Beyond ComplementarityThe Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute or Statute)1 is an important victory against impunity for the large-scale human rights violations that occur all too frequently. Yet international prosecutions are only one tool in the struggle for accountability and should be used as a backup to national prosecutions. National prosecutions should remain the primary option, wherever feasible, because they can handle many more cases and are usually preferable from the perspectives of victims and local justice systems. The ICC Statute recognizes the primacy of national courts, since one of its guiding principles is that the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.
However, complementarity and the Statute’s provisions for assistance to local judiciaries are not enough. If the ICC is to have a noticeable impact on the majority of human rights cases, if prosecution of those responsible for large scale human rights abuses is to be the rule rather than the exception,2 and if this century is not to repeat last century’s “millions of . . . victims of unimaginable atrocities,”3 the ICC will have to do more. It will need to go beyond complementarity and systematically integrate assistance to local judiciaries into its work.
This Article will use Haiti’s experience in coming to terms with the human rights violations of its 1991–94 dictatorship as a point of departure for discussing why the Court should support local prosecutions and how it could do so. Haiti provides a good example because although justice for the dictatorship’s victims is both a popular and a governmental priority and the government has implemented a host of initiatives to achieve it, the results thus far have been disappointing. Many of the difficulties encountered are the result of trying to achieve justice during a democratic transition. Other problems stem from the government’s lack of resources. The ICC is particularly well placed to help countries whose will for justice is frustrated by poverty and the challenges of a democratic transition.
Part I of this Article will discuss Haiti’s efforts to provide justice for the coup victims and analyze the obstacles encountered along the way. Part II will focus on the ICC Statute and on ways the Court could maximize its assistance to countries like Haiti. These would include: 1) helping to train prosecutors and judges from countries that need it the most; 2) helping to obtain evidence; 3) helping with arrests; and 4) effectively using the threat of ICC jurisdiction to encourage national trials.
I. Crime and Punishment: Haiti’s Experience
A. Crimes Against Humanity in Haiti, 1991–1994
The coup d’état of September 30, 1991 ended Haiti’s first experiment with a freely elected government. With the support of the country’s economic elite, a military junta4 overthrew and exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the landslide winner of Haiti’s first democratic elections nine months earlier. Hundreds of thousands of pro-democracy protesters took to the streets throughout the country, wielding signs and photographs, clanging pots and pans. Soldiers shot into the crowds, killing hundreds of people in the first days of the coup. The Haitian people continued their nonviolent resistance for three years, and the coup participants continued to repress them. Between 4,000 and 7,000 people were murdered, over 60,000 forced to the high seas as “boat people,” 300,000 internally displaced, and countless more were victims of illegal arrests and torture, including beatings and rapes, as well as theft and destruction of property.5
The crimes perpetrated against the Haitian population were committed by both regular troops and paramilitary terrorist organizations, often working in concert.6 Although some terror was random, much was systematic, coordinated at the national level, and precisely targeted at leaders and participants in Haiti’s vigorous grassroots groups and pro-democracy movement. Several prominent Aristide supporters were assassinated, notably businessman Antoine Izmery, Minister of Justice Guy Malary, and Father Jean-Marie Vincent.7 These crimes would have fallen squarely within the ICC’s mandate as crimes against humanity, as they were widespread and systematic, pursuant to a state policy, and knowingly directed against a civilian population. The Court cannot, however, prosecute crimes that occurred before its entry into force. 8
Much of the repression occurred while the world was watching and recording. Reporters, photographers, and television crews regularly patrolled Haiti’s streets for atrocities, and had little difficulty finding them. The Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti (MICIVIH), a human rights observer mission created jointly by the United Nations and the Organization of American States, spent most of the coup years in Haiti or across the border in the Dominican Republic. Human rights and solidarity groups regularly visited Haiti and reported on the repression,9 and members of Haitian human rights organizations risked their lives to issue regular reports.10 In fact, the murder of Antoine Izmery took place outside a crowded, public, church service, in full view of MICIVIH observers, members of the diplomatic corps, and the foreign press. Given the high degree of visibility of the acts of violence, there should have been an abundance of evidence available for later prosecutions.
In September 1994, a multinational force with a UN Security Council mandate and led by the United States entered Haiti and forced the coup leaders to relinquish power. In the following months, most of the high military and paramilitary leaders left the country for Central America11 or the United States,12 and the president disbanded the army.
B. Prosecuting Human Rights Violations
Systematic trial of those responsible for large-scale violations of human rights has never been easy at a time of transition,13 and Haiti is no exception. The coup victims have incessantly demanded justice, and the government has made repeated, if not always successful, efforts to provide it.14 Initiatives to advance prosecutions include a national project to collect victim testimonies15 and a national program of legal assistance to victims.16 The government has established special teams of prosecutors and judges,17 a Special Investigative Unit of the national police dedicated to human rights cases, and the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI), a group of lawyers from Haiti and abroad assisting the judiciary with the prosecutions.18 Related initiatives include programs to “find the truth” about the repression,19 as well as programs for victim reparation,20 law reform,21 and commemoration.22 Haitian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and foreign organizations have also sponsored initiatives to provide medical treatment for victims,23 to encourage their psychological rehabilitation,24 and to advocate for a systematic policy of victim compensation.25
Despite the government’s efforts, these initiatives have not come close to satisfying the popular thirst for justice. There have been no systematic prosecutions,26 few major trials, and even fewer long-term jail sentences.27 Fortunately, however, neither the government nor the victims show any signs of giving up. The victims continue to organize28 and to expand their capacity to pressure the government. Fondation 30 Septembre, a victims’ group, has held a demonstration near the National Palace every Wednesday since its founding in 1997, modeled after the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina. Human rights groups continue to issue reports decrying the lack of progress on cases, and less structured groups communicate their concern in less structured ways, such as through graffiti29 and denunciations appearing in the press.
