Juhakenson Blaise, *Parents demand promised Haitian government funds to help enroll children in school*, The Haitian Times (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/30/parents-demand-haiti-supports-schools/> (nationally, just 44.96% of students passed their exams in the 2024-2025 academic year, down from 49.42% in the previous year; in the West Department, the pass rate was even lower, and over 2,000 students who had registered to take exams were absent on the day).

³⁴⁶ See note 246.

³⁴⁷ Juhakenson Blaise, *Parents demand promised Haitian government funds to help enroll children in school*, The Haitian Times (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/30/parents-demand-haiti-supports-schools/> (discussing the government’s failure to respond to parents’ calls for urgent action to ensure access to education and to deliver promised funds to displaced families that would help pay for school fees; according to the head of the Ministry of National Education and Vocational

Training, “[t]he school [system] as we know it, with all its structural problems, is destroyed”) (*internal quotations omitted*); Jean Phares Jérôme, *Curriculum Reform as a Path to Modernizing Haiti’s Education System*, Le Nouvelliste (Dec. 18, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262682/curriculum-reform-as-a-path-to-modernizing-haitis-education-system> (a 2023 report revealed that Haiti’s education system “is marked by a high failure rate and glaring inequalities, . . . exacerbated by instability, lack of funding, and successive crises”).

³⁴⁸ Switchboard TA, *Haitian Backgrounder*, p. 10 (Nov. 2024), <https://www.switchboardta.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Haitian-Backgrounder-20241217.pdf> (“Eighty percent of primary education institutions in Haiti are private, particularly the country’s best schools. The demand for public education far exceeds the supply. . . . Religious organizations and other private actors have filled this gap between educational needs and state funding for schools, though these private options are often prohibitively expensive.”).

³⁴⁹ See, e.g., Onz Chéry, *Haiti’s Labadie to hold crucial election for coordination committee president on Dec. 14*, The Haitian Times (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/12/10/labadie-important-elections-misery/>, (Royal Caribbean’s decision to suspend cruises to the town of Labadie due to insecurity has had broad economic impacts, including on families’ ability to afford school fees); Jérôme Wendy Norestyl & Wethzer Piercin, *Artibonite: Rice Farmers Lose Everything as Gangs Torch Rice Plantations*, Ayibopost (Nov. 1, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/gangs-set-fire-to-grain-depots-and-agricultural-plantations-in-artibonite/> (one farmer whose rice harvest was destroyed by armed groups said the harvest was what allowed him to pay his rent and his children’s school fees); Juhakenson Blaise, *Parents demand promised Haitian government funds to help enroll children in school*, The Haitian Times (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/30/parents-demand-haiti-supports-schools/> (“Amid deepening insecurity and widespread displacement, thousands of families have lost livelihoods, making it nearly impossible to afford school fees or reach schools. . . . ‘We can no longer pay for school, not even the entrance fees or partial payments to have our child accepted, we simply cannot afford it.’”).

³⁵⁰ See generally Section VIII.

³⁵¹ IOM, *Key Information on Forced Returns in Haiti in 2025* (2025), https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11461/files/reports/Key%20information%20on%20deportations%20in%20Haiti%20in%202025_0.pdf?iframe=true (the IOM reported 270,214 people deported in 2025, 36% more than in 2024).

³⁵² Amnesty International, *Crossings and Journeys: People of African Descent in Global Migration and the Enduring Architecture of Racialization* (Nov. 10, 2025), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/IOR4004692025ENGLISH.pdf> (“Amnesty International has denounced systematic practices of structural racism also in the Dominican Republic’s migration policy. . . . [that have] had a disproportionate impact on Haitian migrants, Dominicans of Haitian descent, and Black people.”); Edxon Francisque, *Haitian Newborn’s Death in DR Highlights Abuses in Migration System*, Haitian Times, (Nov. 25, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/25/newborn-haitian-baby-dies-in-de-detention/> (discussing the “deep roots” of anti-Haitian sentiment in the Dominican Republic); Samantha Michaels, *The Haitians of Springfield Are Under Attack Yet Again*, Mother Jones (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2026/02/haitian-immigrants-springfield-ohio-tps-temporary-protected-status-bomb-threats-lawsuit-trump-ice/> (Feb. 20, 2026) (outlining the anti-Black and anti-Haitian racism behind U.S. President Trump’s immigration policies); Rebecca Bietsch, *Appeals court finds Noem illegally ended deportation protections for Venezuela, Haiti*, The Hill (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://thehill.com/latino/5712919-tps-termination-venezuela-haiti/> (an appellate judge in the United States said that President Trump and U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem “repeatedly made statements [in the context of ending Temporary Protected Status for Haitians] that were overtly founded on racist stereotyping based on country of origin”); Black Agenda Report, *BAP Backgrounder: US Racist Immigration Policy toward Haiti Reinforces Imperialism and Weakens*, (Dec. 17, 2025), <https://www.blackagendareport.com/bap-backgrounder-us-racist-immigration-policy-toward-haiti-reinforces-imperialism-and-weakens>; Jacqueline Charles & Verónica Egui Brito, *New Trump policy puts immigration ‘on hold’ for Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela and others*, Miami Herald (Dec. 2, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article313341167.html?giftCode=e8e6cae9ddedbb87cae65b0c57bdf6e0820a6cb76b3971b451ad3f09c541c40b> (according to Miami lawyer Ira Kurzban, the new U.S. policy suspending immigration applications for citizens of 19 countries, including Haiti, “was guided by the administration’s racial animus;” he said that “[t]his is just another step in their efforts to attempt to ‘cleanse’ the country of Black and brown refugees who are desperately seeking freedom from brutality, autocracy and dictatorship.”); Jaqueline Charles, *St. Kitts and Nevis agrees to take U.S. migrants*, Miami Herald (Jan. 13, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314293266.html> (St Kitts and Nevis “agreed to accept a very small number of third-country nationals from the U.S. as long as they are citizens of the 15-member Caribbean Community known as CARICOM, and are not sexual predators, have no violent backgrounds and are not Haitians”); see also Aline Gue & Gabrielle Apollon, *Without Haitians There is No Collective Liberation*, Common Dreams (Feb. 26, 2026), <https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/haitians-collective-liberation>.

³⁵³ See Attorney General of Maryland, *Attorney General Brown Urges Court to Preserve Block on Trump Administration’s Unlawful Termination of Haiti’s Temporary Protected Status Designation* (Feb. 17, 2026), <https://oag.maryland.gov/News/Pages/Attorney-General-Brown-Urges-Court-to-Preserve-Block-on-Trump-Administration%E2%80%99s-Unlawful-Termination-of-Haiti%E2%80%99s-Temporary-Pr.aspx> (Feb. 17, 2026) (18 U.S. attorneys general filed an amicus brief in support of litigation challenging the Trump administration’s decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians, which was taken “without any evidence that the dangerous conditions in Haiti had improved and despite the fact that the U.S. State Department continues to classify Haiti as a “Level 4: Do Not Travel” country – its highest risk designation.”); *350,000 Haitians in U.S. “at Risk of Losing Everything” After Trump Revokes Legal TPS Status*, Democracy Now! (Jan. 30, 2026), https://www.democracynow.org/2026/1/30/temporary_protected_status_haiti (Haitian Bridge Alliance co-founder and executive director Guerline Jozef: “At the end of last year, the U.S. Embassy in Haiti had a webinar where they clearly stated that Haiti is currently at a stage four to not travel, like a war zone. And they have also said that they have removed about 80% to 90% of their personnel in Haiti due to insecurity. But at the same time, they are saying that it is safe enough for half a million Haitians to be returned.”); Human Rights Watch, *Haiti: Cholera Resurgence Threatens Vulnerable Communities*, (Nov. 5, 2025), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/11/05/haiti-cholera-resurgence-threatens-vulnerable->

[communities](#) (Nov. 5, 2025) (noting continued deportations from the Dominican Republic, the United States, the Bahamas, as Turks and Caicos, Human Rights Watch emphasized that “[p]eople should not be deported or otherwise returned to Haiti, where overlapping humanitarian, security, and public health crises endanger lives, and where they face a high risk of violence with no effective access to protection or justice”); CAPIRE, *Elena Lora: In the Dominican Republic, There Is a Policy of Discrimination Based on Racial Origins* (Sep. 18, 2025), <https://capiremov.org/en/interview/elena-lora-in-the-dominican-republic-there-is-a-policy-of-discrimination-based-on-racial-origins-skin-color-and-surnames/>; ACLU, *Judge Rules Trump Administration Unlawfully Stripped TPS from More Than a Million Venezuelans and Haitians* (Sep. 5, 2025), <https://www.aclunorcal.org/press-releases/judge-rules-trump-administration-unlawfully-stripped-tps-more-million-venezuelans-and-haitians/> (in September 2025, a federal judge in the United States ruled that the Trump administration’s attempt to terminate TPS for Haitians is illegal); Shandra Back, *They Grabbed Us Like Dogs’: Deportation Quotas Tear Haitian Migrants’ Lives Apart*, Pulitzer Center (Sep. 7, 2025), <https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/they-grabbed-us-dogs-deportation-quotas-tear-haitian-migrants-lives-apart> (“Raids are increasing, and even people born in the Dominican Republic — with documents or not — are being rounded up and deported, flagrantly disregarding laws, according to human rights organisations.”).

³⁵⁴ IOM, *Key Information on Forced Returns in Haiti in 2025* (2025), https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1461/files/reports/Key%20information%20on%20deportations%20in%20Haiti%20in%202025_0.pdf?iframe=true. For a detailed analysis of the Dominican Republic’s deportations since 2021, see Colectivo de Haitianos en RD, *Informe DDHH 2021–2025* (2025), <https://colectivohaitianosrd.org/informe-ddhh-2021-2025-2/>.

³⁵⁵ IOM, *Key Information on Forced Returns in Haiti in 2025* (2025), https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1461/files/reports/Key%20information%20on%20deportations%20in%20Haiti%20in%202025_0.pdf?iframe=true (reporting 270,214 removals in total, with 265,215 of those from the Dominican Republic); see also OCHA, *Haiti: Crisis Numbers (16 February 2026)* (Feb. 16, 2026), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-crisis-numbers-16-february-2026> (reporting 295,000 people “forcibly returned”).

³⁵⁶ Dominican Republic General Directorate of Migration, *DGM deported 379,553 irregular foreigners in 2025 and processed 20.4 million traveler documents* (Jan. 14, 2026), <https://migracion.gob.do/en/dgm-deported-379553-irregular-foreigners-in-2025-and-processed-20-4-million-traveler-documents/> (Jan. 14, 2026) (the Dominican General Directorate of Migration (DGM) reported 379,553 Haitians expelled in 2025). The discrepancy in numbers may be “because many Haitians are victims of a racket in which people are detained by corrupt officials whom family members must then pay to get their relatives freed,” with the DGM counting the same person deported multiple times as multiple expulsions. Shandra Back, *They Grabbed Us Like Dogs’: Deportation Quotas Tear Haitian Migrants’ Lives Apart*, Pulitzer Center (Sep. 7, 2025), <https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/they-grabbed-us-dogs-deportation-quotas-tear-haitian-migrants-lives-apart> (“The problem is not new and has been acknowledged by Abinader, who says his government is working to combat it. . . . ‘The issue is that people are not being counted, events are being counted,’ says Bridget Wooding, director of the Caribbean Migrants Observatory (Obmica), a research centre studying migration dynamics in the region based in the Dominican Republic’s capital, Santo Domingo. ‘You can have the same person detained and deported several times.’”).

³⁵⁷ Marius Loiseau, *How Far Will the Dominican Republic Go in Deporting Haitians?*, Inkstick Media (Feb. 26, 2026), <https://inkstickmedia.com/how-far-will-the-dominican-republic-go-in-deporting-haitians/>; CAPIRE, *Elena Lora: In the Dominican Republic, There Is a Policy of Discrimination Based on Racial Origins*, (Sep. 18, 2025), <https://capiremov.org/en/interview/elena-lora-in-the-dominican-republic-there-is-a-policy-of-discrimination-based-on-racial-origins-skin-color-and-surnames/>; Shandra Back, *They Grabbed Us Like Dogs’: Deportation Quotas Tear Haitian Migrants’ Lives Apart*, Pulitzer Center (Sep. 7, 2025), <https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/they-grabbed-us-dogs-deportation-quotas-tear-haitian-migrants-lives-apart>; see also Global Justice Clinic, *Racial Profiling & Mass Deportations: Rights Abuses of People of Haitian Descent in the Dominican Republic* (Jun. 2025), <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zZUyVNLZHVvnDIjsGuu8NzSHFAF7cdsS/view>.

³⁵⁸ Shandra Back, *They Grabbed Us Like Dogs’: Deportation Quotas Tear Haitian Migrants’ Lives Apart*, Pulitzer Center (Sep. 7, 2025), <https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/they-grabbed-us-dogs-deportation-quotas-tear-haitian-migrants-lives-apart> (“Gabrielle Apollon, director of the Haiti Project at New York University’s Global Justice Clinic, denounces the intentional secrecy behind the detentions and deportations. “People are rounded up in these cage-like deportation trucks and shipped off to Haiti as quickly as they can be. Nobody has any recourse [to the law],” she says. “How are you going to find a lawyer if you can’t even contact a parent to get you any access?” The government spells out the rules and rights around deportations but in practice, laws are broken and human rights are disregarded, campaigners say. “The Dominican Republic is violating its own legislation,” says Wooding. “Virtually anybody in uniform may take matters into their own hands and participate in these activities.””).