The government continues to try new things, to support initiatives that have proven successful, and to push the system to perform better. As a result, there are more promising cases in the pipeline, most notably the Raboteau Massacre30 and the Cité Soleil arson cases. In the Raboteau case, five years of work by the special police investigative team, local and national judicial officials, the victims, and the BAI have led to twenty-two suspects in custody and strong evidence of culpability, including corroborated testimony from a large number of victims and witnesses. The prosecution has obtained reports from experts in forensic anthropology, genetics,31 and military organization,32 all of whom are expected to testify at the trial. The investigating magistrate issued formal charges in September 1999, which were upheld by the Appeals Court and by the Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court) in May 2000.33 The trial, which began in September 2000, was still underway at this writing.
The uneven success of Haiti’s efforts reflects neither a state policy of impunity nor a lack of popular interest, but rather the difficulty of a poor country providing justice in a democratic transition. The obstacles to justice can be grouped into six main categories: 1) the structure and historical role of the justice system; 2) the need to balance competing governmental priorities; 3) resistance to prosecution within the society; 4) difficulties in gathering and preserving evidence; 5) difficulties in arresting suspects; and 6) general feelings of insecurity. Each category includes barriers that are deeply rooted and systemic, as well as those that can be addressed more easily. However, they all coexist and mutually reinforce one another to frustrate even the strongest of commitments to justice.
The largest single obstacle to prosecutions in Haiti is the legal system itself. It functions poorly in general, and worse with respect to human rights cases. A long history of undemocratic government, capped by the thirty-year dictatorship of Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier (1957–1986) and followed by eight years of turmoil and repression, have left a system unaccustomed to applying the rule of law and unprepared to manage its caseload efficiently. In addition, neither the private bar nor the judiciary is equipped or inclined to help human rights victims seek justice.34
The judiciary has suffered from chronic under-investment. Until 1995, there had been no significant investment in infrastructure for years.35 Judges received salaries that required them to work second jobs or to sell justice to get by.36 There had been no formal judicial training, no continuing education, and very little evaluation or supervision of judicial officials.37
The laws themselves are largely unchanged since the early 19th century,38 leaving a procedure ill-adapted to an early 21st century caseload.39 Haiti has not ratified most of the international conventions that could help with the prosecution of human rights cases.40 The judiciary has little experience with human rights trials or complex cases, and thus little jurisprudence.
More important than physical, financial, and jurisprudential difficulties, Haiti’s legal culture and traditions maintain a system that is slow, formalistic, and geared to serve the interests of economic, military, and political powers.41 For judges, the incentives to sell justice have always been strong, and the possibilities of achieving real justice slight.42 The political upheavals of the last ten years have exacerbated this trend by culling out anyone likely to take a principled stand in any direction.43
The bar has traditionally collaborated closely with the judiciary in serving the interests of the elite. From training and by disposition, very few lawyers are willing and competent to take cases of human rights victims. Even if lawyers are interested in taking these cases, they rarely have the victims’ confidence.44 High barriers to entry allow the bar to replicate itself and maintain this system despite the arrival of democracy.45
Despite the historical trends and current obstacles, there are judges, prosecutors, and lawyers in Haiti who would like to be involved in providing justice for the victims of human rights violations. Their efforts are usually frustrated by an intransigent judicial system, a lack of resources, training, and experience, and a paucity of role models. 46
Victims are alienated from the judicial system, as its structure is designed to exclude them.47 Most victims cannot pay the high court costs and lawyers’ fees.48 Most are excluded linguistically, as court proceedings are usually in French, while most victims speak only Haitian Creole.49 Jury pools are also highly exclusive. Although 60–85% of the population cannot read or write,50 literacy is a prerequisite for jurors in accordance with the Code d’Instruction Criminelle.51 In practice, the court officials who create the jury list include from the literate fringe only those traditionally deemed qualified by status: law students or graduates, large landowners, wealthy businessmen, and prominent teachers.52
Significantly, unlike many nations in similar circumstances, Haiti is spared two common obstacles: an amnesty law and a statute of limitations that would prohibit prosecutions. Although there was substantial pressure by the United States and the United Nations for a broad amnesty upon the restoration of democracy,53 the actual amnesty decree is narrow, covering only the coup d’état of September 1991 itself. It does not cover consequent murders, acts of torture, and other crimes.54 In one of the few legislative accomplishments since the return of democracy, in 1998 Parliament removed the statute of limitations for crimes committed during the coup years.55
The second category of obstacles in Haiti is political, and includes the question of where the fight against impunity fits among the government’s legitimate, often urgent priorities. Haiti is the poorest country in the hemisphere, and among the world’s poorest.56 The education system, after years of upheaval and neglect, is one of the world’s worst,57 and health care is inaccessible to most of the population.58 Law enforcement had been the bailiwick of the army, which was abolished in 1995, and a new police force had to be built from scratch, with few experienced officers.59 As usually happens when a democratic regime replaces a repressive one, common crime has increased.60 With the exception of the 1990, 1995, and 2000 elections, the majority of the population has never effectively participated in electing representatives. Those likely to be elected have little experience governing, because officials who served under the various dictatorships are unlikely to be elected. Since politics has historically been based on acquiring power through means other than pleasing the majority of citizens, there is little tradition of political parties with coherent policy positions.61
Although the Haitian government has made justice for coup victims a priority, the need to balance other competing priorities manifests itself in: a) a shortage of resources for justice efforts in general,62 and for human rights cases in particular; b) the uneven success of programs for human rights prosecutions;63 c) the slow pace of judicial reform; d) the inability to recruit adequate judges and prosecutors; and e) the inability to get the judiciary to effectively process even simple human rights cases.
The privileging of other important priorities at the expense of human rights trials is frustrating from the perspective of those primarily concerned with justice for the coup victims. However, it does not necessarily indicate a lack of will of the government to prosecute those responsible. An analysis of the impunity problem that ignores the complexity of a poor country’s needs and simply classifies the government as one not interested in justice is unlikely to yield results. A more fruitful approach would include concrete strategies to raise justice in the pecking order, through well targeted national and international pressure, and assistance aimed at helping the state overcome some of its real difficulties, both within and without the justice system.
Certain priorities, such as economic and infrastructure development, compete with justice by requiring scarce resources and the energy and time of government officials. Others conflict or are perceived to conflict more directly. Human rights trials, especially in the short term, can put stress on the overall security situation. These trials are sometimes seen as endangering efforts to consolidate democracy, create a stable climate for investment, and develop a police force.64 Even within the justice system itself, there are tensions between making systemic changes and handling a few potentially incendiary cases, and dealing with current crime or dealing with past crimes. Further tension exists between the need for judges, prosecutors, and police who are not performing well to spend time in training rather than working on the impunity cases.
It is often said that a transitional state’s best chance of coming to terms with its past is during the “honeymoon” of the first year of democracy. During the period, before the opposition becomes organized, and while the new government’s support is at its highest, the state can devote itself to justice before it loses some of its support, and more importantly, becomes bogged down with other priorities.65 Haiti, however, enjoyed no such luxury. Within the first fourteen months of restored democracy, the country ran four separate national elections for almost every elective office including President, dismantled the army, and recruited, trained, and installed new forces of police and prison guards.66
3. Resistance to Prosecution Within Society
In countries transitioning from dictatorship to democracy, the amount of power retained by the former oppressors or their political and financial allies varies. In Rwanda, for example, the transition was so abrupt that there is little vestige of the former rulers. In Chile, on the other hand, the power structures remained largely intact after the arrival of formal democracy. To the extent that the old guard retains power, the transitional government is forced to compromise with it, and to expend energy overcoming internal resistance to any reform, including justice for human rights victims.
Haiti faces less resistance to prosecutions than many other transitional societies because it abolished the army, and, at least numerically, the coup supporters were very small while the coup victims were very large. Yet in the transition to democracy, the financial elite who backed the coup retained their old power. The military and paramilitary groups are at least perceived to have some capability, 67 and the civil service is still full of those hired under one dictatorship or another. In Haiti’s tightly knit society, most people, even most victims, have some relationship with someone accused of human rights violations. Therefore, although there is no public resistance or opposition to the prosecution of human rights cases, the prosecutions must overcome significant resistance within Haitian society.
Some of this covert resistance comes from former army members. The army, although disbanded, has not disappeared. Former members continue to organize politically,68 and most of the former high command still meet in Florida, where they live in exile.69 Despite requests from the Haitian government, the multinational force never attempted systematic disarmament of military or paramilitary personnel.70 It is widely believed that former soldiers and paramilitaries still possess their guns.71 In addition, former members of the military recycled into the new civilian police force make up about a third of the force, and almost all of its leadership, especially the police commissaires.72 The military in Haiti generated substantial institutional loyalty, so even former soldiers who were appalled by the carnage of the coup are still reluctant or afraid to help the prosecutions of their former colleagues. None of the former soldiers now serving in the police force (which is under the Ministry of Justice) have provided information to help the prosecutions.
The economic elite that financed and supported the coup are still in business, many of them enriched from importing products through the embargo.73 They employ many people, have significant influence on the government, and retain groups of armed men, mostly former soldiers, as security guards. Although it would be hard to spot the hand of the elite in any particular case, there is at least a general assumption among those working for human rights prosecutions that these elite have been using their influence against the prosecutions.
Prosecutions must also combat the unorganized, but still formidable, resistance based on family or friendship ties that can trump political convictions or professional responsibilities. Although the organizers of the repression were not in contact with the victims, those who executed the policy were recruited from the same poor neighborhoods. Therefore, it is inevitable that many of the victims and attackers had relationships and communications with each other, and often the ones responsible for carrying out the repression would try to spare their friends or relatives. Sometimes even the most malicious person was willing to save potential victims from harm by an advance warning or a word to his accomplices. Many accounts of coup atrocities also mentiona soldier or paramilitary saving potential victims from his own collaborators.74 This assistance goes both ways, as now every accused has some relation with the victims, or if not, with a judge, a police officer, or a court worker.
The resistance to prosecutions within Haitian society is buttressed by the equivocal attitude of the international community toward prosecuting human rights cases. Although most foreign governments are on the record as favoring justice for Haiti’s victims, their actions are often to the contrary. The U.S., for example, despite spending tens of millions of dollars on justice and law enforcement support since the return of democracy, has hindered the prosecutions in many ways, including pressuring the Haitian government to give amnesty to the coup criminals,75 flying the top leaders out of Haiti,76 letting many others stay in the United States,77 and refusing to hand over evidence of atrocities that belongs to Haiti.78 Among the myriad foreign assistance programs in justice and law enforcement, not one provides legal representation to coup victims. MICIVIH alone specifically supported the prosecution of human rights cases.79
4. Collection, Preservation, and Analysis of Evidence
Another obstacle to prosecuting human rights cases in Haiti is finding evidence. Human rights cases are often difficult to prove, and this is especially true with Haiti’s cases. The prosecutions depend heavily on victim testimony because the dictatorship prevented the collection and preservation of other evidence. Although finding victims is easy, they are often unable to identify their attackers80 or are reluctant to testify. When the accused can be identified, corroborating the victim’s testimony is often difficult because the attack took place in a military installation or during the panic of a large-scale operation. Potential corroborating witnesses are often not found because they were internally displaced or otherwise transient, and have since migrated or returned to their homes. Although scores of journalists and human rights workers interviewed victims during the coup, they did not take the testimony in a form useful for prosecutions. Often the interviews do not adequately identify the informant, or do not have sufficient details.81 As most victims are poor and illiterate and come from an oral and informal culture, their stories do not always fit neatly into the logical boxes a prosecutor would like to see in court. These problems of eyewitness testimony become magnified in Haiti, as elsewhere, as time passes, memory fades, and witnesses move or die.
Physical evidence to corroborate the eyewitness reports is rare. Contemporary crime scene and ballistics investigation did not take place because the ones charged with investigating were themselves the perpetrators.82 Few people had cameras to document deaths, injuries, and property damage. Retaining photographs and other evidence, such as a bloody shirt or broken furniture, was not done because doing so would invite further attacks.