³⁵⁹ Marius Loiseau, *How Far Will the Dominican Republic Go in Deporting Haitians?*, Inkstick Media (Feb. 26, 2026), <https://inkstickmedia.com/how-far-will-the-dominican-republic-go-in-deporting-haitians/>; Edxon Francisque, *Haitian Newborn’s Death in DR Highlights Abuses in Migration System*, Haitian Times, (Nov. 25, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/25/newborn-haitian-baby-dies-in-de-detention/> (testimonies from migrants detained in the Haina Detention Center have revealed inconsistent or nonexistent health care, cells with poor ventilation, unhygienic bathrooms, contaminated or insufficient food, reports of gastric infections, and separation of children from their families; “Dominican activist Rowiobel Alcántara said the government’s statements attempt to mask recurring negligence in an institution long known for abuse”) (*internal quotations omitted*).

³⁶⁰ Colectivo de Haitianos en RD, *Informe DDHH 2021–2025*, p. 109 (2025), <https://colectivohaitianosrd.org/informe-ddhh-2021-2025-2/>; Fenel Péliissier, *Pregnant Haitian women targeted by Dominican immigration authorities*, AyiboPost (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pregnant-haitian-women-targeted-by-dominican-immigration-authorities/>; see also Edxon Francisque, *Haitian Newborn’s Death in DR Highlights Abuses in Migration System*, Haitian Times, (Nov. 25, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/25/newborn-haitian-baby-dies-in-de-detention/> (reporting the deaths of three Haitians, including a newborn baby, in Haina Detention Center in 2025; according to human rights advocates, these reflect “a broader system where mass deportations, racial discrimination and inadequate medical care disproportionately endanger the most vulnerable”).

³⁶¹ The government's implementation of its April 2025 immigration protocol requiring foreign patients to "present a valid identity document, proof of employment and proof of residence" or be "reported to immigration services for possible repatriation" has resulted in pregnant women dying at home because they too afraid to go to hospital to give birth or seeking care in private clinics at exorbitant cost. A migrants' rights organization has also recorded three cases of Haitian mothers "abandon[ing] their newborns in the hospital after giving birth to escape immigration." Fenel Pélissier, *Pregnant Haitian women targeted by Dominican immigration authorities*, AyiboPost (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pregnant-haitian-women-targeted-by-dominican-immigration-authorities/> (according to Amnesty International, "[t]he new protocol violates the rights to health, equality and non-discrimination guaranteed by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination"); see also HRW, *World Report 2026: Haiti, Events of 2025* (Feb. 2026), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/haiti> (many of those detained and deported "were pregnant and postpartum women and children, who under Dominican migration law should not be detained"); Edxon Francisque, *Haitian Newborn's Death in DR Highlights Abuses in Migration System*, Haitian Times, (Nov. 25, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/11/25/newborn-haitian-baby-dies-in-de-detention/> (pregnant women who are detained after giving birth are subject to prolonged detention, according to testimonies from migrants detained in the Haina Detention Center); Amnesty International, *Dominican Republic: Dominican Republic: The facts debunk the myth; migrants do not overburden the health system* (Nov. 17, 2025), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/11/republica-dominicana-los-datos-desmienten-el-mito-las-personas-migrantes-no-saturan-el-sistema-de-salud-2/>. For further discussion of the impacts on migration policies on the right to health for Haitian migrants, see IACHR, *Hearing No. 3: Dominican Republic: Impacts of migration policies on the right to health* (March 9, 2026), <https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/sessions/hearing.asp?Hearing=3869>.

³⁶² See Marius Loiseau, *How Far Will the Dominican Republic Go in Deporting Haitians?*, Inkstick Media (Feb. 26, 2026), <https://inkstickmedia.com/how-far-will-the-dominican-republic-go-in-deporting-haitians/> (a Haitian detained in Haina detention center said they were not given water "unless you paid a guard;" another migrant was accused of belonging to a Haitian armed group because "because of the tattoos on his arms, and his family was forced to pay US\$817 for his release); Fenel Pélissier, *Pregnant Haitian women targeted by Dominican immigration authorities*, AyiboPost (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/pregnant-haitian-women-targeted-by-dominican-immigration-authorities/> (to avoid being targeted for deportation after giving birth in a hospital, "Haitian mothers sometimes pay doctors in collusion with immigration officials to obtain permission to leave the hospital"); see also Ali Rogan, *Haitians Displaced by Violence Face Deportation after Fleeing to Dominican Republic*, PBS NewsHour (Nov. 17, 2025), <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/haitians-displaced-by-violence-face-deportation-after-fleeing-to-dominican-republic> (Wooding says "[t]he army, the police, anybody in a uniform, the watchman down the road is beginning to be involved in ways which lead to extortion, corruption, and to creating of chaos.").

³⁶³ See, e.g., @ICEFlightM, *Post on X*, (Feb. 5, 2026), <https://x.com/ICEFlightM/status/2019519873815326931?s=20> (reporting on a removal flight on February 5 from Louisiana to Cap-Haïtien); @josephlunieOFF, *Post on X*, (Jan. 9, 2026), <https://x.com/josephlunieOFF/status/2009640063395561734?s=20> (a deportation flight carrying 136 Haitians landed in Cap-Haïtien on January 8); Onz Chéry, *132 Haitians, including 6 children, arrive in Cap-Haïtien on Trump deportation flight* (Sep. 12, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/09/12/132-haitians-including-6-children-arrive-in-cap-haitien-on-trump-deportation-flight/> (reporting on a deportation flight to Cap-Haïtien on September 10 carrying 132 Haitians); see also Esther Kimberly Bazile, *Key Facts About Deportation, Extradition, and American Legal Framework*, Le Nouvelliste (Jul. 22, 2025), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/258303/key-facts-about-deportation-extradition-and-american-legal-framework> ("On July 21, 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced plans to deport lawful permanent residents linked to the Haitian gang Viv Ansanm, recently designated a foreign terrorist organization. Immigration authorities have already named businessman Pierre Réginald Boulos in this crackdown, prompting concerns about politically motivated or unjust deportations."); notes 418-425.

³⁶⁴ U.S. Embassy in Haiti, *Security Alert – U.S. Embassy Port-au-Prince (January 31, 2026)* (Jan. 31, 2026), <https://ht.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-port-au-prince-january-31-2026/>; U.S. Dep't of State, *Haiti Travel Advisory*, (Jul. 15, 2025), <https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/haiti-travel-advisory.html>; 350,000 Haitians in U.S. "at Risk of Losing Everything" After Trump Revokes Legal TPS Status, Democracy Now! (Jan. 30, 2026), https://www.democracynow.org/2026/1/30/temporary_protected_status_haiti (the U.S. embassy said it has "removed about 80% to 90% of their personnel in Haiti due to insecurity"); Robert Billard, *Marines Under Fire: Defending US Embassy in Gang-Ravaged Haiti*, Military.Com (Nov. 19, 2025), <https://www.military.com/feature/2025/11/19/marines-under-fire-defending-us-embassy-gang-ravaged-haiti.html> (reporting that "[e]mbassy staff have been reduced to essential personnel"); see also Jaqueline Charles, *Is Haiti safe for TPS holders to return to? A federal judge hears arguments*, Miami Herald, <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314240011.html> (the appellate judge presiding over the case brought by Haitians challenging the government's termination of Temporary Protected Status for Haitians told government lawyers, "It seems odd to me to say it's perfectly safe to return to Haiti and then, in the same breath, say that there are gangs running rampant in Haiti").

³⁶⁵ AP News and Fredner Cayemitte, *Third Haitian detainee dies in ICE custody, this time after untreated toothache*, Haitian Times (Mar. 5, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/03/05/haitian-dies-ice-custody-untreated-toothache/>. For a detailed explanation of the abuses linked to U.S. deportation detention practices, see ACLU, *Detained Immigrants Detail Physical Abuse and Inhumane Conditions at Largest Immigration Detention Center in the U.S.* (Dec. 8, 2025), <https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/detained-immigrants-detail-physical-abuse-and-inhumane-conditions-at-largest-immigration-detention-center-in-the-u-s>; Nazish Dholakia, *The Truth About Immigration Detention in the United States*, Vera (Jun. 11, 2025), <https://www.vera.org/news/the-truth-about-immigration-detention-in-the-united-states>; National Immigrant Justice Center, *Policy Brief: Snapshot of ICE Detention – Inhumane Conditions and Alarming Expansion* (Sep. 20, 2024), <https://immigrantjustice.org/research/policy-brief-snapshot-of-ice-detention-inhumane-conditions-and-alarming-expansion/>.

³⁶⁶ See Carl Rosenberg, *Cuban Deportees Who Were Transferred to Guantánamo Sent Back to U.S.*, New York Times (Feb. 6, 2026), <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/06/us/politics/cuban-deportees-guantanamo.html> (reporting that 34 Haitian migrants designated for removal were held in Guantánamo Bay in December 2025); @ICEFlightM, *Post on X*, (Feb. 5, 2026), <https://x.com/ICEFlightM/status/2019519873815326931?s=20> (a February 2026 removal flight from Louisiana to Cap-Haïtien

stopped at Guantánamo Bay *en route*); Jacqueline Charles & Syra Ortiz Blanes, *After labeling transfers to Guantánamo as 'fake news,' Trump deports Haitians from there*, Miami Herald (Jun. 20, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article308884995.html> (“Guantánamo is a black site designed for secrecy and exclusion. Haitian immigrants—and asylum seekers—are once again being subjected to the same cruel, barbaric and inhumane treatment they were subjected in the 1990s, held without access to counsel, without notice to their families or legal advocates and deported under the cover of darkness. . . . These individuals have been stripped of their most basic rights under U.S. and international law.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); see also Haitian Bridge Alliance, *Haitian Bridge Alliance Urges President Trump to Reconsider Proposal to Detain Migrants at Guantánamo Bay, Calls for Humane Immigration Policies* (Jan. 31, 2025), <https://haitianbridgealliance.org/haitian-bridge-alliance-urges-president-trump-to-reconsider-proposal-to-detain-migrants-at-guantanamo-bay-calls-for-humane-immigration-policies/> (discussing Guantánamo Bay’s “troubling history of migrant detention,” with over 34,000 Haitians “kept in appalling conditions, subjected to inadequate medical care, and denied access to proper asylum procedures” between 1991 and 1993).

³⁶⁷ White House, *Restricting and Limiting the Entry of Foreign Nationals To Protect the Security of the United States* (Dec. 16, 2025), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/restricting-and-limiting-the-entry-of-foreign-nationals-to-protect-the-security-of-the-united-states/> (Haiti is among 12 countries that have full bans on immigration applications, with few exceptions for lawful permanent residents and certain non-immigration visa holders; 7 others have partial bans); see also Khalea Robertson & Chase Harrison, *Tracking Trump and Latin America: Migration — Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela Applications Paused*, AS/COA (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.as-coa.org/articles/tracking-trump-and-latin-america-migration-cuba-haiti-venezuela-applications-paused>; Jacqueline Charles & Verónica Egui Brito, *New Trump policy puts immigration 'on hold' for Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela and others*, Miami Herald (Dec. 2, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article313341167.html?giftCode=e8e6cae9ddeddb87cae65b0c57bdf6e0820a6cb76b3971b451ad3f09c541c40b> (“The Department of Homeland Security directive affects everything from green card applications to work permits for individuals with pending asylum applications.”).

³⁶⁸ The Department of Homeland Security announced it was terminating the Family Reunification Parole process for Haitians on December 12, 2025, although a January 2026 court order temporarily prevented the administration from revoking existing grants. USCIS, *DHS Ends the Abuse of the Humanitarian Parole Process and Terminates Family Reunification Parole* (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/alerts/dhs-ends-the-abuse-of-the-humanitarian-parole-process-and-terminates-family-reunification-parole>; *Doe et al. v. Noem*, Case No. 25-cv-10495 (D. Mass. Jan. 25, 2026), ECF No. 258, <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mad.281389/gov.uscourts.mad.281389.258.0.pdf>; see also CLINIC, *CLINIC Court Watch: Federal Immigration Case Updates (January 2026)* (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.cliniclegal.org/resources/clinic-court-watch-federal-immigration-case-updates-january-2026>. In March 2025, the Trump administration also terminated the humanitarian parole program for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, which offered critical protection for over 200,000 Haitians. IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, n. 423 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>.

³⁶⁹ Federal Register, *Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2026* (Oct. 31, 2025), <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/31/2025-19752/presidential-determination-on-refugee-admissions-for-fiscal-year-2026> (President Trump limited refugee admissions for the 2026 fiscal year to just 7,500 people); Khalea Robertson & Chase Harrison, *Tracking Trump and Latin America: Migration — Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela Applications Paused*, AS/COA (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.as-coa.org/articles/tracking-trump-and-latin-america-migration-cuba-haiti-venezuela-applications-paused> (“It is the lowest admissions cap since the U.S. refugee resettlement program began in 1980. The cap for fiscal year 2025, set by the Biden administration, was 125,000.”).

³⁷⁰ White House, *Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restricts the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats* (Jun. 4, 2025), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/06/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-restricts-the-entry-of-foreign-nationals-to-protect-the-united-states-from-foreign-terrorists-and-other-national-security-and-public-safety-threats/>; see also IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, n. 428 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>.

³⁷¹ Jacqueline Charles & Verónica Egui Brito, *New Trump policy puts immigration 'on hold' for Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela and others*, Miami Herald (Dec. 2, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article313341167.html?giftCode=e8e6cae9ddeddb87cae65b0c57bdf6e0820a6cb76b3971b451ad3f09c541c40b> (The suspension of immigration applications “reaches even further into the immigration population, particularly Hispanic and Haitian communities. . . . [who] were already facing deportation with the end of temporary legal protections, and are now facing immigration limbo. . . . The halt of asylum among other immigration process affects some of the most vulnerable people seeking protection in the U.S., including children, single mothers, survivors of domestic violence or torture, and others fleeing persecution or extreme trauma.”); see also Khalea Robertson & Chase Harrison, *Tracking Trump and Latin America: Migration — Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela Applications Paused*, AS/COA (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.as-coa.org/articles/tracking-trump-and-latin-america-migration-cuba-haiti-venezuela-applications-paused> (noting that refugees from Latin America and the Caribbean “made up around one-quarter of refugees resettled in the United States” in 2024). The restrictions on access to protection are leading Haitians to increasingly seek refuge in Mexico, where they face long waits and a dysfunctional system worsened by U.S. funding cuts. Guest Author, *Haitians in Mexico face longer, harder waits as asylum system buckles*, Haitian Times (Feb. 18, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/02/18/haitian-asylum-seekers-mexico-tapachula/>.