Medical evidence, often the best corroborative evidence available, is severely limited. Under the dictatorship, as now, most Haitians could not afford the formal health care system and either went without treatment or consulted traditional healers who do not keep records. Even those victims who could access the health care system often refused to do so out of fear of further injury.83 When victims went back to the hospital, the medical records were often destroyed.84 Despite the limitations, however, there is some medical evidence. Some victims have scars or continuing medical problems that can help substantiate their claims. Others were treated by doctors, often financed by foreign organizations, who kept records.85
Prosecutors have had particular difficulty in demonstrating evidence of command responsibility. As a result, most of the arrestees so far have been those who were on the scene executing the orders, rather than those who gave them. Moreover, no former soldiers have been willing to testify about the command structure, either out of solidarity with their former colleagues or a fear of reprisals.86
The best evidence that could implicate the high command and the paramilitary leadership, as was shown by the Nuremberg trials, is its own documents. Although the Haitian military did not match the Nazis in record keeping, it did keep routine records of intelligence reports, correspondence, troop movements and operations, and financial transactions.87
The military and paramilitary organizations also kept more sadistic documentation, including video and audio cassettes, and “trophy photos” of torture sessions, which reportedly include the torturers posing with their victims. This information would greatly facilitate prosecutions, but approximately 160,000 pages of the best documentation were taken from military and paramilitary facilities by U.S. troops.88 These materials have not been returned despite requests from the Haitian government,89 sixty-nine members of the U.S. House of Representatives,90 and a host of individuals and organizations from the United States and abroad.91 The inability of Haitian prosecutors to access this evidence is a serious impediment to their work, and is one that the ICC could help remove.92
Arrests in Haiti are rendered difficult by the ability of suspects to take refuge both within and outside the country. This difficulty is compounded by other obstacles such as inadequate resources, the limited experience of the police, resistance to arrests by former military members, and the poor organization of the Haitian bureaucracy.
Many of the accused have fled Haiti, across the border to the Dominican Republic or to the United States.93 For those without the means to leave the country, there are ample hiding places in rural areas within Haiti, as there is little police presence outside of towns. Although police units are trying to track down suspects, they are inexperienced and inadequately equipped.94 They do not receive adequate assistance from other units because of poor communication and organization. Furthermore, there is a lack of cooperation from local commanders, many of whom are themselves former members of the military.95
Techniques for locating people that work in more developed countries have borne little fruit in Haiti. Databases such as automobile and tax records are not easy to access because of poor organization and actual resistance by staff. Moreover, even once accessed, documents are not reliable, as aliases are easily and frequently used.96 Many suspects can be identified only by their nicknames, which are even more easily changed. As a result, although victims can often name their attackers, the police do not often succeed in locating and arresting them.
Countries making the transition from authoritarianism to democracy often experience a rise in common crime along with the decrease in political repression.97 With an inexperienced police force, inefficient and corrupt judiciary, guns in the hands of unemployed former military or paramilitary, and a drug trade well established by the coup regime, Haiti is no exception.98 Arrest rates for serious crimes are low, and quick releases for the most violent arrestees are high.99 Although criminals often escape or are liberated illegally, coup-era human rights cases are the exception. In all of the BAI’s cases, for example, there has been only one escape and no liberations of arrestees against whom the evidence was strong.100 In the case of the one escapee, prison authorities fired responsible guards and the departmental prison coordinator, and reinforced the prison structure. The uncertainty caused by the increase of crime and the perception that the state cannot do anything about it makes everyone less willing to participate in the criminal justice system. This is especially true in human rights cases, as it is generally feared that the former military and paramilitary ardently embraced organized crime after the restoration of democracy.101 In the Raboteau case, for example, several defendants who are at large are reported to be gang members.102 Others have been “caught” for the purposes of the case when they were discovered already incarcerated for other recent crimes.
To date, there have been no confirmed reports of attacks against witnesses or officials for participating in a human rights case, but the fear of such attacks is widespread and has a large impact on the prosecutions. Victims and witnesses fear retaliation, judges and prosecutors claim that they cannot advance the cases without more protection, and police complain that their arrestees are soon back on the streets, with a grudge.103 This insecurity has also been cited as a factor in low turnout for jury duty, as has been reported to the author by several judicial officials, especially regarding prospective women jurors.
Haiti’s efforts to provide justice to its human rights victims certainly illustrates the difficulties of such an endeavor. But they also show that the difficulties are not insurmountable, and that a poor country, even without much outside help, can make progress if it keeps trying. Both these successes and failures provide a good background for examining why the ICC should help countries like Haiti, and analyzing how it could do so.
. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute or Statute].
. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 14 Nouvelles Études Pénales 45 (1998); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 Yale L.J. 2537 (1991).
. ICC Statute, supra note 1, preamble. See Jennifer Balint, An Empirical Study of Conflict, Conflict Victimization, and Legal Redress, 14 Nouvelles Études Pénales 101, 107 (1998).
. See Notification of Blocked Individuals of Haiti, 58 Fed. Reg. 58480 (Nov. 1, 1993) (listing people determined by the United States Government to have participated in or supported the coup).
. See generally Si M Pa Rele, Rapport de la Commission Nationale de Verité et de Justice (1997) [hereinafter Truth Commission Report], http://www.haiti.org/ truth/table.htm. See also Irwin Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti (1997); Commission Justice et Paix du Diocèse des Gonaives, La Répression au Quotidien en Haiti 1991–1994 (Gilles Danroc & Daniel Roussière eds., 1995); Human Rights Watch/Americas, Terror Prevails in Haiti: Human Rights Violations and Failed Diplomacy, at 5–7 (1994).
. Truth Commission Report, supra note 5, http://www.haiti.org/truth/ chapit7.htm#Top.
. Id. , http://www.haiti.org/truth/chapit4.htm#Top.
. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 7.
. Groups that reported on human rights violations in Haiti under the de facto regime included the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the New England Observers’ Delegation, the Quixote Center, and Peace Brigades International/Cry for Peace.
. Notably, the Plateforme des Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits de L’Homme and the Catholic Church’s Commission Justice et Paix issued reports.
. Generals Raoul Cédras, the head of the army, and Philippe Biamby, his second-in-command, flew in planes supplied by the United States to Panama. The U.S. rented three of Cédras’ houses for Embassy personnel at $15,000 per month. Lt. Col. Michel François, considered by many the muscle behind the coup, went to the Dominican Republic and subsequently to Honduras, where he survived extradition demands from the U.S. (for cocaine trafficking) and Haiti (for murder). Catherine Orenstein, Haitian Putchist Hits Florida Jackpot, NACLA Report on the Americas, Sept.–Oct. 1997, at 1.