³⁷² TPS is a form of relief granted “due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country's nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.” USCIS, *Temporary Protected Status*, <https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status>; Jaqueline Charles, *Is Haiti safe for TPS holders to return to? A federal judge hears arguments*, Miami Herald, <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314240011.html> (“While Homeland Security’s Federal Registry notice said there are 352,959 people under Haiti’s TPS designation, a public record search shows 568,545 Haitians would be vulnerable to deportations.”).

³⁷³ The U.S. government's order halting TPS was set to go into effect on February 3, 2026, but a federal appellate judge ordered a stay pending the outcome of a lawsuit brought by five Haitian TPS holders. Nate Raymond & Andrew Chung, *US Judge Halts Trump Plan to End Protections for 350,000 Haitians* (Feb. 2, 2026), <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-judge-halts-trump-plan-end-protections-350000-haitians-2026-02-03/>; Bethany Bruner, *Trump administration files official appeal notice in Haitian TPS suit*, The Columbus Dispatch (Feb. 6, 2026), <https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/courts/2026/02/06/trump-homeland-security-appeal-judges-decision-stop-haiti-tps-expiration-protected-status-ohio/88545141007/?gnt-cfr=1&gca-cat=p&gca-uir=true&gca-epi=z116559p003350n11----c11----v116559d--53--b--53--&gca-ft=194&gca-ds=sophi> (government attorneys filed their notice to appeal the decision on Feb. 5); Khalea Robertson & Chase Harrison, *Tracking Trump and Latin America: Migration — Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela Applications Paused*, AS/COA (Dec. 4, 2025), <https://www.as-coa.org/articles/tracking-trump-and-latin-america-migration-cuba-haiti-venezuela-applications-paused>; USCIS, *DHS Terminates Temporary Protected Status for Haiti*, (Nov. 26, 2025), <https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/alerts/dhs-terminates-temporary-protected-status-for-haiti>; Haitian Bridge Alliance, *Statement from TPS Holders on Filing of Brief Opposing Government's Request for Supreme Court Stay in NTPSA v. Noem*, (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://haitianbridgealliance.org/tatement-from-tps-holders-on-filing-of-brief-opposing-governments-request-for-supreme-court-stay-in-ntpsa-v-noem/>; see also Max Wine, *GOP governor: Trump's push to end TPS for Haitians 'is wrong'*, The Hill (Feb. 22, 2026), <https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/5750059-dewine-defends-haitian-migrants/> (“Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine (R) again defended Haitian migrants Sunday, as a legal challenge to the Trump administration’s attempts to revoke temporary protected status (TPS) for those from the Caribbean island plays out.”); New York State Attorney General, *Attorney General James Takes Action to Defend Temporary Protected Status for Haitian Immigrants*, (Feb. 17, 2026), <https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2026/attorney-general-james-takes-action-defend-temporary-protected-status-haitian> (“New York Attorney General Letitia James co-led a coalition of 17 other attorneys general . . . in support of a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for attempting to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for more than 350,000 Haitians. Attorney General James and the coalition argue that terminating TPS for Haitians would jeopardize the safety, health, and economy of communities throughout the country and upend the lives of families who have been living and working in the United States for years.”). DHS originally attempted to terminate TPS on September 2025, but a judge in U.S. federal court ruled in July that DHS did not have the authority to terminate TPS before February 3, 2026. See IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, n. 430 (July 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>.

³⁷⁴ See International Rescue Committee, *IRC: Increasing forced returns and political instability put millions at risk as Haiti's security unravels* (Feb. 11, 2026), <https://www.rescue.org/press-release/irc-forced-returns-and-political-instability-put-millions-risk-haiti> (“Many repatriated Haitians arrive with nowhere to go—nearly 20% were already internally displaced before leaving the country and others remain cut off from loved ones due to expanding gang control. With minimal funding for reintegration, returnees are prime targets for harm, exploitation, and even murder by gangs.”); IOM, *Haiti: Panel Study on the Reintegration of Deported Migrants – Round 1*, (Aug. 2025), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-panel-study-reintegration-deported-migrants-round-1-august-2025?close=true> (finding that returnees suffered similarly high levels of violence, displacement, and barriers to freedom of movement to non-returnees; and that returnees who experienced harm during the deportation process reported having less access to services upon arrival in Haiti, relying more on negative coping mechanisms, and feeling less safe than those who did not).

³⁷⁵ IOM, *Key Information on Forced Returns in Haiti in 2025*, p. 6 (2025), https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1461/files/reports/Key%20information%20on%20deportations%20in%20Haiti%20in%202025_0.pdf?iframe=true.

³⁷⁶ See, e.g., Swiss Info, *Las Mujeres Haitianas Halladas Decapitadas Habían Sido Deportadas de Puerto Rico* (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/las-mujeres-haitianas-halladas-decapitadas-hab%C3%A0dan-sido-deportadas-de-puerto-rico/90885200> (“[G]angs kidnap women . . . to demand a ransom amount from their relatives who live in the United States.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); Adriana Díaz Tirado, *Ya Van 18 Haitianos Deportados que Han Sido Asesinados en su País*, El Nuevo Día (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/locales/notas/ya-van-18-haitianos-deportados-que-han-sido-asesinados-en-su-pais-nueve-fueron-detenido-en-puerto-rico/> (armed groups kidnapped nine returnees in Port-au-Prince in January “to demand \$50,000 for each head, presuming that their relatives lived abroad”).

³⁷⁷ IOM, *Haiti: Panel Study on the Reintegration of Deported Migrants – Round 1 (August 2025)*, pp. 13, 17-25 (Aug. 2025), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-panel-study-reintegration-deported-migrants-round-1-august-2025?close=true>.

³⁷⁸ See International Rescue Committee, *IRC: Increasing forced returns and political instability put millions at risk as Haiti's security unravels* (Feb. 11, 2026), IRC, *IRC: Forced Returns and Political Instability Put Millions at Risk in Haiti*, <https://www.rescue.org/press-release/irc-forced-returns-and-political-instability-put-millions-risk-haiti>; World Food Programme, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point*, p. 18 (Sept. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (gaps in financing have put the WFP’s provision of hot meals to returnees at the Dominican border at risk”); IOM, *Haiti: Panel Study on the Reintegration of Deported Migrants – Round 1 (August 2025)*, pp. 19 (Aug. 2025), <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-panel-study-reintegration-deported-migrants-round-1-august-2025?close=true> (just 5% of returnees surveyed by the IOM and partners reported having received aid or assistance in the four weeks prior to the survey); see also Section VIII.

³⁷⁹ IOM, *Key Information on Forced Returns in Haiti in 2025*, p. 3 (2025), https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1461/files/reports/Key%20information%20on%20deportations%20in%20Haiti%20in%202025_0.pdf?iframe=true (border towns accounted for the highest number of returns (265,607), followed by Cap-Haitien (4,444), with other entry points accounting for just 163 returns); see also Section II.

³⁸⁰ See European Commission, *Haiti - Forced displacement and escalating insecurity put pressure on already fragile health system*, Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (Jan. 13, 2026), <https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Echo-Flash/#/echo-flash-items/30231>; note 76.

³⁸¹ See Marius Loiseau, *How Far Will the Dominican Republic Go in Deporting Haitians?*, Inkstick Media (Feb. 26, 2026), <https://inkstickmedia.com/how-far-will-the-dominican-republic-go-in-deporting-haitians/> (“As migration trucks reach the Haitian

side of the border, smugglers move in, taking advantage of deportees by charging exorbitant fees to bring them back into the Dominican Republic.”); GARR, *Quatre Femmes Haïtiennes Violées Puis Décapitées à la Frontière Haïtiano-Dominicaine* (Feb. 03, 2026), <https://garrhaiti.org/2026/02/03/quatre-femmes-haitiennes-violees-puis-decapitees-a-la-frontiere-haitiano-dominicaine-le-garr-denonce-ces-crimes-crapuleux-et-exige-des-enquetes-appfondies/> (the complete absence of the Haitian state at unofficial border crossings between Haiti and the Dominican Republic allows criminal networks to commit “the most heinous crimes against migrants” in those areas, particularly against women and girls); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2026/32 ¶ 24* (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32> (“A weak State presence at land and maritime borders, limited patrol and inspection capacity and pervasive corruption have created a permissive environment in which smugglers extract rents through extortion, coercion and unsafe transportation.”); Daniel Dickinson, *Record cocaine seizure in Haitian waters underlines country’s ‘pivotal’ trafficking role*, UN News (Nov. 30, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166460> (“Newly established drug routes are also overlapping with migrant smuggling operations, in which Haitian nationals are increasingly involved.”).

³⁸² GARR, *Quatre Femmes Haïtiennes Violées Puis Décapitées à la Frontière Haïtiano-Dominicaine*, (Feb. 3, 2026), <https://garrhaiti.org/2026/02/03/quatre-femmes-haitiennes-violees-puis-decapitees-a-la-frontiere-haitiano-dominicaine-le-garr-denonce-ces-crimes-crapuleux-et-exige-des-enquetes-appfondies/> (reporting four women were found, and suggesting there may be more bodies); Joan Vargas, *Terror en Elías Piña: Hallazgo de Mujeres Decapitadas cerca del Río Macasia*, El Día (Feb. 2, 2026), <https://eldia.com.do/terror-en-elias-pina-hallazgo-de-mujeres-decapitadas-cerca-del-rio-macasia-alarma-a-comunitarios/> (according to a local, “no Haitian authority has approached the border area to investigate the cases”); Karen Juanita Carrillo, *Union Members in Puerto Rico Demand Answers after Murder*, Amsterdam News (Feb. 26, 2026), <https://amsterdamnews.com/news/2026/02/26/union-members-in-puerto-rico-demand-answers-after-murder/>.

³⁸³ Marius Loiseau, *How Far Will the Dominican Republic Go in Deporting Haitians?*, Inkstick Media (Feb. 26, 2026), <https://inkstickmedia.com/how-far-will-the-dominican-republic-go-in-deporting-haitians/>; Shandra Back, *They Grabbed Us Like Dogs: Deportation Quotas Tear Haitian Migrants’ Lives Apart*, Pulitzer Center (Sep. 7, 2025), <https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/they-grabbed-us-dogs-deportation-quotas-tear-haitian-migrants-lives-apart>; Ali Rogan, *Haitians Displaced by Violence Face Deportation after Fleeing to Dominican Republic*, PBS NewsHour (Nov. 17, 2025), <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/haitians-displaced-by-violence-face-deportation-after-fleeing-to-dominican-republic> (Dajabon mayor Santiago Riveron says “[i]t has become a big business, especially for some military. I cannot say that all the military are corrupted, but there are many corrupt military who receive bribes so that the border can be crossed.”).

³⁸⁴ Elissa Miolene, *As Haiti collapses, US doubles down on security over aid*, Devex (Feb. 12, 2026), https://www.devex.com/news/as-haiti-collapses-us-doubles-down-on-security-over-aid-111861?oauth_response=success&skip_optional_steps=true; Jaqueline Charles, *The UN’s New Force Won’t Save Haiti from the Gangs*, Chatham House (Dec. 15, 2025), <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2025-12/uns-new-force-wont-save-haiti-gangs> (“The next phase of the response to the crisis, some argue, cannot just be focused on the killing or arrest of gang leaders. Those alone won’t bring peace. Instead, a comprehensive approach is needed to tie security to social justice and create a path for reconciliation through the building of trust, rather than the criminalization of poverty. . . . Isabelle Clérié, a transitional justice expert, says a commonly voiced sentiment to dealing with the gangs is ‘kill them all’. To which her response is, ‘how can you operationalize killing 10,000 people, of which 5,000 are probably children?’ She went on: ‘Everybody is talking about security. They’re not actually talking about peace. We have no concept of what that means.’”).

³⁸⁵ Jaqueline Charles, *The UN’s New Force Won’t Save Haiti from the Gangs*, Chatham House (Dec. 15, 2025), <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2025-12/uns-new-force-wont-save-haiti-gangs> (“As a political vacuum looms, pressure is building from Washington for elections to be held.”); Jaqueline Charles, *U.S. revokes visa of top Haiti official for alleged gang support, fanning instability*, Miami Herald (Nov. 30, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313118626.html> (“During the press conference, where he [Jean] was joined by fellow council member Leslie Voltaire, Jean shared copies of alleged exchanges with the U.S. chargé d’affaires and the Canadian ambassador where both urged against the push “to topple the head of government.”. . . The alleged message from the U.S. embassy also ordered the publishing of an electoral decree, which has the first round of general elections scheduled for August and allows anyone, including gang leaders who have not been convicted in Haiti, to run for elected office.”).

³⁸⁶ See IJDH, *Human Rights Update – December 2024*, p. 13 (Dec. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/December-2024-Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – June 2024*, pp. 2, 14 (Jun. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments-December-2023-through-May-2024.pdf>; see also Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak> (Marie Yolène Gilles, director of the NGO Fondasyon Je Klere: “It is CARICOM [the Caribbean regional bloc] who decided to have a nine-member council without taking into account Haiti’s reality. How can a poor country, where deprivation is obvious, be led by nine people receiving excessively high wages, with a high level of expenses and corruption? With their per diems, their expenses, and all their benefits and advantages, they lead a good life and let the population starve.”).