. See Steve Fainaru, U.S. Is a Haven for Suspected War Criminals, Boston Globe, May 2, 1999, at A1 (Col. Carl Dorélien, the head of personnel for the army under the coup, reports that 15 high ranking former military personnel, including the entire high command except for Cédras and Biamby, emigrated to the United States); Catherine Orenstein, supra note 11, at 1 (Dorelien won $3.2 million in the July 1997 Florida state lottery). Emmanuel Constant, the acknowledged head of FRAPH, the most prominent paramilitary organization, lives in New York despite a 1995 deportation order from an immigration judge. In re Emmanuel Constant, No. A 74 002 009 (Immigration Ct. 1995). Catherine Orenstein, Haitian Refugee, The Village Voice, Aug. 12, 1997, at 49 (describing a secret deal between Constant and the U.S. Department of Justice, where Constant refrains from speaking to the press in return for the suspension of his deportation, and the New York City Council calling for his deportation). See also Catherine Orenstein, The Death Squad Kid, In These Times, Nov. 29, 1998, at 9; Ron Howell, Haunted by Haiti Violence, N.Y. Newsday, Aug. 21, 2000, at A4.
. See Stanley Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and the Policing of the Past, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 7, 20 (1995) (“There has probably been no historical instance where anything remotely like a full policy of criminal accountability has been implemented.”).
. See generally Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti, OEA/ONU, Haiti: La Lutte Contre l’Impunité et pour la Réparation en Haïti (1999).
. The most prominent of these was the “Bureau des Doléances,” a Presidential initiative of offices in the regional departments with staff to record victim testimony. Each Bureau was to pass its information on to the local prosecutor for use in preparing complaints. Although the Bureau did gather substantial amounts of testimony in some areas, local prosecutors rarely made use of the information. See id. at 5–6.
. In 1995 and 1996 the government attempted to set up a national network of lawyers to help victims with their cases. This effort failed because it proved difficult to find lawyers who would aggressively pursue the cases. The intransigence of the local judiciaries was also a factor.
. The first such team, UPENA (“Unité Pénale Nationale”) was composed of selected judges and prosecutors and received specialized training at the Judicial Academy. It never started to actually work on cases, and is now defunct. See Rodolfo Mattarollo, The Transition to Democracy and Institution Building: The Case of Haiti, 14 Nouvelles Études Pénales 483, 495 (1998). The Ministry of Justice set up less formal but eventually more effective teams for other cases.
. The BAI has existed since 1995 and targets notorious human rights violations. BAI lawyers work with the victims to prepare complaints and coordinate with prosecutors, judges, police, and national officials to advance the prosecutions.
. The Commission Nationale de Verité et de Justice (Truth Commission or CNVJ) started work in April, 1995, and presented its report, Si M Pa Rele (If I Don’t Cry Out), to the government in February, 1996. See Truth Commission Report, supra note 5. Although the report’s information is useful for prosecutors in that it helps locate witnesses and confirm their stories and provides background information for specific cases, the CNVJ’s mandate was expressly not a judicial one. Id. The Truth Commission report does play a role in the broader debates about justice, as its recommendations for prosecutions still carry much weight.
. Soon after its reestablishment, the democratic government provided medical and housing assistance and jobs to human rights victims in a non-systematic way. In 1997, the Ministry of Justice attempted to systematize this work through an office called Le Bureau Poursuites et Suivi. See Le Bureau Poursuites et Suivi & Les Victimes du Coup d’État de 1991–94, Ministère de la Justice et de la Sécurité Publique, Haiti, Bilan et Perspectives (1999). That program proved controversial, and was terminated in April 1999. The Ministry of Justice has met with human rights and victim’s groups in order to plan a replacement, but there is no program yet in place. The government has provided assistance to victims of specific events, especially those of the December 1993 FRAPH arson in Cite Soleil, who received either a new house or compensation in August 1999, and those of the April 1994 Raboteau massacre, who have received some monetary compensation and training.
. See Commission Preparatoire à la Réforme du Droit et de la Justice du Ministère de la Justice et de la Sécurité Publique, Document de Politique Générale (2ème ver., 1998) [hereinafter Report of the Commission for Law Reform].
. Although no substitute for prosecutions, the Haitian government has made a significant effort to publicly acknowledge the sacrifices of the coup victims. The anniversaries of the coup d’état itself, as well as prominent events such as the Raboteau massacre, major assassinations, and the return to democracy, are publicly commemorated. There is a large statue and park near the National Palace for victims, which has become a focal point for victim organizing. There are also statues for female victims and for Antoine and George Izmery, Guy Malary, Father Jean-Marie Vincent, and the victims of Raboteau.
. Médecins du Monde, a French NGO, MICIVIH, and Human Rights Fund, a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) sponsored project, have all provided medical treatment for victims.
. MAP VIV (Mouvement d’Appui aux Victimes de Violence), FAVILEK (Famn Viktim Leve Kanpe), SOFA (Solidarite Famn Ayisyen), and many other Haitian groups, as well as Human Rights Fund, Médecins du Monde, and MICIVIH have all had programs in this area. See generally Cécile Marotte & Hervé Rakoto Razafimbahiny, Mémoire Oubliée (1997).
. See, e.g., MAP VIV, Jalons pour une Politique de Réparation (1998) (copy on file with author); Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti, OEA/ONU, Haïti: Droits de l’Homme et Réhabilitation des Victimes (1997).
. See Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti, supra note 14, at 18.
. In 1995, there were two major trials for the murderers of Aristide supporter Antoine Izmery and pro-democracy activist Jean-Claude Museau. The Izmery jury found fourteen defendants guilty, including some high level military and paramilitary operatives. However, all but one, a low level paramilitary, were tried in absentia. (The unreported trial court decision is on file with the author.) The Museau court found only one defendant guilty, and he had fled a few weeks before trial. The author followed the Museau case as human rights observer for MICIVIH in 1995. All information regarding the case comes from a review of the case file and conversations with justice officials working on the case. The year 1996 saw the trial for the assassination of Justice Minister Guy Malary in October 1993. The two defendants were acquitted by the jury. Seeinfra note 144 and accompanying text. In 1999, former Sergeant Jean-Fritznel Jean-Baptiste was tried, convicted, and sentenced to five years in prison for torture, attempted murder, and kidnapping. Adama Dieng, Independent Expert of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Introductory Remarks on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, Before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 56th Session (Apr. 19, 2000).