³⁸⁷ See Widlore Mérancourt et Wethzer Piercin, *Fritz Alphonse Jean Denies Allegations in U.S. State Department Statement*, (Aug. 2, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/fritz-alphonse-jean-denies-allegations-in-u-s-state-department-statement/> (“In 2021, the U.S., alongside other embassies and institutions, had already intervened to settle a leadership dispute in favor of Ariel Henry over former Prime Minister Claude Joseph. . . . [D]espite changes in Washington, political interventionism remains a hallmark of U.S. policy in Haiti,” said Jake Johnston, a researcher at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. “The U.S. is once again taking sides in an internal conflict,” he added. “What makes it worse is that the entire transitional structure—put in place with strong U.S. backing last year—suffers from a deep lack of legitimacy and has no real popular support.”); see also Jaqueline Charles, *Haiti’s presidential council relinquishes power; prime minister to run country for now*, Miami Herald (Feb. 7, 2026),

<https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314613174.html> (noting that Fils-Aimé “still lacks a formal governing pact despite the backing of the United States and other foreign nations”).

³⁸⁸ See Section I.

³⁸⁹ Notably, in December 2025, signatories of the Montana Accord unveiled a formal roadmap document proposing a refoundation of the political transition that would be led by a three-member Presidential Council and overseen by a group of stakeholders from among those who participated in the formation of the April 2024 Accord. On February 6, 2026, the Commission for the Facilitation of the Inter-Haitian National Dialogue and the Monitoring Committee for the Inter-Haitian National Dialogue jointly appointed three individuals to sit on the three-person Presidential Council: supreme court judge Marie Joceline Casimir (representing the judiciary), *Fanmi Lavalas* member Leslie Voltaire (representing the TPC), and former education minister Charles Tardieu (representing civil society). Vant Bèf Info, *Haiti: Les Signataires de l'Accord de Montana Présentent une Feuille de Route* (Dec. 22, 2025), <https://vantbefinfo.com/haiti-les-signataires-de-laccord-de-montana-presentent-une-feuille-de-route-pour-la-transition-post-7-fevrier-2026/>; Jean Junior Celestin, *Inter-Haitian dialogue: a three-member Presidential College appointed, three names proposed for the Prime Minister's office*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Feb. 6, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/264103/dialogue-inter-haitien-un-college-presidentiel-de-trois-membres-designe-trois-noms-proposes-pour-la-primature>; see also Colete Lespinasse, *Haiti: Le Premier Ministre Alix D. Fils-Aimé Assume Désormais Tous les Pouvoirs*, *Coordination Europe Haiti* (Feb. 19, 2026), <https://www.coch.eu/fr/haiti-le-premier-ministre-alix-d-fils-aime-assume-desormais-tous-les-pouvoirs-sans-aucun-partage/> (“[A]s February 7, 2026, approached, everyone was concerned about the possibility of an institutional vacuum at the highest level of the Haitian state. Numerous negotiations had taken place between political groups and some civil society organizations to find a replacement.”).

³⁹⁰ See Jaqueline Charles, *Troops for Gang Suppression Force in Haiti expected in April; U.N. says work is on track*, *Miami Herald* (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314499097.html> (U.S. Ambassador to the UN Jennifer Locetta said that “Prime Minister Fils-Aimé’s tenure as Haiti’s prime minister remains integral to advancing efforts to combat terrorist gangs and stabilizing the country,” a position that “was shared by a number of countries including France, the United Kingdom, China and the Caribbean Community”); U.S. Dep’t of State, *Secretary Rubio’s Call with Haitian Prime Minister Fils-Aimé*, (Jan. 23, 2026), <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/secretary-rubios-call-with-haitian-prime-minister-fils-aime> (in a call with Fils-Aimé, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio “emphasized the importance of his continued tenure as Haiti’s Prime Minister to combat terrorist gangs and stabilize the island” and added that the TPC “must be dissolved by February 7 without corrupt actors seeking to interfere in Haiti’s path to elected governance for their own gains”); Michelson Césaire, *Keeping Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé in Office Remains Essential, Says U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Henry Wooster*, *Le Nouvelliste* (Jan. 23, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/263625/keeping-prime-minister-alix-didier-fils-aime-in-office-remains-essential-says-us-charge-daffaires-henry-wooster> (the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Haiti stated that “maintaining Alix Didier Fils-Aimé at the head of the Haitian government remains essential to advancing efforts to combat terrorist gangs and stabilize the country” and warned that “[t]he United States is watching closely. . . [and] will ensure that anyone who supports the terrorism responsible for chaos in Haiti and insecurity in the region faces severe consequences”); Jaqueline Charles, *U.S. revokes visa of top Haiti official for alleged gang support, fanning instability*, *Miami Herald* (Nov. 30, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313118626.html> (“[T]he U.S. and Canadian embassies have been engaged in trying to halt . . . [TPC efforts to replace the acting Prime Minister], arguing that a political vacuum would invite more instability at a time armed criminal groups are on the offensive.”); Widlore Mérancourt et Wethzer Piercin, *Fritz Alphonse Jean Denies Allegations in U.S. State Department Statement*, (Aug. 2, 2025), <https://ayibopost.com/fritz-alphonse-jean-denies-allegations-in-u-s-state-department-statement/> (in August 2025, the U.S. Department of State posted on social media reaffirming “its support for cooperation between the CPT and the Prime Minister” and warning “that anyone attempting to disrupt this collaboration would be held accountable”); see also Jaqueline Charles, *U.S. backs Haiti’s prime minister as presidential transitional council’s mandate ends*, *Miami Herald* (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314580378.html> (“Some critics say the lack of consensus [leading up to February 7] has created an opening for foreign influence, particularly from the United States, to shape the country’s political transition.”); Jake Johnston, *Private Sector Assumes Control of Haitian State*, *CEPR* (Aug. 18, 2025), <https://cepr.net/publications/private-sector-assumes-control-of-haitian-state/> (noting that Fils-Aimé hired Washington, DC-based lobbyists for a 12-month contract in February 2025).

³⁹¹ See note 10; see also Jake Johnston, *Private Sector Assumes Control of Haitian State as DC Lobbying Picks up Pace*, *CEPR* (Aug. 18, 2025), <https://cepr.net/publications/private-sector-assumes-control-of-haitian-state/> (discussing “the long-standing relationship that Haiti’s private sector has with US politicians and diplomats [which] continues to be a significant driver of policy in Haiti” as highly relevant given businessman Fils-Aimé’s seat in the primature).

³⁹² In November 2025, the Department of State imposed visa restrictions on TPC member Fritz Alphonse Jean, who had voiced concerns about the consolidation of private sector power should Fils-Aimé stay in power. It imposed restrictions against an addition four unnamed councilors (two of whom are presumed to be Leslie Voltaire and Smith Augustin) after a majority of TPC members voted to oust Fils-Aimé in late January. The stated rationale for all the sanctions was supporting or enabling armed groups. U.S. Dep’t of State, *Visa Restrictions for Haitian Official Supporting Gangs*, (Nov. 24, 2025), <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/11/visa-restrictions-of-haitian-official-supporting-gangs-and-other-criminal-organizations-in-haiti>; U.S. Dep’t of State, *Visa Restrictions for Haitian Officials Empowering Terrorist Gangs* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/visa-restrictions-for-haitian-officials-empowering-terrorist-gangs-in-haiti> (once again alleging that the sanctioned individuals were involved in the operation of armed groups); U.S. Dep’t of State, *Visa Restrictions for Transitional Presidential Council Members for Supporting Gangs*, (Jan. 25, 2026), <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/visa-restrictions-for-transitional-presidential-council-tpc-members-for-supporting-gangs> (Jan. 25, 2026); @Radio Metronome, *Post on X*, (Jan. 28, 2026), https://x.com/Radio_Metronome/status/2016649775832023212?s=20; Diego Da Rin, *US Gunboats Patrol Haiti’s Waters Amid Wrangling over New Government*, *Crisis Group* (Feb. 5, 2026), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/anb/latin-america-caribbean/haiti-united-states-us-gunboats-patrol-haitis-waters-amid-wrangling-over-new-government>; see also Jaqueline Charles, *U.S. revokes*

visa of top Haiti official for alleged gang support, fanning instability, Miami Herald (Nov. 30, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313118626.html> (Jean said that once TPC members “started talking about the incompetence of the government to resolve the problems of insecurity, to resolve the governance, elections....threats started arriving,” and emphasizes that “[i]t is unacceptable for embassies to presume to threaten a presidential council member under the pretext that he has decided to participate in the dismissal of Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, whose inability to govern the country is undeniable”) (*internal quotations omitted*); Jake Johnston, *Private Sector Assumes Control of Haitian State as DC Lobbying Picks up Pace*, CEPR (Aug. 18, 2025), <https://cepr.net/publications/private-sector-assumes-control-of-haitian-state/> (in August, Jean pointed out that with former head of the American Chamber of Commerce in Haiti Laurent Saint-Cyr taking over as transitional president and businessman Fils-Aimé as acting Prime Minister, and no elected officials holding office at any level, “the government is directly in the hands of the private sector,” which has “played a role in creating this chaos”); Jaqueline Charles, *US revokes visas of two members of Haiti’s ruling presidential council, cites gang ties*, Miami Herald (Jan. 25, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314450833.html> (“No specifics were offered about the alleged ties with gangs that currently control large swaths of Port-au-Prince and are quickly expanding to other regions. But in the last 24 hours, some council members have been attempting to use their vote as leverage with the prime minister, while a well-known gang figure posted a video on TikTok voicing support for the council.”).

³⁹³ @HouseForeignGOP, *Post on X*, (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://x.com/HouseForeignGOP/status/2019153715970621452> (Feb. 4, 2026) (“At the direction of the Secretary of War, the USS Stockdale, USCGC Stone and USCGC Diligence have arrived in the Bay of Port-au-Prince as part of Operation Southern Spear. Their presence reflects the United States unwavering commitment to Haiti’s security, stability, and brighter future. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard reaffirm their partnership and support to ensure a safer and more prosperous Haiti.”).

³⁹⁴ Diego Da Rin, *US Gunboats Patrol Haiti’s Waters Amid Wrangling over New Government*, Crisis Group (Feb. 5, 2026), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/amb/latin-america-caribbean/haiti-united-states/us-gunboats-patrol-haitis-waters-amid-wrangling-over-new-government> (“While President Donald Trump’s administration has stopped short of threatening Haiti with military intervention, it has intimated via social media that it is intent on quashing attempts by members of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) to oust Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé before the council’s mandate expires on 7 February. The naval presence appears to provide the latest proof of Washington’s willingness to use the threat of force to shape politics in the Western hemisphere.”); Leah Schroeder, *Further US intervention in Haiti would be worst Trump move of all*, Responsible Statecraft (Feb. 17, 2026), <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/haiti-us-intervention/> (“The mandate expired Feb. 7, leaving U.S.-backed Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé in power. Experts believe the warships were a show of force from Washington to demonstrate that the U.S. was willing to impose its influence, encouraging the council to step down. It did.”); Juhakenson Blaise, *US Embassy confirms warships in Haiti’s water amid political deadline and gang violence*, Haitian Times (Feb. 4, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/02/04/us-military-ships-haiti-waters/> (reporting that some fear the ships’ presence “signals renewed external influence at a time when Haiti’s political future hangs in the balance”); Daniel Ruiz Bracamonte, *Three Destroyers and One Order: How the US Imposed Its Rule on Haiti*, Orinoco Tribune (Feb. 11, 2025), <https://orinocotribune.com/three-destroyers-and-one-order-how-the-us-imposed-its-rule-on-haiti/>.

³⁹⁵ See Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti’s New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti>; Frances Robles, *U.N. Security Council Approves Larger Force to Fight Gangs in Haiti*, New York Times (Sep. 30, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/30/world/americas/un-haiti-security-gangs.html?unlocked_article_code=1.qE8.bpKU.0VWcalnjO1pd&smid=url-share (“[The MSS], which consists of about 1,000 officers, managed a few victories, like taking back the airport and seaport, but was never fully staffed or funded and failed to quell the spread of violence to areas outside the capital.”); Jaqueline Charles, *‘Gang Suppression Force’ to replace Haiti’s Kenya-led mission under U.S. proposal*, Miami (Aug. 31, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311889116.html> (“In the new [UNSC] resolution, the authors note that despite the best efforts of the Kenya mission, its modest resources and resultant capacities have not been able to keep pace with the dramatic expansion of the threat posed by gangs and thus the mission requires sustainable logistical support.”); see also IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, p. 13 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – December 2024*, p. 13 (Dec. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/December-2024-Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – June 2024*, p. 14 (Jun. 2024), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Human-Rights-and-the-Rule-of-Law-in-Haiti-Key-Recent-Developments-December-2023-through-May-2024.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – December 2023*, p. 12 (Dec. 2023), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/IJDH-HRU-Dec.-2023-12.11-FINAL.pdf>; IJDH, *Human Rights Update – June 2023*, n. 447 – 447 (Jun. 2023), https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/HRU-June-2023-FINAL_updated-8.14.pdf.