. In addition to existing human rights groups and Fondation 30 Septembre, there has been a significant rise in local victims’ organizations and women’s groups. The grassroots groups are starting to form federations of groups, based on geography (e.g., the Central Plateau) or issues (e.g., female victims of political violence).
. Popular inscriptions include, usually in Creole, “No reconciliation without justice,” “The Criminals must be judged,” and “No Democracy Without Justice.”
. The Raboteau Massacre was a military/paramilitary operation in Raboteau, Gonaives in April 1994. The raid took place in the context of a nationwide clamp-down on pro-democracy activities. Gonaives, and particularly Raboteau, has always prided itself on being a center of resistance to tyranny. During the coup, Raboteau lived up to its reputation as its residents continued to organize demonstrations, hide fugitives, and distribute pro-Aristide literature despite frequent retaliation. On April 22, the de facto authorities decided they had had enough, and in a dawn raid soldiers and paramilitaries went from house to house, beating, looting, and sacking. Those who did not flee were often arrested, beaten, or dunked in the area’s open sewers. Those who fled were hunted down, and either arrested and tortured or shot. The attackers even commandeered fishing boats to shoot people who fled into the harbor, their traditional refuge.
The Raboteau trial has become the most prominent human rights trial in Haiti and is receiving special government attention. The Juge d’Instruction and prosecutors in the case have been given enhanced logistical support, including a special secure office. Two BAI lawyers, including the author, have worked on the case for five years. There are programs to educate victims and witnesses about the legal process and to provide them medical, psychological, and economic assistance. A team from the police’s special investigative unit works on the case full-time and a special office coordinates these initiatives.
. A team of forensic anthropologists, invited by the CNVJ and under the auspices of the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team and the Human Rights Program of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, conducted research on the Raboteau massacre in 1995. More research, including DNA identification, was sponsored by MICIVIH in 1997 and 1998. See An Inter-American Team of Forensic Anthropology Consultants, Forensic Anthropology Investigation: A Report for the Haitian Commission on Truth and Justice (1995).
. Two experts from the Centro de Militares para la Democracia Argentina, under the auspices of MICIVIH, investigated and wrote a report on the responsibility of the military hierarchy in the massacre.
. Unpublished decisions on file with the author. See also David Stoelting, Enforcement of International Criminal Law, 34 Int’l Law. 671 (2000).
. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Paper Laws, Steel Bayonets: Breakdown of the Rule of Law in Haiti 1 (1990) (The report, written before the 1991 coup d’état, opens with “[t]here is no system of justice in Haiti. Even to speak of a ‘Haitian Justice System’ dignifies the brutal use of force by officers and soldiers, the chaos of Haitian courtrooms and prisons, and the corruption of judges and prosecutors”); National Coalition of Haitian Refugees, No Greater Priority: Judicial Reform in Haiti (1995); Report of the Commission for Law Reform, supra note 21; Stotzky, supra note 5, at 81 (Haiti’s judicial structure is “less developed than that of virtually any nation that has attempted” a democratic transition) .
. For example, the trial court in Gonaives, Haiti’s third largest city, was crammed into the second floor of a ramshackle building with no telephone, electricity, or bathrooms. Missing floorboards afforded a view of the court of appeals hearings on the first floor. This situation has improved since 1995, since the Canadian government built courthouses for each of Haiti’s trial courts, and now, thanks to national and international investment, most trial courts have minimally adequate facilities.
There has been a similar improvement in supplies. In 1995, many courthouses had no texts, paper, or pens other than what the judges were willing to supply themselves, which was sometimes nothing. Again, due to both national and international investment, notably by USAID, most courthouses have basic legal texts and office supplies.
. Even after the raises, trial judges interviewed by the author reported that their salaries are $600–$700 per month and that most still teach school.
. This has improved since 1995 as well. Through national and international efforts, an Ecole de la Magistrature [Judicial Academy] has been set up, which provides continuing education to judicial officials and a year-long program for new officials.
. See Report of the Commission for Law Reform, supra note 21, at 2.
. See id. at 18 (“La lenteur de la justice haïtienne est proverbiale.”).
. International instruments to which Haiti is a party are integrated into domestic law. Haiti Const. art. 276-2. However, Haiti has not acceded to many important human rights instruments, including: 1) Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2) Convention on the Punishment and Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid, 3) Convention on the Inapplicability of Statute of Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 4) Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 Relative to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, 5) Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 Relative to the Protection of Victims of Internal Armed Conflict, 6) Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights Relative to Economic, Cultural, and Social rights, and 7) Inter-American Convention for the Prevention of Torture. These treaties could help with extradition and transfer of information from other countries. Haiti’s adoption of these treaties would also incorporate useful international standards into Haitian law, such as the doctrines of command responsibility, statutes of limitation, and the duty to refuse an illegal order. In Rwanda, for example, the ratification of international instruments has proven to be an important and practical advantage in the prosecutions of human rights violators. Daniel de Beer, Commentary: The Organic Law of 30 August 1996 on the Organization of the Prosecution of Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity 14–15 (1997).
. See Report of the Commission for Law Reform, supra note 21, at 2. See also National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, supra note 34, at 1–7.
. In an interview with the author, one Justice of the Peace, who preferred to remain anonymous, reported that he wanted to follow the letter of the law, but with little police protection and not enough money to rent a secure house, he felt too vulnerable to oppose the powerful. He subsequently traded his robes in Haiti for a house painter’s brush in Miami.
. For instance, a judge with ten years experience at the time current President Préval took office in 1996 would have been appointed under the dictatorship of Jean Claude Duvalier, served two years under the dictatorship of Gen. Henri Namphy, five months under a token democracy, another three months of Namphy, eighteen months under Gen. Prosper Avril, eleven months under an interim president appointed from the Supreme Court, nine months under the elected Aristide administration, three years under a dictatorship, and another fourteen months under Aristide. Surviving such a diversity of masters requires a much different set of skills than does conducting human rights trials.