³⁹⁶ The UN Security Council authorized the GSF on September 30, 2025 for an initial period of 12 months. UN Security Council, *Resolution 2793 (2025)*, S/RES/2793 (Sep. 30, 2025), [https://docs.un.org/S/RES/2793\(2025\)?_gl=1*fonrcr1_ga*OTc0MDM1ODQyLjE3NjE0MjQ2Mzg.*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*_czE3NzE5NzA2NDkkbzE2JGcxJHQxNzcxOTcwNzYyJGo2MCRsMCRoMA](https://docs.un.org/S/RES/2793(2025)?_gl=1*fonrcr1_ga*OTc0MDM1ODQyLjE3NjE0MjQ2Mzg.*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*_czE3NzE5NzA2NDkkbzE2JGcxJHQxNzcxOTcwNzYyJGo2MCRsMCRoMA); see also International Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance*, p. 25 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf> (“A brainchild of the Trump administration, the resolution drafted by the U.S. and Panama mandated the deployment of up to 5,500 military personnel and 50 civilians to ‘neutralise, isolate and deter’ Haiti’s gangs.”); Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti’s New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti>; Jaqueline Charles, *UN Security Council approves new ‘Gang Suppression Force’ for Haiti*, Miami Herald (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312320989.html> (“Like the MSS, the new force will still have a force commander in charge. But now, it will be overseen by a group of countries representing the coalition of the willing, troop contributing countries. . . . Also, the new force will be reporting up through a special representative, a civilian who will provide oversight and political direction.”). The OAS also plays a role in the GSF’s operations – it “has been asked to

contribute to the overall strategic concept of the GSF” and “given a mandate to provide . . . a targeted support package to the GSF and HNP . . . including food and water, fuel, transports, tents, defense supplies, appropriate communication equipment.” Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti's New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti>.

³⁹⁷ Christopher Shell, *Haiti is in a Crisis of State Capacity* (Dec. 17, 2025), <https://web.archive.org/web/20251219153918/https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/12/haiti-crisis-state-capacity-gangs-weapons-drugs?lang=en> (“Observers have raised concerns that the GSF, which was approved for a one-year mandate, may provide short-term relief, but that without meaningful investment in Haiti’s state capacity, the cycle of violence could return once the international force departs. . . . Concerns I heard from Haitian interlocutors mirror those expressed by observers in Washington: Without sustained resources, clear strategy, and long-term investment in Haitian state capacity, external interventions tend to fall short.”); Jaqueline Charles, *The UN's New Force Won't Save Haiti from the Gangs*, Chatham House (Dec. 15, 2025), <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2025-12/uns-new-force-wont-save-haiti-gangs> (“The size of the new GSF is five times greater than the force it is replacing. This and the fact it can deploy lethal force may mean it is more successful than the previous Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission. But it risks repeating the failures of past UN peacekeeping missions, which focused on tactical gains rather than achieving stability for the people.”); Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak> (reporting Haitian concerns that the GSF will be “yet another pointless foreign intervention” that kills poor people); Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti's New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti> (“[Himmler] Rébu, the former Haitian special forces commander, believes the latest intervention is ill-conceived because it is based on bringing a large amount of security personnel from abroad to fight gangs in the streets, instead of training Haitian forces to help them regain control of the territory, and, more fundamentally, ensuring that the societal root causes of the crisis are addressed.”); Jaqueline Charles, *UN Security Council approves new 'Gang Suppression Force' for Haiti*, Miami Herald (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312320989.html> (China’s Permanent Representative Fu Cong Fu said “[r]esorting to military force to combat violence with violence at this juncture is not only unlikely to succeed, but could further complicate Haiti’s already intractable situation”); Jaqueline Charles, *'Gang Suppression Force' to replace Haiti's Kenya-led mission under U.S. proposal*, Miami (Aug. 31, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311889116.html> (according to Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, head of Haiti Observatory at Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, the GSF resolution cannot be successful if it does not consider “the fight against networks supporting gangs, whether political or economic, through sanctions or other multilateral mechanisms, or in support of the Haitian justice system”).

³⁹⁸ Frances Robles, *U.N. Security Council Approves Larger Force to Fight Gangs in Haiti*, New York Times (Sep. 30, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/30/world/americas/un-haiti-security-gangs.html?unlocked_article_code=1.qE8.bpKU.0VWcalnjO1pd&smid=url-share (“China argued that the United States had treated the Council as a ‘rubber stamp’ by failing to answer key questions, including about paying for the new force, its rules of engagement and where the personnel would come from. . . . Eugene Chen, a senior fellow at U.N. University’s Center for Policy Research, said the new force was similar to one now deployed in Somalia, and was a mere ‘rebranding’ of the Multinational Security Support mission. . . . ‘This new force addresses some — but not all — of the operational challenges of the Multinational Security Support mission, but not the strategic ones.’”); Jaqueline Charles, *Gang Suppression Force not a done deal, U.S. says as it sanctions former Haiti leaders*, Miami Herald (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312209995.html> (“[T]here are questions about how will it achieve its target of 5,500 personnel when the current mission could not get more than 1,000.”); Jaqueline Charles, *'Gang Suppression Force' to replace Haiti's Kenya-led mission under U.S. proposal*, Miami Herald (Aug. 31, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311889116.html>; see also InAfrica, *US Seeks Larger Haiti Force; Kenya Flags Unreliable Vehicles at UN* (Sep. 23, 2025), <https://inafrika.co.tz/haiti-security-force-un-kenya-vehicles-2025/> (Kenyan President William Ruto highlighted supply gaps, problems with logistics, and old vehicles that broke down as some of the challenges the MSS faced, and urged international partners to fix those before expanding the force with the GSF).

³⁹⁹ UN Security Council, *Resolution 2793 (2025)*, S/RES/2793 ¶¶ 1, 10 (Sep. 30, 2025), [https://docs.un.org/S/RES/2793\(2025\)?_gl=1*fonrcr*_ga*OTc0MDM1ODQyLjE3NjE0MjQ2Mzg.*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*_czE3NzE5NzA2NDkkbzE2JGcxJH0xNzcxOTcwNzYyJGo2MCRsMCRoMA](https://docs.un.org/S/RES/2793(2025)?_gl=1*fonrcr*_ga*OTc0MDM1ODQyLjE3NjE0MjQ2Mzg.*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*_czE3NzE5NzA2NDkkbzE2JGcxJH0xNzcxOTcwNzYyJGo2MCRsMCRoMA) (“the cost of personnel will be borne by voluntary contributions,” while a new UN support office is to “assume full logistical support responsibility of the GSF within six months of adoption”); Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti's New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti> (“There will be some funding from the UN budget, but the majority of the money will still be coming from voluntary contributions.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); Frances Robles, *U.N. Security Council Approves Larger Force to Fight Gangs in Haiti*, New York Times (Sep. 30, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/30/world/americas/un-haiti-security-gangs.html?unlocked_article_code=1.qE8.bpKU.0VWcalnjO1pd&smid=url-share (“The [GSF] force would depend on voluntary contributions, which was problematic for the Kenyan-led security mission since few countries other than the United States were willing to help with either personnel or money.”); Jaqueline Charles, *'Gang Suppression Force' to replace Haiti's Kenya-led mission under U.S. proposal*, Miami (Aug. 31, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311889116.html> (“While troops’ salaries would continue to be paid from voluntary contributions to the United Nations, logistical support will be funded from a newly created U.N. Support Office in Haiti,” paid for through UN member states’ assessed contributions).

⁴⁰⁰ The UN trust fund set up to receive voluntary contributions has received approximately US\$61 million since the GSF was authorized on September 30, 2025. UN Data Hub, *Contributions to the Trust Fund for the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission for Haiti authorised under SCR 2699 (2023) and Gang Suppression Force (GSF) authorised under SCR 2793(2025)*

(2025), <https://psdata.un.org/dataset/DOS-MSSTrustFund> (the total amount in the trust fund as of the end of writing is US\$174.1 million, but this includes all contributions made since the MSS was authorized in 2023); see also Jaqueline Charles, *Troops for Gang Suppression Force in Haiti expected in April; U.N. says work is on track*, Miami Herald (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314499097.html>; Jaqueline Charles, *Mexico becomes first Latin American country to give to Kenya-led fund for Haiti*, Miami Herald (Sep. 23, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312216004.html> (“While the total cash in hand at the U.N. is enough to pay for the stipends of the Kenya mission’s 1,000 personnel until the end of the year, the funds are not enough to support the effort to dismantle the high-powered criminal groups terrorizing Haiti and ensure that the personnel have the necessary equipment, supporters of the mission have said.”). Shifting part of the funding responsibility to the UN will not necessarily resolve its financial problems, either: the UN is experiencing a “major budget shortfall,” including as a result of the United States’ longstanding failure to pay its assessed contributions timely and in full and recent U.S. funding cuts. Rebecca Leppert, *How the United Nations Is Funded and Who Pays the Most*, Pew Research (Jul. 31, 2025), <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/07/31/how-the-united-nations-is-funded-and-who-pays-the-most/>; International Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance*, p. 26 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf>; Jaqueline Charles, *UN Security Council approves new ‘Gang Suppression Force’ for Haiti*, Miami Herald (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312320989.html> (“The U.S. has come under fire at the U.N. for its clawback of billions of dollars in aid that had been previously authorized by Congress to U.N. agencies — including for the very peacekeeping fund that is supposed to partly fund the newly created U.N. Support Office intended to help provide logistics and operational backing for the gang suppression force, alongside the OAS. . . . Pakistan Ambassador Asim Iftikhar Ahmad. . . . noted that the MSS never reached its 2,500 authorized strength due to funding, which impacted its effectiveness. ‘The resolution’s authorization for the use of U.N. peacekeeping funds for logistics and operational support does address this concern to some extent, but cannot be considered a silver bullet,’ he said, referencing the body’s ongoing financial crisis. ‘As we have repeatedly heard, including from the Secretary General for the liquidity crunch in the peacekeeping budgetary allocations.’”).

⁴⁰¹ See Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti’s New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti> (noting that the amount in the trust fund established by the UN to gather contributions is “much less than the \$600-800 million per year needed to finance the previous force, let alone one expected to be five times larger”); International Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti’s Deadly Gang Alliance*, p. 26 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf> (“U.S. officials have indicated that the combined costs of the GSF and support office might come close to \$1 billion per year.”); Frances Robles, *U.N. Security Council Approves Larger Force to Fight Gangs in Haiti*, New York Times (Sep. 30, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/30/world/americas/un-haiti-security-gangs.html?unlocked_article_code=1.qE8.bpKU.0VWcalnjO1pd&smid=url-share.

⁴⁰² Christopher Shell, *Haiti is in a Crisis of State Capacity* (Dec. 17, 2025), <https://web.archive.org/web/20251219153918/https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/12/haiti-crisis-state-capacity-gangs-weapons-drugs?lang=en> (“[S]ignificant questions remain about the mission’s viability—especially given the international community’s anemic response to the Biden administration’s requests for material and financial support.”); Jaqueline Charles, *The UN’s New Force Won’t Save Haiti from the Gangs*, Chatham House (Dec. 15, 2025), <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2025-12/uns-new-force-wont-save-haiti-gangs> (“countries have been slow to write cheques or deploy troops”); Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti’s New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti> (“In Panama, which co-sponsored the UN Security Council resolution, President José Raúl Mulino told a press conference days after the vote that he had offered to train Haitian police officers but wouldn’t ‘send soldiers to Haiti to die there, because that is most likely what will happen.’ The United States, which refused to send security personnel when the MSS was deployed, has expressed no intention to change its position. According to some experts, this is also deterring others from pitching in. ‘We will find ourselves in the same situation as before if the US doesn’t provide the largest contingent of troops,’ [said] Colonel Himmler Rébu, former commander of the Haitian Army’s special forces.”); see also Jaqueline Charles, *Mexico becomes first Latin American country to give to Kenya-led fund for Haiti*, Miami Herald (Sep. 23, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312216004.html> (“[U.S. Secretary of State Marco] Rubio has also suggested that the leadership of the anti-gang fight should be spearheaded by a country or countries in the Americas region, not necessarily Kenya. It’s a tall order considering that despite concerns about Haiti’s violence spilling over, Latin America and Caribbean nations have not been responsive. Jamaica and The Bahamas, for example, have yet to make good on their troop-deployment promises, while Belize and Barbados both took a step back.”).

⁴⁰³ @GSForceHaiti, *Post on X*, (Nov. 5, 2025), <https://x.com/GSForceHaiti/status/1986161453670539454?s=20> (Nov. 5, 2025); Jaqueline Charles, *Troops for Gang Suppression Force in Haiti expected in April; U.N. says work is on track*, Miami Herald (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314499097.html> (“A dozen countries have so far offered to deploy troops, and the first contingent is expected to begin arriving in April.”); Jaqueline Charles, *Haiti secures major troop offers for new anti-gang fighting force*, Miami Herald (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313572872.html> (Chad and Bangladesh have promised to send 1,500 soldiers each; Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Sri Lanka, the Bahamas, Belize, and Jamaica have all promised to send personnel); Jaqueline Charles, *Dispute over kidnappings triggers deadly war among Haiti’s gang coalition*, Miami Herald (Dec. 9, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313559561.html?giftCode=59a8570a8204727d94d798ea9cc6666de41d0092f99edee9c041982b77507e22> (Force Commander Godfrey Otunge said Kenya “stands with Haiti for as long as it takes, until peace prevails”).

⁴⁰⁴ 230 Kenyan officers made up the first deployment since the UNSC authorized the GSF, joining the 700 or so Kenyan, Jamaican, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran officers who were already there. Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, The New Humanitarian (Dec. 10, 2025),

<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak>; Juhakenson Blaise, *New 'Gang Suppression Force' puts 230 Kenyan police officers on the ground in Haiti*, *Haitian Times* (Dec. 9, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/12/09/fifth-kenyan-police-contingent-haiti-anti-gang-force/>; Jaqueline Charles, *Dispute over kidnappings triggers deadly war among Haiti's gang coalition*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 9, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313559561.html?giftCode=59a8570a8204727d94d798ea9cc6666de41d0092f99edee9c041982b77507e22> (“In total, there are currently 989 foreign police officers in the country.”).