. For example, in 1996 the BAI attempted to recruit lawyers in the city of Gonaives to help in the case of the 1994 Raboteau massacre. At that time, two years after the return of democracy, no lawyers or organizations had offered legal services to the massacre victims, even though one legal assistance organization with foreign funding supposedly targeted the Raboteau area. Although some local lawyers said they would be willing to work on cases if paid, the victims did not trust any of them, so an out-of-town lawyer was hired.
. After finishing law school, graduates must present a mémoire, or thesis. Technical support, access to materials, and advice for this process are not integrated into the curriculum, so students must find a lawyer willing to help them with their proposed topic, for a price. After successfully defending their mémoire, candidates must complete a two-year stage or internship. Although some internships may be done in the public sector (in a courthouse, for example), the vast majority of candidates must find a senior lawyer in private practice who is willing to supervise them. As a result, although many students are enrolled in Haiti’s six law schools, some motivated by the possibility of using the law for social change, fewer than twenty lawyers per year are admitted to practice, most of whom are motivated primarily by money and power. This estimate is based on the author’s discussion with lawyers and law students.
Haiti’s legal education system is changing, but haltingly. Citizens Network, a Belgian NGO, installed a pilot legal assistance program in 1996 to help law school graduates with their mémoire and stage in return for lightly paid legal assistance for the poor. According to personnel at the Citizen’s Network, although successful and popular, that program was terminated for lack of funding. A new progressive law school in the town of Jérémie graduated its first class in July 1999. The BAI recently started a program to create a core group of progressive, well-trained lawyers to work on human rights cases as lawyers, prosecutors, and judges.
. Author’s conversations with judges, prosecutors and lawyers, 1995–2000.
. See Report of the Commission for Law Reform, supra note 21, at 7–11.
. Alix Cantave, Haitian Studies Association Report, Political and Economic Reconstruction of Haiti, 1926, available at http://www.cas.umb.edu/hsarpt.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2000) (quoting World Health Organization statistics on illiteracy of 63% for men, 68% for women and noting that the commonly quoted figure is 85% percent overall).
. Code d’Instruction Criminelle art. 216 (Haiti).
. The author has been working on jury selection issues for the BAI since 1996. This work includes advising local and national officials and interviewing victims, potential jurors, and local officials.
. See Michael Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty To Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 Tex. Int’l L.J. 1, 8 (1996). See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Conclusion: Combating Impunity, in Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice 300 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).
. “Sont amnistiés . . . les auteurs et complices du Coup d’état du 30 Septembre, 1991 qui a entraîné le départ forcé pour l’exil du Président de la République . . . .” [“Are hereby amnestied . . . the authors and accomplices of the Coup d’état of September 30, 1991, which led to the forced departure for exile of the President of the Republic . . .” (author’s translation)]. See Le Moniteur (Official Government Newsletter, Port-au-Prince, Haiti), Dec. 1, 1994, at 55. Some have argued that this could be broadly interpreted to include other crimes committed from 1991–94 in support of the coup regime’s consolidation. See,e.g., Scharf, supra note 53, at 17. This interpretation is inconsistent with President Aristide’s actual practice of pursuing cases against the coup criminals, as well as with the language of the decree itself. Furthermore, Aristide showed that he could make a broader decree when he did so under pressure in 1993. That decree was subsequently revoked. The amnesty law has never been successfully invoked in trials for coup era human rights violations. The defense lawyers in the Raboteau case, some of the most experienced in the country, did not even raise the issue of amnesty in their appeals of the charges. The BAI represented the victims on appeal. The author reviewed all submissions in the case and observed the hearings.
. La Loi sur la Réforme Judiciaire du 8 Mai, 1998 art. 7 (published in Le Moniteur (Official Government Newsletter, Port-au-Prince, Haiti), Aug. 17, 1998).
. Haiti’s annual per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is usually calculated at below U.S. $300. Kevin Watkins, Oxfam International, Education Now: Break the Cycle of Poverty 116 (1999), available at http://www.caa.org.au/oxfam/advo-cacy/education/report/index.html.
. According to Oxfam, only Bhutan, Niger, and Ethiopia have worse educational performance. Id.
. Health care for the poor has improved dramatically in the last year, with the arrival of 800 health professionals from Cuba, who offer low cost care in underserved areas. Chris Chapman, Cuba to Send More Doctors to Haiti Under Aid Pact, Reuters Newswire, Jan. 19, 2000.
. See Amnesty International, Haiti: Still Crying Out for Justice (1998).
. See Wallace Scott, You Must Go Home Again, Harper’s Mag., Aug. 2000, at 47, 48 (reporting that crime increased in El Salvador following transition); Fear Felt in Haiti Ahead of Vote, Associated Press, May 5, 2000.
. This situation has been improving. For the 2000 legislative elections, one party, Fanmi Lavalas, issued a 182-page program document. See Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Investir dans l’Humain: Livre Blanc de Fanmi Lavalas (1999).
. For example, a rookie police officer earns about as much as a chief prosecutor or trial court judge and much more than a Justice of the Peace. Author’s conversations with police officers, prosecutors, and judges, 1996–2000.
. Several initiatives have fallen short because of lack of funding, and many judges and prosecutors claim that they would do more if they were better equipped and protected. In some cases, like the Raboteau and Jean Dominique case, however, the government has provided generous assistance to judges and prosecutors, including a special workroom, transportation, and security.
. In the long term, however, these political and economic goals cannot be achieved without progress in the judicial arena.
. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 53, at 282.
. The author observed the four elections as part of the Organization of American States’ electoral mission. He worked with the new prison guards and police with MICIVIH in 1995 and 1996 and with the BAI from 1996–2000.
. 18 Haiti Progress 31 (2000) (repeating Haitian National Television report that former members of the military now in the police force were preparing prominent assassinations and a coup d’état).
. For example, former soldiers periodically demonstrate in Port-au-Prince over their pension funds. Also, several right-wing candidates for Haiti’s 2000 legislative elections have advocated a revival of the army.
. See Stotzky, supra note 5, at 160, 172–73 (reporting that some Special Forces units actually helped the army and paramilitary groups hide weapons). See also Amnesty International, supra note 59. In 1995, United States Special Forces members in Haiti told the author that they knew where the guns were hidden and who had them, but were under orders to not conduct disarmament operations. See id. (quoting reports that the disarmament of Haiti has not been successful).