⁴⁰⁵ International Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance*, p. 26 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf> (“On paper, the new force represents a major departure from the MSS. It is designed to be a military-led offensive operation, not a police mission, and will be entitled to act independently from Haitian authorities.”); Jaqueline Charles, *UN Security Council approves new 'Gang Suppression Force' for Haiti*, *Miami Herald* (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312320989.html>; Jaqueline Charles, *'Gang Suppression Force' to replace Haiti's Kenya-led mission under U.S. proposal*, *Miami Herald* (Aug. 31, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311889116.html> (“The Kenya mission was sold as providing support to the Haitian police by reinforcing, training and mentoring cops. But in reality that didn't happen, as the Haitian police high command failed to provide intelligence on gangs, and internal fighting and political tensions with the country's transitional government fractured the already divided force. Unlike the current, mostly police-led Kenya mission, which cannot conduct operations on its own, the newly revised force would be authorized to act independently of the Haiti National Police.”).

⁴⁰⁶ See, e.g., Frances Robles, *U.N. Security Council Approves Larger Force to Fight Gangs in Haiti*, *New York Times* (Sep. 30, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/30/world/americas/un-haiti-security-gangs.html?unlocked_article_code=1.qE8.bpKU.0VWcalnjO1pd&smid=url-share (“The new force's mandate will be ‘more muscular,’ said Henry Wooster, the United States' chargé d'affaires in Haiti. ‘That allows greater freedom of maneuver, freedom of action,’ he said. Its name — the Gang Suppression Force — ‘should speak volumes.’”).

⁴⁰⁷ See Milo Milfort, *As new UN force set to tackle gangs, Haitians speak of exhaustion and hopelessness*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/first-person/2025/12/10/new-un-force-gang-violence-haitians-speak> (the director of Haitian human rights organization Fondasyon Je Klere raised concerns about the lack of transparency: “Now a new force has arrived. But with what mission? What mandate? What operational strength? What are this mission's commitments to the Haitian population? We don't know. And can they really operate without the Haitian police? I don't think so. They are foreigners who don't know the country, don't speak Kreyol or French. How will they operate without credible guides? To operate, they need to be able to enter the neighbourhoods with locals who know the streets, the areas, the gangs strongholds.”).

⁴⁰⁸ Jaqueline Charles, *Haiti secures major troop offers for new anti-gang fighting force*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313572872.html> (“The lack of commitment by Latin American countries, according to a diplomatic source, stems from the U.S. drafted Concept of Operations, known as CONOPS. Ahead of the meeting, a number of nations had raised concerns about making commitments without a clear agreement on how the mission would operate, and on a U.S. directive that focused mainly on ‘killing’ gang members, many of whom are youth.”); Jaqueline Charles, *Special representative named for U.S. backed-Gang Suppression Force in Haiti*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 2, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313313420.html?giftCode=8a3dadca960f20562c76b300557c0bed596366da81c2b23241b9be2a5689d3f3> (“Both in international circles and in Haiti, some are insisting that the focus on the new force can't solely be about killing gang members. The GSF's mission also needs to ensure a localized strategy for non-military actions so that real peace building can finally happen in Haiti, some are insisting.”); Jaqueline Charles, *UN Security Council approves new 'Gang Suppression Force' for Haiti*, *Miami Herald* (Sep. 30, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article312320989.html> (“How often will [the Standing Group of Partners] . . . meet, how will they settle differences, are among the glaring issues with the proposal, experts on peacekeeping missions have said, noting that the GSF will have soldiers and police who've never trained or work together before being asked to fight gangs.”); Jaqueline Charles, *'Gang Suppression Force' to replace Haiti's Kenya-led mission under U.S. proposal*, *Miami Herald* (Aug. 31, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311889116.html> (“[I]n terms of the details, the coordination with the Haitian authorities is barely mentioned. . . . Notably absent from the resolution is any reference to Haiti's police task force, which currently is using weaponized drones and mercenaries to go after gangs. The resolution also makes no mention of the country's nascent army, which has also been recruited in the fight.”); see also Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti's New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti> (According to a security expert, “[t]he increasing use of drones to combat the gangs is also a disincentive. ‘Countries can't commit based on a resolution alone. . . . And I'm not sure they will be very inclined to deploy troops knowing that a private military company is also intervening on the ground. It only reinforces reluctancies.’”).

⁴⁰⁹ See UN Security Council, *Resolution 2793 (2025)*, S/RES/2793, ¶ 18 (Sep. 30, 2025), [https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf](https://docs.un.org/S/RES/2793(2025)?_gl=1*fonrcr*ga*OTc0MDM1ODQyLjE3NjE0MjQ2Mzg.*ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*czE3NzE5NzA2NDkkbzE2JGcxJHQxNzcxOTcwNzYyJG02MCRsMCRoMA; see also IJDH, Human Rights Update – July 2025</i>, p. 13 (Jul. 2025), <a href=).

⁴¹⁰ See Jaqueline Charles, *Special representative named for U.S. backed-Gang Suppression Force in Haiti*, *Miami Herald* (Dec. 2, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313313420.html?giftCode=8a3dadca960f20562c76b300557c0bed596366da81c2b23241b9be2a5689d3f3> (“[O]ngoing negotiations over the force's concept of operations . . . [have] triggered concerns over the military focused of the force given the large number of children and youth who make up Haitian gangs.”); Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti's New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 3, 2025),

<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti> (Founder and executive director of the US-based think tank Haiti Policy House Wolf Pamphile expressed concern “that civilians will get hurt, that innocent people will die, because usually when Haiti or any Black country is in the crosshairs of police or military, there tends to be less care about collateral damage. . . . If the GSF has an opportunity to take out Barbecue (Jimmy Chérizier, the leader of the gang coalition Viv Ansanm), for instance, but there are three kids nearby, what will they do? What is the limit? . . . If a high number of civilians – and especially children and teenagers – are killed in security operations, the fear is that large sections of the Haitian population could rise up against the GSF, and this situation could then play into the favour of the gangs instead of effectively combatting them.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); OHCHR, *Child Trafficking by Gangs Putting Haiti's Future at Risk: UN Report* (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/child-trafficking-gangs-putting-haitis-future-risk-un-report> (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said “that it is essential that the newly-created Gang Suppression Force ensures that children’s rights are fully respected during the planning and conduct of operations against gangs, in accordance with international human rights law.”); *see also* International Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance*, p. 27 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf> (“Accountability concerns also abound. The force will need personnel with expertise in offensive urban operations, as most gangs are entrenched in densely populated slums. Because of the likelihood that civilians will be used as human shields during combat, the UN will need to provide close oversight to prevent human rights violations.”).

⁴¹¹ *See* Jaqueline Charles, *Haiti secures major troop offers for new anti-gang fighting force*, Miami Herald (Dec. 10, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313572872.html> (Canada emphasized the need for the GSF “to protect women and girls, who are being subjected to horrific rapes by criminal gangs”).

⁴¹² Daniel Dickinson, *Haiti is under a UN arms embargo: So why are 500,000 illegal weapons in circulation?*, UN News (17 Oct. 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166121> (“Haiti does not manufacture firearms or ammunition, but according to the latest figures released by the UN human rights office there are an estimated between 270,000 and 500,000 illegal weapons in circulation.”); UN Security Council, *Resolution 2700*, UN Doc. S/RES/2700, (Oct. 19, 2023), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4024715?ln=en&v=pdf>; UN Security Council, *Resolution 2653*, UN Doc. S/RES/2653 (2022), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2653.pdf; *see also* OHCHR, *Child Trafficking by Gangs Putting Haiti's Future at Risk: UN Report*, (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/child-trafficking-gangs-putting-haitis-future-risk-un-report> (Feb. 20, 2026) OHCHR, *Child Trafficking by Gangs Putting Haiti's Future at Risk: UN Report* (Feb. 20, 2026), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/02/child-trafficking-gangs-putting-haitis-future-risk-un-report> (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said enforcing the UN arms embargo is critical to stopping the “never-ending cycle of violence”).

⁴¹³ UN Security Council, *Resolution 2814*, UN Doc. S/RES/2814 (Jan. 29, 2026), [https://docs.un.org/S/RES/2814\(2026\)?_gl=1*_nhye9*_ga*OTc0MDM1ODQyLjE3NjE0MjQ2Mzg.*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*_czE3NzE5ODgzMDEkbzE3JGcwJHQxNzcxOTg4MzAxJGo2MCRsMCRoMA](https://docs.un.org/S/RES/2814(2026)?_gl=1*_nhye9*_ga*OTc0MDM1ODQyLjE3NjE0MjQ2Mzg.*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*_czE3NzE5ODgzMDEkbzE3JGcwJHQxNzcxOTg4MzAxJGo2MCRsMCRoMA) (the newly-adopted BINUH resolution expressed “grave concern about the continued flow of illicit arms and ammunition into Haiti” and emphasized “the urgent need to prohibit the transfer of arms and related materiel of all types to non-State actors engaged in or supporting gang violence, criminal activities, or human rights abuses in Haiti; as well as to prevent their illicit trafficking and diversion”); UN Office on Drugs and Crime, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti* (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs (noting that armed groups’ territorial control “requires sustained access to military-grade firepower, which gangs are able to procure from abroad and transport into the capital through the same routes they dominate,” and reporting “a surge in the trafficking of high-caliber and military-style weapons,” many of which “are behind the gangs’ sniper attacks, mass lootings, kidnappings, attacks on prisons and seizures of new territories”); UN Security Council, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant*

to resolution 2752 (2024), ¶¶ 74-77 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597>, (discussing the types of weapons being trafficked into Haiti, for which demand remains high); *Haiti's Gangs*, Financial Times (Jul. 29, 2025), <https://ig.ft.com/haiti-gangs/>; *see also* Daniel Dickinson, *Record cocaine seizure in Haitian waters underlines country's 'pivotal' trafficking role*, UN News (Nov. 30, 2025), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166460> (“Intelligence from Jamaica also links firearms seizures to a guns-for-drugs trade involving Haitian gangs.”); UN Security Council, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2752 (2024)*, ¶¶ 102-118 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (“Drug trafficking sustains the economy of gangs, . . . fuelling the violence by allowing them to acquire weapons and expand territorial control.”). For an extensive discussion of weapons flows into Haiti, *see* BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2026/32*, ¶¶ 17-26, 33-34 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32>.

⁴¹⁴ UN Office on Drugs and Crime, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti* (Jan. 21, 2026), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer_organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs; BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2026/32*, ¶ 17 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32>; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, *Combating Illicit Firearms Trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean*, p. 7 (Aug. 2025), <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/48beddab-c6ee-4a56-8689-fad062428172.pdf>; *Haiti's Gangs*, Financial Times (Jul. 29, 2025), <https://ig.ft.com/haiti-gangs/> (a Financial Times analysis shows how weapons are smuggled from the United States into Haiti); *see also* UN Security Council, *Report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023)*, UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶ 25 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420> (“A recent firearms trafficking incident involving smugglers operating across the Dominican Republic Haiti and the United States highlights the transnational nature of weapons and ammunition flows. . . . [T]he criminal network first procured firearms in the United States. According to investigations, the alleged buyers had direct ties to individuals in Miami (United States), Belladère (Centre Department of Haiti) and Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic). Weapons were

then shipped from Florida aboard a cargo ship registered under the Honduran flag. The shipment transited through the port of Haina in the Dominican Republic before being intercepted by authorities.”).

⁴¹⁵ See *Haiti – Trois Armes à Feu, 1,800 Cartouches et Matériels Saisis au Port*, AlterPresse (Dec. 30, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Trois-armes-a-feu-1-800-cartouches-et-plusieurs-materiels-saisis-au-port> (“[T]he United States Department of Homeland Security’s investigative services seized, during the year 2025, more than 23,000 weapons and quantities of narcotics destined for Haiti.”); Quixote Center, *DHS Response Letter*, (Dec. 16, 2025), https://quixote.org/files/dhs_response_letter_dr_kim_lamberty_1.14.26.pdf (outlining U.S. screening measures for international shipments departing the United States); U.S. Dep’t of Just., *Haitian Nationals Charged with Unlawfully Smuggling Firearms from the United States*, (Jan. 6, 2026), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/haitian-nationals-charged-unlawfully-smuggling-firearms-united-states> (one U.S. citizen and two Haitian nationals were indicted on “conspiracy to smuggle goods and unlawfully ship firearms, smuggling goods from the United States, and unlawfully shipping firearms” to Haiti, and face a maximum penalty of 20 years in federal prison if convicted”); UN Security Council, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2752 (2024)*, ¶¶ 19-20, 85-90 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (“With regard to the arms embargo, the [U.S.] authorities stated that they continued to work closely with Haitian authorities and international partners to address firearms trafficking. Those efforts included capacity-building initiatives for Haitian law enforcement and information-sharing.”); *Florida man arrested in alleged gun smuggling scheme to Haiti via PortMiami*, Haitian Times (Jul 18, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/07/18/florida-man-smuggling-guns-haiti/>. During the reporting period, U.S. courts sentenced three individuals convicted of trafficking arms to Haiti. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., *International Gun Trafficking Conspiracy Dismantled*, (Dec. 11, 2025), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/international-gun-trafficking-conspiracy-dismantled>; U.S. Dep’t of Just., *Former Police Officer Sentenced to Three Years for Gun Trafficking*, (Aug. 14, 2025), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/former-police-officer-sentenced-three-years-federal-prison-gun-trafficking-offense..>

⁴¹⁶ BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, pp. 18, 19 (Jan. 30 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (there has been no material progress in three criminal cases related to arms trafficking in Haiti, one of which goes back to 2022); UN Office on Drugs and Crime, *Explainer: Organized Crime and Gang Violence in Haiti* (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2026/January/explainer-organized-crime-and-gang-violence-in-haiti.html#:~:text=With%20access%20to%20sophisticated%2C%20military,Drugs> (“Haiti’s policing and customs authorities – frequently the target of gangs – also struggle to staff and resource their agencies, meaning that many borders and airstrips are poorly surveilled and patrolled, and shipments inadequately monitored.”); Christopher Shell, *Haiti is in a Crisis of State Capacity* (Dec. 17, 2025), <https://web.archive.org/web/20251219153918/https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/12/haiti-crisis-state-capacity-gangs-weapons-drugs?lang=en> (under-resourcing of the Haitian military has left “the HNP with the tasks of urban policing, rural patrols, border security, and maritime operations—a tall order for a force of roughly 9,000 officers policing a nation of 11 million”); UN Security Council, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2752 (2024)*, ¶¶ 17-18, 83 (Sep. 25, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/597> (“The Haitian authorities did not report any seizures of arms or ammunition at ports of entry [between September 2024 and September 2025] . . . and embargoed materiel continues to flow into the country undetected. Field visits by the Panel indicate that law enforcement agencies continue to have limited access to most ports of entry, which hampers effective efforts to implement the embargo, due to gang violence in Port-au-Prince and local criminal groups operating near the land border. Furthermore, a handful of powerful businesspeople control some ports, including in the south of Haiti, turning them into quasi-private entities where State agents have little access or are in collusion with criminal networks. As a result, goods are able to flow in and out of the country uncontrolled.”); see also OHCHR & BINUH, *Intensification of Criminal Violence in Lower Artibonite, the Centre Department, and Regions Located East of the Metropolitan Area of Port-Au-Prince*, p. 20 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-july-artibonite-and-mirebalais-EN.pdf> (“According to several United Nations reports, the Belladère border post (located in the Centre department, approximately 100 kilometres from the capital) has, for several years, been a transit zone for trafficking in arms, drugs, and other contraband goods, either coming from or destined for the Dominican Republic.”).