. Stotzky, supra note 5, at 44.
. At least six former military members of the police have been arrested for human rights violations committed during the coup. Three former soldiers in the police, including a commissaire, were convicted for their participation in the May 1999 Carrefour Feuille police massacre. The author observed the Carrefour Feuille trial in August 2000. Three more soldiers have been arrested and charged in the Raboteau trial.
. Catherine Orenstein, Second Hand Democracy, 13 Tikkun 44, 45 (1998). The current head of the Chamber of Commerce is widely accused of having organized the massacre of peasants occupying land he claimed as his own in the village of Piatre. When a team of judges began investigating the case, the chamber head left the country. The BAI has worked with the Piatre victims.
. In the Raboteau case, for example, the activists for whom the military claimed to be looking had left town the night before, tipped off by one of the massacre’s most zealous participants. Also in the Raboteau case, victims have asked the judge to release a defendant arrested on the complaint of other victims.
. Scharf, supra note 53, at 8.
. Orenstein, supra note 11, at 1.
. Fainaru, supra note 12, at A1.
. Id . After hearing a news report about the United States declining to execute the deportation order of paramilitary chief Emmanuel Constant, one of the most persistent victims approached the author, visibly deflated and said that “they” (the victims) just could not do it: they were used to fighting the army, the paramilitaries and the judicial system, and could persevere there, but they could not beat the United States.
. MICIVIH provided training for UPENA, an initiative to create a team of judges and prosecutors to work on human rights cases; provided informal assistance to judges and prosecutors actually working on cases; and sponsored experts in forensic anthropology and military organization in the Raboteau case. Until its departure in March 2000, the mission was unequivocal on the need to prosecute the coup criminals and the need for the international community to increase its contribution to this effort. Many victims, however, criticized the mission for not being more directly involved in the cases, and for not providing all of its documentation to the prosecution. In addition, MICIVIH did not collect its information during the dictatorship in a form that would be useful for prosecutions. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) helped with the Raboteau trial by financing the international experts who will testify.
. In general, repression in Port-au-Prince was anonymous. Victims can say little more about their attackers than what they were wearing. Outside of the capital, however, it was more personalized, with some soldiers desiring that the victims specifically fear them. As a result, it is most difficult to build cases in the worst atrocities, the mass shootings in urban areas.
. The author prepared several human rights cases for trial from 1996–2000.
. The most notorious unit of the Haitian military was the police department’s investigative unit, called “Anti-Gang.”
. For example, one of the victims of the Raboteau massacre left the hospital in Gonaives after soldiers came in looking for her and was forced to do the same a week later in the capital.
. The state hospital in Gonaives, which is the only hospital in the area, has no record of admissions for the victims of the Raboteau massacre.
. Medecines du Monde treated victims during the coup. USAID, through its Human Rights Fund, paid local doctors to treat victims.
. In the Raboteau case, however, prosecutors have been able to establish a strong command responsibility case. The High Command issued a press notice a few days after the massacre, acknowledging that it was an army operation, but contending that the action was a reprisal against terrorists. Several witnesses have testified that the massacre was planned in advance and involved transfers of troops from other districts. There is also much circumstantial evidence, especially the timing of the attack relative to other regional, national, and international events. Finally, a team of military experts from the Centro de Militares para la Democracia in Argentina conducted documentary research and interviews in Haiti, and provided a report detailing the responsibility of the military commanders. Spanish and French versions of the report on file with author.
. The army’s record keeping is analyzed in the report of the Argentine military experts for the Raboteau case, on file with the author.
. David Gonzalez, So That Tyrants Won’t Rest, Haitians Keep a Vigil, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 2000, at A4; Howell, supra note 12 (explaining that “[t]he desire to root out the crimes of the coup has . . . propelled a campaign for the United States to return documents it seized from the paramilitary group and the Haitian military”).
. Letters from members of the U.S. House of Representatives, to President William Clinton (Dec. 1, 1995 & Jan. 30, 1996).
. A group of Haitian grassroots organizations has mounted an international campaign to demand their return. For more information, e-mail avokahaiti@aol.com.
. See Fainaru, supra note 12 (describing how suspected war criminals from Haiti, among other countries, have settled in the United States).
. In one 1997 arrest, a member of the police team on the Raboteau case burst into the BAI office, asking for the office’s car keys, explaining that a suspect was nearby on Avenue John Brown. The suspect suffered more than most from the Port-au-Prince traffic as the police caught up with him in their borrowed car. He was a former soldier and believed to be armed and dangerous, so the team toted a shotgun along with their service revolvers. He did not resist, which was fortunate since there was no ammunition in the shotgun. That arrest marked number twenty-one, which was at the time one more than the total incarcerated for the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal.
. See Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti, supra note 14, at 32–34.
. Using a false name was common practice in the army during the dictatorship. Truth Commission Report, supra note 5, at http://www.haiti.org/truth/ chapit7.htm#Top.
. For example, Russia, El Salvador, and South Africa experienced increased crime levels. See Scott, supra note 60.
. Michel François, one of the coup leaders, was indicted by a Florida grand jury for drug smuggling, but Honduras refused the extradition request. See Honduran Judge Refuses to Extradite Haitian Ex-Official to U.S., N.Y. Times Apr. 17, 1997, at A4. Lt. Marc Valmé, a François associate, was sentenced to life imprisonment in the same case. Patricia Zengerle, Haiti-U.S. Drug Trio Sentenced to Life, Reuters (Miami), Feb. 12, 1999; Tim Weiner, CIA Formed Haitian Unit Later Tied to Narcotics Trade, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1993, at A1; Stotzky, supra note 5 at 175–76.
. Amnesty International, Haiti un Travail Inacheve 11 (2000).
. This is mostly because of the high profile of the cases, the fear of victim reaction to an improper release, and close coordination among police, judicial, and penal authorities.
. See Amnesty International, supra note 59, at 3.
. Author’s interviews with police investigators, lawyers on the case, and victims.
. The fear of release has had one salutary effect on the police working on BAI cases: they now look more closely at the evidence before making an arrest, and often coordinate with the judge issuing the warrant to confirm that the case is strong.