⁴¹⁷ Jean Junior Celestin, *Two Arms Seizures in Under Ten Days in Cap-Haïtien and Quartier-Morin*, Le Nouvelliste (Jan. 7, 2026), <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/263101/two-arms-seizures-in-under-ten-days-in-cap-haitien-and-quartier-morin>; Jaqueline Charles, *They shipped high-powered ammo, guns to Haiti from Miami, federal prosecutors say*, Miami Herald (Jan. 6, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314224327.html> (Haitian police arrested two individuals in connection with an arms trafficking scheme); *Haiti – Trois Armes à Feu, 1,800 Cartouches et Matériels Saisis au Port*, AlterPresse (Dec. 30, 2025), <https://www.alterpresse.org/Haiti-Trois-armes-a-feu-1-800-cartouches-et-plusieurs-materiels-saisis-au-port>; Christopher Shell, *Haiti is in a Crisis of State Capacity* (Dec. 17, 2025), <https://web.archive.org/web/20251219153918/https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/12/haiti-crisis-state-capacity-gangs-weapons-drugs?lang=en> (the author notes that “[u]pon landing at Cap-Haïtien International Airport in mid-November, . . . [their] flight was met by customs officials who meticulously searched every pocket of every passenger’s bags. . . . looking for prohibited electronic devices, namely drones”); BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (April – June 2025)*, p. 17 (Jun. 2025), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf (in March and April 2025, PNH officials arrested six individuals in connection with arms trafficking schemes). Few of the firearms that are seized in Haiti are submitted for tracing, further impeding efforts to hold traffickers, dealers and manufacturers accountable. See Government Accountability Office, *CARIBBEAN FIREARMS: Agencies Have Anti-Trafficking Efforts in Place, But State Could Better Assess Activities* (Oct. 2024), <https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-107007/index.html>.

⁴¹⁸ Since IJDH’s last update, the U.S. government announced sanctions on former member of parliament Arnel Belizaire, former Senator Antonio Cheramy, former police officer and head of National Palace security Dimitri Hérard, and armed group leader Kempes Sanon. It also imposed visa restrictions on four unnamed TPC members and one cabinet minister (presumed to be Minister of Finance Alfred Métellus). U.S. Dep’t of State, *Designation of Two Former Haitian Public Officials for Significant*

Corruption, (Sep. 22, 2025), <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/designation-of-two-former-haitian-public-officials-for-involvement-in-significant-corruption/>; U.S. Dep't of Treasury, *Treasury Sanctions Terrorist Viv Ansanm Affiliates* (Oct. 17, 2025), <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0282>; U.S. Dep't of State, *Visa Restrictions for Haitian Official Supporting Gangs*, (Nov. 24, 2025), <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/11/visa-restrictions-of-haitian-official-supporting-gangs-and-other-criminal-organizations-in-haiti>; U.S. Dep't of State, *Visa Restrictions for Haitian Officials Empowering Terrorist Gangs*, (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/visa-restrictions-for-haitian-officials-empowering-terrorist-gangs-in-haiti>; U.S. Dep't of State, *Visa Restrictions for Transitional Presidential Council Members for Supporting Gangs*, (Jan. 25, 2026), <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/visa-restrictions-for-transitional-presidential-council-tpc-members-for-supporting-gangs>; Juhakenson Blaise, *US slaps visa restrictions on CPT amid fight over changing Haiti's PM*, *Haitian Times* (Jan. 27, 2026), <https://haitiantimes.com/2026/01/27/us-visa-restrictions-haiti-presidential-council-gang-ties/>. The UN Security Council likewise announced sanctions against Hérard and Sanon. UN Security Council, *Security Council Renews Sanctions Regime on Haiti, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2794* (2025) (Oct. 17, 2025), <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16195.doc.htm>. The European Council announced sanctions against former president and PHTK founder Michel Martelly, former Senators Youri Latortue and Rony Célestin, and the 5 *Segonn* armed group. European Council, *Haiti: Council Lists Three Individuals and One Entity over Gang Violence and Related Human Rights Abuses* (Dec. 15, 2025), <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/15/haiti-council-lists-three-individuals-and-one-entity-over-gang-violence-and-related-human-rights-abuses/>; see also BINUH, *Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (October – December 2025)*, p. 21 (Jan. 2026), https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf (“As of 31 December 2025, 35 individuals remained under sanctions by Canada, 20 by the United States, ten by the United Kingdom, and 18 by the European Union (EU), for acts undermining peace, security, and stability in Haiti, as well as for serious human rights violations. In addition, ten individuals and two entities (Gran Grif gang and the Viv Ansanm coalition of gangs) remained subject to the United Nations Security Council sanctions regime, which was extended in October.”); BINUH, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, S/2026/32*, ¶ 46 (Jan. 15, 2026), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/32>. *US offers \$5 million reward for information leading to arrest of 'Barbecue'* | *Breaking News*, *Haitian Times* (Aug. 12, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/12/barbecue-5-million-reward-indictment/> (“Federal prosecutors have unsealed an indictment charging Jimmy “Barbecue” Cherizier with conspiring to violate US sanctions by directing funds from the United States to his gang network in Haiti. Authorities are offering a \$5 million reward for information leading to his arrest or conviction. . . Cherizier, a former Haitian National Police officer, leads the Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies and helped create Viv Ansanm, a coalition of Haiti’s gangs designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2025. Authorities say Cherizier has been under U.S. sanctions since December 2020 for his role in human rights abuses.”). In December 2025, U.S. Congress passed the Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act, which “mandates the U.S. government to investigate, report on and impose sanctions against political and economic elites in Haiti who have colluded with violent gangs.” *Congress passes Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act in defense bill*, *Haitian Times* (Dec. 18, 2025), <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/12/18/congress-passes-haiti-criminal-collusion-transparency-act-in-defense-bill/>. (“Faith in Action International, an advocacy group, praised the legislation as a ‘potential turning point for Haiti’ and urged U.S. officials to fully implement the law, including sanctions on influential individuals accused of financing gangs.”); U.S. Congress, *Haiti Criminal Collusion Transparency Act (Senate Amendment 3558)*, <https://www.congress.gov/amendment/119th-congress/senate-amendment/3558/text>.

⁴¹⁹ The U.S. Department of State designated *Viv Ansanm* and *Gran Grif* as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. U.S. Dep't of State, *Terrorist Designations of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif* (May 2, 2025), <https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/terrorist-designations-of-viv-ansanm-and-gran-grif>; Office of Foreign Assets Control, *Counter Terrorism Designations* (May 2, 2025), <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recentactions/20250502>.

⁴²⁰ Mehdi Bouzouina, *US hails progress on Haiti's anti-gang force, but elections face steep hurdles*, *France 24* (Feb. 28, 2026), <https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20260228-us-hails-progress-haiti-anti-gang-force-rubio-elections>; see also UN Security Council, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2752 (2024)*, ¶¶ 12-16, 83 (Sep. 25, 2025) (attributing “the slow progress in the implementation of the sanctions regime in Haiti. . . to the lack of awareness, but in most part to the limited capacity of State institutions and political will of certain actors”).

⁴²¹ The U.S. government also indicted and arrested a U.S. citizen accused of funding Chérizier. U.S. Dep't of Just., *Haitian Gang Leader 'Barbecue' Indicted for Conspiracy to Violate U.S. Sanctions*, (Aug. 12, 2025), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/haitian-gang-leader-barbecue-indicted-conspiracy-violate-us-sanctions>.

⁴²² U.S. Dep't of Just., *Haitian Gang Leader 'Barbecue' Indicted for Conspiracy to Violate U.S. Sanctions*, (Aug. 12, 2025), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/haitian-gang-leader-barbecue-indicted-conspiracy-violate-us-sanctions> (“Concurrent with the indictment, the U.S. Department of State’s Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program is offering a reward of up to \$5 million for information leading to the arrest or conviction of Cherizier.”).

⁴²³ International Crisis Group, *Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance*, pp. 30, 36 (Dec. 2025), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/110-haiti-deadly-gang-alliance%20%281%29.pdf> (EU and UN sanctions, which are largely limited to armed group leaders, “have little or no impact on individuals who have no bank accounts and do not travel;” efforts at the UN Security Council to expand the list of sanctioned individuals who support armed group activities to include Haitian politicians Rony Célestin and Youri Latortue were reportedly blocked by Russia, which said “it did not back restrictions on political figures”).

⁴²⁴ Kenneth Mohammed, *Sanctions are not a humane alternative to bombs. They are economic warfare*, *The Guardian* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/jan/28/sanctions-economic-warfare-civilians-collateral-damage-us-embargo-cuba-haiti-venezuela>, (“Framed as driven by humanitarian or security concerns, the imposition of financial restrictions, banking de-risking, diplomatic isolation and travel advisories have further severed Haiti from global trade. Sanctions deepened poverty, decimated state capacity and accelerated displacement.”); UN Security Council, *Report of the United Nations*

Office on Drugs and Crime pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023), UN Doc. S/2025/420, ¶ 17 (Jun. 27, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/420>; (“The designation of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif as foreign terrorist organizations. . . [can] generate unintended outcomes, including additional legal, criminal justice and operational complexities for humanitarian, commercial and international actors. For example, reports have already started emerging that gangs are increasing extortion fees in response to these designations. There are also fears that sanctions could disrupt fuel and other deliveries, pushing transportation and other sectors to collapse.”); see also IJDH, *Human Rights Update – July 2025*, p. 14 (Jul. 2025), <https://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/HRU-July-2025.pdf>.

⁴²⁵ See note 392.

⁴²⁶ International Rescue Committee, *2026 Emergency Watchlist*, pp. 44-45 (Dec. 16, 2025), <https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/Watchlist%202026.pdf>, (“Haiti’s humanitarian response is among the least funded globally. . . Cuts to funding are at risk of leaving 1.7 million people without aid amid a substantial risk in 2026 from the mid-year hurricane season”); World Food Programme, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point*, p. 7 (Sept. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (“[Haiti] is facing its highest level of humanitarian needs since the 2010 earthquake, at the very moment when humanitarian funding is being sharply reduced. . . Haiti relied on USD1.3 bn in aid annually – now funding is shrinking.”); World Food Programme, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point*, pp. 14, 17 (Sept. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/>.

⁴²⁷ OCHA, *Financial Tracking Service: Haiti 2025*, <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/96/summary/2025>. As of writing, the 2026 basket is 18.4% funded. OCHA, *Financial Tracking Service: Haiti 2026*, <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/96/summary/2026>.

⁴²⁸ The humanitarian response plan for Haiti was 44.1% funded in 2024, 34.4% in 2023, and 51.7% in 2022. OCHA, *Financial Tracking Service: Haiti 2024*, <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/96/summary/2024>; OCHA, *Financial Tracking Service: Haiti 2023*, <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/96/summary/2023>; OCHA, *Financial Tracking Service: Haiti 2022*, <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/96/summary/2022>.

⁴²⁹ U.S. foreign aid to Haiti was reduced by 88% from 2024 to 2025. Promises from other donors, including the European Commission and the governments of Canada, Sweden and Switzerland, to increase their support are “unlikely to fill the significant gap left by the decline in United States funding.” World Food Programme, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point*, p. 14 (Sept. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/>; Jaqueline Charles, *As gang rapes surge in Haiti, aid groups strain under demand for services*, Miami Herald (Dec. 12, 2025), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article313038946.html> (a Miami Herald analysis found that Haiti organizations lost funding worth a total of US\$1.3 billion from the U.S. Agency for International Development when the Trump administration shut down the agency in 2025); Nawal Al-Maghafi & Jasmin Dyer, *In a Haitian city ruled by gangs, young rape survivor raises baby she was told to abort*, BBC (July 23, 2025), <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c07d3m3xk320> (“Haiti has long been one of the largest recipients of funding from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which President Donald Trump has slashed, dubbing it ‘wasteful’”).

⁴³⁰ The rules prohibit U.S. non-governmental organization (NGO) recipients of foreign assistance from providing abortions, providing “sex-rejecting procedures,” or engaging in “unlawful DEI-related discrimination” outside the United States. The prohibition also extends to foreign NGOs and international organizations, which are additionally prohibited from funding any other entity that engages in such activities. Chetan A. Patil et al., *State Department Issues New Foreign Assistance Rules Expanding the Mexico City Policy*, Ropes & Gray (Jan. 30, 2026), <https://www.ropesgray.com/en/insights/alerts/2026/01/state-department-issues-new-foreign-assistance-rules-expanding-the-mexico-city-policy>; MSF, *MSF Condemns Sweeping Expansion of Global Gag Rule* (Jan. 27, 2026), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/msf-condemns-sweeping-expansion-global-gag-rule> (referring to the Trump administration’s expansion of the Global Gag Rule as “an attempt to reshape US foreign assistance along ideological lines”).

⁴³¹ See World Food Programme, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point*, pp. 16-17 (Sept. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (“Funding cuts are weakening the capacity of national NGOs, which constitute the front line of the response, and are crucial for accessing people living in the most-affected areas. While many continue to operate, most told us they have implemented staff cuts and reduced salaries for those who remain. Numerous NGOs have been forced to suspend or delay critical activities due to lack of resources or following the stop-work order from [the United States Agency for International Development’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance].”).

⁴³² See Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, The New Humanitarian (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions>, (discussing the devastating impacts of funding cuts on access to food assistance; for example, “UNICEF’s nutrition programme under the Humanitarian Action for Children appeal reported a 72% funding gap in 2025”); World Food Programme, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point*, p. 15-17 (Sept. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (“[F]ood security is one of the lowest funded clusters, with contributions amounting to USD 9.3 million out of the USD 425 million required to target 3.4 million people, i.e., only 2.2 percent funded, according to OCHA. . . . According to the Food Security Cluster (FSC), the number of partners reporting food security activities dropped from 17 in 2024 to just 11 in 2025. Several partners have suspended monthly assistance due to lack of operational capacity and at least 22 percent have reduced the size of food rations.”).

⁴³³ See UN Security Council, *Amid Relentless Armed Violence, Collapsing Schools, Hospitals, Haiti Facing ‘Perfect Storm of Suffering’, Secretary-General Warns Security Council* (Aug. 28, 2025), <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16158.doc.htm>, (“Not closing this [funding] gap is not just a technical statistical matter; it is literally the difference between life and death.”) (*internal quotations omitted*); World Food Programme, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point*, pp. 16-17, 23 (Sept. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (noting the resulting protection gap for women and girls, in particular); see also World Food Programme, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point*, p. 23 (Sept. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (without sufficient funding, the WFP is unable to carry out

assessments and collect monitoring data, which impacts its ability “to identify emerging vulnerabilities, track deteriorating conditions, or advocate effectively for resources”).

⁴³⁴ World Food Programme, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point*, p. 22 (Sept. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/>.

⁴³⁵ OCHA, *Haiti: Armed Attacks and Population Displacement in Montrouis - Update No. 1 (as of 6 January 2026)* (Jan. 6, 2026), [https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-armed-attacks-and-population-displacement-montrouis-update-no1-6-january-2026#:~:text=HIGHLIGHTS,1%2C120%20people%20\(225%20households\)](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-armed-attacks-and-population-displacement-montrouis-update-no1-6-january-2026#:~:text=HIGHLIGHTS,1%2C120%20people%20(225%20households)); Daniela Mohor, *Haiti in-depth: The new Gang Suppression Force and what it means for Haitians*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 3, 2025), Daniela Mohor, *In Depth: Haiti's New Gang Suppression Force — What It Means for Haiti*, *The New Humanitarian* (Dec. 3, 2025), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/12/03/haiti-depth-new-gang-suppression-force-what-it-means-haiti> (the head of MSF in Haiti said that “[w]orking conditions are becoming increasingly difficult, especially with the fear that has taken hold in the humanitarian sector since a gang kidnapped UNICEF workers [in July]”) (*internal quotations omitted*); UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti*, UN Doc. S/2025/641, ¶ 65 (Oct. 14, 2025), <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/641> (“Insecurity has constrained freedom of movement within Port-au-Prince and key supply corridors, limiting [humanitarian] staff mobility, humanitarian access and logistics support. Local procurement capacity remained negligible due to insecurity and economic contraction, forcing reliance on regional and international sourcing at higher cost and longer lead times.”); World Food Programme, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point*, p. 8, 17 (Sept. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (noting that the closure of Port-au-Prince airport to passenger traffic, in particular has presented “a major obstacle for humanitarians,” and that “[s]ome NGOs have also left Port-au-Prince altogether because of insecurity”); see also UN Security Council, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2752 (2024)*, ¶ 60 (Sep. 25, 2025) (six humanitarian workers were kidnapped by members of *Viv Ansanm* in early July in the Port-au-Prince area and held for 21 days before being released).

⁴³⁶ For example, new U.S. funds worth about US\$37.5 million are likely going to be disbursed in “areas identified as most ‘in need’—metropolitan Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, and others—the same areas that are almost entirely controlled by gangs.” In these areas, “[g]ang members have been known to divert distributions by stealing or extorting the money from recipients by forcibly taking sim cards, falsifying cell numbers, etc., bolstering their operations and failing to make any positive impact on the intended recipients. When the cash transfers are done by international organizations with few relationships in communities and little understanding of the context and dynamics at play, this risk is compounded.” Funders Coalition for Haitian-led Development, *Emergency Funding or Entrenched Dependency?* (Mar. 5, 2026), <https://haitifunders.substack.com/p/emergency-funding-or-entrenched-dependency>.

⁴³⁷ See Haiti Funders, *Emergency Funding or Entrenched Dependency?*, <https://haitifunders.substack.com/p/emergency-funding-or-entrenched-dependency> (explaining how funding practices “undermine local leadership, create competition for limited resources, decimate domestic industry, funnel resources into the gangs, and break down the fabric of Haitian society,” and can be used as tools to shape political outcomes); Linnea Fehrm, *Haiti in-depth: As gang violence breeds hunger, Haitians seek homegrown solutions*, *The New Humanitarian* (Jan. 21, 2026), <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2026/01/21/haiti-depth-gang-violence-breeds-hunger-haitians-seek-homegrown-solutions> (discussing the ways in which foreign food aid practices in the 2000s weakened Haiti’s agricultural sector, and noting that “[m]ost agricultural experts are now foreigners who rarely go into the fields”); World Food Programme, *A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point*, p. 15 (Sept. 2025), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000168972/download/> (as the proportion of flexible spending allowed by donor countries has decreased, nearly all earmarked support is directed toward emergency assistance and logistics support, which “severely limits the organization’s ability to pivot resources toward sustainable solutions and long-term resilience programmes”).

⁴³⁸ UN Security Council, *Resolution 2814*, UN Doc. S/RES/2814 (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.un.org/en/media/accreditation/pdf/SCRes3.pdf>.

⁴³⁹ Multiple countries – including Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, the UK, Colombia, China, and Russia – expressed concern about the changes. UN Security Council, *Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2814 (2026), Security Council Renews Mandate of United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti* (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16285.doc.htm>; UN Security Council, *Resolution 2814*, UN Doc. S/RES/2814 (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.un.org/en/media/accreditation/pdf/SCRes3.pdf>; Jaqueline Charles, *Troops for Gang Suppression Force in Haiti expected in April; U.N. says work is on track*, *Miami Herald* (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article314499097.html>; Security Council Report, *Haiti: Vote on BINUH Mandate Renewal* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/01/haiti-vote-on-binuh-mandate-renewal-4.php> (“The fact that the draft text [of the new mandate] . . . does not recall any of the previous Security Council resolutions that established and developed BINUH’s mandate has been interpreted by some observers as a further indication of the intention of the penholders to reshape BINUH’s mandate.”).

⁴⁴⁰ Compare UN Security Council, *Resolution 2814*, UN Doc. S/RES/2814, Preamble ¶¶ 4, 7, 2(vi) (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.un.org/en/media/accreditation/pdf/SCRes3.pdf>, with UN Security Council, *Resolution 2653*, UN Doc. S/RES/2653, Preamble ¶¶ 6, 13, 17-19, 4, 12, 16, 21 (Jul. 12, 2024), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4054146?ln=en&v=pdf>, and UN Security Council, *Resolution 2476*, UN Doc. S/RES/2476, ¶ 1(b)(ii) (Jun. 25, 2019), <https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2476%282019%29>; see also Security Council Report, *Haiti: Vote on BINUH Mandate Renewal* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/01/haiti-vote-on-binuh-mandate-renewal-4.php> (“[U]nlike previous resolutions on BINUH’s mandate, the first draft of the resolution did not contain any language on women or gender. During the negotiations, members such as Colombia, Denmark, and Greece advanced several proposals on these issues, including requesting references to gender-based violence (GBV) and women’s participation in electoral and political processes. It seems, however, that despite support for these additions from many Council members, the US remained reluctant to include these references. While the second revised draft added references to the participation of “all Haitians” and sexual violence against

“women, men and children”, the continued exclusion of substantive [women, peace, and security] WPS language was apparently another key reason for the silence break by the five European members and Colombia.”).

⁴⁴¹ Compare UN Security Council, *Resolution 2814*, UN Doc. S/RES/2814, Preamble ¶¶ 3, 2(i) (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.un.org/en/media/accréditation/pdf/SCRes3.pdf>, with UN Security Council, *Resolution 2653*, UN Doc. S/RES/2653, Preamble ¶¶ 7, 12, 2 (Jul. 12, 2024), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4054146?ln=en&v=pdf>, and UN Security Council, *Resolution 2476*, UN Doc. S/RES/2476, Preamble ¶¶ 8, 1(b)(iii) (Jun. 25, 2019), <https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2476%282019%29>; see also Security Council Report, *Haiti: Vote on BINUH Mandate Renewal* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/01/haiti-vote-on-binuh-mandate-renewal-4.php>; UN Security Council, *Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2814 (2026)*, *Security Council Renews Mandate of United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti* (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16285.doc.htm> (Denmark and Latvia emphasized that “women must have an equal voice in making decisions about Haiti’s future”) (*internal quotations omitted*); UN Security Council, *Resolution 2814*, UN Doc. S/RES/2814 (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.un.org/en/media/accréditation/pdf/SCRes3.pdf> (“Colombia regrets the resistance to preserving fundamental elements of the mandate, in particular the comprehensive gender approach and the emphasis on inclusive and representative political participation, especially of women and youth.”).

⁴⁴² Compare UN Security Council, *Resolution 2814*, UN Doc. S/RES/2814, ¶ 2(ii, iii) (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.un.org/en/media/accréditation/pdf/SCRes3.pdf> (referring to “elections through a credible process”) with UN Security Council, *Resolution 2653*, UN Doc. S/RES/2653, Preamble ¶¶ 8, 12, ¶¶ 2, 6 (Jul. 12, 2024), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4054146?ln=en&v=pdf> and UN Security Council, *Resolution 2476*, UN Doc. S/RES/2476, ¶ 1(b)(i) (Jun. 25, 2019), <https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2476%282019%29>; see also Security Council Report, *Haiti: Vote on BINUH Mandate Renewal* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/01/haiti-vote-on-binuh-mandate-renewal-4.php> (the “free and fair” language was “proposed by members including China, Colombia, Denmark, Greece, Russia, and the UK”).

⁴⁴³ Compare UN Security Council, *Resolution 2814*, UN Doc. S/RES/2814, ¶ 2(vi) (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.un.org/en/media/accréditation/pdf/SCRes3.pdf> (referring only to “maintaining dedicated capacity for protection advisors”) with UN Security Council, *Resolution 2653*, UN Doc. S/RES/2814, ¶¶ 10, 12 (Jul. 12, 2024), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4054146?ln=en&v=pdf> (Jul. 12, 2024), and UN Security Council, *Resolution 2476*, ¶ 2, 3 (Jun. 25, 2019), <https://docs.un.org/en/s/res/2476%282019%29>; see also Security Council Report, *Haiti: Vote on BINUH Mandate Renewal* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/01/haiti-vote-on-binuh-mandate-renewal-4.php> (the reference to protection advisors in paragraph 2(iv) was apparently a compromise, after members including Latvia and the UK requested that the text include references to women protection advisors and child protection advisors); UN Security Council, *Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2814 (2026)*, *Security Council Renews Mandate of United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti* (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16285.doc.htm> (Denmark, Latvia, France, Greece, and the UK called for a strengthened “human rights unit and dedicated women- and child-protection advisors,” whose “presence is essential to continue monitoring and reporting on human rights violations in Haiti, including reporting on sexual and gender-based violence, and grave violations against children”) (*internal quotations omitted*); UN Security Council, *Resolution 2814*, UN Doc. S/RES/2814 (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.un.org/en/media/accréditation/pdf/SCRes3.pdf> (“Colombia regrets the resistance to preserving fundamental elements of the mandate, in particular the comprehensive gender approach.”).

⁴⁴⁴ See UN Security Council, *Resolution 2814*, UN Doc. S/RES/2814 (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://www.un.org/en/media/accréditation/pdf/SCRes3.pdf> (Colombia’s representative noted that the reduction of gender-based violence to just sexual violence against women, men, and children “is not neutral; it obscures the structural nature of gender-based violence as a violation of human rights and a manifestation of deep-rooted power inequalities, as well as integrated access to justice and reparation mechanisms for survivors, and it consolidates the systematic exclusion of women from decision-making spaces”).

⁴⁴⁵ See UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, *BINUH*, <https://dppa.un.org/en/factsheet/binuh-haiti> (last visited Mar. 11, 2026); see also Security Council Report, *Haiti: Vote on BINUH Mandate Renewal* (Jan. 28, 2026), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/01/haiti-vote-on-binuh-mandate-renewal-4.php>